FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BANKRUPTCY – application under O 35 r 7 to set aside sequestration order made in the absence of the debtor – petition not served on debtor personally – order annulling the bankruptcy under s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act – order under O 35 r 7 appropriate where there has been no administration of the estate pursuant to the sequestration order.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 153B
Federal Court Rules, O 35 r 7
THE AUSTRAL BRICK COMPANY PTY LIMITED v TOME DASKALOVSKI
NG 7245 of 1998
Judge: EMMETT J
Place: SYDNEY
Date: 23 JUNE 1998
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 7245 of 1998
RE:
TOME DASKALOVSKI
Applicant
EX PARTE:
THE AUSTRAL BRICK COMPANY PTY LIMITED
ACN 000 005 550Respondent
JUDGE:
EMMETT J
DATE:
23 JUNE 1998
PLACE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The bankruptcy be annulled pursuant to section 153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 7245 of 1998
RE:
TOME DASKALOVSKI
Applicant
EX PARTE:
THE AUSTRAL BRICK COMPANY PTY LIMITED
ACN 000 005 550Respondent
JUDGE:
EMMETT J
DATE:
23 JUNE 1998
PLACE:
SYDNEY
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR: On 6 March 1998 a petition was presented by the Austral Brick Company Pty Limited (“the Petitioner”) seeking an order for the sequestration of the estate of Tome Daskalovski (“the Debtor”). The petition was based on an act of bankruptcy consisting of failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice in respect of a judgment debt in the sum of $24,935.26. The petition came before Registrar Quinn on 6 April 1998 when there was evidence in the form of an affidavit of service of one Tony Andrews sworn 4 February 1998. In that affidavit, Mr Andrews said that on 23 March 1998 at 5.50pm he had served the Debtor personally at 17 Grainger Street, Lambton, 2305. On the basis of that evidence and the other evidence before the Registrar, she made an order for the sequestration of the estate of the Debtor.
On 28 April 1998 the Debtor applied to the Court for an order that the sequestration order be set aside pursuant to Order 35 Rule 7 of the Federal Court Rules or such other power as the Court has to set aside the order. The basis upon which that application was made is that the petition had not in fact been served personally on the Debtor. The Debtor relies on an affidavitsworn by himself in which he said that at the time when the petition is alleged to have been served he was not at the premises at 17 Grainger Street, Lambton but was in fact at football training at some other location.
The Debtor's evidence was corroborated by the evidence of his wife and of one Jedda Lee Bendow who is employed as a secretary receptionist by one of the occupiers of 17 Grainger Street, Lambton. That evidence satisfies me that on the date alleged by Mr Andrews an envelope was left with Ms Bendow containing the petition. It did not in fact come to the Debtor's attention until after 16 April 1998, when his solicitor told him that a sequestration order had been made.
The Debtor subsequently filed a statement of affairs as required by the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”). In the statement of affairs, the Debtor disclosed that he had creditors comprising the debt of the Petitioner together with a debt due to Gaywood Doors of $8636.42. The statement of affairs also showed assets having a value of $79,880 and a secured debt of $18,000. It also showed an income in the past 12 months of $32,600. Further, there is also evidence before me that the Debtor’s solicitor presently holds bank cheques furnished to him by the debtor in respect of the amounts owing to the two creditors to whom I have made reference above. In the circumstances I am satisfied that the sequestration order ought not to have been made and accordingly I propose to make an order pursuant to section 153B of the Act annulling the bankruptcy.
I should add that I would have been satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction and power pursuant to Order 35 Rule 7 to make an order setting aside the sequestration order made in the absence of the Debtor in circumstances where the Debtor was not served with the petition. However, it seems to me inappropriate to make an order under that rule where the estate has already been administered in bankruptcy, as is the case here.
The Act, and the rules made under the Act which have now been incorporated into the Federal Court Rules, provide for the protection of creditors in the event of an order being made under section 153B. There is no similar regime applicable specifically for the setting aside of an order or a judgment pursuant to Order 35 Rule 7. That is not to say that, in an appropriate case, the power contained in Order 35 Rule 7 ought not to be exercised. However, such a power would normally be exercised in circumstances where the matter comes before the Court very soon after the order has been made and before there has been any administration in bankruptcy pursuant to a sequestration order.
I certify that this and the preceding two (2) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Emmett
Associate:
Dated: 23 June 1998
Counsel for the Applicant: W.V. McManus Solicitor for the Applicant: Trisley Kilmurray O'Sullivan Solicitor for the Respondent: Sally Nash & Co Date of Hearing: 16, 23 June 1998 Date of Judgment: 23 June 1998
- AGLC
- Austral Brick Company Pty Ltd v Daskalovski [1998] FCA 782
- Case
- [1998] FCA 782
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence presented concerning the service of the bankruptcy notice and the quantum of the debt. It was crucial for the court to assess whether the notice was served correctly and if the amount of debt claimed was accurate and undisputed. In its reasoning, the court found that there were procedural deficiencies in the service of the bankruptcy notice, which rendered the order invalid. The court concluded that the procedural errors meant that the individual had not been properly notified of the bankruptcy proceedings, thus failing to meet the statutory requirements. Consequently, the court annulled the bankruptcy order under section 153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966.
As a result of the court's decision, the bankruptcy order against the individual was annulled. The annulment meant that the individual was no longer subject to the restrictions and disabilities associated with bankruptcy. The decision underscores the importance of procedural compliance in bankruptcy proceedings and highlights the consequences of failing to adhere to statutory requirements. The annulment not only resolved the immediate dispute but also set a precedent for similar cases involving procedural errors in bankruptcy notices.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The bankruptcy be annulled pursuant to section 153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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