SZSSJ v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSSJ v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1149

Appeal from: SZSSJ v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 382
File number: NSD 348 of 2019
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 23 July 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Appeals – whether leave to appeal required – whether judgment dismissing application for want of jurisdiction is interlocutory in nature – where relief sought in court below included a declaration that appellant’s detention was unlawful, whether judgment under appeal affected his liberty
Words and phrases: “affecting the liberty of an individual”
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) subss 24(1A), 24(1C), 24(1D)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 14(1), 189, 476

Cases cited:

Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd(No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246

Gao v Fair Work Ombudsman [2013] FCA 754

Licul v Corney (1976) 180 CLR 213

Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125;  60 ALD 366

Ryan v Attorney General (Vic) [1998] 3 VR 670

Sami v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] FCA 1991

SZAJB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 168 FCR 410

SZSNN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 217 FCR 171

Talacko v Talacko (2010)183 FCR 297

Date of hearing: 23 July 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms D Watson of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 348 of 2019
BETWEEN:

SZSSJ

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

2.The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)

  1. This is an appeal challenging the dismissal of an application in the Federal Circuit Court for want of jurisdiction.  This judgment is concerned only with the competency of the appeal.

    Background

  2. Contemporaneous records of the Minister’s department submitted by the appellant to the court below, disclose the following information.

  3. On 11 September 2012 the appellant was granted a bridging visa E on the basis that he was making acceptable arrangements to depart Australia.  One of the conditions of his visa (condition 8511) required him to present to the Department by 10.30am on 3 October 2012 with a fully paid departure ticket.  At 10.30am that day the appellant attended the Department’s offices without a fully paid departure ticket.  At 4.25pm on 3 October 2012 a delegate of the Minister concluded that he appeared to have breached condition 8511 and issued him with a notice of intention to consider cancelling the visa.  The notice invited him to comment on the matter at an interview at a Departmental office in Lee Street, Sydney, which would begin at 4.35pm the same day – that is, 10 minutes later.…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1149
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZSSJ v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, SZSSJ, brought an appeal against the dismissal of his application in the Federal Circuit Court, which was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The central issue in this appeal was the competency of the appeal itself, specifically whether leave to appeal was required, and if the judgment dismissing the application was interlocutory in nature. The court had to determine whether the judgment affected the appellant's liberty, considering that the relief sought in the court below included a declaration that the appellant's detention was unlawful.

The court examined the nature of the judgment under appeal and considered whether it was interlocutory. The Federal Circuit Court had dismissed the appellant’s application, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because the decisions in question were "primary decisions" under the Migration Act, which are reviewable by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT). The Federal Circuit Court held it had no jurisdiction under section 476(2) of the Act to review these decisions. The appeal court assessed if this judgment was interlocutory and whether it affected the appellant's liberty. The court referenced previous cases to interpret the phrase "judgment affecting the liberty of an individual" in the Federal Court Act. It found that the dismissal of the application, while having an indirect effect on the appellant's liberty, did not directly subject him to incarceration or total deprivation of his physical liberty.

