James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] FCA 582

Citation: James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] FCA 582
Appeal from: James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia & Anor v James [2015] FCCA 1056
Parties: DAVID ANTHONY JAMES v COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA (ACN 123 123 124)
File number: NSD 552 of 2015
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 11 June 2015
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY — Federal Circuit Court dismissed application for review of Registrar’s decision to set aside bankruptcy notice and made sequestration order — pending proceedings in Supreme Court and Court of Appeal ‑‑ application by bankrupt to extend time under notices given under Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 60(3) — application to stay the operation of a sequestration order — whether arguable case on appeal — whether balance of convenience favours the making of the orders
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 33, s 37(2)(a), 52(3), 57, 60(3)
Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2005 (Cth) r 3.02
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 20.03
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 29
Cases cited:

Adamopoulos v Olympic Airways SA (1990) 95 ALR 525
Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137
Burns v AMP Finance Ltd [2005] FCA 761
Burrell v Reavill Farm Pty Ltd (2014) 286 FLR 310; [2014] FCCA 1449
Endresz v Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2014] FCA 1139
Evans v Heather Thiedeke Group Pty Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 424
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Hussain v King Investment Solutions Pty Ltd (2006) 153 FCR 428

Informax International Pty Ltd v Clarius Group Ltd (2011) 192 FCR 210
Liprini v Liprini [2010] FCA 1117
Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 692
Nolten v Groeneveld Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1494
O’Meara v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 1575
O'Brien v Bank of Western Australia Ltd (2013) 16 BPR 31,705; [2013] NSWCA 71
Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corp (1996) 67 FCR 65
Singh v Owners Strata Plan No. 11723 [2012] FCA 538
Stobbart v Mocnaj (1996) 16 WAR 318
Temsign Pty Ltd v Biscen Pty Ltd (1998) 20 WAR 47

Date of hearing: 25 May 2015
Date of last submissions: 27 May 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 81
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M Cashion SC with Mr J Baird
Solicitor for the Appellant: Allsop Glover Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D A McLure
Solicitor for the Respondent: Gadens Lawyers
Solicitor for the Trustees: Mr K Warwick of Norton Rose Fulbright
Counsel for Rabobank, supporting creditor: Mr B F Katekar
Counsel for ANZ Bank, supporting creditor: Mr R M Foreman

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 552 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

DAVID ANTHONY JAMES
Appellant

AND: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
(ACN 123 123 124)
Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

11…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 582
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In James v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the primary issue before the Federal Circuit Court was whether to extend the time for compliance with notices given under s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and to stay the operation of a sequestration order. The dispute arose from proceedings where Mr James, the bankrupt, had been served with a bankruptcy notice by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) following a judgment entered against him in the District Court of New South Wales for $737,241.39, stemming from a loan default by a company of which Mr James was the sole director. Mr James filed an application to set aside the bankruptcy notice, alleging that the judgment was entered without his knowledge and that the property securing the debt was sold for significantly less than its market value. The court was required to determine whether Mr James had established an arguable case for appeal and whether the balance of convenience favoured staying the sequestration order.

The court found that there were multiple arguable points in Mr James' favour, including the potential shortfall in the sale price of the property and the possibility of a successful claim against the CBA for breach of contract. The court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured granting a stay of the sequestration order, particularly in light of the pending proceedings in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. The court noted that the CBA's interest in enforcing the judgment debt and avoiding unrecoverable costs was a relevant factor but did not outweigh the public interest in ensuring that the bankruptcy jurisdiction was exercised fairly and justly. Consequently, the court extended the time for compliance with the notices and suspended the operation of the sequestration order to allow Mr James to pursue his appeals and other proceedings.

In summary, the court granted the relief sought by Mr James, extending the time for compliance with the notices and staying the sequestration order. This decision was based on the presence of arguable points in Mr James' favour and the balance of convenience favouring the stay. The court also noted the public interest in the fair exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction and the CBA's interest in avoiding unrecoverable costs. The orders were made to allow Mr James to continue with his appeals and other legal proceedings without the immediate threat of sequestration.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. In relation to the following notices (“the Notices”):

(a) the notice from Gadens Lawyers to Messrs A Scott and M Robinson of PPB Advisory (“the trustees”) dated 29 April 2015;

(b) the notice from Kemp Strang Lawyers to the trustees dated 27 April 2015;

(c) the notice from Adrian Holmes, Lawyer to the trustees dated 4 May 2015;

the time stipulated in s 60(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) be extended to the date which is seven (7) days after the determination of the appeal.

2. The operation of the sequestration order made against the estate of the applicant on 24 April 2015 be suspended to the extent necessary to permit the applicant to prosecute the proceedings the subject of the Notices (“the Proceedings”), namely:

(a) NSW Court of Appeal proceedings No 2015/98507 against the respondent being the application for leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, the appeal;

(b) NSW Supreme Court proceedings Nos 2014/71424, 2014/71413 and 2014/71396 against Rabobank Australia Limited;

(c) NSW Court of Appeal proceedings No 2015/118223 against Douglas and 6 others.

3. The respondents to the proceedings mentioned in Order 2(c) above have liberty to apply on three (3) days’ notice to vary that order.

