AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCAFC 77

Appeal from: AZO24 v Commonwealth (Summary Dismissal) [2024] FCA 1053
File number: NSD 1252 of 2024
NSD 1450 of 2024
Judgment of: WIGNEY, LEE AND RAPER JJ
Date of judgment: 11 June 2025
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to extend time and to appeal from orders summarily dismissing the proceeding – applications dismissed

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from a decision dismissing the applicant’s application for judicial review of the decision of a Registrar refusing leave to file an application and affidavit – no appealable error – appeal dismissed  

Legislation:

Constitution ss 71, 78

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 22, 23, 24(1A), 24(1C)(a), 24(1D)(b), 25(6), 28, 31A, 31A(2), 31A(3), 35A(7)(b), 37AF, 37AG(1)(a), 37AG(1)(c), 37AI, 37AI(1), 37AI(2), 37M, 37M(3), 37AO, 37AO(2)(a), 37AO(2)(b), 37AO(3), 37AO(4), 37AQ(1)(a), 37AR, 51

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.21, 1.32, 1.34, 1.35, 1.39, 2.25(1), 2.26, 2.27(b), 2.27(f), 4.12(1), 35.13(a), 35.22, 36.11(1), 39.04, 39.05, 39.05(a), 39.05(b), 39.05(c), 39.05(g), 39.05(h), 39.23(3)

Foreign Evidence Act 1994 (Cth)

Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 107A

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts 2, 14, 16

Cases cited:

Alfred v Wakelin (No 3) [2009] FCA 224; 179 IR 76

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; 239 CLR 175

Ashby v Slipper (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 67; 314 ALR 84

Austal Ships Sales Pty Ltd v Stena Rederi Aktiebolag [2009] FCAFC 179; 263 ALR 384

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Bluescope Steel Ltd (No 7) [2023] FCA 1140

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Oakmoore Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 1170

Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318

Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) [1993] HCA 6; 176 CLR 300

AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 555

AZO24 v Commonwealth (Summary Dismissal) [2024] FCA 1053

AZO24 v Commonwealth (Suppression Orders) [2024] FCA 1113

AZO24 v Commonwealth [2024] FCA 218

AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 426

AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 1004

AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia [2024] FCA 1151

AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia (No 4) [2024] FCA 1212

AZO24 v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia [2024] FCA 976

Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 42; 128 FCR 353

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

CCU21 v Minister for Home Affairs (Costs) [2023] FCAFC 112; 297 FCR 530

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 104; 209 FCR 123

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (No 2) [2010]…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 77
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia involves an applicant who brought numerous applications in the Federal Court, seeking various orders including document production, suspension of orders, and vacating an apartment complex. The primary judge dismissed the proceedings summarily, and the applicant now seeks leave to appeal and an extension of time to do so. The court must determine whether to grant the application for leave to appeal and an extension of time.

The legal issues before the court include whether the proposed appeal is misconceived and without merit, and whether the applicant has demonstrated sufficient doubt in the primary judge's decision to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court. The court also needed to consider whether the applicant has shown that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. Additionally, the court had to determine if the applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal was made within the required timeframe and whether exceptional circumstances justified an extension.

The court found that the applicant's proposed appeal was misconceived and without merit. It held that the applicant needed to demonstrate that the primary judge's decision was attended with sufficient doubt and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court found that the applicant failed to meet these criteria. Furthermore, the court noted that the time for filing the appeal had expired for each of the interlocutory decisions, and the applicant did not provide a justification for the late filing. Consequently, the court refused the application for leave to appeal and the extension of time.

The court ordered that the applicant's applications for leave to appeal and extensions of time be dismissed. Additionally, it ordered that the applicant pay the respondents' costs in the proceedings and that the interim pseudonym order be vacated. The court also set a deadline for the applicant to file any material upon which she intends to rely to oppose the making of the proposed orders, along with a written outline of submissions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal dated 26 September 2024, interlocutory application dated 18 October 2024 and interlocutory applications dated 12 February 2025 in proceeding NSD 1450 of 2024 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs in proceeding NSD 1450 of 2024.

3. The appeal in proceeding NSD 1252 of 2024 be dismissed.

4. The interim pseudonym order made on 28 October 2024 is vacated.

5. On or by 9 July 2025, the applicant file any material upon which she intends to rely to oppose the making of the proposed orders and any written outline of submissions of no more than 10 pages (of 2.0 line spacing, Times New Roman font, 12pt font size).