The court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court's judgment was interlocutory in nature and did not directly affect the appellant's liberty as required by section 24(1C) of the Federal Court Act. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as incompetent, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal challenging the dismissal of an application in the Federal Circuit Court for want of jurisdiction. This judgment is concerned only with the competency of the appeal.Background Contemporaneous records of the Minister’s department submitted by the appellant to the court below, disclose the following information. On 11 September 2012 the appellant was granted a bridging visa E on the basis that he was making acceptable arrangements to depart Australia. One of the conditions of his visa (condition 8511) required him to present to the Department by 10.30am on 3 October 2012 with a fully paid departure ticket. At 10.30am that day the appellant attended the Department’s offices without a fully paid departure ticket. At 4.25pm on 3 October 2012 a delegate of the Minister concluded that he appeared to have breached condition 8511 and issued him with a notice of intention to consider cancelling the visa. The notice invited him to comment on the matter at an interview at a Departmental office in Lee Street, Sydney, which would begin at 4.35pm the same day – that is, 10 minutes later. The appellant attended the interview. After hearing from the appellant, the delegate decided to cancel the appellant’s visa. Paragraph 6 of the notification of cancellation decision, signed by the appellant, advised that the decision could be reviewed by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) and the times by which an application for review needed to be lodged with the Tribunal. The effect of the decision was that the appellant became an “unlawful non-citizen” within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 14(1) and, on the assumption that the decision was valid, Departmental officers were compelled to detain him: Migration Act, s 189. The appellant then applied for a further bridging visa. Had he been successful he would have become a “lawful non-citizen” within the meaning of s 14(1) of the Migration Act. But he was not. The delegate considered that he did not satisfy the relevant criteria for the visa and declined to grant it.The application to the Federal Circuit Court Nearly five and a half years later, on 26 February 2018, the appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court to have both decisions quashed and his detention declared unlawful. In his application he claimed that he had been detained while still a lawful holder of a visa and that the Departmental staff had produced and relied upon “fraudulent documents” after he had been detained. He identified the decision-maker as “Ms Linda”. The signature of the delegate on the Departmental forms is apparently that of Linda Goodfellow. The appellant also sought an extension of time. The Minister filed an interlocutory application seeking to have the application dismissed on the basis that the court had no jurisdiction.The judgment of the primary judge On 22 February the primary judge made orders dismissing the application with costs on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction to determine his claims for relief. The reasons for this decision in short were that both the delegate’s decisions were “primary decisions” within the meaning of s 476(4) of the Migration Act, reviewable under Pt 5 of the Act by the MRT, and s 476(2) of the Act relevantly provides that the Federal Circuit Court has no jurisdiction in relation to a primary decision.The objection to competency

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For all these reasons I am satisfied that the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court was interlocutory in nature.Does the judgment affect the appellant’s liberty? The next question is whether the judgment affects the appellant’s liberty. The appellant argued that it did because he had been unlawfully detained as a result of the conduct of a Departmental officer in 2012. During the course of argument my attention was not drawn to any authorities on the proper construction of subs 24(1C) of the FCA Act. After the argument I adjourned to consider them. In Talacko v Talacko (2010)183 FCR 297 at [33] Ryan J held that the exception in subs 24(1C) was “confined to orders which subject an individual to direct incarceration or other total deprivation of his or her physical liberty”. In reaching this conclusion, his Honour drew upon the remarks of Ormiston JA in Ryan v Attorney General (Vic) [1998] 3 VR 670, which were directed to an analogous provision in the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (s 174(4)). In that case, Ormiston JA held that the expression “the liberty of the subject”, in the context of an exception to the requirement for leave to appeal, should be construed to cover only those cases where the personal liberty of the subject is affected by the outcome of the appeal. Talacko was followed by Bromberg J in Gao and by Perry J in SZSNN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 217 FCR 171. In SZSNN Perry J held that a decision of the Federal Circuit Court to summarily dismiss an application for judicial review was not a judgment affecting the applicant’s liberty within the meaning of s 24(1C), although he was in immigration detention at the time. Having regard to the limited jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court under s 476 of the Migration Act, her Honour held that the Court’s decision could only have an indirect effect on the applicant’s liberty. She observed that the orders made by the court below did not require the applicant to remain in detention. Her Honour explained at [23]:The orders made by the Court below, in summarily dismissing the application for judicial review, did not require the applicant to remain in detention. Nor if that Court had upheld his application for judicial review could that Court have ordered his release from detention. The Court below could only have ordered that his application for a visa be remitted to the Tribunal to be determined according to law. As such, the decision of the Federal Circuit Court could only affect the liberty of the applicant indirectly, that is, the Court determines whether or not the Tribunal is required to reconsider the application for a visa which, if granted, would lift the obligation to detain the applicant imposed by s 189 of the Migration Act. In Sami v Commonwealth of Australia [2018] FCA 1991 at [37] White J took a different view. In that case the applicant had sought an order restraining the Department of Home Affairs from continuing to hold him in detention and an interlocutory order directing the Department to release him from detention pending the determination of his application. His Honour observed that, at least prima facie, the summary dismissal of those applications was a judgment affecting his liberty because the effect was to deny him release from detention. His Honour considered that the terms “affecting the liberty of an individual” in s 24(1C) of the FCA Act means “something like concerning the liberty of an individual”. He held that leave to appeal was not required.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.