SZAJB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZAJB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 75

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – migration – protection visa – time limits on judicial review application – non-extendable – time limit exceeded – application dismissed as incompetent – application for leave to appeal – whether dismissal interlocutory or final – whether abuse of process – constitutional validity of time limit

APPEALS  - appeal from dismissal of application for want of jurisdiction – whether decision final or interlocutory – whether leave to appeal required – criteria for grant of leave – utility – primary application abuse of process

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 477
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 cited
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473 discussed
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651 cited
Brouwer v Titan Corporation Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 241 cited
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246 cited
Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc (1984) 58 ALJR 512 cited
Farajvand v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [2001] FCA 795 referred to
Fifita v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1695 cited
Fisher v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) ALD 66 cited
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 cited
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 cited
Kabir v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 20 discussed and explained
Licul v Corney (1976) 180 CLR 213 cited
Lloyd Werft Bremerhaven GmbH v Owners of Ship “Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya” (1979) 79 FCR 71 cited
Meredith v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 125 FCR 308 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKKC (2007) 159 FCR 565 cited
Minogue v Williams (1960) 60 ALD 366 cited
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 190 ALR 601 referred to
NAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37 cited
Plaintiff S157/2000 v The Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 cited
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (No 1) (1980) 147 CLR 35 cited
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1980-1981) 147 CLR 589 cited
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 cited
Re Will of Gilbert (1946) 46 SR(NSW) 318 cited
Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198 cited
Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 6) [2004] FCA 1699 cited
Standard Discount Co v La Grange (1877) 3 CPD 67 cited
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 237 ALR 634 cited
SZDGN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1543 referred to
SZDPF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 85 referred to
SZECI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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Details
Case
[2008] FCAFC 75
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involves SZAJB, a citizen of Pakistan, and the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. The dispute revolves around SZAJB's application for a protection visa, which was declined. SZAJB sought judicial review of the decision through the Federal Magistrates Court, which was dismissed. He subsequently filed a second application for judicial review, which was also dismissed as out of time. The legal issues before the court were whether section 477 of the Migration Act 1958, which imposes a time limit on applications for judicial review, was valid and, if invalid, whether it should be read down. The court held that the application constituted an abuse of process and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

The court found that the proceedings brought in the Federal Magistrates Court and the subject of the present application for leave to appeal constituted an abuse of process. The court held that even if there were an arguable case about the validity or operation of section 477 of the Act, the success of that argument would not affect the character of the proceedings as an abuse of process. The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered SZAJB to pay the Minister's costs. The court also dismissed the appeal as incompetent and ordered the appellants to pay the Minister's costs of the appeal. The cross-appeal was also dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

