Wollongong Corporation v Cowan

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93 CLR 435

COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF GREATER

WOLLONGONG COWAN

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

NEW SOUTH WALES Appeal-New trial-Verdict regularly obtained-Fresh evidence-Availity and

character of evidence-Reason for non-production on first trial-Standard necessary before Court will interfere-Presentation of fresh evidence to appellate court-Necessity for fullest detail.

Leaving aside cases where a trial has miscarried through misdirection, misreception or wrongful rejection of evidence or other error, and cases of surprise, malpractice or fraud, it is essential to give effect to the rule that a verdict, regularly obtained, should not be disturbed without some insistent demand of justice. The discovery of fresh evidence in such circumstances can rarely, if ever, be a ground for a new trial unless (a) it is reasonably clear that if such evidence had been available at the first trial and had been adduced, there would have been an opposite result, (b) if it is not reasonably clear that such would have been the outcome, it must have been so highly likely as to make it unreasonable to suppose otherwise, and (c) reasonable diligence had been exercised prior to the first trial to procure such evidence.

In support of an application for a new trial of an action on the ground of the discovery of fresh evidence the solicitor for the unsuccessful plaintiff made an affidavit wherein he deposed that following the trial of the action he inter- viewed the plaintiff who subsequently gave him certain information as a result of which he contacted an officer of the defendant council and made further inquiries. The affidavit did not state when the plaintiff first learned the 04 certain information" subsequently communicated to the solicitor, the name or position of the officer or the precise nature of the information, nor did it reveal what further in quiries were made. As a result of such inquiries

93 CLR 436

it was stated that the solicitor verily believed that further evidence was available that (i) on 18th January 1951 the then chief clerk of the defendant council had sustained injury by slipping on the same polished linoleum as that on which the plaintiff had slipped some seventeen months later and at a spot eight to ten feet removed from that where the plaintiff had fallen, (ii) that a file relating to this occurrence existed and had existed when the solicitor interviewed the chief city health inspector, one Way, prior to the first trial, (iii) that no file existed in relation to other similar incidents occurring in the council's main office but that verbal reports had been made concerning them by Way to his superiors, (iv) that after the date of the plaintiff's injury Way had instructed the cleaners of the defendant council to apply polish more sparingly to the linoleum in question, (v) that shortly after the plaintiff's accident another woman had slipped and fallen at a spot some six feet from where the plaintiff had fallen, (vi) that thereafter and before the issue of the plaintiff's writ Way…

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Details
Case
[1955] HCA 16
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning a personal injury claim brought by Mrs. Maizie Cowan against the Council of the City of Greater Wollongong. Mrs. Cowan alleged that she suffered injury due to the Council's negligence in maintaining a slippery, polished linoleum floor in the town hall. After a jury found in favour of the Council, Mrs. Cowan appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking a new trial on the grounds of fresh evidence discovered after the initial trial. The Supreme Court granted a new trial, and the Council appealed this decision to the High Court.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Supreme Court erred in granting a new trial based on the discovery of fresh evidence. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the newly discovered evidence met the stringent legal criteria required to disturb a verdict that had been regularly obtained. This involved assessing whether the evidence was likely to produce an opposite result, whether reasonable diligence had been exercised to obtain such evidence prior to the first trial, and whether the affidavit supporting the application for a new trial was sufficiently detailed and credible.

The High Court reasoned that a verdict regularly obtained should only be disturbed in exceptional circumstances, such as where justice demands it due to the discovery of fresh evidence. The Court outlined the established legal principles: the fresh evidence must be reasonably clear to have produced an opposite result, or at least be so highly likely to do so as to make the contrary unreasonable. Furthermore, the party seeking a new trial must demonstrate that reasonable diligence was exercised to procure the evidence before the first trial. The Court found the affidavit in this case to be inadequate, lacking specific details about the witnesses, the precise nature of the evidence, and the inquiries made. It concluded that the fresh evidence, which largely concerned prior and subsequent incidents and did not definitively prove the Council's knowledge of an unusual danger at the time of the accident, did not meet the required standard of cogency. The Court also found that the requirement of reasonable diligence had not been fulfilled.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, discharged the order of the Supreme Court granting a new trial, and dismissed Mrs. Cowan's appeal to the Supreme Court. The Council was awarded its costs.

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