THE COURT NOTES:

The undertaking by the trustees that they will not make any election to discontinue pursuant to s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act under the Notices or in respect of the Proceedings or any of them without first giving 10 days’ notice in writing to the applicant.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I have concluded that this is an appropriate case to warrant the exercise of the discretion in Mr James’ favour. There is more than one arguable point and the balance of convenience favours the grant of a stay.BACKGROUND Relevantly, Mr James’ troubles with the CBA began when it sued him in the District Court of New South Wales on 19 May 2014 for $674,920.12. The lion’s share of this sum represented the amount outstanding under a loan made to a company, Print National Nominees Pty Ltd (“Print National”), of which Mr James was the sole director, and whose debt he had guaranteed. The loan was secured by a mortgage over some real estate owned by the company. When the company defaulted under the loan facility, the CBA called upon the guarantee. When Mr James did not heed the call, the CBA sold the property for a price Mr James now contends was substantially less than its market value. By notice of motion filed on 10 October 2014 and returnable on 31 October 2014, the CBA applied for summary judgment. Mr James, who claims to have been unaware of this application until he was served with the bankruptcy notice, did not appear in court on 31 October 2014 and, due to an oversight, neither did his then solicitor. Consequently, the CBA’s application proceeded ex parte and default judgment was entered against Mr James in the sum of $737,241.39. On 11 November 2014 — eleven days after the publication of judgment — the CBA caused a bankruptcy notice to issue. The notice was served a short time thereafter. Mr James had 21 days in which to comply with it. Before the time for compliance expired, Mr James filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The application was supported by an affidavit. Mr James also sought an interim order extending the time for compliance with the notice until his application was determined. At the time he filed his application, Mr James was unrepresented. It appears that, contrary to r 3.02(2) of the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006 (Cth) (“Bankruptcy Rules”), his supporting affidavit did not state the amount by which the alleged counterclaim, set-off or cross demand exceeds the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice and the reason the counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand was not raised in the bank’s District Court action which culminated in the judgment debt in relation to which the bankruptcy notice was issued. It appears that the central grounds of the application were that the judgment had been entered in his absence because his solicitor failed to appear, that he was unaware of the entry of judgment until 15 November 2014 and that he had instructed his solicitor to file a notice of motion in the District Court to set aside the judgment and for leave to file a cross-claim. In the draft cross-claim Mr James alleged that the CBA sold Print National’s property for $1.65 million when it was actually worth $3.8 million, resulting in a shortfall of $2.15 million.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, there is authority for the proposition that where, as here, there is a bona fide appeal challenging the existence of the debt upon which the bankruptcy is founded, a stay of the sequestration order should “fairly readily be granted”: Evans v Heather Thiedeke Group Pty Ltd (1990) 95 ALR 424 (Pincus J); Menzies v Paccar Financial Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 692 (Ryan J). CONCLUSION In all the circumstances, orders should be made along the lines of those proposed by Mr James in the draft short minutes of order. Costs should follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

His Honour then proceeded to deal with the creditor’s petition. The creditor’s petition for a sequestration order At the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Court may make a sequestration order against the debtor’s estate if, having required proof of the matters stated in the petition, service of the petition, and the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing, the Court is satisfied with that proof: Bankruptcy Act, s 52(1). On the other hand, if the Court is not satisfied with proof of any of these matters or is satisfied by the debtor that he or she is able to pay his or her debts or that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not be made, it may dismiss the petition: Bankruptcy Act, s 52(2). Nevertheless, the Court has a discretion at any time to adjourn the proceeding: Bankruptcy Act, s 33(1). The primary judge declined to adjourn the hearing of the petition. The reasons he gave (at [16]) were that he was satisfied that there was an “underlying debt”, that the counterclaim, set-off or cross demand would give rise to an amount equal to or in excess of the judgment debt and that this was “not a case in which there is any merit or basis to go behind the judgment debt”. His Honour referred (at [21]) to Mr James’ application for leave to appeal, noted that it was fixed for hearing on 11 May 2015, and observed that it was not necessary “on either application” to determine the issues it raised. He then considered whether Mr James was likely to succeed in any claim against the CBA and said (at [22]) that on the material before the court he was not satisfied that he was. His Honour went on to say that he was satisfied that, if Mr James were to succeed, “it would be for an amount substantially less than the amount currently owing to the petitioning creditor”. His Honour also said (at [24]) that Mr James was unlikely to succeed in his claim against the CBA alleging a breach of s 111A of the Conveyancing Act and there was no arguable case that the contract of guarantee was unjust at the time it was made (referring to a possible Contracts Review Act claim). In addition, his Honour observed that Mr James owed $11,751,606 to ANZ. He noted that on 19 May 2014 Mr James had filed a statement of claim against ANZ but his Honour considered it to have no merit. At [27] his Honour said:Notwithstanding the proximity of the hearing date before the Court of Appeal in respect of a leave application, this Court has a broader interest than the parties which includes a public interest in relation to its bankruptcy jurisdiction in respect of an insolvent debtor and the interest of the supporting creditor opposing an adjournment is a relevant factor taken together with the lack of merit in relation to the claim being advanced by Mr James on the findings that I have made. An adjournment in this case would also give rise to the real prejudice of the incurring of further unrecoverable costs by the petitioning creditor in circumstances where the Court is satisfied that thecounterclaim, set-off or cross demand will not give rise to an amount equal to or in excess of the judgment debt.