Tresize v National Australia Bank Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tresize v National Australia Bank Limited [2020] FCA 902

File numbers: VG 200 of 1992
VID 1382 of 2018
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 26 June 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary dismissal – where the applicant claimed that consent orders made in 1993 should be set aside on the basis of fraud on the part of the respondent – where the applicant had brought at least three earlier proceedings seeking to have the consent orders set aside – whether the claims should be permanently stayed or dismissed on the basis of abuse of process, Anshun estoppel, res judicata or issue estoppel – whether the claims should be dismissed on the ground that they had no reasonable prospect of success or constituted an abuse of process
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth)

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 26.01, 39.05

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)

Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic)

Cases cited:

Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCA 973

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW (2006) 226 CLR 256

Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311

Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235

Huddersfield Banking Co Ltd v Henry Lister & Son Ltd [1895] 2 Ch 273

Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw [2006] FCA 22

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589

Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Spies v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 24 NSWLR 691

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2008) 171 FCR 174

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507

Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149

UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 265 CLR 77

Urban Transport Authority of NSW v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471

Date of hearing: 30 January 2020
Date of last submissions: 23 June 2020
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 138
Counsel for the First Applicant in VG 200/1992 and Counsel for the Applicant in VID 1382/2018: Mr Tresize appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent in each Proceeding: Mr DC Morgan
Solicitor for the Respondent in each Proceeding: King & Wood Mallesons

ORDERS

VG 200 of 1992
BETWEEN:

JOHN COLIN MAXWELL TRESIZE

First Applicant

MONICA ANN TRESIZE

Second Applicant

REMEA PTY LTD (ACN 006 356 047) (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)

Respondent

JUDGE:

MOSHINSKY J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 JUNE 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The first applicant’s interlocutory application filed on 5 July 2018 be dismissed.

2.Within 14 days, each party provide a written submission (of no more than three pages) on the issue of the costs of the interlocutory application.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 902
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Mr Tresize sought to set aside consent orders made in 1993 on the basis of fraud by the Bank. This case involves a complex and lengthy procedural history, with Mr Tresize having previously brought at least three proceedings attempting to have the consent orders set aside. The Bank applied for the dismissal of Mr Tresize's claims on grounds of abuse of process, Anshun estoppel, res judicata, issue estoppel, and lack of reasonable prospect of success.

The court was required to decide whether Mr Tresize's claims should be permanently stayed or dismissed due to the aforementioned legal principles, as well as whether they should be dismissed on the ground that they had no reasonable prospect of success or constituted an abuse of process. The court considered Mr Tresize's arguments, which included claims of fraud, misleading or deceptive conduct, and unconscionable conduct by the Bank. The court also examined the statutory provisions cited by Mr Tresize in his statement of claim.

The court ultimately dismissed Mr Tresize's interlocutory application and the proceeding. The court found that Mr Tresize's claims constituted an abuse of process or had no reasonable prospect of success, or both. The court ordered that Mr Tresize's interlocutory application dated 16 June 2020 be dismissed, the proceeding be dismissed, and the applicant's interlocutory application provided to the Court on 14 December 2018 be dismissed. The court also requested written submissions on the issue of costs from each party within 14 days.

In summary, the Federal Court of Australia dismissed Mr Tresize's attempt to set aside the 1993 consent orders on the basis of fraud by the Bank. The court found that Mr Tresize's claims constituted an abuse of process or had no reasonable prospect of success, or both, and dismissed his proceeding accordingly.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 16 June 2020 be dismissed.

2. The proceeding be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 on the basis that each of the claims constitutes an abuse of process or has no reasonable prospect of success, or both.

