United Petroleum Pty Ltd v Bousaleh

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

UNITED PETROLEUM PTY LTD v BOUSALEH [2020] FCCA 2226
Catchwords:
BANKRUPTCY – Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – Application for review of a sequestration order made by Registrar of the Court – petitioning creditor paid out and no other creditor sought to be substituted – Debtor solvent – sequestration order set aside and Creditor’s Petition dismissed – Debtor’s Bankruptcy Trustee entitled to costs, expenses and remuneration in the period since the making of the sequestration order – Trustee not guilty of any conduct disentitling her to her costs, expenses and remuneration – annulment order ought also be made under s.153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) so as to enable Trustee to avail herself of s.154.

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.5, 54, 153B, 154

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.104
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Flint v Richard Busuttil & Company Pty Ltd and Another (2013) 216 FCR 375

Pattison v Hadjimouratis (2006) 155 FCR 226

Applicant Creditor: UNITED PETROLEUM PTY LTD
Respondent Debtor: GAIL CHRISTINE BOUSALEH
Intervener (as to costs): KATHERINE ELIZABETH BARNET IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF GAIL CHRISTINE BOUSALEH
File Number: SYG 1758 of 2019
Judgment of: Judge Dowdy
Hearing date: 22 July 2020
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 18 August 2020

REPRESENTATION

There was no appearance for the Applicant Creditor.

Counsel for the Respondent Debtor: Mr G. Fernie
Solicitors for the Respondent Debtor: DWF Law (Australia)
Counsel for the intervener Trustee in Bankruptcy: Mr D. Robertson of Counsel
Solicitors for the intervener Trustee in Bankruptcy: Colin Biggers & Paisley Lawyers

THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE AS FOLLOWS:

  1. The sequestration order made on 15 August 2019 is set aside.

  2. The Creditor’s Petition filed on 11 July 2019 is dismissed.

  3. The bankruptcy of the Respondent Debtor is annulled pursuant to s.153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1758 of 2019

UNITED PETROLEUM PTY LTD

Applicant Creditor

And

GAIL CHRISTINE BOUSALEH

Respondent Debtor

KATHERINE ELIZABETH BARNET IN HER CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF GAIL CHRISTINE BOUSALEH

Intervener (as to costs)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and Procedural History

  1. This proceeding commenced through the filing of a Creditor’s Petition by United Petroleum Pty Ltd (the Creditor) on 11 July 2019, in which it sought a sequestration order against the estate of Gail Christine Bousaleh (the Debtor) for her failure to comply with a Bankruptcy Notice served on her on 14 June 2019 in relation to a judgment debt obtained by the Creditor against the Debtor in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for $133,317.38, including interest.

  2. The Creditor’s Petition was heard by Registrar Morgan on 15 August 2019 when the Debtor failed to appear and a sequestration and other orders were made, as follows:

    THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

    1. The estate of Gail Christine Bousaleh be sequestrated under…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCCA 2226
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved an application for review of a sequestration order made against Gail Christine Bousaleh (the Debtor). The original sequestration order was made on 15 August 2019, following a creditor's petition by United Petroleum Pty Ltd (the Creditor). Katherine Elizabeth Barnet was appointed as the Trustee of the Debtor's estate. The Debtor subsequently applied to have the sequestration order set aside, arguing that her debts had been settled and that she was not insolvent.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the sequestration order should be set aside, and if so, what further orders should be made. Specifically, the court had to determine whether to simply set aside the sequestration order and dismiss the creditor's petition, or whether to also make an order annulling the bankruptcy under section 153B of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth). This distinction was crucial for determining the Trustee's entitlement to costs, expenses, and remuneration incurred during her administration of the estate.

The court reasoned that the Debtor's application for review had merit because the Creditor's debt had been settled, and no other creditor sought to be substituted as the petitioning creditor. Furthermore, the Trustee's report indicated that the Debtor had made arrangements satisfactory to the Australian Taxation Office and was now solvent. The court noted that simply setting aside the sequestration order would leave the Trustee without a statutory basis to recover her remuneration and expenses, forcing her to rely on general law. Drawing on the principles established in *Flint v Richard Busuttil & Company Pty Ltd and Another* and *Pattison v Hadjimouratis*, the court concluded that an annulment order under section 153B was appropriate. This would allow the Trustee to avail herself of section 154 of the *Bankruptcy Act*, enabling her to apply the Debtor's property towards her remuneration and expenses.

Consequently, the court ordered that the sequestration order be set aside and the Creditor's Petition be dismissed. Crucially, the court also made an order annulling the Debtor's bankruptcy under section 153B of the *Bankruptcy Act 1966* (Cth). The court further ordered that the Trustee's costs, expenses, and remuneration incurred since the making of the sequestration order be paid from the Debtor's estate, finding that the Trustee was not disentitled to these amounts.

Orders

Orders of the court

2.

