Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 8) [2019] FCA 1382
File number:
NSD 2179 of 2017
Judge:
WIGNEY J
Date of judgment:
23 May 2019
Date of publication of reasons:
28 August 2019
Catchwords:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal – application made after liability determined – whether fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that judge does not have an impartial mind to resolve the outstanding issue in the proceeding – where outstanding issue narrow in scope – where it was contended that findings and reasoning in liability judgment and interlocutory judgments gave appearance of bias – where cumulative effect of statements or findings relied upon to suggest a reasonable apprehension of bias – where no basis for finding that there was an appearance of bias upon consideration of the context of statements and whole of the judgments.
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 8) and more:
The parties to the proceeding were Rush and Nationwide News Pty Limited. The nature of the dispute was an application for the judge to recuse themselves on the basis of apprehended bias. The court involved was the Federal Court of Australia. The legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge had an impartial mind to resolve the outstanding issue in the proceeding and if the findings and reasoning in the liability judgment and interlocutory judgments gave an appearance of bias.
The court's reasoning was that the statements made in the judgments were taken out of context and mischaracterised by the respondents. The court held that there was no inconsistency in the approach that was taken to the assessment of the evidence of Nevin and Winter in any respect. The court also held that the statement made in [447] of the liability judgment was a minor point added as a note to the point that was being made in respect of the disputed conversation. The court found that there was no such contrast and no such inconsistency between the use made of Exhibit A68 in relation to an assessment of the reliability of Norvill's evidence, on the one hand, and in the consideration of aggravated damages, on the other.
The outcome of the case was that the application by the respondents that Wigney J recuse themselves from continuing to hear the matter was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application by the respondents that Wigney J recuse himself from continuing to hear the matter be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
On 23 May 2019, I declined to recuse myself. Having read and heard detailed submissions from the parties, I was not satisfied, in all the circumstances, that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the outstanding issue in the proceeding. I indicated that I would publish my reasons for that finding in due course. These are those reasons. BACKGROUND Shortly after the proceeding was commenced, it was allocated to my docket for case management. Throughout 2018, I presided over numerous case management hearings and determined a number of procedural or interlocutory disputes. I delivered four judgments in relation to those interlocutory matters prior to the commencement of the trial. The interlocutory disputes and the judgments which resolved them included: an application by Mr Rush to strike out parts of Nationwide and Mr Moran’s defence (Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 357; 359 ALR 473 – Rush No. 1); an application by Nationwide and Mr Moran to amend their defence and file a cross-claim against a third party (Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 550; 359 ALR 564 – Rush No. 2); and an application by Nationwide and Mr Moran for leave to adduce evidence served otherwise than in accordance with the procedural orders which had been made (Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 4) [2018] FCA 1558 – Rush No. 4). The trial commenced on 22 October 2018. It ran for 15 days in late October and early November 2018. During the course of the trial, I delivered another two judgments: one relating to an application by Nationwide and Mr Moran to exclude expert opinion evidence that Mr Rush sought to adduce (Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 5) [2018] FCA 1622 – Rush No. 5) and one relating to another application by Nationwide and Mr Moran to further amend their defence (Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 6) [2018] FCA 1851 – Rush No. 6). The latter judgment also dealt with suppression or non-publication orders that were made in the context of the proposed amended defence. Altogether, the judgments I delivered prior to and during the trial ran to many hundreds of pages. They dealt with a number of difficult and complex case management, procedural and evidentiary issues. Nationwide and Mr Moran relied, in support of their allegation of apprehended bias, on a relatively small number of statements made in those judgments which they contended referred to them in “derogatory terms”. The precise nature of those statements and the context in which they were made will be explained later. It suffices at this point to note that, at no point prior to the delivery of the liability judgment, did Nationwide and Mr Moran raise any complaint or objection about any statement made by me in the interlocutory judgments, let alone apply for me to recuse myself on the basis of anything said or decided by me in those judgments. Nationwide and Mr Moran’s explanation for that was that the apprehension of bias arising from the statements made in the interlocutory judgments “was conveyed for the first time upon the delivery” of the liability judgment.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
