Statutes—Delegated legislation—Family Law Rules—O 24 r 1(8) and (9)—Inadmissibility of evidence as to anything said in conference—Rule-making power vested in judges of Family Court—Scope of rule-making power—"Practice and procedure" of Family Court—Consistency with Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)—Matters arising under Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Family Law—Conference—Inadmissibility of evidence—Inconsistency with Act. Constitutional Law—Judicial power of Commonwealth—Family Law Rules—O 36A r 5(2)—Time limit of seven days on application for review of exercise by registrar of delegated powers of the Court—Whether effective supervision and control by Family Court over exercise of delegated powers—Validity of time limit for review. Statutes—Delegated legislation—Family Law Rules—Severance—Substantial purpose and effect of impugned provision—Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 37A, 79, 79A, 123. Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), ss 15A, 15C, 28, 46, 48, 48A, 48B, 49, 50. Family Law Rules.
Headnote
Hearing
CANBERRA, 21 March 1996 #DATE 24:4:1996
Counsel for the Appellant D. M. J. Bennett QC with G. Richardson
Solicitors for the Appellant Keddies
Counsel for the Respondent M. D. Broun QC with P. E. Nygh
Solicitors for the Respondent Adrian Twigg and Co
Interveners G. Griffith QC, Solicitor General for the Commonwealth with E. Willheim for the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth, instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor
Orders
1. Appeal allowed. 2. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Family Court of 14 March 1995 and 17 July 1995. 3. Remit the matter to the Full Court of the Family Court (a) to determine any outstanding issues on appeal from the primary judge, and (b) to make such order (if any) as the Full Court considers just as to the costs in the proceedings to date before the primary judge and in the Full Court of the Family Court. 4. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of this appeal.
Decisions
BRENNAN CJ, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON, McHUGH AND GUMMOW JJ. This appeal is brought from the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia (Ellis, Lindenmayer and Chisholm JJ) (1). The Full Court set aside orders made by a judge of that Court (Moss J) and remitted for rehearing certain applications by the appellant. Both Moss J and the Full Court made costs orders pursuant to s 117(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). It is accepted by both parties that, if the appeal to this Court succeeds, there will still remain for disposition various grounds of appeal against the decision of the primary judge with which, given the course it took, the Full Court did not deal. Accordingly, if this Court allows the appeal, the consequential order must be the remission of the matter to the Full Court for further hearing of the appeal to it.
2. The issues which attracted the grant of special leave by this Court, and which were pursued at the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Harrington v Lowe
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Harrington v Lowe [1996] HCA 8
Case
[1996] HCA 8
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland in a dispute between Harrington and Lowe. The core of the disagreement concerned the interpretation and enforceability of a deed of settlement and release entered into by the parties.
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the deed of settlement was valid and binding, and if so, whether it effectively released Lowe from all claims Harrington might have had against him, including those arising from alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. The Court also had to determine the proper construction of the release clause within the deed.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, reasoned that the deed of settlement was a valid and binding agreement. Their Honours applied principles of contract law, emphasizing the importance of clear and unambiguous language in release clauses. They found that the wording of the deed, particularly the phrase "all and all manner of actions and causes of action," was sufficiently broad to encompass the claims Harrington sought to pursue, including those related to fiduciary duties. The Court held that the parties had intended to achieve a final and comprehensive resolution of all disputes through the deed, and that Harrington had, by executing the deed, released Lowe from any further claims.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland, and ordered that Harrington's claim be dismissed.