1. The appeals be dismissed as incompetent.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

In each case an argument was mounted that s 477 of the Act was invalid and, alternatively, ought to be read down so as not to impose an unextendable time limit upon the commencement of proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court. The argument, although carefully presented, had little prospect of success. But even if successful it would have been of no benefit in these proceedings. For in each case the proceeding in the Federal Magistrates Court was a second round judicial review application seeking, in effect, to challenge afresh the original decision which had already been the subject of an unsuccessful judicial review proceeding and unsuccessful appellate proceedings. The Court will not entertain such misuse of its procedures. In the case of the application for leave to appeal, the application will be dismissed with costs. In the case of the appeal, the appeal will be dismissed as incompetent with costs. SZAJB - procedural background SZAJB is a citizen of Pakistan. He came to Australia on a visitors visa in February 2001. On 20 March 2001 he applied for a protection visa. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs declined his application and he was notified of that decision on 26 April 2001. On or about 29 May 2001 he made an application, through a migration agent, to the Tribunal for a review of that decision. On 28 February 2003 the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant him a protection visa. SZAJB then applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. His application was heard by Raphael FM on 20 February 2004 and on the same day was dismissed with costs. SZAJB appealed to the Federal Court against the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court. The appeal was heard by Branson J on 8 June 2004 and was dismissed on that day with costs. Subsequently, SZAJB applied in the original jurisdiction of the High Court for orders nisi for writs of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition against the Minister and the Tribunal. The application was dismissed on 23 August 2004 by Heydon J. An application for special leave to appeal to the High Court from the judgment of Branson J was dismissed on 10 March 2006 by Hayne and Heydon JJ. SZAJB filed a second application in the Federal Magistrates Court on 30 March 2006 again seeking judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal made on 28 February 2003. Raphael FM summarily dismissed the application on the Minister’s motion on the basis that it was out of time having regard to the provisions of s 477 of the Act. His Honour also noted that the claim appeared to be barred as res judicata because all of the issues to be tried between the parties had already been tried. SZAJB had told the Court that the reason he had filed the fresh proceedings was because of the manner in which he had been let down by his migration agent. He applied for leave to appeal from the second judgment of Raphael FM. That application was dismissed by Jessup J on 14 September 2006. An application for special leave to appeal against the decision of Jessup J was dismissed by Hayne and Crennan JJ on 24 May 2007.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH, ALLSOP AND TRACEY JJ
It is sufficient to say that the proceedings brought in the Federal Magistrates Court and the subject of the present application for leave to appeal did constitute an abuse of process. No encouragement should be given to their continuance even if there were an arguable case about the validity or operation of s 477 of the Act. The success of that argument would not affect the character of the proceedings as an abuse of process. In my opinion therefore leave should be refused.Conclusion For the preceding reasons, the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. SZABG and SZABI – procedural background The appellants who are husband wife, are citizens of Sri Lanka. They arrived in Australia on 16 August 1999. On 17 September 1999 they lodged an application for a protection visa with what was then the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. A delegate of the Minister refused their application on 20 March 2000. On 3 April 2000 they applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision. On 22 September 2002 the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant them protection visas. The appellants then applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. On 16 June 2003 the application was dismissed with costs by Driver FM. They then appealed from his decision to the Federal Court by a notice dated 4 July 2003. However on 9 September 2003 they filed a notice of discontinuance. On 16 September 2003 they filed an application in the High Court of Australia for orders nisi for the issue of writs of prohibition and certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal. On 16 February 2004 Heydon J remitted their application to the Federal Court. On 21 October 2004 Jacobson J dismissed the application. On 9 November 2004 the appellants lodged an appeal in the Federal Court against the judgment of Jacobson J. That appeal was dismissed on 13 May 2005 by a Full Court comprising Wilcox, Gyles and Downes JJ. The appellants were ordered to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal. The appellants then applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Full Court. That application was dismissed by Gummow and Heydon JJ on 7 March 2006. On 1 February 2007 a fresh application seeking judicial review under s 476 of the Act in respect of the decision of the Tribunal given in September 2002 was lodged. The application and affidavit in support of it acknowledged that actual notification of the Tribunal’s decision had occurred prior to December 2005. It was not in contest that if s 477 of the Act were legally effective and constitutionally valid, the application was incompetent. On the Minister’s application the application was dismissed as incompetent on 26 June 2007 by Smith FM with an order that the appellants pay the Minister’s costs in the sum of $5,000. On 17 July 2007 the appellants filed a notice of appeal in this Court against the decision of Smith FM. The Minister filed a notice of objection to competency on 23 July 2007. The objection was taken on the basis that the purported appeal was from an interlocutory judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court and that, pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court Act, the appellants required leave to appeal against the decision. The appellants argued that leave to appeal was not required as the decision appealed from was final.Grounds of appeal 2.His Honour erred in dismissing the appellants’ application for a remedy under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (the “Act”) as incompetent on grounds of strict time limits found in section 477 of the Act in circumstances where section 477 is constitutionally invalid because it “stultifies the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth” (Abebe v Minister (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [134] per Gummow and Hayne JJ) by curtailing the constitutionally entrenched right to seek a review of an administrative decision. Particularsa.His Honour was bound to follow the recent Full Court decision in SZICV v Minister [2007] FCAFC 39.b.However, SZICV did not consider the High Court decisions in Abebe and Bodrudazza v Minister [2007] FCA 14.c.While Parliament may be acting within the power conferred by the Constitution whenever it authorises a federal court such as the Federal Magistrates Court (“FMC”) to determine rights, duties liabilities of litigants which arise out of controversies that fall within paragraphs (i) – (v) of the section 75 of the Constitution, it nevertheless acts outside the Constitution by completely curtailing the right to any such remedy if not brought within the limitation period created by Parliament. [sic]d.It is constitutionally impermissible for Parliament to so restrict entitlement to constitutionally guaranteed rights of review. 3.His Honour also referred in dismissing the appellants’ alternative statutory construction argument – viz, the structure of Div 2 of Part 8 of the Act reveals an inconsistency considering that one of the central provisions enacted to ensure uniform time limits was recently held by the High Court in Bodruddaza to be constitutionally invalid. 4.His Honour also erred in applying the test deeming the review application an abuse of process for reason of either res judicata or Anshun estoppel.Particulars a.His Honour stated that “none of the arguments provide the requisite ‘special circumstances’ or explain why it was now ‘reasonable’ to permit new grounds to be raised in fresh proceedings. b.His Honour referred to medical evidence showing psychological disabilities suffered by one or both appellants. c.In the preceding circumstances it was not unreasonable that the fresh grounds now sought to be raised were not raised in the original applications and amount to a special circumstance especially considering that the appellants’ [sic] were not legally represented before the most recent application. d.The appellants reiterate and rely on the grounds of review adumbrated in the application filed on 1 February 2007 in the Federal Magistrates Court in Matter No SYG 315/2007.The Minister’s cross appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH, ALLSOP AND TRACEY JJ