1. The estate of Gail Christine Bousaleh be sequestrated under the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

2. The Applicant Creditor’s costs fixed in the sum of $8,562.23 be paid from the estate of the Respondent Debtor in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966.

3. A copy of this order be provided by the Applicant Creditor to the Official Receiver in Sydney within 2 days.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

4. The date of the act of bankruptcy is 5 July 2019.

5. A consent to act as trustee signed by Katherine Elizabeth Barnet (the Trustee) has been served on the Respondent.

(the sequestration order)

3.

On 19 August 2019 the Trustee forwarded for completion to the Debtor a Statement of Affairs, noting that the sequestration order had been made on 15 August 2019.

4.

On 30 August 2019 the solicitor for the Debtor sent an email to the Trustee which advised in substance that:

a) he acted for the Debtor;

b) the bankruptcy appeared to have been prematurely obtained; and

c) an application was being made to set aside the bankruptcy and that he expected the Creditor to support that application.

5.

By email in response dated 3 September 2019 the Trustee advised, and requested from, the Debtor’s solicitor as follows:

a) advised that the Trustee agreed to suspend the realisation or recovery of any property of the Debtor for a period of 14 days;

b) requested an update on the progress of the foreshadowed application to set aside the bankruptcy;

c) requested that in the interim the Debtor agree not to deal with any of her property, other than in the ordinary course of business;

d) requested that the Debtor complete and return her Statement of Affairs by 9 September 2019; and

e) advised that the Trustee’s costs to date constituted about $6,000.

I note that the debtor never gave any agreement or undertaking not to deal with her property as requested, and did not complete and return the Statement of Affairs to the Trustee until 9 October 2019.

6.

The Debtor lodged an Application for Review of the sequestration order on 9 September 2019 (formally regarded as filed on 11 September 2019) (the Review Application) which was on its face made returnable before me on 27 September 2019. It sought that the orders made by Registrar Morgan on 15 August 2019 be set aside on the following grounds:

1. a. The Applicant has a claim against the Respondent for monies owing.

b. The claims about monies owing between the Applicant and Respondent have been settled in full.

c. The Applicant is not insolvent.

7.

By email dated 10 September 2019 the Debtor’s solicitor advised the Trustee that the Debtor had filed the Review Application and asked whether the Debtor had any creditors other than the Creditor. This email attached an unsealed and unfiled copy of the Review Application. The Trustee responded to the Debtor’s solicitor’s email by email of the same date, advising that the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) was owed $204,593.30 and the ANZ Bank owed $34,984.30, and noting that the Statement of Affairs had still not been received.

8.

By email dated 12 September 2019 the Debtor’s solicitor advised the Trustee that the Debtor believed her debt to the ATO was only around $4,000 and sought confirmation of the amount of $204,593.30. On the same day the Trustee provided to the Debtor’s solicitor a copy of the ATO’s proof of debt dated 29 August 2019 in the amount of $204,593.30, and in response on 13 September 2019 the Debtor’s solicitor advised the Trustee as follows:

I am now intending to withdraw the application to set aside the sequestration order.

I await instructions from my client to confirm this but there seems little point in pursuing this from my end given the size of the ATO debt.

9.

The Debtor did not serve a copy of the filed Review Application on the Trustee. Without advising the Trustee and contrary to the advice given to the Trustee that the Review Application was going to be withdrawn, the Debtor’s solicitor instructed Mr Fernie as city agent to appear at the scheduled directions hearing on 27 September 2019, which date was unknown to the Trustee. Mr Fernie then informed me in Court that he mentioned the matter on behalf of the Creditor and handed up a letter dated 24 September 2019 from the Creditor’s solicitor to the Debtor’s solicitor, which stated in short that the debt owed by the Debtor to the Creditor had been paid pursuant to settlement terms which included a condition that the Creditor would not oppose any application to set aside the sequestration order. On the basis of the representations then made to me I made orders setting aside the sequestration order. I note that no criticism is made of Mr Fernie himself in this connection.

10.

Unbeknownst to me at the time, the Debtor had not complied with r.7.05 of the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) by either notifying the Trustee of the Review Application at least seven days prior to its return date or giving notice of it to any of her other creditors.

11.

On 30 September 2019 the Debtor’s solicitor informed the Trustee of the appearance before me on 27 September 2019 and the setting aside of the sequestration order. Correspondence then ensued between the respective solicitors, but the Debtor refused to consent to the setting aside of my orders of 27 September 2019 and indicated that any such application for the same would be opposed. Accordingly, on 2 October 2019 the Trustee filed an Interim Application seeking to set aside my orders of 27 September 2019 under r.16.05(2) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), which Interim Application was listed before his Honour Judge Cameron as Duty Judge. His Honour set the Interim Application down for hearing before him on 4 October 2019, when Mr D. Robertson of Counsel appeared for the Trustee and Mr E. Thompson of Counsel appeared for the Debtor to oppose the setting aside of my orders of 27 September 2019. In the result Judge Cameron set aside my orders, which had the effect of reinstating the bankruptcy of the Debtor, and the matter was set down for directions before me at a date to be advised. Judge Cameron ordered that the Trustee’s costs of the Interim Application be paid by the Debtor because of the failure of the Debtor to comply with r.7.05 of the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth), as noted in [10] above.

