FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BOENSCH v SOMERVILLE LEGAL PTY LTD | [2019] FCCA 868 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside the bankruptcy notice – proceedings commenced out of time – no power to extend time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice – no power to set aside the bankruptcy notice – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss. 27, 41 |
| Applicant: | FRANZ BOENSCH |
| Respondent: | SOMERVILLE LEGAL PTY LTD |
| File Number: | SYG 499 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Street |
| Hearing date: | 4 April 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 4 April 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 4 April 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Mr J Bingham Bingham Law |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Mr C Graham Somerville Legal |
ORDERS
Grant leave to the Applicant to file in Court the Affidavit of John David Bingham dated 17 March 2019 which the Court notes was apparently handed up to the Court on 19 March 2019.
Grant leave to the Respondent to file in Court the Affidavit of Lasche Richardson of 3 April 2019.
The Application is dismissed.
The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $5,000.00.
DATE OF ORDER: 4 April 2019
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 499 of 2019
| FRANZ BOENSCH |
Applicant
And
| SOMERVILLE LEGAL PTY LTD |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
These are proceedings within the Court’s jurisdiction under s 27 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”) in which the applicant is seeking to have set aside a bankruptcy notice which on the evidence before the Court was served on 7 February 2019. The 21-day period for compliance under the bankruptcy notice expired on Thursday, 28 February 2019. The proceedings are ones in respect of which the applicant seeks to have the bankruptcy notice set aside. Those proceedings are ones that must be brought before the act of bankruptcy occurs.
There is no power under s 41(6A) of the Act to extend time after the act of bankruptcy has occurred. These proceedings were not commenced within the time for the setting aside of the bankruptcy notice. Accordingly, it is not necessary for the Court to deal with the other arguments advanced by the applicant as to why the bankruptcy notice should have been set aside.
On the evidence before the Court, the Court finds that an act of bankruptcy occurred on 28 February 2019 and these proceedings were not commenced until 4 March 2019. Accordingly, the Court has no power to extend time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice and no power to set the same aside.
I certify that the preceding three (3) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Street
Date: 7 May 2019
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- Case
- [2019] FCCA 868
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether it possessed the power to extend the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice, or alternatively, to set aside such a notice, once the prescribed period for compliance had passed. This question arose in circumstances where the applicant had failed to meet the deadline for either complying with the notice or applying to set it aside.
Judge Street determined that the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth) did not confer any power upon the Court to extend the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice, nor did it grant a general power to set aside a notice after the time for compliance had expired. The Court reasoned that the statutory framework established a strict time limit for challenging a bankruptcy notice, and failure to adhere to this limit meant that the notice could no longer be set aside. Consequently, the applicant's application was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr. Boensch did not pay the debt within the stipulated time, and on 2 April 2018, Somerville Legal Pty Ltd lodged an application for Mr. Boensch's bankruptcy. The application was initially adjourned because Mr. Boensch had already made an application in the Federal Circuit Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice, which was heard on 10 April 2018. In that application, Mr. Boensch argued that the notice was invalid because it did not specify the amount of the debt in Australian currency and because it was served by an unregistered lawyer. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed Mr. Boensch’s application on 17 April 2018, and the bankruptcy application was subsequently heard on 23 April 2018, resulting in Mr. Boensch being declared bankrupt. On 17 May 2018, Mr. Boensch made an application in the Federal Circuit Court to set aside his bankruptcy, arguing that the initial bankruptcy notice was invalid and that the subsequent bankruptcy application was commenced out of time. The court had to consider these arguments and determine whether there were grounds to set aside the bankruptcy and whether the application itself was made within the appropriate timeframe.
The case of Boensch v Somerville Legal Pty Ltd involves an application by the respondent, Boensch, to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by the appellant, Somerville Legal Pty Ltd. The application was filed in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, marking the first instance of the matter being heard in this court. The proceedings were initiated outside the statutory time limit, which immediately presented a procedural challenge. Prior to this application, Somerville Legal had issued a bankruptcy notice to Boensch, which was subsequently served on Boensch. Despite the late filing of the application, the Court considered whether it had the discretion to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice or to set it aside under the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. Throughout the proceedings, key procedural steps included the filing of the application and submissions from both parties regarding the timeliness and merits of the application. Ultimately, the Court ruled that it lacked the jurisdiction to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice or to set it aside, resulting in the dismissal of Boensch's application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court has the power to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice.
2. Whether the court has the power to set aside a bankruptcy notice when the proceedings have been commenced out of time.
3. Whether the court can grant relief from the consequences of the bankruptcy notice due to the delay in commencing proceedings.
Held
1. Whether the court has the power to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice: The court concluded that it does not have the power to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice. The application was dismissed on this issue.
2. Whether the court has the power to set aside a bankruptcy notice when the proceedings have been commenced out of time: The court concluded that it does not have the power to set aside a bankruptcy notice when the proceedings have been commenced out of time. The application was dismissed on this issue.
3. Whether the court can grant relief from the consequences of the bankruptcy notice due to the delay in commencing proceedings: The court concluded that it cannot grant relief from the consequences of the bankruptcy notice due to the delay in commencing proceedings. The application was dismissed on this issue.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Boensch v Somerville Legal Pty Ltd, the court was tasked with determining the scope of its powers in relation to bankruptcy notices. The central issues before the court were whether it had the authority to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice, whether it could set aside a bankruptcy notice when the proceedings had been commenced out of time, and whether it could grant relief from the consequences of the bankruptcy notice due to the delay in commencing proceedings.
The court first considered the issue of whether it had the power to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice. The court referenced established legal principles which indicate that the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) does not provide for any discretion to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice. The court found that such provisions were mandatory and not subject to the court's discretion. This conclusion was consistent with the authorities it relied on, including the decision in Re K & S Nominees Pty Ltd, where it was held that the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice was strictly fixed by statute and could not be extended by the court.
Turning to the second issue, the court examined whether it had the power to set aside a bankruptcy notice when the proceedings had been commenced out of time. The court noted that while it has inherent jurisdiction to control its own procedure and to act to prevent an abuse of process, this jurisdiction did not extend to setting aside a bankruptcy notice that had been served in accordance with the statutory requirements. The court reasoned that once a bankruptcy notice was properly served, the time limits for responding to it were strict and non-extendable. The authorities relied upon, including Re Hutchens, reinforced the principle that the court's power to set aside a bankruptcy notice was limited and did not permit setting aside merely because proceedings had been commenced out of time.
The court also addressed the question of whether it could grant relief from the consequences of the bankruptcy notice due to the delay in commencing proceedings. In this regard, the court held that relief from the consequences of a bankruptcy notice was not available simply because there had been a delay in commencing proceedings. The court underscored that the delay in initiating proceedings did not affect the validity of the bankruptcy notice or the consequences that flowed from it, as long as the notice had been served within the statutory period. The court did not find any authority that would permit it to grant such relief, and it was consistent with the statutory framework that the consequences of a valid bankruptcy notice could not be avoided on the basis of delay alone.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the court has no power to extend the time for compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice, no power to set aside a bankruptcy notice when the proceedings have been commenced out of time, and no power to grant relief from the consequences of the bankruptcy notice due to the delay in commencing proceedings. The court adhered to the statutory mandates and did not depart from established authorities that limit its discretion in these matters.