Complainant 201707 v The Australian Capital Territory

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ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL



COMPLAINANT 201707 v THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY (Discrimination) [2019] ACAT 1

DT 7/2017

Catchwords:                DISCRIMINATION — scope of matters to be considered by Tribunal upon referral — self-represented complainant — test for litigation guardian — actions by care and protection workers under the Children and Young People Act 2008 leading to emergency action — were activities of workers a ‘service’

Legislation cited:        ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 ss 9, 29, 30, 39

Children and Young People Act 2008 s 866
Discrimination Act 1991 ss 7, 20
Human Rights Commission Act 2005 ss 53A, 78

Subordinate

Legislation cited:        ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedural Directions 2010 (No 1)

Cases cited:Clarey v Permanent Trustee Co Limited & Anor [2005] VSCA 128

Commissioner of Police v Mohamed [2009] NSWCA 432
IW v City of Perth and Others (1996-97) 191 CLR 1
L v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2006] FCAFC 114
Legal Practitioner v Council of the Law Society (No 2) [2014] ACTSC 352
Murphy v Doman [2003] NSWCA 249
Owners of Strata Plan No 23007 v Cross, in the matter of Cross [2006] FCA 900
Rainsford v Victoria [2007] FCA 1059
Slaveski v State of Victoria [2009] VSC 596
Waters and Ors v Public Transport Corporation (1992) 173 CLR 349
Wood v Calvary Health Care ACT Ltd [2006] FCA 1433
WSOL v John James Memorial Hospital [2011] ACAT 81

Tribunal:Presidential Member MT Daniel

Member E Trickett

Date of Orders:  3 January 2019

Date of Reasons for Decision:         3 January 2019

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY  )

CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL       )          DT 7/2017

BETWEEN:

COMPLAINANT 201717

Applicant

AND:

THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Respondent

TRIBUNAL:Presidential Member MT Daniel

Member E Trickett

DATE:3 January 2019

ORDER

The Tribunal orders that:

  1. The complaint is dismissed.

………………………………..

Presidential Member MT Daniel

For and on behalf of the Tribunal

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background

  1. On 16 February 2017 the applicant made a discrimination complaint to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) about the conduct of the Director-General of the Community Services Directorate. The complaint referred to interactions between staff of the Directorate (the staff) and the applicant on 23, 24 and 25 September 2015, which culminated in the taking of emergency action in relation to children of the applicant under the Children and Young People Act 2008 (CYP Act). The applicant asserted that these interactions had involved unlawful discrimination on the basis of his mental disability, due to an acquired brain injury.

  2. The HRC closed the complaint on the basis that it was lacking in substance, pursuant to section 78(2)(c)(iv) of the Human Rights Commission Act 2005 (HRC Act). The applicant then requested that the complaint be referred to the tribunal under section 53A of the HRC Act. On 31 May 2017 the HRC referred the complaint to the tribunal, providing copies of the original complaint (with attachments), the request for referral and the correspondence of the HRC to the applicant…

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Details
Case
[2019] ACAT 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The complainant, who sustained a brain injury from a motorcycle accident in 2006, lodged a complaint against the Australian Capital Territory under the Discrimination Act 1991 (Cth). The complainant alleged that the respondent, the Australian Capital Territory, discriminated against them due to their disability when they failed to provide reasonable adjustments in the context of a child protection matter. The case was heard in the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. The central issue was whether the complainant had a mental disability that constituted a protected attribute under the Discrimination Act at the time of the respondent's actions in September 2015. The tribunal considered whether the complainant's brain injury resulted in cognitive impairments sufficient to qualify as a disability. The tribunal noted that while the complainant experienced cognitive difficulties, particularly memory issues, after the accident, more recent evidence suggested that the complainant had the capability to act as an advocate for others, indicating some recovery of cognitive function. The tribunal concluded that although the complainant had a mental disability in September 2015, the respondent was not required to make reasonable adjustments under the Act as the complainant had not requested such adjustments.

The tribunal dismissed the complaint. The tribunal found that the respondent was not obliged to make reasonable adjustments under the Discrimination Act because the complainant had not requested such adjustments. Furthermore, the tribunal determined that the respondent's failure to provide adjustments did not amount to discrimination as the complainant had not demonstrated a need for adjustments at the time. The tribunal emphasised the importance of the complainant's responsibility to request reasonable adjustments and the respondent's reliance on the complainant to communicate their needs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Tribunal orders that:

1.

The complaint is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant had a motorcycle accident in 2006 that resulted in an acquired brain injury. The medical evidence regarding the impact of this injury on the applicant's cognitive function varied. While some early reports suggested that the applicant was unlikely to return to the workforce due to his head injuries, more recent expert opinions indicate that the applicant has the capability to act as an advocate for others. The applicant has represented himself in the Supreme Court and has travelled independently to pursue proceedings before the United Nations. His performance in this case, where he gave almost two hours of oral evidence, further demonstrates his ability to understand and respond appropriately to tribunal processes. The applicant's mental health history includes diagnoses of chronic psychotic conditions, exacerbated by amphetamine use, as well as bipolar and schizophrenia. Although there were cognitive function issues and difficulties in understanding at certain points, the applicant has shown improvements over time, particularly in his capacity to engage in legal proceedings.