3. The applicant’s interlocutory application provided to the Court on 14 December 2018 be dismissed.

4. Within 14 days, each party provide a written submission (of no more than three pages) on the issue of costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the outset of the hearing, Mr Tresize sought an adjournment so as to prepare an amended statement of claim in the 2018 Proceeding and to enable a mediation to take place. I refused the application for the adjournment for reasons given at the time. These included the lengthy procedural history of the matter. Among other things, the Bank’s interlocutory application seeking a permanent stay or summary dismissal of the 2018 Proceeding had been listed for hearing on two earlier occasions, and each of those dates had been vacated to give Mr Tresize more time to prepare his material. In refusing the application for an adjournment, I indicated that, in considering the Bank’s interlocutory application, I would have regard to allegations in Mr Tresize’s affidavits as well as those in his statement of claim.Background factsThe 1992 Proceeding In 1992, Mr Tresize, Monica Tresize, Remea and others commenced the 1992 Proceeding against the Bank (Federal Court proceeding VG 200 of 1992). A convenient summary of the allegations in the statement of claim in the 1992 Proceeding is provided in the judgment of French J in the 1994 Proceeding:The statement of claim [in the 1992 Proceeding] alleged an agreement between Max and Monica Tresize and Remea on the one hand and the Bank on the other made in July 1988 whereby if the Tresizes channelled all their property business through the Bank it would give favourable consideration to applications for finance to fund purchases of property made by them and provide expertise and advice in relation to the funding and financial side of their business. The agreement was said to have been constituted by conversations between Max Tresize and [Jeffrey] Smallacombe [, the manager of the Somerville branch of the Bank,] over a number of meetings in July and August 1988. Alleged terms of the agreement were that the Bank would act in good faith for the benefit of the Tresizes, would act with reasonable care in relation to the provision of advice to them on matters concerning financial aspects of their business and carrying out actions on their behalf and would act honestly. These were all said to be implied terms of the agreement.Under the agreement, Max and Monica Tresize and Remea commenced to channel all their property business through the Bank, made applications exclusively to the Bank for finance and refinanced all of their financial commitments through the Bank.They alleged that the Bank failed to act in good faith in that in or about September 1989 Smallacombe and [Daryl] Pearce [, a regional manager of the Bank, based in Mornington,] threatened to withdraw Bank support unless they agreed to enter into a partnership with them to share the profits of the Park Lane enterprise. Pearce and Smallacombe allegedly took advantage of the relationship between themselves and the Tresizes and the trust which had been established and did so in order to enrich themselves. Moreover it was said that after Max Tresize had agreed to enter into a partnership with Smallacombe and Pearce they provided advice and took actions designed to profit and enrich themselves and that they preferred the property in which they had an interest at the expense of other properties owned by Max and Monica Tresize and Remea.The Bank was also said to have breached its duty to take reasonable care in relation to the provision of advice and actions taken on behalf of the Tresizes. This allegation was based in part on advice provided by Smallacombe and Pearce that the Tresizes should not accept an offer to purchase Park Lane at a profit of $300,000 but should enter into an arrangement with Smallacombe and Pearce personally so as to share profits from that enterprise. Other matters pleaded included an advice that allotments in Park Lane should not continue to be sold and that funds should be channelled from the development of a property at Hastings into the development of the Park Lane property. Also the Bank’s officers had allegedly advised the Tresizes to take out an offshore loan in circumstances where they had no realistic prospect of obtaining such a loan and where the Bank lacked the necessary infrastructure to undertake its administration. Further advice in relation to the offshore loan complained of included the referral to the financial broker, Uren, and the suggestion in 1990 and 1991 that the Tresizes conduct their affairs on the assumption that they would obtain an overseas loan and should not dispose of certain properties but maintain an essential core to be used as security for that loan. It was said that Smallacombe and Pearce advised Max and Monica Tresize to get a partner to inject capital into their enterprise and made arrangements with Gary Condon for the Bank to lend him $400,000 to the credit of the Tresizes so that he could purchase a half share of profits from the development of the property called Nyora. This was in circumstances where there was little realistic prospect of repayment. Again, in December 1990 it was alleged they advised the Tresizes to arrange to inject mortgage funds from a former solicitor of Max Tresize’s, Brian Kollias, into their business when there was no realistic prospect of repayment of such funds.The statement of claim also pleaded that Smallacombe and Pearce acted carelessly and made damaging and carleess statements in relation to a property at Cranbourne. In breach of the duty to act honestly, it was said they acted dishonestly and to enrich themselves at the expense of the Tresizes. Representations as to Pearce’s expertise in matters of property development and subdivision were false and induced the Tresizes to act in accordance with his advice. Representations made by Pearce as to the readiness of the Bank to provide finance in connection with the development of specific properties were said to have been [dishonest]. The representations and other elements of the conduct of Pearce and Smallacombe also constituted misleading or deceptive conduct or conduct likely to mislead or deceive under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and/or s 11 of the Fair Trading Act 1985 (Vic). It was said to be unconscionable for the Bank to resile from its representations and promises. It had failed in its duty of care in various ways particularised. By reason of all of these matters it was pleaded the Tresizes had suffered loss and damage.