SZSNN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSNN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1218

Citation: SZSNN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1218
Parties: SZSNN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1338 of 2013
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 20 November 2013
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – whether jurisdictional error in the court below – whether failure to comply with the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether deprivation of natural justice – application with no real chance of success

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – whether leave is required – whether order is one ‘affecting the liberty of a person’ under s 24(1C) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – leave required – substantive appeal without merit – leave to appeal refused

Legislation: Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth) s 3, Sch 2
Constitution s 75(v)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12(1)(a)
Federal Court of Australia 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1), 24(1A), 24(1C), 24(1D)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) art 9
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 13, 14, 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 189(1), 422B, 476(4)
Cases cited: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Guss v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455
Moore v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 161 FCR 236
NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24
Peng Gao v Fair Work Ombudsman [2013] FCA 754
Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1
SZSNN v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 836
Talacko v Talacko [2010] FCA 239
Date of hearing: 26 September 2013
Date of last submissions: 26 September 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Solicitor for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms M Ardita of DLA Piper Australia
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1338 of 2013

BETWEEN:

SZSNN
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 NOVEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1338 of 2013

BETWEEN:

SZSNN
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE:

20 NOVEMBER 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. By an application filed on 11 July 2013, the applicant seeks leave to appeal…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1218
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, SZSNN, a citizen of Nepal, applied for leave to appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed his application for judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to refuse his application for a protection visa. The applicant sought to argue that the Tribunal failed to comply with the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), had deprived him of natural justice, and had made an error in failing to consider whether Australia owed him protection obligations under the complementary protection regime. The Court was also asked to consider whether leave to appeal was required and, if so, whether it should be granted.

The Court considered whether leave to appeal was required and found that the order for summary dismissal of the application for judicial review was interlocutory, meaning that leave was required unless an exception applied under s 24(1C) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The Court noted that the exception in s 24(1C)(a) applies to appeals from interlocutory judgments affecting the liberty of an individual, but was not satisfied that the applicant's appeal fell within that exception. The Court also considered whether the applicant had a real chance of success on the merits of the appeal but found that the appeal was without merit.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the Minister's costs. The Court found that the Tribunal had not erred in law or made a jurisdictional error in refusing the applicant’s application for a protection visa, and that the applicant’s claims were not credible. The Court also found that the proposed fresh evidence would not have led to a different result being reached by the Court below and that the appeal was without any realistic chances of success.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Absent, however, the authorities to which I have referred, I would have considered that there was a real question as to whether or not an indirect affection of the individual’s liberty in circumstances such as the present might suffice to attract the exception in s 24(1C) of the Federal Court Act. The Act itself uses only the phrase “affecting the liberty of an individual” unqualified by such terms as ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’. Moreover, the inclusion of the exception recognises the importance that the common law attaches to protection of the liberty of the individual. The right to liberty and not to be subject to arbitrary detention, together with the entitlement of those deprived of their liberty to take proceedings without delay on the lawfulness of his or her detention, are also fundamental human rights recognised in article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which Australia is a party, among other international treaties and instruments. The purpose, therefore, of s 24(1C) of the Federal Court Act would seem to be to ensure that in matters affecting these basic common law and human rights, the procedural impediment of seeking leave to appeal would not apply. However, these are questions for another day for the reasons that I have explained and I express no view on how they might ultimately be resolved. 3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The background to the application for judicial review is set out in detail in the reasons of the Court below and can be briefly summarised as follows.3.1 The applicant’s claims The applicant is a citizen of Nepal. He applied with the assistance of a migration agent for a protection (Class XA) visa on 18 July 2012, almost five years after he arrived in Australia on 22 October 2007. The applicant claims to fear persecution in Nepal because he fears Maoists in Nepal. In particular, he claimed that he and his family had been attacked in 1998 by Maoists and had subsequently been threatened if they did not provide financial support to Maoists. He claims to have received threats through relatives in his home village if he refused to support the Maoists from the time of the attack until October 2007 when he left Nepal. The applicant also claims to fear persecution if returned to Nepal because he claims to be homosexual. He claims that homosexuality is taboo in Nepal and as a Hindu Thankuri he would not be accepted because of his sexual orientation and would be the subject of discrimination in education, employment and in society generally. He also claimed that he told his family that he is homosexual in August 2008, as a consequence of which his family disowned him. He claimed to fear harm and mistreatment by reason of his sexual orientation.3.2 The decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal The Minister’s delegate refused the applicant’s application for a protection visa on 23 August 2012. Subsequently, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision. On 7 January 2013, the Tribunal made a decision affirming the initial decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The Tribunal’s reasons may be summarised as follows:(a)The Tribunal had serious concerns relating to the applicant’s subjective fear of persecution given the lengthy delay in lodging his protection visa application (Tribunal reasons at [72]). (b)In relation to the claims of a fear of persecution at the hands of the Maoists, the Tribunal accepted that the applicant’s family faced extortion at the hands of the Maoists in his home village in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s (at [73]). However, it found that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Nepal from the Maoists. In particular, it found at [74]-[75] that “there is no real chance that the applicant would face persecution at the hands of the Maoists in Nepal” given that:i.the country information disclosed that circumstances had changed substantially in Nepal from 2004 to 2010 with a sharp reduction in extortion activities in Nepal by the Maoists and Young Communist League (‘YCL’) being the youth wing of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (‘Maoists’);ii.the country information did not indicate that the applicant was or will be a person with the political profile or background to attract the adverse interests of Maoists or the YCL in Nepal in the foreseeable future; iii.the applicant’s evidence about the situation predated 2007 and the Tribunal preferred the country information from external sources; andiv.the applicant’s evidence that he last had contact with the Maoists in the early 2000’s.(c)Even if the Tribunal were to find that the applicant faced a real chance of persecution in his local area, it would find that he could safely relocate to Kathmandu (Tribunal reasons at [76]-[77]).(d)The Tribunal found that the applicant had not been involved in homosexual relationships and his evidence regarding these relationships was not credible given, among other matters, his lack of knowledge in relation to homosexuality, the gay community in Australia, his superficial understanding of same sex relationships, and the absence of any corroborating evidence that he had been involved in same-sex relationships (Tribunal reasons at [90]). Nor did the Tribunal accept as credible his claims to be homosexual (Tribunal reasons at [91]). The Tribunal also found that, given that he was not homosexual, he would not be perceived as homosexual and harmed as a result. As a consequence, the Tribunal concluded that there was insufficient credible evidence before it upon which to find that there is a real chance that the applicant would face persecution in Nepal as a homosexual man (Tribunal reasons at [93]).(e)Finally, the Tribunal considered whether there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Nepal, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm as defined in s 36(2A) of the Act, and did not accept that the applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the complementary protection provision, namely, s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. 3.3 The decision by the Federal Circuit Court