The term “migration decision” is defined in s 5(1) thus: migration decision means: (a) a privative clause decision; or(b) a purported privative clause decision; or (c) a non-privative clause decision. Section 5E defines “purported privative clause decision” thus: (1) In this Act, purported privative clause decision means a decision purportedly made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in purported exercise of a discretion or not), that would be a privative clause decision if there were not: (a) a failure to exercise jurisdiction; or (b) an exercise of jurisdiction;in the making of the decision.(2) In this section decision includes anything listed in subsection 474(3).The latter definition of decision includes the refusal of a visa. In the joint judgment of the majority the High Court rejected a contention that s 486A was directed to conferring validity upon the ministerial decision. Their Honours said at [30]:The text of s 486A indicates, as the above example illustrates, that it is directed not to the conferral of validity but to deny the competency of applications to this Court not commenced within the stipulated period. It is in this setting that the alleged invalidity of s 486A falls for decision on the special case. Their Honours found it unnecessary to decide the case on the plaintiff’s proposition which was that constitutionally permissible legislative regulation of s 75(v) jurisdiction could never support a fixed time limit upon the making of an application to the Court. Their Honours said (at [53]): It is sufficient to accept a less absolute proposition as follows. This is that a law with respect to the commencement of proceedings under s 75(v) will be valid if, whether directly or as a matter of practical effect, it does not so curtail or limit the right or ability of applicants to seek relief under s 75(v) as to be inconsistent with the place of that provision in the constitutional structure, as explained in Plaintiff S157/2002. The High Court held that s 486A fixed upon the time of actual notification of the decision in question and had the consequence that it did not allow for the range of vitiating circumstances which could affect administrative decision making. It was from that deficiency that the invalidity of the section flowed (at [57]): The fixing upon the time of the notification of the decision as the basis of the limitation structure provided by s 486A does not allow for supervening events which may physically incapacitate the applicant or otherwise, without any shortcoming on the part of the applicant, lead to a failure to move within the stipulated time limit. In that case the plaintiff was one day late apparently by reason of a failure on the part of his migration advisor. Section 477 of the Act which was in issue in the present case, imposes time limits on applications to the Federal Magistrates Court in terms similar to those of s 486A in relation to the High Court. Section 477A, similarly worded, applies to proceedings in this Court.