Owners of Strata Plan No 23007 v Cross

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Owners – Strata Plan No. 23007 v Cross, in the matter of Cross [2006] FCA 900

BANKRUPTCY – Proceedings in connection with sequestration – petition and sequestration order – where petition served personally on mentally disabled debtor – where sequestration order made by registrar in absence of debtor – where application for review out of time – where alternative application based on debtor’s absence – whether service of petition defective – whether  sequestration order effective – whether formal defect or irregularity – whether sequestration order should be set aside or bankruptcy annulled – whether costs, charges and expenses of bankruptcy to be borne by debtor

EVIDENCE – Burden of proof, presumptions, and weight and sufficiency of evidence – mental capacity – consideration of interaction between presumption of capacity and presumption of continuance – evidence of involuntary admission to psychiatric hospital

PROCEDURE – Disability – mentally disabled persons – consideration of matters relevant to determining whether a person is, owing to mental illness, incapable of managing his or her affairs in respect of the proceedings

HELD – Debtor was a mentally disabled person at the time of service – personal service upon the debtor constituted a breach of the rules and a defect in the proceedings on the petition – the defect was not a formal defect or an irregularity – the sequestration order was effective though voidable – the order ought to be set aside rather than the bankruptcy annulled. 

WORDS & PHRASES ‘mentally disabled person’

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 35A
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 30, 153B, 154
Federal Court Rules O 43 r 13, O 35 r 7    

Adams v Lambert (2006) 225 ALR 396 applied
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571 referred to
Capsalis v Ozdemir [2005] FMCA 1163 referred to
Gibbons v Wright (1953) 91 CLR 423 referred to
Ginane v Diners Club Limited (1993) 120 ALR 375 referred to
Hadjimouratis v Casanova [2005] FMCA 1468 referred to
In re Daskalavski (Applicant); Ex parte The Austral Brick Co Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 782 distinguished
Kirby v Leather [1965] 2 QB 367 referred to
Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl 165 CLR 71 applied
Kyriackou v Shield Mercantile Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2004] FCA 1338 considered
Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co (Nos 1 and 2) (CA) [2003] 1 WLR 1511 applied
Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 referred to
Murphy v Doman (2003) 58 NSWLR 51 applied
Official Trustee v Nedlands (2000) 173 ALR 255 referred to
Re Ditfort; Ex Parte DCT (1988) 19 FCR 347 referred to
Re Long; Ex parte Fraser Confirming Pty Ltd (1975) 12 ASR 130 referred to
Re Millar; Ex parte Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (No. 388/1993, unreported, 27 April 1993, Burchett J) applied
Sarina v Council of the Shire of Wollondilly (1980) 48 FLR 372 applied
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Hammond (1988) 15 NSWLR 395 referred to
The Fore Street Warehouse Company Limited v Durrant &…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 900
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Owners of Strata Plan No 23007 v Cross, the court considered the application by the trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Cross to set aside a sequestration order made against her. The application arose from proceedings initiated by the Creditor for unpaid strata contributions, which resulted in a default judgment and subsequent bankruptcy. The primary issues were whether the sequestration order should be set aside or annulled, and who should bear the costs of the administration and the motion.

The court examined the appropriateness of bankruptcy proceedings as a debt collection remedy, the size of the debt, the value of Ms Cross' assets, and the circumstances of her mental health, which were not considered at the time of the sequestration order. The court found that Ms Cross was not properly served with the Creditor's petition and that she was not represented or present at the hearing. Given these findings, the court concluded that it would be unfair to Ms Cross to bear any costs of the administration of her estate. The court also noted that the Creditor's costs of the motion were disproportionate, as they did not have to cover the costs of the petition.

Ultimately, the court set aside the sequestration order and dismissed the Creditor's petition. The court ordered that the costs of the motion be paid by the Creditor on an indemnity basis. The decision underscores the importance of proper service and the consideration of a debtor's mental health in bankruptcy proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Michael Gregory Jones, trustee of the bankrupt estate of Isabell Jean Cross, be joined as a party (second respondent) to the proceedings, effective 6 December 2005.

2. The orders of Registrar Tesoriero made 9 August 2004 be set aside and the applicant’s petition dated 4 March 2004 and filed 23 March 2004 be dismissed.

3. The costs of the first and second respondents of the motion be paid by the applicant on an indemnity basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