There is, in all the circumstances, no basis for Nationwide and Mr Moran’s contention that a fair-minded lay observer, who fairly read the whole of the liability judgment, would perceive there to be any inconsistent or unequal approach to the assessment of the reliability of the evidence of Ms Nevin and Mr Winter. There is no basis for asserting that this aspect of the liability judgment is capable of contributing to any appearance of bias. Ground two – Reliance on Exhibit A68 in the absence of evidence from Ms Crowe The circumstances in which Exhibit A68 came to be tendered and received into evidence are addressed in some detail at [355] to [360] of the liability judgment. In short, Exhibit A68 was included in the list of the documents that Nationwide and Mr Moran proposed to tender at trial, though ultimately the document was tendered by Mr Rush over Nationwide and Mr Moran’s objection. The basis for the objection was that the email contained or comprised hearsay evidence and that its probative value was outweighed by the prejudice arising from the fact that its contents could not be tested because Ms Crowe had not been called. That was a curious submission given that Nationwide and Mr Moran had subpoenaed Ms Crowe, had served a document purporting to be an outline of her evidence and had foreshadowed, in their opening address, that they might call her. It was at all times open to Nationwide and Mr Moran to call Ms Crowe if they wanted to. It was their choice not to call on the subpoena. In those circumstances, the complaint now made about the use to which Exhibit A68 was put is difficult to understand. In any event, the complaint has no merit. It was not, in all the circumstances, incumbent on Mr Rush to call Ms Crowe, particularly given that Nationwide and Mr Moran bore the onus of proving the substantial proof of the defamatory imputations. Nor could that have been reasonably expected given that she had been subpoenaed by Nationwide and Mr Moran and that Nationwide and Mr Moran had not only served a purported outline of her evidence, but had indicated in their opening address that they might call her. If the complaint now made concerns the reliability of the statements recorded in the document, that issue is addressed in detail in [363] to [366] of the liability judgment. Nationwide and Mr Moran did not, in their submissions, directly challenge the findings in relation to that issue, let alone give any cogent reasons why those findings were erroneous. If the complaint concerns the basis upon which the document was found to be relevant to an assessment of the reliability of Ms Norvill’s evidence, that issue is considered in detail at [368] to [377] of the liability judgment. In short, there were apparent inconsistencies between what Ms Norvill had told Ms Crowe about the alleged incidents and her evidence about those incidents at trial. Nationwide and Mr Moran did not, in their submissions, directly challenge the findings or reasoning in relation to that issue, let alone give any cogent reasons why the findings or reasons were erroneous. It is difficult to see why or how the inconsistencies of Ms Norvill’s account could be said to be irrelevant to an assessment of the reliability of her evidence.
Decision
Reasons for decision
There is no basis for Nationwide and Mr Moran’s contention that a fair-minded lay observer, who fairly read the whole of the liability judgment, would perceive there to be any indications of partiality or prejudgment in the observation concerning Ms Nevin and Ms Buday’s character and integrity in [416] of the liability judgment. Ground five – Statement in [447] of the liability judgment This ground is another instance where a relatively insignificant statement made in the liability judgment is taken entirely out of context and mischaracterised by Nationwide and Mr Moran. The statement in the last two sentences of [447] of the liability judgment, to the effect that there was no evidence to suggest that Mr Rush had in fact ever sexually harassed anyone in the past and that no such proposition was put to Mr Rush in cross-examination, must be read in the context of [436] to [449]. Those paragraphs deal with the conflict between the evidence of Ms Norvill and Ms Nevin concerning a conversation they had during the production of the play All My Sons. Ms Norvill’s evidence was that during that conversation she told Ms Nevin that she had been harassed by Mr Rush during King Lear and that Ms Nevin had responded by saying “I didn’t think Geoffrey was doing that anymore”. Ms Nevin denied that any such conversation had occurred. The point that was being made in [447] of the liability judgment was that Ms Norvill’s version of the conversation appeared somewhat improbable