FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Boensch v Somerville Legal Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 645
File numbers: NSD 2088 of 2019
NSD 2048 of 2019Judge: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 14 May 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where sequestration order made against the estate of the appellant – where application for extension of time and leave to appeal commenced before sequestration order – whether appellant has standing to bring the application on the making of the sequestration order – where s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) is engaged – where Trustees in Bankruptcy have chosen not to prosecute the action – where action deemed abandoned pursuant to s 60(3) – whether Trustees in Bankruptcy should be joined in the bankruptcy appeal Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 60, 52
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 24
Cases cited: Cristovao v Tan and Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] WASCA 171
Cox v Journeaux(No 2) [1935] HCA 48; (1935) 52 CLR 713
Gittins v Field (Trustee) [2018] FCA 976
Sheehan v Brett-Young (No 2) [2016] VSC 39
Berryman v Zurich Australia Ltd [2016] WASC 196; (2016) 310 FLR 108
Flint v Richard Busuttil & Co Pty Limited [2013] FCAFC 131; (2013) 216 FCR 375
Evans v Heather Thiedeke Group Pty Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 424
Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd [2002] FCA 427
Endresz v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2014] FCA 1139
James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] FCA 582; (2015) 236 FCR 379
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL [1996] HCA 19; (1996) 185 CLR 124
Date of hearing: The matter was determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 4 May 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 33 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Graham of Somerville Legal Solicitor for the Respondent: Somerville Legal Counsel for the Trustees in Bankruptcy: Ms D Naidenov of Daniela Fazio Lawyers Solicitor for the Trustees in Bankruptcy: Daniela Fazio Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 2088 of 2019 BETWEEN: FRANZ BOENSCH
Appellant
AND: SOMERVILLE LEGAL PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 MAY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave is granted for the Trustees in Bankruptcy to intervene in this matter.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
NSD 2048 of 2019 BETWEEN: FRANZ BOENSCH
Applicant
AND: SOMERVILLE LEGAL PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 MAY 2020
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
1.The matter has been abandoned.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
On 4 April 2019, a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed with costs, an application by the appellant in…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 645
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, particularly section 60 which deals with the stay of legal proceedings upon a person becoming a bankrupt, and section 116(2) which outlines exceptions to property vesting in Trustees in Bankruptcy. The Court determined that the application for an extension of time directly related to property vested in Mr Boensch’s Trustees, and did not fall within any exceptions in section 116(2). The Trustees in Bankruptcy had not elected to prosecute the action within the requisite period, leading to the action being deemed abandoned under section 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. The Court concluded that Mr Boensch lost standing to maintain the application once the property vested in the Trustees.
The Court granted leave for the Trustees in Bankruptcy to intervene in the matter. This decision underscored the importance of understanding the implications of bankruptcy on legal proceedings and the necessity of Trustees in Bankruptcy being joined in appeals concerning actions that involve property vested in them. The matter was ultimately abandoned.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave is granted for the Trustees in Bankruptcy to intervene in this matter.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
NSD 2048 of 2019
BETWEEN:
FRANZ BOENSCH
Applicant
AND:
SOMERVILLE LEGAL PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 MAY 2020
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
1. The matter has been abandoned.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Trustees noted that as a result of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, the property (being the chose in action) vested in the Trustees, subject to any existing encumbrances at the commencement of the appellant’s bankruptcy. Any action commenced by the appellant after the date of bankruptcy concerning "property" which has vested in his Trustees also vests in his Trustees in Bankruptcy (being the chose in action) unless any such action falls within one of the exceptions set out in s 116(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. The application for an extension of time directly relates to property vested in the appellant’s Trustees, and it is not an action that fits within any of the exceptions contained in s 116(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. It was submitted that where a chose in action is vested in the Trustee of a bankrupt estate the bankrupt loses standing to maintain or prosecute an action for enforcement of the rights attaching to that chose in action.Consideration Section 60 is relevantly in the following terms:60 Stay of legal proceedings…(2) An action commenced by a person who subsequently becomes a bankrupt is, upon his or her becoming a bankrupt, stayed until the trustee makes election, in writing, to prosecute or discontinue the action.(3) If the trustee does not make such an election within 28 days after notice of the action is served upon him or her by a defendant or other party to the action, he or she shall be deemed to have abandoned the action.(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, a bankrupt may continue, in his or her own name, an action commenced by him or her before he or she became a bankrupt in respect of:(a) any personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt, his or her spouse or de facto partner or a member of his or her family; or(b) the death of his or her spouse or de facto partner or of a member of his or her family....(5) In this section, action means any civil proceeding, whether at law or in equity. The evidence plainly establishes that this application for an extension of time was filed, and the appellant subsequently became a bankrupt. Indeed, the appellant accepts that s 60(2) and (3) “in principle” apply, but submits the exemption under s 60(4) applies. Notice of the action was served on the Trustees by the respondent on 12 December 2019, as evidenced in the affidavit of Mr Bailey. As an election was not made within 28 days after the notice was served, the Trustees are deemed to have "abandoned the action": s 60(3). Section 60(5) defines action to mean any civil proceeding, whether at law or in equity. This application is an “action” for the purposes of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act: see for example, Cristovao v Tan and Tan Lawyers Pty Ltd [No 2] [2017] WASCA 171 (Cristovao) at [8]. The appellant relies on s 60(4)(a) and s 116(2)(g) which relates to an action in respect of “any personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt”. The test as to what constitutes a “personal injury or wrong” within the meaning of s 60(4) was described by Dixon J in Cox v Journeaux(No 2) [1935] HCA 48; (1935) 52 CLR 713 at 721 as follows:The test appears to be whether the damages or part of them are to be estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his mind, body or character and without reference to his rights of property.