On the application of Michael Gregory Jones, trustee of the bankrupt estate of Ms Cross, I ordered that the Trustee should be joined as a second respondent pursuant to O 6 r 8 of the FCR. Mr Jones had filed notice of intention to oppose the motion. The application was made at the commencement of the hearing of the motion and the formal order of joinder is the first of the orders disposing of the motion.BACKGROUND Ms Cross was born on 3 December 1939 and is currently 66 years old. On 28 May 2003 the Creditor commenced proceedings in the Local Court at Kogarah against her for unpaid contributions to the Creditor’s administrative and sinking funds totalling $1,813.58 and interest of $29.81. On 15 June 2003 a licensed commercial agent served Ms Cross with a Statement of Liquidated Claim. The relevant portion of the affidavit of service is as follows:‘1. I did on [the] 15th day of June, 2003 duly serve the defendant Isabell Jean Cross with this Statement of Liquidated Claim by delivering a true copy thereof to a male apparently not less than the age of sixteen (16) years and apparently residing at 12/28 Tullimbar Road, Cronulla being the defendant’s usual place of residence.2. At the time of service I said to the person to be served, ‘Does Isabell Jean Cross reside here?’, to which the person replied, “Yes”.’ On 25 July 2003 default judgment was entered in the Local Court in favour of the Creditor in the amount of $2,413.31. A writ of execution subsequently issued but remained unsatisfied. On 21 January 2004 the Creditor caused a bankruptcy notice to be served on Ms Cross. The relevant portion of the affidavit of service is as follows:‘1. On Wednesday the 21st of January, 2004 at 8:50 o’clock in the afternoon [sic] I did duly serve Isabell Jean Cross with the Bankruptcy Notice herein by delivering a true copy thereof, signed and dated by the Official Receiver, in a sealed envelope addressed to the debtor and placing it under the door of her residence at 12/28 Tullimbar Road, Cronulla.2. At the time of service I spoke with a male occupant of Unit 11 and he said to me in words to the effect [sic], ‘She’s home now.’ I knocked on the door, however, no-one came to the door. I then walked to the rear of the unit and looked in from the balcony. All the lights were on inside and I observed a female sitting on the lounge. I attempted to get her attention but she refused to acknowledge my presence. I then returned to the front door and again tried knocking on the door. There was no response and I, therefore, placed the envelope containing the Bankruptcy Notice under the door.3. I had previously attended the address on at least seven previous occasions without success including the previous day when neighbours had again advised me that the debtor was at home and had observed her inside the unit from the balcony, however, she refused to come to the door.’ Ms Cross did not comply with the bankruptcy notice and the Creditor’s solicitors were instructed to proceed with a creditor’s petition. Mr Adrian Mueller had carriage of the matter for the Creditor’s solicitors, J S Mueller & Co, and swore an affidavit in relation to the present motion. Mr Meuller deposed, relevantly:‘8. It was difficult to locate the whereabouts of the respondent in order to effect service of the creditor’s petition upon her. For this reason a number of inquiries were made by my firm in order to ascertain the respondent’s whereabouts and obtain further information about the respondent and her affairs.9. As a result of these inquiries on or about 31 March 2004 J. S. Mueller & Co. became aware that the respondent was at Sutherland Hospital.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

EDMONDS J
In re Daskalavski (Applicant); Ex parte The Austral Brick co Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 782, Emmett J (in a short ex tempore judgment) concluded that, in circumstances where his Honour was satisfied that the sequestration order ought not to have been made, it was appropriate to annul the bankruptcy rather than set it aside where the estate had already been administered in bankruptcy. But that is not the case here. Only one asset of Ms Cross, her home unit at Cronulla, has been vested in the Trustee and the debt on which she was bankrupted, together with subsequent unpaid strata levies, was paid out by the OPC, not the Trustee, following the Protective Commissioner being appointed the financial manager of Ms Cross’ financial affairs by order of the Guardianship Tribunal dated 11 April 2003. Notwithstanding the Trustee’s claim for remuneration to 3 June 2005 ($13,990) and his anticipated claim for additional remuneration ($5,500), there was no evidence that the Trustee had been actively involved in the administration of Ms Cross’ bankrupt estate.CONCLUSION When this choice – as between an order that the sequestration order be set aside on the one hand and an order for annulment of the bankruptcy on the other – has come before the courts on earlier occasions, the courts have consistently stressed that a balance must be struck between the rights of the applicant, who should never have been made bankrupt in the first place, and the Trustee who has simply done what the Act requires him to do: Kyriackou v Shield Mercantile Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2004] FCA 1338 at [43] per Weinberg J; followed in Capsalis v Ozdemir [2005] FMCA 1163 at [17] per Connolly FM; Hadjimouratis v Casanova [2005] FMCA 1468 at [13] and [16] per Connolly FM; and in Vaucluse Hospital Pty Ltd v Phillips at [70] and [71] per Riethmuller FM. The rights of the petitioning creditor have never been referred to as a relevant factor, and understandably so. This is not a case where the pendulum of balance tilts in favour of Ms Cross (compare Kyriackou) as against the Trustee; on the contrary, I have come to the firm conclusion that it would be totally unfair, indeed a miscarriage of justice, for Ms Cross to be saddled with any of the relatively considerable costs of the administration of her estate. While that may involve the invocation of some injustice on the Trustee, in the circumstances of this case it seems it must be tolerated in the face of an inability of the Court to order the petitioning creditor to bear such costs: Kyriackou at [39] per Weinberg J. For present purposes, I am prepared to accept that as being the correct position, however, I do not think it is free from doubt. The powers of the Court under s 30 of the Act are expressed in extremely wide terms. In the circumstances of this case, it seems unjust to me that the Creditor only has to pay the costs of the motion even though it also loses the registrar’s order as to costs of the petition. Because of the conclusion I have come to as expressed in [116] supra, I propose to exercise my discretion under O 35 r 7 of the FCR to set the sequestration order aside. In the circumstances, it is only appropriate that I summarise the matters I have taken into account in exercising my discretion to do so:1.The inappropriateness of bankruptcy proceedings as a debt collection remedy or mechanism. Such proceedings were never intended to operate against debtors who could, but would not, for whatever reason, pay.2.The size of the debt – originally less than $2,000.3.The aggregate value (free of encumbrances) of Ms Cross’ assets – closer to $600,000 than $500,000, approximately $200,000 of which were in liquid form.4.The size of the actual and anticipated costs and expense of administering the estate: In excess of $35,000, when, on the evidence, there was minimal administration.5.The circumstances of Ms Cross’ mental condition and her admissions (once involuntarily) to the Psychiatric Unit of Sutherland Hospital during 2004 – for a total of over three months.6.My finding that Ms Cross was not properly served with the Creditor’s petition.7.The fact that she was not present or represented at the hearing at which the sequestration order was made.8.The fact that the circumstances referred to in 5 and those underlying my finding in 6 were not ventilated before the registrar on 9 August 2004 (the first return date of the petition) when the sequestration order was made.9.The fact that those involved in ensuring that Ms Cross was bankrupted on 9 August 2004 – Messrs Meuller and Bentley – were officers of the Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EDMONDS J