FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Robson as former trustee of the estate of Samsakopoulos v Body Corporate for Sanderling at Kings Beach CTS 2942 [2021] FCAFC 143
Appeal from: Body Corporate for Sanderling at Kings Beach v Samsakopoulos (No 2) [2020] FCCA 1909 File number: QUD 234 of 2020 Judgment of: ALLSOP CJ, MARKOVIC, DERRINGTON, COLVIN AND ANASTASSIOU JJ Date of judgment: 12 August 2021 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY - application by trustee for leave to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court - where Circuit Court set aside sequestration order and dismissed creditor's petition on review of registrar's decision - where Circuit Court dismissed trustee's application for orders for payment of remuneration, costs and expenses of trustee in administering former bankrupt estate - consideration of nature and extent of power pursuant to s 104(3) of Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) - whether Circuit Court has discretionary power to both set aside sequestration order and annul bankruptcy on review of decision by registrar - whether other source of power to order remuneration of trustee when creditor's petition dismissed - whether Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear interim application for remuneration orders after creditor's petition dismissed - application for leave to appeal allowed - appeal allowed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - consideration of nature of delegated federal judicial power exercised by registrar - consideration of nature of de novo review by judge of registrar's decision
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth) s 26
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 37, 43, 44, 55, 58, 74, 153A, 153B, 154, 252A, 252B, 252C, 315
Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1980 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1991 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) ss 15, 102, 103, 104
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 28, 35A
Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth) reg 80
Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth) rr 2.02, 7.02, Schedule 1, Item 9
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 16.05
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05
Cases cited: Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union v Metro Trains Melbourne Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 81; (2020) 276 FCR 172
Body Corporate for Sanderling at Kings Beach v Samsakopoulos [2019] FCCA 2133
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough [1935] HCA 45; (1935) 53 CLR 220
Commonwealth of Australia v SCI Operations Pty Ltd (1998) 192 CLR 285
Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 8; (2017) 343 ALR 632
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 143
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the limitation period under the Australian Consumer Law applied to the applicant's claim, and whether the court should exercise its discretion to order that certain questions be determined separately. The court also needed to consider the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure and whether ordering separate questions would serve that purpose.
In its reasoning, the court held that the limitation period under the Australian Consumer Law did apply to the applicant's claim. However, the court decided not to order that certain questions be determined separately, as it was of the view that doing so would not serve the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure. The court emphasised the importance of considering the efficiency and effectiveness of the legal process as a whole, rather than focusing on individual questions in isolation. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicant's application for an order that certain questions be determined separately.
In conclusion, the Federal Court of Australia dismissed Han Jing Pty Ltd's application for an order that certain questions be determined separately under rule 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. The court held that the limitation period under the Australian Consumer Law applied to the applicant's claim, but decided not to exercise its discretion to order separate questions, as it would not serve the overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. There be leave to the applicant to appeal.
2. The appeal is allowed.
3. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 11 December 2019 are set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered pursuant to s 104(3) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) that the following orders be made consequent upon the order made by the Federal Circuit Court on 17 July 2019 that the creditor's petition filed on 30 July 2018 be dismissed (Dismissal Order):
(a) the petitioning creditor do pay the reasonable remuneration of Mr William Roland Robson in administering the estate of Ms Victoria Samsakopoulos pursuant to the orders made by a registrar of the Federal Circuit Court exercising delegated judicial power (Administration) which orders ceased to have effect on 17 July 2019, such remuneration to be capped in the amount of $30,000 plus GST;
(b) the petitioning creditor do pay the costs and expenses reasonably and properly incurred by Mr Robson in the Administration prior to 17 July 2019;
(c) there be no order as to the remuneration, costs and expenses incurred by Mr Robson in respect of the Administration on or after 17 July 2019;
(d) to the extent necessary, all acts done prior to 17 July 2019 by Mr Robson when acting as trustee pursuant to the sequestration order made on 1 November 2018 or any person acting under the authority of Mr Robson when acting pursuant to the order are taken to have been validly done;
(e) to the extent necessary and to the extent possible without further order, all property that vested in Mr Robson when acting as trustee pursuant to the sequestration order made on 1 November 2018 that has not been returned to Ms Samsakopoulos shall vest immediately in Ms Samsakopoulos;
(f) there be liberty to Mr Robson to apply for such further orders as may be reasonably necessary to ensure that all property that vested in Mr Robson when acting as trustee pursuant to the sequestration order made on 1 November 2018 is vested in Ms Samsakopoulos and as soon as reasonably possible Mr Robson do apply pursuant to such liberty for such orders as may be reasonably necessary to vest the property in Ms Samsakopoulos;
(g) Mr Robson shall do all things as may be reasonably necessary to give effect to order (e) and any orders made pursuant to order (f);
(h) the petitioning creditor shall not by any means seek to recover any contribution from Ms Samsakopoulos in respect of any amount that the petitioning creditor is liable or becomes liable to pay pursuant to these orders;
(i) it is declared that Ms Samsakopoulos shall not have the status of a former bankrupt;
(j) there be no orders as to the costs of the application filed on 11 December 2019; and
(k) there be liberty to apply for any further consequential orders.
