FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCAFC 77
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- Case
- [2025] FCAFC 77
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court include whether the proposed appeal is misconceived and without merit, and whether the applicant has demonstrated sufficient doubt in the primary judge's decision to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court. The court also needed to consider whether the applicant has shown that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. Additionally, the court had to determine if the applicant's application for an extension of time to appeal was made within the required timeframe and whether exceptional circumstances justified an extension.
The court found that the applicant's proposed appeal was misconceived and without merit. It held that the applicant needed to demonstrate that the primary judge's decision was attended with sufficient doubt and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court found that the applicant failed to meet these criteria. Furthermore, the court noted that the time for filing the appeal had expired for each of the interlocutory decisions, and the applicant did not provide a justification for the late filing. Consequently, the court refused the application for leave to appeal and the extension of time.
The court ordered that the applicant's applications for leave to appeal and extensions of time be dismissed. Additionally, it ordered that the applicant pay the respondents' costs in the proceedings and that the interim pseudonym order be vacated. The court also set a deadline for the applicant to file any material upon which she intends to rely to oppose the making of the proposed orders, along with a written outline of submissions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal dated 26 September 2024, interlocutory application dated 18 October 2024 and interlocutory applications dated 12 February 2025 in proceeding NSD 1450 of 2024 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs in proceeding NSD 1450 of 2024.
3. The appeal in proceeding NSD 1252 of 2024 be dismissed.
4. The interim pseudonym order made on 28 October 2024 is vacated.
5. On or by 9 July 2025, the applicant file any material upon which she intends to rely to oppose the making of the proposed orders and any written outline of submissions of no more than 10 pages (of 2.0 line spacing, Times New Roman font, 12pt font size).
6. The issue as to whether the proposed orders ought to be made be dealt with on the papers by the Full Court.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The scope of r 39.05 (which applies after entry) is narrower than provided for by r 39.04; in that it is a power only enlivened by the existence of one of the matters specified in paragraphs (a)–(g), and once enlivened, it is discretionary power, to be exercised judicially, with caution, in “exceptional circumstances”: Professional Administration Service Centres Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 180; 295 ALR 52 at [53]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318 at [6] per Gordon J. The underlying principle of the finality of litigation has particular force in circumstances involving interlocutory orders (r 39.05(c)) where the subject of the order has already been the subject of unsuccessful appellate or review processes. The rule cannot be used as an alternative to the appellate procedure available with respect to interlocutory judgments: Dudzinski v Centrelink [2003] FCA 308 at [11]; Professional Administration at [53]; ActiveSuper at [15]; Austal Ships Sales Pty Ltd v Stena Rederi Aktiebolag [2009] FCAFC 179; 263 ALR 384 at [22]–[23] and [25] per Finn and Dowsett JJ; see also Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 304 at [37]. It is a power that may be enlivened and exercised for the purposes of 39.05(c), (g) and/or (h) to rectify injustices or reflect the true intention of the Court, for example, by removing a civil penalty imposed upon an individual respondent when one had not been applied for by an applicant and would not have been ordered had the Court known that to be the case: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Bluescope Steel Ltd (No 7) [2023] FCA 1140; to clarifying the scope of ambiguous declarations made in a proceeding, including from several years prior where there remains a dispute between parties (Owston Nominees No 2 Pty Ltd v Branir Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 629; 129 FCR 558 at [51], [61]–[64] per Allsop J; or to vacate an order for costs made under a misapprehension of the Court’s jurisdiction to award costs in the proceeding (Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Mammoet Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 104; 209 FCR 123 at [8]–[10], [41]–[43] per Gilmour J); or, where the Court made no order for costs under a misapprehension that none was sought: Fischer v Commonwealth [1997] FCA 1029 at [1] and [3] per Branson J. It was submitted that the primary judge erred in law by distinguishing the cases the applicant had relied upon namely Pettigrew, Autodesk and Kitoko, which are said to illustrate that there is a power to reopen or set aside orders made by a single judge exercising the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. This submission is misconceived because it is premised on a factual scenario that did not occur in this case. Neither the Registrar nor the primary judge reasoned that there was no power to reopen or set aside orders made before or after entry, under either rr 39.04 or 39.05, made by a single judge exercising the Court’s appellant jurisdiction.