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Tresize claims that the Consent Orders should be set aside pursuant to r 39.05(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 on the ground that the orders were obtained by fraud on the part of the Bank. Mr Tresize also relies on paragraphs (d), (e), (f) and (g) of r 39.05. The paragraphs of r 39.05 relied on by Mr Tresize are as follows:39.05 Varying or setting aside judgment or order after it has been enteredThe Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:…(b) it was obtained by fraud; or…(d) it is an injunction or for the appointment of a receiver; or(e) it does not reflect the intention of the Court; or(f) the party in whose favour it was made consents; or(g) there is a clerical mistake in a judgment or order; … The SOC also refers to a number of statutory provisions, including provisions of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic), the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth), and the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Mr Tresize’s contentions can be summarised as follows.(a)The Bank obtained both the Consent Orders and the Deed of Settlement by fraud, misleading or deceptive conduct, or unconscionable conduct. In particular:(i)Prior to the Deed of Settlement being entered into, the Bank falsely represented the amounts owing by the applicants (to the 1992 Proceeding) to the Bank and that certain mortgages were in default. In particular:·the applicants’ facilities were capped at $5 million, but the Deed of Settlement fraudulently stated that $11,376,564.30 (being the total of $7,962,231.60 and $3,414,332.70) was owing by Mr Tresize, Monica Tresize and Remea – SOC paragraph 11;·the Deed of Settlement incorrectly stated that Marie Lorraine Tresize, the wife of Kevin Tresize, owed $658,522.37 to the Bank – SOC paragraphs 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39; ·the amounts referred to in the Deed of Settlement in respect of Lot 2, Kenmure Park and a property at Ballarto Road, Cranbourne did not reflect the amounts actually borrowed – SOC paragraphs 63 and 75;·the Bank falsely represented that certain mortgages were in default when they were not – Mr Tresize’s affidavit dated 20 January 2020 (the January 2020 Affidavit), paragraphs 15, 36, 170, 172, 210, 218, 220;·the interest and other charges claimed by the Bank (prior to the Deed of Settlement being entered into) were substantially overstated – January 2020 Affidavit, paragraphs 21, 26, 37, 38-45, 61, 73-101, 115, 126, 130, 158, 159, 171, 179, 197, 199;·one of the guarantees relied on by the Bank in its cross-claim in the 1992 Proceeding was false and another was partially discharged – January 2020 Affidavit, paragraphs 21, 193;·the amounts claimed by the Bank prior to the Deed of Settlement being entered into were substantially overstated – January 2020 Affidavit, paragraphs 27, 29, 35, 52, 53, 58, 70, 203.(ii)The Bank did not disclose, prior to Mr Tresize signing the Deed of Settlement, that the properties would be sold but the proceeds would not be applied to reduce the debt, such that the debt would remain the same indefinitely; had this been disclosed, Mr Tresize would not have signed the Deed of Settlement – SOC paragraphs 19, 20, 24 and 25.(iii)The Consent Orders differ significantly from, and do not reflect, the Deed of Settlement. In particular:·the Consent Orders represented that the debts were separate from the debts in the Deed of Settlement – SOC paragraph 9(a);·the Consent Orders did not reflect the agreed basis of the settlement, which was that the applicants gave the Bank possession of the properties in lieu of the debts – SOC paragraph 9(b)-(e);·the Consent Orders doubled the amount of the debt, such that $22,753,128.60 became owing by the applicants – SOC paragraph 9(f);·the Consent Orders were not sighted by the applicants prior to being made by the Court – SOC paragraph 9(g);·the Consent Orders provided that the Bank “recovers” possession of the various properties, while the Deed of Settlement referred to the applicants “granting” possession of the properties to the Bank – SOC paragraph 12; and·the Consent Orders incorrectly stated that the Bank recovered possession of the property known as Bower Park, in circumstances where no debt in respect of that property was identified in the Consent Orders – SOC paragraph 40.(b)The Bank refuses to disclose details concerning the application of the proceeds of realisation of the secured properties pursuant to the Deed of Settlement. In particular:(i)the Bank has not disclosed the amounts of the proceeds realised after sales of the properties – SOC paragraphs 18, 27, 30, 32, 72 and 74;(ii)the Bank has refused to disclose to Mr Tresize the real amount of the debt, if any, owing to the Bank – SOC paragraphs 57, 58, 61 and 62;(iii)the Bank has refused to provide copies of the mortgage documents for the properties in the Deed of Settlement – SOC paragraphs 72, 73, 75 and 76.(c)The Bank has falsely claimed, and falsely claims, that the applicants (to the 1992 Proceeding) continue to owe money to the Bank. In particular:(i)from 1993 to the present, the Bank has falsely, recklessly and fraudulently claimed that the applicants owe $22,753,128.60 – SOC paragraph 11;(ii)the Bank has sold the properties referred to in the Deed of Settlement, but the debt owing, as stated in the Consent Orders, has remained the same – SOC paragraphs 13 and 29; and(iii)the Bank, as at 2018, was claiming that Mr Tresize and Remea still owed the debts listed in the Consent Orders – SOC paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 28.