12.

The Review Application then had four further directions hearings before me and on 20 December 2019 was listed for hearing on 24 March 2020. The March hearing was vacated because of COVID-19, and ultimately the Review Application was listed for hearing on 22 July 2020. At one of those directions hearings, namely on 15 November 2019, an order was made by the consent of the Trustee and the Debtor that the Trustee file and serve any Report in the proceeding by 5pm on 5 December 2019. On 10 December 2019 the Trustee filed her Report (Trustee’s Report), dated 6 December 2019 which concluded that for the reasons summarized at [11.9] of the Trustee’s Report, the Debtor was insolvent for the purposes of s.5(2) and (3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act). Another directions hearing had to be adjourned because of the Debtor’s failure to comply with a previous order to file her Written Submissions in support of the Review Application, and she was ordered to pay the costs thrown away by the unproductive appearance before the Court.

Review Application Hearing

13.

At the hearing Mr Fernie again appeared as city agent for the Debtor’s solicitors and Mr Robertson of Counsel appeared for the Trustee. An application for review of a sequestration order involves and requires a hearing de novo with the Creditors Petition being heard afresh, and a decision being given on the material presented at that fresh hearing. No party appeared at the hearing to press for the making of a sequestration order against the Debtor. The Creditor did not appear because it has been paid its judgment debt. No other creditor applied to be substituted as petitioning creditor. The ATO did not appear and the Trustee accepted that an arrangement satisfactory to the ATO had been made between it and the Debtor. Further, the Trustee accepted that the arrangement between the ATO and the Debtor entered into since the Trustee’s Report meant that the Debtor is now solvent. Accordingly it follows that the Review Application must succeed and at the very least the sequestration order set aside and the Creditor’s Petition dismissed and that is the question for determination here; namely whether as submitted by the Debtor the only orders which ought be made are that the sequestration order be set aside and the Creditor’s Petition dismissed, or alternatively as submitted by the Trustee, there should also be a further order, namely that the Debtor’s bankruptcy be annulled under s.153B of the Act.

14.

The purpose of the making of an annulment order in the present context is sufficiently explained by the following passages from the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia comprised of Allsop CJ, Katzmann and Perry JJ in Flint v Richard Busuttil & Company Pty Ltd and Another (2013) 216 FCR 375 (Flint) at 384 – 385 [48] – [51]:

What orders should be made?

[48] It follows that the appeal should be allowed. Ms Flint applied for an order setting aside the sequestration order. The trustee asked to be heard on the question.

[49] The trustee was given leave to intervene as a party to protect his position. He submitted that an order annulling the bankruptcy should be made under s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act in order that his costs and remuneration be protected in accordance with s 154. If the sequestration order were set aside, the creditor’s petition dismissed and no order annulling the bankruptcy made, the authorities reveal that the trustee would have no statutory basis for any remuneration and his action (and the consequences thereof) would be left to the general law: see the discussions in Austral Brick Company Pty Ltd v Daskalovski [1998] FCA 782; Symons v Bateman [1999] FCA 658; Kyriackou v Shield Mercantile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2004] FCA 1338 (Kyriackou) and Pattison v Hadjimouratis (2006) 155 FCR 226 (Pattison). The exposure of the trustee to that position in this case would be a gross injustice, as we later explain.

[50] An order for annulment would provide a simple means of enabling the trustee to recover his costs and remuneration in the administration of the bankruptcy. Ms Flint opposed the making of such an order on the ground that it is not possible to annul an order which was made without power.

[51] Still, in Pattison the Full Court (by majority) held that it was open to the Court to make orders both setting aside a sequestration order and annulling the bankruptcy. No party in this appeal contended that Pattison was wrongly decided and the course it sanctioned appears to be within the terms of s 153B.

15.

In practical terms, the question then translates into whether the sequestration order ought be:

a) set aside under s.104(3) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (the FCCA) with the Creditor’s Petition dismissed, which would result in the Trustee having no recourse for seeking relief with respect to the costs, charges, expenses and remuneration arising out of her administration of the Bankrupt Estate of the Debtor (Trustee’s remuneration) otherwise than at general law as explained in Flint at [49]; or

b) both set aside and annulled under s.153B of the Act, with the Creditor’s Petition dismissed, which would give the Trustee the benefit of s.154, allowing her to apply the property of the Debtor still vested in her in payment of her Trustee’s remuneration.

16.

I note that in Pattison v Hadjimouratis (2006) 155 FCR 226 (Pattison) Nicholson J considered s.104(3) of the FCCA as it then stood in the same terms under the

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