Tresize v National Australia Bank Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tresize v National Australia Bank Limited [2005] FCA 1095

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ‑ application to strike out statement of claim or part thereof ‑ principal application seeks setting aside of consent judgment ‑ bases upon which consent judgment can be impugned ‑ pleading fraud ‑ pleading deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation ‑ whether statement of claim embarrassing ‑ whether fails to disclose reasonable cause of action.

Federal Court Rules, O 11 r 16

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134 distinguished
Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632 cited
Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 cited
Brookfield v Yevad Products Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1164 distinguished
Spies v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 24 NSWLR 691 discussed
Huddersfield Banking Co Ltd v Henry Lister & Son Ltd [1895] 2 Ch 273 cited
Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563 cited
Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235 cited
Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 cited
Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215 cited
Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1882) 11 QBD 55 cited
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 cited

G Dal Pont, ‘Judgments Fraudulently Obtained: The Forgotten Equity’ (1995) 14 University of Tasmania Law Review 129

JOHN COLIN MAXWELL TRESIZE and REMEA PTY LTD (ACN 006 356 047) v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937) and ORS

VID 338 OF 2004

SUNDBERG J
MELBOURNE

11 AUGUST 2005


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 338 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

JOHN COLIN MAXWELL TRESIZE and REMEA PTY LTD (ACN 006 356 047)
APPLICANTS

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
FIRST RESPONDENT

MARTIN SAXON BROWN
SECOND RESPONDENT

MARY KATHLEEN TRESIZE-BROWN
THIRD RESPONDENT

KEVIN ALLAN ADRIELLE TRESIZE
FOURTH RESPONDENT

MARIE LORRAINE TRESIZE-BROWN
FIFTH RESPONDENT

TANIA LEE TRESIZE
SIXTH RESPONDENT

SHANE MICHAEL TREZISE
SEVENTH RESPONDENT

JANINE VERONICA TRESIZE
EIGHTH RESPONDENT

GREGORY WILLIAM BIRT
NINTH RESPONDENT

MONICA ANN TRESIZE (BY HER GUARDIAN TANIA LEE TRESIZE)
TENTH RESPONDENT

JOHN ROSS VINE WILLIAMS
ELEVENTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 AUGUST 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.On the motion of the first respondent, notice of which was filed on 26 November 2004, paragraphs 79 to 92 of the amended statement of claim be struck out.

2.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the said motion.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 338 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

JOHN COLIN MAXWELL TRESIZE and REMEA PTY LTD (ACN 006 356 047)
APPLICANTS

AND:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED (ACN 004 044 937)
FIRST RESPONDENT

MARTIN SAXON BROWN
SECOND RESPONDENT

MARY KATHLEEN TRESIZE-BROWN
THIRD RESPONDENT

KEVIN ALLAN ADRIELLE TRESIZE
FOURTH RESPONDENT

MARIE LORRAINE TRESIZE-BROWN
FIFTH RESPONDENT

TANIA LEE TRESIZE
SIXTH RESPONDENT

SHANE MICHAEL TREZISE
SEVENTH RESPONDENT

JANINE VERONICA TRESIZE
EIGHTH RESPONDENT

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 1095
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Tresize v National Australia Bank Ltd, the primary focus was on the validity of a consent judgment and the accompanying statement of claim filed by the applicants. The dispute centred around the applicants' request to set aside the consent judgment, challenging its legitimacy due to alleged misrepresentations and lack of proper disclosure during the 1992 proceedings. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the respondents argued that the statement of claim contained superfluous information that did not pertain to the current proceedings.

The legal issues before the court involved the necessity and propriety of the content within the applicants' statement of claim. The respondents contended that the statement included irrelevant historical details that did not serve a useful purpose in the context of the current motion. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the applicants' grounds for seeking to set aside the consent judgment were sufficient and whether the extensive recounting of past events was necessary or appropriate.

The court found that while the applicants were entitled to challenge the consent judgment, the statement of claim included unnecessary details that exceeded what was required for the current proceedings. The judge ordered that specific paragraphs (79 to 92) of the statement of claim be struck out as they did not contribute to the resolution of the current issues. Furthermore, the applicants were directed to pay the respondents' costs associated with the motion.

In conclusion, the court granted the first respondent's motion to strike out certain paragraphs of the statement of claim and ordered the applicants to cover the associated costs. This decision underscored the importance of limiting the scope of pleadings to relevant and necessary information in legal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. On the motion of the first respondent, notice of which was filed on 26 November 2004, paragraphs 79 to 92 of the amended statement of claim be struck out.

2. The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the said motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG J
Finally, counsel for the first respondent characterised the assignment as simply a means by which the first respondent sought to protect its position in relation to the Nyora property once Kollias had indicated his inability to repay the funds that it had lent to him on the security of that property. That may well be correct.CONCLUSION For the above reasons I do not propose to order that the remainder of the statement of claim be struck out. At the same time, the applicants should be under no illusion that it is free of defects. Without limiting the generality of that warning, I note that though the applicants ask the Court to set aside the consent judgment, the grounds upon which they do so are confined to only one of the many issues that were raised in the 1992 proceeding. I therefore fail to see what purpose is served by recounting in detail and at length the entirety of the alleged conduct that gave rise to those proceedings ‑ or even a significant proportion of it. Much of what is included the remainder of the statement of claim travels far beyond what is necessary or proper to provide a useful context for the instant proceedings. I refer also to what I have said in the last sentence in [60]. I will order that paras 79 to 92 of the statement of claim be struck out. I will also order that the applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motion.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SUNDBERG J

Full text does not contain this section.