The case was brought before the relevant tribunal to address a complaint filed by the applicant against the Australian Capital Territory. The applicant argued that he had a mental disability in September 2015 due to his acquired brain injury, which was a protected attribute under the Discrimination Act. The respondent did not deny the existence of the mental disability at that time but argued that the applicant's capacity to handle the litigation was not impaired. The tribunal considered the medical evidence, the applicant's recent activities, and his performance during the hearing to assess his capacity to act as an advocate for himself. The tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding that the applicant did not demonstrate a lack of capacity to represent himself in the proceedings.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The factors described in Slaveski can be usefully applied in the tribunal context, subject to the qualification that in that case the Court was considering a litigant attempting to represent himself in a Court, faced with the rules of evidence and civil procedure. It should be expected that a self-represented litigant would find the processes of a tribunal, not bound by the rules of evidence and conducted informally, less intimidating.Medical evidence in relation to capacity The applicant had a motorcycle accident in 2006. The medical evidence in relation to the applicant’s acquired brain injury varies. The applicant experienced some seizures after the accident. Although no gross abnormalities of the brain were evident, testing in the year after the accident showed reduced cognitive function, especially in the area of memory. The applicant at that time was taking strong medications for pain, and to reduce risk of seizures. The early medical opinions as summarised in the vocational future earning capacity report of 25 May 2010 were pessimistic:Dr Hampshire reported on 21 July 2009 … that [the applicant] suffers from an organic brain syndrome which is ‘stable, chronic and is directly attributable to the motor bike accident … [the applicant] ‘will be unable to return to the workforce due to his head injuries’.Dr Akkerman reported on 5 November 2009 that [the applicant] is ‘totally unfit’ for work. ‘In my opinion he is unlikely to ever return to work’Dr Girgis reported on 23 July 2008 that [the applicant] is ‘permanently unfit for work and his prognosis is guarded’.…N.Saunders reported on 3 March 2008 that [the applicant] has a serious defect in his cognition in most areas assessed, including:· Memory, short and delayed recall of auditory information· Visual recall of information· Switching off attention· Impulse control Dr Hampshire is a consultant psychiatrist who had seen the applicant for a number of years leading up to 2010. In March 2010 he diagnosed the applicant with post‑traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression. Dr Ben Teoh in a report of 30 May 2010, and psychologist Dana Marie Adam in reports of 2009, similarly diagnosed the applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder and reduced cognitive capacity. Not all of the applicant’s difficulties from time to time were attributable to the acquired brain injury suffered in July 2006:[24] on 18 May 2006 the applicant had been diagnosed at St George Hospital Sydney as suffering from a chronic psychotic condition, exacerbated by 12 months prior amphetamine use.[25] The psychometric testing conducted in 2008 indicated a prior history of bipolar and schizophrenia diagnoses. Immediately after the accident, and for some years following, the applicant took medication to control seizures and manage pain that impacted adversely on his cognitive functioning.[24] One report also notes that it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of the injury, as the applicant’s pre-accident level of functioning is not known[25] Exhibit A6 at [19]

Decision

Reasons for decision

As noted in Slaveski at paragraph 28:The question of incapacity in relation to litigation must be examined against the facts and subject matter of the particular litigation, the number and complexity of the issues involved and the identity, number and interests of the other parties, particularly opposing parties. A person can have the requisite capacity for one proceeding and lack it for another. (footnote omitted)Conclusion In summary, the historic medical evidence shows the applicant had a history of drug use and mental illness prior to his involvement in a motorcycle accident in 2006. After the accident, the applicant demonstrated reduced cognitive function particularly in the area of memory. The applicant at that time was on strong medication. Currently, the applicant is not using any medication except Ibuprofen. Most recently, the expert opinion of Dr Jeeawody is that the applicant has the capability to act as an advocate for others. The opinion of Dr Jeeawody is consistent with the applicant’s reported activities in 2018, and the Tribunal’s observations of the applicant in the hearing. He has in 2018 represented himself in the Supreme Court, and travelled to and from Geneva (by himself on the return journey) to pursue proceedings before the United Nations. In the current proceedings, he was able to give almost two hours of oral evidence of events occurring over two years earlier, on the basis of having memorised his notes of those events. His behaviour before the Tribunal indicated an understanding of tribunal processes and the ability to respond appropriately. He seemed to understand what was required of him before, during and after the hearing. The more recent emails of the applicant show he understood the need to obtain legal advice, and arrange to obtain it, as per the test described in Owners – Strata Plan No 23007 v Cross, in the matter of Cross.[29] It was, however, an action that he did not take until late in the day.[29] [2006] FCA 900 The applicant submits that he had a mental disability in September 2015 due to his acquired brain injury. The medical reports written in 2014 and 2015 establish that at that time the applicant had cognitive function issues such as memory problems and difficulty understanding. In September 2015 the applicant was still taking medication for back pain and he claims he was less mentally agile then than he is now. The respondent does not deny that the applicant had a mental disability which was a protected attribute in 2015 at the time of the emergency action. The respondent also concedes that relevantly for section 7(2)(e) of the Discrimination Act, the staff, by 24 September 2015 at least, believed that the applicant had a mental disability and thus a protected attribute. Indeed, the respondent submits that the staff were required to take into account the applicant’s disability when performing their function of appraising the child concern report and, specifically, determining whether there was a parent both willing and able to provide care and protection to the children.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court assessed the applicant's capacity to represent himself in the current litigation, considering the nature and complexity of the proceedings, the identity of other parties, and the applicant's ability to understand and respond appropriately to tribunal processes. The court relied on recent expert evidence and observations of the applicant's behaviour during the hearing, concluding that the applicant had the requisite capacity. Regarding the applicant's mental disability, the court noted that the respondent did not dispute the applicant's status as having a protected attribute under the Discrimination Act at the relevant time. The court examined the respondent's actions in relation to the child concern report, finding that the staff failed to consider the applicant's mental disability when determining the suitability of the applicant as a parent willing and able to provide care and protection to the children. The court's decision highlights the importance of considering an individual's mental disability in relevant decision-making processes, aligning with statutory protections and obligations.