Edwards v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 9)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Edwards v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 9) [2025] FCA 1042

File number(s): NSD 129 of 2022
Judgment of: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 28 August 2025
Date of publication of reasons: 1 September 2025
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applicant’s application for recusal on the ground of apprehended bias – consideration of legal principles concerning apprehended bias – no sound basis for allegation of bias established – application dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for remaining issues to be cross-vested to the Supreme Court of New South Wales pursuant to the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) – separate proceedings concerning the validity of a solicitor, client costs agreement, existence of a lien and alleged disentitling conduct – interests of justice favour cross-vesting – application granted

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, s 18

Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) s 5(4)

Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) ss 178, 182, 185

Cases cited:

British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283; [2011] HCA 2

Concrete Pty Limited v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55

CUR24 v Director of Public Prosecutions (2012) 83 NSWLR 385; [2012] NSWCA 65

Disqualification for Bias (Federation Press, 2012)

Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19

DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 2) (2018) 363 ALR 681; [2018] FCA 1270

Downey v Acting District Court Judge Boulton (No 5) (2010) 78 NSWLR 499; [2010] NSWCA 240

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63

Edwards v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 5) [2024] FCA 422

Edwards v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 6) [2024] FCA 758

Edwards v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 7) [2025] FCA 137

Hamod v State of New South Wales (No 11) [2008] NSWSC 967

IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd v SEAS Sapfor Forests Pty Ltd (1999) 78 SASR 151; [1999] SASC 249

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2000] HCA 48

Knaggs v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2007) 170 A Crim R 366; [2007] NSWCA 83

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70; [1990] HCA 31

R v George (1987) 9 NSWLR 527

Re J.R.L.; Ex parte C.J.L (1986) 161 CLR 342; [1986] HCA 39

Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88

Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 8) [2019] FCA 1382

Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423; [2006] HCA 3

Spalla v St George Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 416

SZCOS v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 570

Westpac Banking Corporation v Forum Finance Pty Limited (Apprehended Bias Application) [2022] FCA 981

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 43
Date of hearing: 28 August 2025
Counsel for applicant: Ms…
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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 1042
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Edwards v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited, the applicant sought the recusal of Justice Wigney on the grounds of apprehended bias. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the allegations of bias warranted the judge's disqualification from the proceedings. Additionally, the court considered an application to cross-vest the remaining issues in the case to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The primary legal issue was whether the facts presented by the applicant, Ms. Edwards, established a sound basis for the allegation of apprehended bias against Justice Wigney. This involved examining whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge could not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the remaining issues. Another issue was whether the interests of justice favoured the cross-vesting of the remaining matters to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

Justice Wigney dismissed the application for recusal, concluding that no fair-minded lay observer would reasonably apprehend bias from the facts presented. He addressed the applicant's concerns, particularly regarding a lunch with senior counsel for Nine Network, and explained that the lunch occurred many months after the liability and costs judgments were handed down in Ms. Edwards' favour. The judge also observed that a judge should not too readily recuse themselves, as it would amount to an abrogation of their duty to determine matters before them. Regarding the cross-vesting application, the court found that the interests of justice favoured transferring the remaining issues to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The court granted the application to cross-vest the remaining aspects of the proceeding to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Justice Wigney also made no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application that Wigney J recuse himself from hearing this matter on the grounds of apprehended bias or actual bias, being prayer 1 in the applicant’s amended interlocutory application dated 21 August 2025 be dismissed.

2. The remaining aspect of this proceeding be transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales pursuant to s 5(4) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth).

3. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I should add an additional observation, particularly in light of one of the statements made by me which Ms Edwards contended demonstrated apprehended bias. That statement was that, after Ms Edwards raised with me the fact that I had lunched with senior counsel for Nine Network after the costs judgment, but indicated that she did not intend to apply to have me recuse myself, I said (obviously flippantly) that “I would be delighted to disqualify myself” and that “would be my happiest day”. More will be said of that exchange later. The observation that I would make in this context, however, is that a judge should not too readily recuse himself or herself because that would in some respects amount to an abrogation of the judge’s duty to determine matters that come before him or her. As Lee J observed in Westpac Banking Corporation v Forum Finance Pty Limited (Apprehended Bias Application) [2022] FCA 981 at [16], a judge has a “duty to sit, which has been described as equally strong as the duty not to sit where disqualified”. Consideration and determination I am not persuaded that any of Ms Edwards’ grounds and submissions demonstrates apprehended bias. I am not persuaded that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the remaining question or matter that I am required to decide for any of the reasons advanced by Ms Edwards.The lunch As for the lunch with senior counsel, I have no recollection of the lunch, or having received an email invitation from counsel to have lunch, though I do not doubt that both events occurred. The lunch, however, must be considered in context. I have known senior counsel who appeared for Nine Network for many years as we were colleagues at the Bar. The lunch occurred many months after I handed down the liability judgement which, as indicated earlier, was in Ms Edwards’ favour. The lunch also occurred after I handed down the costs judgment, which was also to a large respect in Ms Edwards’ favour. The only remaining outstanding issue that could arise in the proceedings concerned the adoption of the referee’s report in respect of the lump sum costs order. It would appear that both senior counsel and I did not imagine or envisage that there would be any issue in respect of the adoption of the referee’s report. We were both sadly mistaken in that regard. It is indeed regrettable in the circumstances that I lunched with senior counsel after the costs judgment. Not because it was an unpleasant or disagreeable lunch. I doubt that it was, though (without wishing to offend the said senior counsel) I have no recollection of it. The lunch is regrettable because, as events transpired, the matter had not been finalised at that point. But for the factors or considerations to which I am about to turn, I would accept that the lunch may have provided a basis for me to disqualify myself from further hearing this matter. The difficulty for Ms Edwards’ contentions based on the lunch, however, are twofold.