in the light of Ms Nevin’s evidence as a whole. The statement she was said to have made implied that she was aware that Mr Rush had harassed actors in Ms Norvill’s position before. That was inconsistent with Ms Nevin’s evidence concerning Mr Rush’s reputation in theatre circles. It was in that context, and in that context alone, that the statement in the last two sentences of [447] was made. It was a very minor point added as a note to the point that was being made in respect of the disputed conversation. In those circumstances, and in that context, the fact that this was not a matter in issue in the pleadings is entirely immaterial. It is, in all the circumstances, impossible to see how this fairly minor observation could give rise to, or contribute to, any reasonable appearance of bias.Ground six – Exhibit A68 and aggravated damages Nationwide and Mr Moran contended that there was a stark contrast between the use made of Exhibit A68 in relation to an assessment of the reliability of Ms Norvill’s evidence, on the one hand, and in the consideration of aggravated damages, on the other. When the relevant parts of the liability judgment which deal with those two issues are read fairly and in context, however, there is no such contrast and no such inconsistency. The relevance of Exhibit A68 to the overall assessment of the reliability of Ms Norvill’s evidence concerning Mr Rush’s conduct during King Lear has already been adverted to. In short, it was found, for the reasons given at [361] to [366] of the liability judgment, that Ms Crowe’s account of what Ms Norvill had told her, as recorded by her in her email, was not an unreliable or inaccurate account as Nationwide and Mr Moran had submitted. That is not to say that the email contained an accurate or reliable account of what Mr Rush actually did. Contrary to the submission advanced by Nationwide and Mr Moran, no such finding was made in the liability judgment. The point of significance, in terms of the reliability of Ms Norvill’s evidence, was that there was an inconsistency between what Ms Norvill told Ms Crowe about Mr Rush’s conduct, as recorded in the email, and the evidence which she gave about that conduct.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The fifteenth ground was raised only in oral submissions. It related to one aspect of the reasoning relating to the reliability of Ms Norvill’s evidence concerning Mr Rush’s conduct during the rehearsals and production of King Lear. That aspect was the apparent inconsistency between Ms Norvill’s evidence and certain contemporaneous statements that she made to two journalists about her experiences working with, and alongside, Mr Rush. CONSIDERATION As discussed earlier, Nationwide and Mr Moran did not contend that any of the individual grounds relied on by them would alone establish apprehended bias. Their case was that the grounds, “taken cumulatively and as a whole”, established apprehended bias. It is nevertheless necessary to first assess the individual grounds separately and to then assess them cumulatively.Ground one – Assessment of credit or credibility As explained earlier, the main thrust of Nationwide and Mr Moran’s submission in relation to this ground was that the approach I took to the assessment of the credit of Ms Nevin was inconsistent with the approach I took to the assessment of the evidence of Mr Winter in two respects: first, it was said that I considered Ms Nevin’s frankness and candour in admitting that her recollection of one matter was not good was to her credit, whereas I considered Mr Winter’s candour in admitting that his recollection of an incident was vague was “against his credit”; and second, it was said that I considered that the inconsistency between Mr Winter’s evidence about one alleged incident and his otherwise positive views about Mr Rush cast considerable doubt on the reliability of his evidence about that incident, whereas I did not see any inconsistency in Ms Nevin’s evidence about her reaction when Ms Norvill’s allegations against Mr Rush became public. Nationwide and Mr Moran’s submissions concerning the inconsistency of the approach taken to the evidence of Ms Nevin and Mr Winter have no merit. There was no inconsistency in the approach that was taken to the assessment of the evidence of Ms Nevin and Mr Winter in any respect, let alone any significant or material respect. Nationwide and Mr Moran’s submissions mischaracterise the findings that were made about the reliability of the evidence given by Ms Nevin and Mr Winter and seek to extract some fairly minor observations out of their proper context so as to conjure up some illusory inconsistency. The following points may be made. The paragraph references are all references to paragraphs of the liability judgment. First, despite the fact that Mr Winter’s evidence was of fairly narrow compass, the nature and reliability of that evidence was dealt with at some length: see generally at [345]-[346] and in respect of specific incidents at [385]-[393], [475]-[476] and [432]-[449] of the liability judgment. The matters now seized upon by Nationwide and Mr Moran were fairly minor considerations in the overall assessment of the reliability of Mr Winter’s evidence.