FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Boensch v Somerville Legal Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1752
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Boensch v Somerville Legal Pty Ltd [2019] FCCA 868 File number: NSD 616 of 2019 Judge: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 25 October 2019 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether proposed appeal competent – whether leave is required pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether decision sought to be appealed from is interlocutory or final – if incompetent, whether leave to appeal ought to be granted – held: appeal incompetent, leave to appeal refused
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – where decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant’s application for an extension of time for compliance with, and to set aside, a bankruptcy notice
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 36(2)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 52
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 24(1)(d)
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) r 16.01(2)
Cases cited: Avetmiss Easy Pty Ltd v Australian Skills Qualifications Authority [2014] FCA 507
Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225
Boensch v Somerville Legal Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 590
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 237; (2001) 183 ALR 700
Plaintiff S164/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] HCA 51; (2018) 361 ALR 8
Rana v University of South Australia [2004] FCA 559; (2004) 136 FCR 344
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238
Seller v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 865; (2011) 282 ALR 80
Sharpe v W H Bailey & Sons Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 921
SZAJB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 75; (2008) 168 FCR 410
Thai v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 53 FCR 252
Thai v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 28 ATR 418
Date of hearing: 31 July 2019 Date of last submissions: 21 August 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 52 Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr Bingham of Bingham Law Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr Graham of Somerville Legal ORDERS
NSD 616 of 2019 BETWEEN: FRANZ BOENSCH
Appellant
AND: SOMERVILLE LEGAL PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 OCTOBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is incompetent.
2.Leave to appeal is refused.
3.The appellant to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
On 4 April 2019,…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1752
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the decision of the primary judge was final or interlocutory, focusing on the legal effect of the judgment rather than its practical outcome. The court noted that the test for determining whether a judgment is final or interlocutory is whether it finally determines the rights of the parties. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the decision was a final order, as it would still be open to the appellant to bring a second application, even if it would be doomed to fail. The court found the appellant's reliance on the case of Thai v DCT to be misplaced, as the reasoning in that case did not support the appellant's argument. Consequently, the appeal was found to be incompetent, and leave to appeal was refused.
In conclusion, the court found that the appeal was incompetent, and leave to appeal was refused. The court ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs, to be agreed or taxed. The case highlights the importance of correctly identifying whether a decision is final or interlocutory in determining the competence of an appeal, and the need for parties to properly address the relevant legal principles in their submissions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is incompetent.
2. Leave to appeal is refused.
3. The appellant to pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Suffice to say that the transcript was obtained and the appellant put on further written submissions. However, those submissions do not address the ground on which the opportunity was provided, but rather, based on the transcript, attempted to reargue that which already had been addressed in the hearing of this application. The appellant made further submissions in relation to Thai v CT based on the transcript of the hearing, and submitted that the primary judge considered that the hearing was a final hearing. The appellant argued that Thai v CT was on all fours with this case and that the decision of the primary judge was a final order, although for interlocutory reasoning. The respondent replied, taking issue with that argument. The respondent pointed out that the appellant did not address the issue of procedural fairness in his submission, and that the transcript supports his submission that there was no merit in the ground.ConsiderationFinal v Interlocutory The appellant’s initial submission focussed entirely on the result; that as the bankruptcy notice was not set aside, the decision is a final one. However, that approach does not address the principles relevant to determining whether a decision was a final one. Moreover, the appellant’s submission which he used to illustrate that the decision was a final one, that the primary judge dismissed his substantive application to set aside the bankruptcy notice as an abuse of process, is not borne out by the reasons. The test for determining whether a judgment is final or interlocutory is whether the judgment finally determines the rights of the parties: Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225 at [25]; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564 (Johnson Tiles) at [42]; Plaintiff S164/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] HCA 51; (2018) 361 ALR 8 (Plaintiff S164/2018) at [11]. This depends upon the legal and not the practical effect of the judgment: Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 248, 256; Plaintiff S164/2018 at [11]. The legal effect of a judgment is not final, where it would be open to a party to bring a second application, even if it would be doomed to fail: Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 248, 256; Plaintiff S164/2018 at [11]. The appellant’s reliance on Thai v DCT and Thai v CT is misplaced. In that case an issue arose as to whether a decision of Davies J, and a later decision of Einfeld J, were interlocutory or final. The Full Court accepted, and it did not appear to be challenged, that the decision of Einfeld J in which he made a sequestration order, was a final order, and as such a right of appeal lay from that order. The appellant’s submission appears to be that Einfeld J made the sequestration order for “interlocutory reasons” rather than determining the basis of the creditor’s petition. From that the appellant submitted that the reasons of the primary judge in this case were interlocutory reasons for a final order. It follows, the appellant submitted, that Thai v CT is “on all fours” with this case, and that I am bound by that decision. The appellant submitted the consequence is that the primary judge’s decision is final. That reasoning is flawed. The order made by Einfeld J was a sequestration order, which was a final order. I observe that the orders made by Davies J, were held to be interlocutory orders. Davies J determined some, but not all matters which were relevant to satisfying the criteria for a sequestration order. Those matters preceded the making of a sequestration order. In this case, that the bankruptcy notice was not set aside is but one aspect to the making of the sequestration order. As explained below, the appellant accepts that his arguments in relation to the bankruptcy notice which are the subject of this appeal can be made during the hearing of the creditor’s petition.