(d)The Bank took possession of and sold the properties referred to in the Deed of Settlement, but failed to apply the proceeds of sale to the debt owed by the applicants – SOC paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 26, 31 and 72.(e)The Bank has breached the Deed of Settlement, or otherwise engaged in improper conduct, in relation to Lot 2, Kenmure Park. In particular:(i)pursuant to the Deed of Settlement, the Bank is liable for debts (including rates) in respect of Lot 2, Kenmure Park for the period up to April 2018 (when the Bank released its mortgage in respect of the property); this is because the Bank was in possession of the property from the time of the Deed of Settlement and the Consent Orders – SOC paragraphs 41, 42, 43, 51, 52, 77, 78 and 84; (ii)the Bank has represented, falsely, that it did not take possession of Lot 2, Kenmure Park – SOC paragraphs 44 and 45;(iii)there was no agreement between the Bank and Mr Tresize or Remea to the effect that they would be liable for the rates and any other utilities in relation to Lot 2, Kenmure Park; the only agreement was for Monica Tresize to be able to reside in the property during her lifetime – SOC paragraphs 46, 48, 49, 50, 69 and 79;(iv)in breach of the Deed of Settlement, the Bank left Lot 2, Kenmure Park in the name of Remea, rather than transferring the property to the Bank’s own name – SOC paragraphs 47, 64, 65 and 66;(v)the Bank has claimed, falsely, that Remea is responsible for the rates in relation to Lot 2, Kenmure Park – SOC paragraphs 50, 67 and 80;(vi)the Bank has claimed, falsely, that Mr Tresize, by executing the Deed of Settlement, agreed to be responsible for the rates – SOC paragraphs 53 and 54;(vii)as a result of the Bank’s breaches, Remea has suffered loss or damage, namely that the City of Casey claims that Remea is responsible for outstanding rates of approximately $51,637.74, and the costs associated with a broken water line – SOC paragraph 68; and(viii)the Bank applied an incorrect amount to the mortgage of Lot 2, Kenmure Park – SOC paragraphs 71 and 74.(f)The Consent Orders no longer reflect the intention of the Court, or are misleading, and therefore should be set aside – SOC paragraph 58. In particular:(i)the Consent Orders present a false and misleading picture, namely that substantial debts are owed by the applicants to the Bank, in circumstances where the Bank has sold the applicants’ properties in lieu of those debts – SOC paragraphs 55, 56, 58, 59, 60 and 85;(ii)if the debts remain in the Consent Orders, it would mean that the Bank has stolen the applicants’ land – SOC paragraph 81; and(iii)Lot 2, Kenmure Park should be removed from the Consent Orders in circumstances where the Bank has released its mortgage – SOC paragraphs 34, 82 and 83.(g)In August 1993, the Bank improperly sold a property at Nyora, Victoria (which is not included in the Deed of Settlement) pursuant to a mortgage given by the Tresizes to Brian Kollias and has failed to account for the proceeds – SOC paragraphs 70 and 71; January 2020 Affidavit, paragraphs 221-241.(h)The Bank has failed to discharge its mortgages with respect to two properties formerly owned by Mr Tresize, namely McDonalds Track, Lang Lang and Westernport Road, Lang Lang – January 2020 Affidavit, paragraph 216.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court considered the Bank's interlocutory application seeking a permanent stay or summary dismissal of the 2018 Proceeding, which was brought by Mr Tresize seeking to set aside consent orders made in 1993 on the basis of fraud. The Court found that the proceeding should be dismissed on the grounds that each of the claims constituted an abuse of process or had no reasonable prospect of success, or both. The Court concluded that the proceeding was an abuse of process due to the lengthy procedural history of the matter and the numerous earlier proceedings brought by Mr Tresize seeking to have the consent orders set aside. The Court also found that the claims had no reasonable prospect of success, as Mr Tresize had not provided sufficient evidence to support his allegations of fraud.

In reaching its decision, the Court considered the legal principles of abuse of process and the reasonable prospect of success. The Court noted that an abuse of process occurs where a party brings a proceeding for an improper purpose, such as to harass or intimidate the other party. The Court also noted that a proceeding has no reasonable prospect of success where the claims are not supported by evidence or are otherwise unmeritorious.

The Court further found that the proceeding was also barred by issue estoppel, as the issues raised by Mr Tresize had already been determined in earlier proceedings. The Court also found that the proceeding was barred by Anshun estoppel, as Mr Tresize had knowledge of the relevant facts and issues at the time the consent orders were made and did not raise them at that time.

In reaching its decision, the Court distinguished prior authority on the grounds that the facts of this case were unique, and the lengthy procedural history of the matter warranted a finding of abuse of process. The Court also noted that the principle of issue estoppel is a strong one, and should be applied to prevent parties from relitigating issues that have already been determined.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a proceeding may be dismissed on the grounds of abuse of process or lack of reasonable prospect of success where there is a lengthy procedural history of the matter and the claims are not supported by evidence or are otherwise unmeritorious. The decision also establishes that issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel may be applied to bar proceedings where the relevant facts and issues were known to the party at the time a prior judgment or order was made, and were not raised at that time.