6. The issue as to whether the proposed orders ought to be made be dealt with on the papers by the Full Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Schedule A to these reasons sets out in short-form a list of applications brought by the applicant in each of the five proceedings she has commenced in this Court, numbering 23 applications, of which some were rejected for filing. The applications were variously directed to compel government agencies to produce vast categories of documents, “suspend or stay” the operation of orders, allowing the filing of further evidence, submissions or applications, suppression and non-publication, and extraordinarily, for persons living within her apartment complex to vacate. Why leave is refused to extend time and appeal the decision of Kennett J to summarily dismiss the applicant’s proceedings For the following reasons, I would refuse the applicant’s application for leave to extend time and appeal on the basis that the proposed appeal is entirely misconceived and without merit. The applicant requires leave to appeal as the decision was summary dismissal pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act, which requires leave to appeal: ss 24(1A), (1D)(b). The principles which govern the grant of leave to appeal are well established. The Court’s discretion must be exercised judicially in a way that best promotes the overarching purpose in s 37M(3) of the Federal Court Act: Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70 at [2]. In Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398–99, this Court identified the two primary considerations for determining the question of leave to appeal: (1) whether, in all the circumstances, the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered by the Full Court; and (2) whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong. However, when considering whether to grant leave to appeal from interlocutory orders, account is taken of the subject matter of those orders and whether they relate to points of procedure or determine substantive rights. In the latter case, leave will be more readily granted: Décor at 400; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; 104 FCR 564 at [43] per French J, as he then was, (Beaumont and Finkelstein JJ agreeing). However, an applicant seeking leave to appeal must still show that the decision below is attended by sufficient doubt, and that substantial injustice would flow from the decision to refuse leave: Sandhurst Trustees Ltd v Clarke [2015] FCAFC 21; 321 ALR 1 at [17] citing Wills v Australian Broadcasting Company [2009] FCAFC 6; 173 FCR 284 at [31] per Rares J (with whom Emmett J agreed). The applicant also requires the Court to extend time for her to appeal the seven procedural orders, which were dated 21 June 2024, 28 June 2024, 25 July 2024, 31 July 2024, 30 August 2024 and 25 September 2024. The applicant is required under r 35.13(a) of the Rules to file her application for leave to appeal with respect to these interlocutory decisions within 14 days after the date on which the order was made. Accordingly, with respect to each of the orders, the time for filing expired on 5 July 2024, 12 July 2024, 8 August 2024, 14 August 2024, 13 September 2024 and 9 October 2024. The applicant’s application was lodged on 26 September 2024 and accepted for filing on 15 October 2024: r 2.25(1). Therefore, the applicant’s application for leave to appeal from each of those procedural decisions requires a grant of extension of time of 102 days, 95 days, 68 days, 62 days, 32 days and 6 days respectively.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The scope of r 39.05 (which applies after entry) is narrower than provided for by r 39.04; in that it is a power only enlivened by the existence of one of the matters specified in paragraphs (a)–(g), and once enlivened, it is discretionary power, to be exercised judicially, with caution, in “exceptional circumstances”: Professional Administration Service Centres Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 180; 295 ALR 52 at [53]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318 at [6] per Gordon J. The underlying principle of the finality of litigation has particular force in circumstances involving interlocutory orders (r 39.05(c)) where the subject of the order has already been the subject of unsuccessful appellate or review processes. The rule cannot be used as an alternative to the appellate procedure available with respect to interlocutory judgments: Dudzinski v Centrelink [2003] FCA 308 at [11]; Professional Administration at [53]; ActiveSuper at [15]; Austal Ships Sales Pty Ltd v Stena Rederi Aktiebolag [2009] FCAFC 179; 263 ALR 384 at [22]–[23] and [25] per Finn and Dowsett JJ; see also Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 304 at [37]. It is a power that may be enlivened and exercised for the purposes of 39.05(c), (g) and/or (h) to rectify injustices or reflect the true intention of the Court, for example, by removing a civil penalty imposed upon an individual respondent when one had not been applied for by an applicant and would not have been ordered had the Court known that to be the case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Bluescope Steel Ltd (No 7) [2023] FCA 1140; to clarifying the scope of ambiguous declarations made in a proceeding, including from several years prior where there remains a dispute between parties (Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Branir Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 629; 129 FCR 558 at [51], [61]–[64] per Allsop J; or to vacate an order for costs made under a misapprehension of the Court’s jurisdiction to award costs in the proceeding (Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 104; 209 FCR 123 at [8]–[10], [41]–[43] per Gilmour J); or, where the Court made no order for costs under a misapprehension that none was sought: Fischer v Commonwealth [1997] FCA 1029 at [1] and [3] per Branson J. It was submitted that the primary judge erred in law by distinguishing the cases the applicant had relied upon namely Pettigrew, Autodesk and Kitoko, which are said to illustrate that there is a power to reopen or set aside orders made by a single judge exercising the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. This submission is misconceived because it is premised on a factual scenario that did not occur in this case. Neither the Registrar nor the primary judge reasoned that there was no power to reopen or set aside orders made before or after entry, under either rr 39.04 or 39.05, made by a single judge exercising the Court’s appellant jurisdiction.