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant’s final ground of appeal, that the Tribunal did not act to assess the question of whether the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia owed complementary protection obligations for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act, was unarguable. The issue was squarely addressed by the Tribunal at [94] of its reasons.4.3 The further evidence upon which the applicant sought to rely Finally, the applicant submitted that he wished to rely upon fresh evidence which had not been before the Tribunal or sought to be tendered in the Court below. That evidence was material which the applicant apparently wished to be considered on the appeal in the event that leave were granted, and which he wished this Court to have regard in determining whether the proposed grounds of appeal had sufficient merit to warrant a grant of leave to appeal in the first place. The further evidence consisted of documents which the applicant sought to tender for the first time on this appeal which had come into existence after the decision of the Court below. The documentation comprised country information that had apparently been obtained from the internet after the decision of the Court below; client medical request forms relating to the applicant’s health while in detention; and a letter to the Commonwealth Ombudsman. Section 27 of the Federal Court Act permits the court to receive fresh evidence on an appeal in the exercise of its discretion. In Guss v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455 at [30], Sackville J, with whom Drummond and Dowsett JJ agreed, emphasised that “it is ordinarily necessary for the party seeking to adduce further evidence to demonstrate that the evidence relied on is cogent; that is, the Court exercising appellate jurisdiction needs to be satisfied that the proffered evidence would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available at the trial.”: see, also, Moore v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 161 FCR 236 at 240 [7]. Further, the party seeking to adduce the evidence must show that it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been adduced at the trial: NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24 at [42] (Beaumont, Lindgren and Tamberlin JJ). The potential relevance and weight of the proposed evidence, and therefore whether it could have affected the result of the decision of the Court below, must be assessed having regard to the subject-matter of the appeal to this Court. In this case, the subject-matter of the appeal is the decision of the primary judge on an application for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal, which was immune from review otherwise than on the ground of jurisdictional error. The jurisdiction of this Court is similarly confined. The proposed evidence is relied upon in support of the same contentions as those made by the appellant in relation to the further evidence sought to be admitted before the Court below, which fail to raise any possible jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. The further evidence would be relevant only to a consideration of the merits of the Tribunal’s decision which this Court cannot review. As such, the proposed fresh evidence would not satisfy the requirement that it be of such relevance and weight that, if admitted, the evidence would be likely to lead to a different result being reached by the Court below. Accordingly, it does not change my view that an appeal would not enjoy any realistic chances of success, if leave were granted. 5. CONCLUSION

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons that I set out below, I refuse the grant of leave to appeal against the decision of the Court below on the basis that an appeal would not have any reasonable prospects of success. The grounds on which the applicant seeks to appeal the judgment below are ultimately concerned with the merits of the applicant’s claim to protection or allege errors that are not established on the evidence or could not give rise to jurisdictional error. Nor does the new ground alleging a failure to consider whether the applicant was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the complementary protection regime in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act have any merit as that issue was expressly considered by the Tribunal.2. IS LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT REQUIRED? Prior to the hearing, the Court wrote to the legal representatives for the Minister requesting that the Minister address the preliminary question of whether leave to appeal was in fact required and, in particular, whether the exemption from seeking leave to appeal in s 24(1C)(a) of the Federal Court Act applied to the present case. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by s 24(1) of the Federal Court Act to hear and determine appeals from judgments of the Federal Circuit Court exercising original jurisdiction subject to certain exceptions not presently relevant. Section 24(1A), however, provides that in the case of an interlocutory judgment, an appeal shall not be brought without leave. While s 24(1D) of the Federal Court Act provides that certain judgments are taken to be interlocutory, including a decision of this Court granting or refusing summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court Act, it makes no mention of an order summarily dismissing an application for judicial review under rule 44.12(1)(a) of the FCC Rules. However, the list is not an exhaustive one: Peng Gao v Fair Work Ombudsman [2013] FCA 754 at [21] (Bromberg J). The proper characterisation of a decision for summary dismissal under rule 44.12(1)(a) is determined by rule 44.12(2) which provides that, “To avoid doubt, a dismissal under paragraph (1)(a) is interlocutory.” In my view, both s 24(1D) and rule 44.12(2) reflect the position at common law in any event in providing that an order for summary dismissal of an application is interlocutory, as the Minister submitted: Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1 at 4 [10] (McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Haydon). However, s 24(1C) of the Federal Court Act creates an exception from the requirement that leave be sought in certain cases. The section provides that:“Leave to appeal under subsection (1A) is not required for an appeal from a judgment referred to in subsection (1) that is an interlocutory judgment:(a)affecting the liberty of an individual; or(b)in proceedings relating to contempt of the Court or any other court.” Section 24(1C) was inserted by s 3 and Schedule 2 of the Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established