FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Burhala v Commissioner of Taxation [2020] FCA 1854
File number: VID 1390 of 2019 Judgment of: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 23 December 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary dismissal or strike out of whole statement of claim – where the applicant was a bankrupt residing in Romania – where the respondent was a creditor of the bankrupt – where the applicant alleged that an earlier interlocutory judgment of the Court should be set aside on the basis that it had been obtained by fraud or because there were exceptional circumstances – where the applicant alleged that the respondent had enforced or was seeking to enforce a remedy against the person or property of the bankrupt in respect of a provable debt in contravention of s 58(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – whether the claims should be summarily dismissed or struck out
BANKRUPTCY – where the applicant was a bankrupt residing in Romania – where the respondent was a creditor of the bankrupt – where the applicant alleged that the respondent had enforced or was seeking to enforce a remedy against the person or property of the bankrupt in respect of a provable debt in contravention of s 58(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – whether the bankrupt had standing to bring the claim
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 58
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 16.21, 26.01, 39.05
Cases cited: Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 154 CLR 589
Commissioner of Taxation v Yeo (Trustee) [2018] FCA 635
Commissioner of Taxation v Yeo (Trustee) (No 2) [2019] FCA 1188
Coumanios v Giunti [2017] FCA 678
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124
Fraser v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 69 FCR 99
Kattirtzis v Zaravinos [2001] FCA 1158
McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424
McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409
Sadie Ville Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) (2017) 123 ACSR 223
Shelton v National Roads and Motorists’ Association Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 278
Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 96 Date of hearing: 21 July 2020 Counsel for the Applicant: Dr J Glover Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Rosewarne Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 1390 of 2019 BETWEEN: FLORIN BURHALA
Applicant
AND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MOSHINSKY J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 DECEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The following claims be summarily dismissed:
(a)the applicant’s claim that the interlocutory orders dated 1 August 2019 in proceeding VID 1336 of 2017 should be set aside on account of the respondent’s fraud (paragraph 1 of the amended application…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1854
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the claims and the orders in question. It concluded that the August 2019 orders, being interlocutory, did not prevent Mr Burhala from pursuing his claims relating to s 58(3)(a). The court found that Mr Burhala's claims regarding the August 2019 orders had no reasonable prospect of success and should be dismissed. However, the court was not persuaded that the claims relating to s 58(3)(a) should be dismissed on the basis of a lack of standing or abuse of process. The court ultimately decided to dismiss the claims concerning the August 2019 orders but allowed the other claims to proceed, reserving costs for later determination.
In summary, the court dismissed the claims regarding the interlocutory orders but allowed the claims relating to the alleged contraventions to proceed. The court also reserved the decision on costs for later determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The following claims be summarily dismissed:
(a) the applicant’s claim that the interlocutory orders dated 1 August 2019 in proceeding VID 1336 of 2017 should be set aside on account of the respondent’s fraud (paragraph 1 of the amended application and paragraphs 17-33 of the statement of claim); and
(b) the applicant’s claim that the said interlocutory orders should be set aside on account of exceptional circumstances (paragraph 2 of the amended application and paragraphs 34-36 of the statement of claim).
2. The respondent’s interlocutory application dated 5 June 2020 otherwise be dismissed.
3. Subject to paragraph 4, the costs of the respondent’s interlocutory application be reserved.
4. If either party seeks a different costs order, the party may file and serve a written submission on costs (of no more than 2 pages) by 4.00 pm on 29 January 2021, in which case the other party may file a responding written submission (of no more than 2 pages) by 4.00 pm on 5 February 2021.
5. The matter be listed for case management on a date to be fixed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I discussed some of the principles relating to r 16.21 in Sadie Ville Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) (2017) 123 ACSR 223 at [15]-[21], with reference to cases including McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 at [21]-[39], Shelton v National Roads and Motorists’ Association Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 278 at [18] and McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409 at [23]-[26], [29].Consideration It will be convenient to consider, first, the Commissioner’s contentions relating to Mr Burhala’s claims relating to the August 2019 orders, and then the Commissioner’s contentions in relation to Mr Burhala’s claims relating to alleged contravention of s 58(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and the Convention.Mr Burhala’s claims relating to the August 2019 Orders As discussed earlier in these reasons, Mr Burhala seeks to have the August 2019 Orders set aside on two alternative bases: that they were procured by fraud on the part of the Commissioner; alternatively there are exceptional circumstances justifying the setting aside of the orders. The Commissioner contends that these claims should be summarily dismissed; alternatively that the relevant allegations in the statement of claim should be struck out. At the outset, I note that the purpose of seeking to have the August 2019 Orders set aside would seem to be to clear the path to make the claims set out in the last part of the statement of claim, that is, the claims relating to alleged contravention of s 58(3)(a). It seems that Mr Burhala or those advising him have assumed it to be necessary to set aside the August 2019 Orders before he can pursue those claims, perhaps anticipating an argument by the Commissioner that his s 58(3)(a) claims are precluded on the basis of res judicata, issue estoppel or abuse of process. In fact, in his defence, the Commissioner pleads at [48] that the proceeding is an abuse of process. And in his outline of submissions on the present interlocutory application, the Commissioner submits at [27] that Mr Burhala is attempting to re-litigate issues already resolved and this constitutes an abuse of process. However, if it be Mr Burhala’s assumption that he needs to set aside the August 2019 Orders to pursue his claims relating to s 58(3)(a), I do not consider that assumption to be correct. Further, I do not accept the Commissioner’s submission that it is an abuse of process for Mr Burhala to pursue his s 58(3)(a) claims (because they involve the re-litigation of matters already resolved). The August 2019 Orders are merely interlocutory orders. As such, they do not constitute a res judicata, an element of which is that the decision was final: see KR Handley, Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata (5th ed, LexisNexis, 2019) at [1.02], [5.32]. Further, the August 2019 Orders and the August 2019 Reasons do not constitute an issue estoppel in relation to Mr Burhala’s claims relating to s 58(3)(a) (or his standing to bring such claims). It is true that Mr Burhala’s interim application (see [28] above) referred to s 58(3)(a), and that Anderson J decided that Mr Burhala lacked standing to bring his interim application. However, as discussed above, Anderson J focussed on the question of standing in the context of the two substantive elements of the interim application. Thus, his Honour considered, first, Mr Burhala’s standing to set aside the orders made on 20 December 2017 and, secondly, Mr Burhala’s standing to preserve the property of the bankrupt estate. Justice Anderson did not address whether Mr Burhala had standing to claim a contravention of s 58(3)(a), let alone reach a conclusion on this question. Indeed, in the last section of his reasons, Anderson J emphasised that, because of s 58(3)(a), the Commissioner could not enforce any remedy against the person or property of Mr Burhala, and the previous orders granting leave pursuant to s 58(3)(b) should not be understood as permitting this. Thus the orders and judgment do not constitute an issue estoppel on this matter.