Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 304

Citation: Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 304
Parties: TIMOTHY DOUGLAS KEYNES, ELIZABETH JANE KEYNES, CHRISTOPHER JOHN MCCOURT and ROBERT NEVILLE KEYNES v RURAL DIRECTIONS PTY LTD, GRAIN POOL PTY LTD, ABB GRAIN LTD and GLENCORE GRAIN PTY LTD
File number: SAD 110 of 2008
Judge: BESANKO J
Date of judgment: 1 April 2011
Corrigendum: 13 May 2011
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Application by plaintiff to set aside orders made pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) giving summary judgment in favour of two defendants — where orders granting summary judgment had been subject of unsuccessful appeal to the Full Court — where plaintiffs claimed to have argument which had not been considered at first instance or on appeal which could lead to relief claimed — where argument related to application of definition of derivative contained in s 761D of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to certain grain contracts — whether summary judgments interlocutory for purpose of applications to set aside — discussion of test on application to set aside judgment under s 31A — where there was no explanation as to why new allegations had not been advanced at time of application for summary judgment — where there were difficulties with new argument — whether other claims not precluded by judgments should have been brought forward before application for summary judgment

HELD: The application to set aside the judgments was dismissed and the plaintiffs were refused leave to file an amended statement of claim in the terms proposed.

Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Ch 7 Pt 7.1, s 761D s 764A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Cases cited:

Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300, cited
Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44, cited
De L v Director-General NSW Department of Community Services [No 2] (1997) 190 CLR 207, cited
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372, cited
Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 100; (2010) 186 FCR 281 referred to
Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 567; 72 ACSR 264, referred to
Kowalski v MMAL Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401, cited
Smith v NSW Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256, cited

Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; 269 ALR 233, cited

Date of hearing: 24 January 2011
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 63
Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Mr B M O’Brien
Solicitor for the Plaintiffs: Proud & Company
Counsel for the First Defendant: Ms J Kinnear
Solicitor for the First Defendant: DLA Phillips Fox
Counsel for the Second Defendant: The Second Defendant did not appear
Counsel for the Third Defendant: Mr B J Doyle
Solicitor for the…
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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 304
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Keynes v Rural Directions Pty Ltd (No 4), the plaintiffs sought to set aside summary judgments made in favour of two defendants. The judgments, which were granted under section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, had previously been the subject of an unsuccessful appeal to the Full Court. The plaintiffs argued that they had a new argument relating to the application of the definition of derivative in section 761D of the Corporations Act 2001 that had not been considered at first instance or on appeal, and which could potentially lead to the relief they claimed. The court had to determine whether the summary judgments were interlocutory for the purpose of setting them aside, and if there were special or exceptional circumstances justifying the setting aside of the judgments.

The court began by identifying the relevant principles on an application to set aside summary judgment. The court noted that, although the orders were interlocutory, the need for finality in litigation remained important, and that the power to set aside the judgments should be exercised only in special or exceptional circumstances. The court also highlighted that the plaintiffs had not provided an explanation as to why the new allegations had not been advanced at the time of the application for summary judgment, and that there were difficulties with the new argument. The court further considered that other claims not precluded by the judgments should have been brought forward before the application for summary judgment.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the application to set aside the judgments and refused the plaintiffs leave to file an amended statement of claim in the terms proposed. The court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated special or exceptional circumstances that would justify setting aside the summary judgments. The court further held that the plaintiffs' new argument was not sufficient to warrant setting aside the judgments, and that the other claims should have been brought forward before the application for summary judgment.

The court's final orders were that the amended notice of motion filed on 22 December 2010 be dismissed. The plaintiffs were not granted leave to file an amended statement of claim in the terms proposed, and the summary judgments in favour of the two defendants remained in place.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Amended Notice of Motion filed on 22 December 2010 be dismissed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

As I understand it, it is common ground between the parties that the New Arrangement Claim can only be raised in the event that the judgments are set aside. The plaintiffs’ contention that the judgments should be set aside was the main issue on the hearing of the application. The other claims which, as I have said, are only relevant in relation to the third defendant – the Basis Contract PDS Claim and the Misleading Washout Claim – are not said by the third defendant to be precluded by the judgments. It does submit that leave to amend to introduce should be refused for other reasons.SETTING ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT The first matter is to identify the relevant principles on an application to set aside summary judgment given under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act. The relevant orders have been entered. The Court’s power to set them aside is contained in O 35 r 7(2) of the Federal Court Rules. That subrule provides as follows:(2)The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after the order has been entered where:(a)the order has been made in the absence of a party, whether or not the absent party is in default of appearance or otherwise in default and whether or not the absent party had notice of the motion for the order;(b) the order was obtained by fraud; (c) the order is interlocutory; (d) the order is an injunction or for the appointment of a receiver; (e) the order does not reflect the intention of the Court; or (f) the party in whose favour the order was made consents. The submissions made to the Court proceeded on the assumption that the orders were interlocutory orders and that the relevant paragraph is (2)(c). Before 1 January 2010 there was considerable debate in the authorities as to whether judgment under s 31A was final or interlocutory for the purpose of determining whether leave to appeal was required under s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act: Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372; Kowalski v MMAL Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401. The matter is now the subject of a specific statutory provision to the effect that for the purposes of the leave to appeal provisions (s 24(1A) and (1C)) an order granting or refusing summary judgment under s 31A is taken to be an interlocutory judgment (s 24(1D)). The third defendant was prepared to argue the matter on the basis that judgments under s 31A were also interlocutory for the purposes of applications to set them aside. However, it also indicated that it wished to reserve its position on this matter should there be an appeal to the Full Court from my judgment. Even though the orders are interlocutory the need for finality in litigation is still important. Furthermore, there is a wide variety of interlocutory orders or judgments and judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act has many of the characteristics of a final judgment. Not only was there an avenue of appeal in this case but an appeal was taken and was unsuccessful. These considerations suggest to me that even though the orders are interlocutory the cases dealing with the setting aside of final judgments provide guidance and that the power to set aside the judgments should be exercised only in special or exceptional circumstances.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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