Zurich Insurance Company Ltd v Koper

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER, GORDON, EDELMAN, STEWARD, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ

ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY LTD & ANOR             APPELLANTS

AND

DARIUSZ KOPER & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Zurich Insurance Company Ltd v Koper

[2023] HCA 25

Date of Hearing: 13 April 2023
Date of Judgment: 8 August 2023

S147/2022

ORDER

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

B W Walker SC with G E S Ng for the appellants (instructed by Wotton + Kearney)

N C Hutley SC with M F Caristo and B A O'Connor for the first respondent (instructed by Piper Alderman)

S P Donaghue KC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, with B K Lim and J G Wherrett for the second respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ.   The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) ("the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act") is designed to streamline the process for resolving civil proceedings with trans-Tasman elements[1] and to implement in Australian law the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement ("the Trans-Tasman Agreement")[2].

    [1]Section 3(a) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act.

    [2]Section 3(c) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act.

  2. Article 4 of the Trans-Tasman Agreement provides, amongst other things, that "[i]nitiating process in civil proceedings in a court within the territory of one Party may be served, without leave of a court, in the territory of the other Party"[3] and that "[s]ervice rendered in accordance with this Article shall have the same effect as if it had occurred in the jurisdiction of the court in which the initiating process was issued"[4]. The Trans-Tasman Agreement defines "court within the territory of a Party", for Australia, to include any court of a State[5].

    [3]Article 4(1) of the Trans-Tasman Agreement.

    [4]Article 4(2) of the Trans-Tasman Agreement.

    [5]Article 1 of the Trans-Tasman Agreement (definition of "court within the territory of a Party").

  3. Part 2 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act, which is headed "Service in New Zealand of initiating documents issued by Australian courts and tribunals", is specifically designed to implement Art 4 of the Trans-Tasman Agreement in Australian law[6]. Within the meaning of the Act, an "Australian court" includes a court of a State[7] and an "initiating document" in relation to an Australian court is a document by which a civil proceeding is commenced in that court or by reference to which a person becomes a party to a civil proceeding in that court[8].

    [6]Australia, House of Representatives, Trans-Tasman Proceedings Bill 2009, Explanatory Memorandum at 6.

    [7]Section 4 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (definition of "Australian court").

    [8]Section 4 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act (definition of "initiating document").

  4. Key provisions within Pt 2 are ss 9 and 10. Subject to limited exceptions[9], s 9(1) permits an initiating…

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Details
Case
[2023] HCA 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Zurich Insurance Company Ltd (the appellant) against a decision concerning service of process outside Australia. The first respondent, Mr Koper, sought leave to bring proceedings against the appellant insurers in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The ability to do so was contingent on whether proceedings could have been brought against a New Zealand resident insured in New South Wales, and whether service on that insured in New Zealand would have been effective under the *Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010* (Cth) (TTPA).

The central legal issues before the Court were whether sections 9 and 10 of the TTPA had valid application to an initiating document issued by a State court in relation to a civil proceeding within a State jurisdiction. This involved examining the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament under section 51(xxix) of the Constitution, and whether there were any implied limitations on this power derived from sections 51(xxiv), 77(ii), and 77(iii) of the Constitution that would render the TTPA invalid in this context. The Court also considered the implications of the Constitution's structure on the capacity of the Commonwealth Parliament to alter the scope and reach of State judicial power.

The Court reasoned that section 51(xxiv) of the Constitution expressly grants the Commonwealth Parliament the power to make laws with respect to the service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and criminal process of the courts of the States. This provision demonstrates that it is consistent with the constitutional structure for Commonwealth legislation to extend the reach of State court process. The existence of this specific legislative power was sufficient to deny the existence of any implied structural limitation that the appellant insurers argued would invalidate the application of the TTPA to State court proceedings. Consequently, the Court found that sections 9 and 10 of the TTPA were within the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament and had valid application to initiating documents issued by State courts in State jurisdiction.

The High Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ GORDON, EDELMAN AND STEWARD JJ
Far from constituting an exception to a general rule pursuant to which it is inconsistent with the nature of State judicial power for the reach of the process of a State court in a proceeding in State jurisdiction to be extended by Commonwealth legislation, s 51(xxiv) of the Constitution demonstrates that for Commonwealth legislation to extend the reach of the process of a State court in a proceeding in State jurisdiction is wholly consistent with the structure of the Constitution. Section 51(xxiv) "is a legislative power given to the central legislature for the very purpose of securing the enforcement of the civil and criminal process of each State in every other State [and Territory]"[48]. The very existence of s 51(xxiv) is sufficient to deny the existence of the structural implication for which the Insurers argued.[48]Aston v Irvine (1955) 92 CLR 353 at 364. See also Dalton v New South Wales Crime Commission (2006) 227 CLR 490 at 500-501 [23].Conclusion Sections 9 and 10 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act are within the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament under s 51(xxix) of the Constitution. They have valid application to an initiating document issued by a State court in relation to a civil proceeding in State jurisdiction no less than they have valid application to an initiating document issued by a State court in relation to a matter in federal jurisdiction. The appeal must be dismissed. Mr Koper's costs of the appeal must be paid by the Insurers. The facts and circumstances of the present appeal are set out in the reasons of the other members of the Court ("the Joint Reasons"). So are the provisions of the applicable federal and State legislation. We agree that the appeal must be dismissed. We write separately to address three matters: constitutional implications, the so-called "constitutional conception of 'jurisdiction'" and, finally, the premise on which this appeal was argued.Constitutional implications In Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth ("ACTV")[49], in a passage quoted with approval by Brennan CJ in McGinty v Western Australia[50], Mason CJ said:"It may not be right to say that no implication will be made unless it is necessary. In cases where the implication is sought to be derived from the actual terms of the Constitution it may be sufficient that the relevant intention is manifested according to the accepted principles of interpretation. However, where the implication is structural rather than textual it is no doubt correct to say that the term sought to be implied must be logically or practically necessary for the preservation of the integrity of that structure."[49](1992) 177 CLR 106 at 135.[50](1996) 186 CLR 140 at 168-169. Contrary to how that statement is applied in the Joint Reasons, Mason CJ was saying little more than that the process of constitutional interpretation is not mechanistic or literalist. The meaning conveyed by the words of the Constitution may be deeper and more nuanced than that which is revealed by the attribution of singular dictionary meanings to particular words.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, GAGELER, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ, GORDON, EDELMAN AND STEWARD JJ

Full text does not contain this section.