FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Talacko v Talacko [2010] FCA 239
Citation: Talacko v Talacko [2010] FCA 239 Parties: HELENA MARIE TALACKO, ALEXANDRA ANN BENNETT, MARTIN THORBURN JAN TALACKO, ROWENA KIRSTEN EVE TALACKO and MARGARET HELEN BEATRICE TALACKO v JAN EMIL TALACKO File number: VID 142 of 2010 Appeal from: Talacko v Talacko [2010] FCA 193 Parties: JAN EMIL TALACKO v HELENA MARIE TALACKO, ALEXANDRA ANN BENNETT, MARTIN THORBURN JAN TALACKO, ROWENA KIRSTEN EVE TALACKO and MARGARET HELEN BEATRICE TALACKO File number: VID 152 of 2010 Judge: RYAN J Date of judgment: 17 March 2010 Date of hearing: 10 March 2010 Date of last submissions: 11 March 2010 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 48 Counsel for the Applicants in VID 142 of 2010 and Respondents in VID 152 of 2010: Mr G Bigmore QC with Mr P Fary Solicitor for the Applicants in VID 142 of 2010 and Respondents in VID 152 of 2010: Holding Redlich Counsel for the Respondent in VID 142 of 2010 and Applicant in VID 152 of 2010: Mr M D Wyles SC with Dr T J F McEvoy Solicitor for the Respondent in VID 142 of 2010 and Applicant in VID 152 of 2010: Findlay Arthur Phillips
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 142 of 2010
BETWEEN: HELENA MARIE TALACKO
First ApplicantALEXANDRA ANN BENNETT
Second ApplicantMARTIN THORBURN JAN TALACKO
Third ApplicantROWENA KIRSTEN EVE TALACKO
Fourth ApplicantMARGARET HELEN BEATRICE TALACKO
Fifth ApplicantAND: JAN EMIL TALACKO
Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MARCH 2010
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent’s application for variation or discharge of the order of 5 March 2010 or the undertaking given that day by the debtor’s solicitor be dismissed.
2.The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the hearing on 10 March 2010, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION VID 152 of 2010
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: JAN EMIL TALACKO
ApplicantHELENA MARIE TALACKO
First RespondentALEXANDRA ANN BENNETT
Second RespondentMARTIN THORBURN JAN TALACKO
Third RespondentROWENA KIRSTEN EVE TALACKO
Fourth RespondentMARGARET HELEN BEATRICE TALACKO
Fifth Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MARCH 2010
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal from the orders of Dodds-Streeton J of 5 March 2010 be refused.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 142 of 2010
BETWEEN: HELENA MARIE TALACKO
First ApplicantALEXANDRA ANN BENNETT
Second Applicant
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- AGLC
- Talacko v Talacko [2010] FCA 239
- Case
- [2010] FCA 239
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the Court was required to decide pertained to whether the debtor's application for variation or discharge of the orders made on 5 March 2010 should be granted and whether leave to appeal from those orders should be allowed. The Court examined whether the presumptive injustice to the debtor, who was unable to travel overseas for about a fortnight, outweighed the insufficiency of the doubt attending the orders of 5 March 2010. The Court also considered the debtor's common law rights and whether they could be protected by allowing him to apply for delivery of his passport for specific international travel.
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the debtor's inability to travel for a short period was slight, and the doubt about the orders made on 5 March 2010 was insufficient. The Court held that the debtor's common law rights could be protected by allowing him to apply on 48 hours' notice for delivery of his passport for a specific and identifiable journey, provided he intended to return to Australia. Consequently, the Court dismissed the debtor's application for variation or discharge of the orders of 5 March 2010 and refused his application for leave to appeal from those orders. The debtor was ordered to pay the applicants’ costs of the hearing on 10 March 2010.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s application for variation or discharge of the order of 5 March 2010 or the undertaking given that day by the debtor’s solicitor be dismissed.
2. The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the hearing on 10 March 2010, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.
Note:
1. The application for leave to appeal from the orders of Dodds-Streeton J of 5 March 2010 be refused.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As well, Counsel for the applicants pointed to the need for the registered trustee to investigate, and possibly explore with the debtor, whether his property includes any shares held by him directly or indirectly in Grange Lynne or Noel Grave or any interest held through either or both of those companies in 2/6 Grange Road. Consideration of the application for variation or discharge of the orders of 5 March 2010 Contrary to the submission on behalf the debtor, I do not regard the statement quoted at [44] of Dodds-Streeton J’s reasons reproduced at [8] above that “the debtor’s common law rights could be protected if he were permitted to apply to the Court for delivery up of his passport in relation to a specific and identifiable journey, with evidence of a present intention to return to Australia” as indicating a view by her Honour that all the debtor had to do to recover his passports was to indicate a specific journey which he wished to undertake from which he presently intends to return to Australia. Rather, her Honour, in that passage, was paraphrasing part of the reasons of Cooper J in Brazel where his Honour observed, after doubting, without deciding whether s 30(1)(b) ought to be construed as giving a power to restrain a debtor, before the making of a sequestration order, from leaving the jurisdiction;… … Even if the power to restrain the debtor leaving Australia exists, the material does not to my mind make out a case for the exercise of the power.However the question of the passport is a different matter. The debtor says that the passport is his property. That is a common but mistaken view. The property in a passport under s.6A of the Passport Act 1938 remains always in the Commonwealth. There is however a right to obtain a passport as a travel document to enable a person to exercise a common law right of travel and freedom of movement where in order to make use of that right a passport, as an internationally recognised travel document, is necessary.In the instant case, there is before the court no specific proposal in relation to overseas travel. There is therefore, with the passport being held by the court, no present impediment of any common law right of travel. The position may be different should a specific occasion arise where the debtor wishes to exercise his right of travel for business or any other purpose and in order to do so needs his passport, or access to his passport as a document of international travel, to allow him to leave the country. If and when that occasion arises the question will then be whether or not there are circumstances which would enable the passport to be withheld notwithstanding that the withholding of the passport impinged or abrogated the debtor's common law right of travel. Whether the passport ought to be retained pending the hearing of the creditor’s petition is a question of balancing the public interest in ensuring that if the debtor’s estate is sequestrated, any order of the court or the operation of the Act is not rendered nugatory by the debtor's refusal to return to Australia against the debtor's common law right of freedom of movement and travel.Although the material would not satisfy me that a warrant should issue for Mr. Brazel's arrest as a fleeing debtor, objectively there are a number of reasons why, in the absence of substantial assets in his own name in Australia, he would seek to take up a position overseas if he could earn $100,000.00 a year. There is in these circumstances some risk that the debtor may leave the jurisdiction and not return.In my view the debtor's common law rights can be protected and given effect to by allowing him to apply on 48 hours notice to the court for delivery up of his passport in order to enable him to travel in relation to a specific and identifiable journey with a specific and identifiable itinerary where he has a ticket which shows that it is his then present intention to return to Australia. Therefore I propose, pursuant to s.30(1)(b) of the Act, to order that the passport be retained in the custody of the District Registrar with liberty to the debtor to apply on 48 hours notice for delivery up of the passport for the purpose of international travel.