4. The appellant and first respondent shall each bear their own costs of the appeal.
5. On or before 2 September 2021, the appellant do file and serve an affidavit providing any explanation as to why the appellant failed to promptly give effect to the Dismissal Order and do show cause by affidavit and any submissions as to any reason why the Court should not appoint a registrar as a referee to inquire into the extent to which the failure by Mr Robson to promptly give effect to the Dismissal Order has caused loss or damage to Ms Samsakopoulos for the purpose of the Court formulating such further consequential orders pursuant to s 104(3) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act as may be appropriate in the circumstances which have occurred.
6. On or before 16 September 2021, Ms Samsakopoulos do file and serve any submissions in response to any submissions filed by the appellant pursuant to order 5.
7. The question whether there should be any further orders in the appeal be reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated in the Federal Circuit Court where the appellant filed a creditor's petition against the respondent, resulting in a sequestration order. The appellant's petition was later dismissed. Following this dismissal, the appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court for an order setting aside certain questions to be determined separately, citing the limitation period under the Australian Consumer Law. The Federal Circuit Court declined the application. Dissatisfied with this decision, the appellant appealed to the Federal Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the limitation period under the Australian Consumer Law applies in this case.
2. Whether the Federal Circuit Court correctly exercised its discretion under r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) not to order certain questions be determined separately.
3. What are the principles relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion in this context?
Held
1. The court held that the limitation period under the Australian Consumer Law does not apply in this case.
2. The court held that the Federal Circuit Court correctly exercised its discretion under r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) not to order certain questions be determined separately.
3. The court outlined the principles relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion in this context.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Thus, I do not consider that s 37 impinges upon or constrains the authority and discretion of the Court under s 104(3) (or s 35A(6)) to grant appropriate relief consequent upon dismissal of the petition.Can one set aside the sequestration order made by the registrar in an exercise of power under s 104(3) of the FCCA Act (or s 35A(6) of the FCA Act)? Before turning to matters of principle, as a matter of precedent, Pattison 155 FCR 226 stands as authority for an affirmative answer. The debate in the three sets of reasons was whether an annulment order could also be made, and if so, on what foundation. All agreed that the subsisting sequestration order be set aside. Further, that conclusion was not founded upon any flawed conception of the nature of the review. That said, as Colvin J says, there was an assumption, and no argument to the contrary, in Pattison as to the availability of an order to set aside the sequestration order. As the Court said in Bechara v Bates and as Colvin J says, the analysis of the nature of the review by Lander J (from which there was no dissent by Nicholson J or Jacobson J) accords with the views expressed in Bechara v Bates and the unbroken line of authority to which reference was made in Bechara v Bates. On that correct foundation, I would prefer not to see the approach in Pattison as to the availability of an order to set aside the sequestration order as wrongly founded on vitiation of the registrar’s decision, but rather as an exercise of power to make consequential orders. As a matter of practice and practicality an application for review under s 104(2) of the FCCA Act (or s 35A(5) of the FCA Act) may be made without any other application; it may be accompanied (as it was here by Ms Samsakopoulos) by an application for an annulment; it may be accompanied by an application under the rules (such as r 16.05(2)(a) or (b) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 or r 39.05(a) or (b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011), or under the inherent or implied power (Cameron v Cole) to set aside the sequestration order if no opportunity to be present was afforded, or perhaps for some other vitiating reason, perhaps jurisdictional error. Not infrequently given the nature of the jurisdiction, litigants are self-represented and their documents, claims and the jurisprudential bases therefor may be confused or wanting in expression. It is correct to say, as Colvin J does, as the Court did in Bechara v Bates and as Lander J did in Pattison that the demonstration of error on the part of the registrar is not a necessary part of the review. Rather, the review is the rehearing of the creditor’s petition and the earlier exercise of jurisdiction is not the subject of debate. Nevertheless, in the often confused or multiple applications, what happened before the registrar may be part of the whole controversy. Also, what happened at the hearing before the registrar may be relevant to the choice of consequential orders should the petition be dismissed on review.