Burhala v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Burhala v Commissioner of Taxation [2020] FCA 1854

File number: VID 1390 of 2019
Judgment of: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 23 December 2020
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary dismissal or strike out of whole statement of claim – where the applicant was a bankrupt residing in Romania – where the respondent was a creditor of the bankrupt – where the applicant alleged that an earlier interlocutory judgment of the Court should be set aside on the basis that it had been obtained by fraud or because there were exceptional circumstances – where the applicant alleged that the respondent had enforced or was seeking to enforce a remedy against the person or property of the bankrupt in respect of a provable debt in contravention of s 58(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – whether the claims should be summarily dismissed or struck out

BANKRUPTCY – where the applicant was a bankrupt residing in Romania – where the respondent was a creditor of the bankrupt – where the applicant alleged that the respondent had enforced or was seeking to enforce a remedy against the person or property of the bankrupt in respect of a provable debt in contravention of s 58(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – whether the bankrupt had standing to bring the claim

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 58

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 16.21, 26.01, 39.05

Cases cited:

Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 154 CLR 589

Commissioner of Taxation v Yeo (Trustee) [2018] FCA 635

Commissioner of Taxation v Yeo (Trustee) (No 2) [2019] FCA 1188

Coumanios v Giunti [2017] FCA 678

Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124

Fraser v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 69 FCR 99

Kattirtzis v Zaravinos [2001] FCA 1158

McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424

McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409

Sadie Ville Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) (2017) 123 ACSR 223

Shelton v National Roads and Motorists’ Association Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 278

Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Talacko v Bennett (2017) 260 CLR 124

Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 96
Date of hearing: 21 July 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr J Glover
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Rosewarne
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 1390 of 2019
BETWEEN:

FLORIN BURHALA

Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MOSHINSKY J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 DECEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The following claims be summarily dismissed:

(a)the applicant’s claim that the interlocutory orders dated 1 August 2019 in proceeding VID 1336 of 2017 should be set aside on account of the respondent’s fraud  (paragraph 1 of the amended application…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1854
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Burhala v Commissioner of Taxation concerned an application by the Commissioner of Taxation to dismiss or strike out claims brought by the bankrupt, Mr Burhala, regarding alleged breaches of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The Commissioner argued that the claims should be dismissed as they had no reasonable prospect of success, lacked standing, or constituted an abuse of process. The key legal issues were whether the claims regarding the August 2019 orders and alleged contraventions of s 58(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act should be dismissed or struck out.

The court examined the nature of the claims and the orders in question. It concluded that the August 2019 orders, being interlocutory, did not prevent Mr Burhala from pursuing his claims relating to s 58(3)(a). The court found that Mr Burhala's claims regarding the August 2019 orders had no reasonable prospect of success and should be dismissed. However, the court was not persuaded that the claims relating to s 58(3)(a) should be dismissed on the basis of a lack of standing or abuse of process. The court ultimately decided to dismiss the claims concerning the August 2019 orders but allowed the other claims to proceed, reserving costs for later determination.

In summary, the court dismissed the claims regarding the interlocutory orders but allowed the claims relating to the alleged contraventions to proceed. The court also reserved the decision on costs for later determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The following claims be summarily dismissed:

(a) the applicant’s claim that the interlocutory orders dated 1 August 2019 in proceeding VID 1336 of 2017 should be set aside on account of the respondent’s fraud (paragraph 1 of the amended application and paragraphs 17-33 of the statement of claim); and

(b) the applicant’s claim that the said interlocutory orders should be set aside on account of exceptional circumstances (paragraph 2 of the amended application and paragraphs 34-36 of the statement of claim).

2. The respondent’s interlocutory application dated 5 June 2020 otherwise be dismissed.

3. Subject to paragraph 4, the costs of the respondent’s interlocutory application be reserved.

4. If either party seeks a different costs order, the party may file and serve a written submission on costs (of no more than 2 pages) by 4.00 pm on 29 January 2021, in which case the other party may file a responding written submission (of no more than 2 pages) by 4.00 pm on 5 February 2021.

5. The matter be listed for case management on a date to be fixed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The affidavit of Ms Biltris dated 31 July 2020 and the affidavit of Mr Burhala dated 30 July 2020 were filed (with leave) following the hearing. These affidavits were signed but not sworn or affirmed. In response to an email from my chambers, by email dated 11 August 2020 counsel for Mr Burhala stated that Mr Burhala was content with the Court accepting these affidavits as if they had been sworn or affirmed, subject to an objection to annexure “FB-4” to Ms Biltris’s affidavit on the basis that it contains inadmissible hearsay. By email dated 12 August 2020, the Commissioner’s solicitors stated that the Commissioner was content with the Court accepting these affidavits as if they had been sworn or affirmed. In these circumstances, I will receive these affidavits (apart from annexure “FB-4” to Ms Biltris’s affidavit) into evidence for the purposes of the present interlocutory application as if they had been sworn or affirmed. In relation to annexure “FB-4”, while information and belief evidence is admissible on an interlocutory application, the contents of that annexure have not been put into evidence in this way.Background In this section of these reasons, I outline the background to the present proceeding. This largely concerns the 2017 Proceeding. On 10 August 2016, Mr Burhala was made bankrupt by an order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Trustees were appointed as the joint and several trustees of Mr Burhala’s bankrupt estate. On 15 October 2016, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation lodged a proof of debt with the Trustees for outstanding taxation liabilities owed by Mr Burhala to the Commonwealth of Australia. On or about 5 December 2017, the Commissioner commenced the 2017 Proceeding. The Trustees were the first and second respondents to the proceeding. Mr Burhala was the third respondent to the proceeding. By the application in that proceeding, the Commissioner sought (among other things) leave pursuant to s 58(3)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act to commence certain proceedings in respect of a provable debt. On 20 December 2017, I gave judgment on the Commissioner’s application for leave pursuant to s 58(3)(b), and delivered ex tempore reasons. In those reasons, I explained that the application for leave related to three proceedings:(a)the 2017 Proceeding itself, by which the Commissioner sought judgment for $4,737,623.81 in respect of outstanding taxation liabilities;(b)a claim that had been jointly filed in the name of the Trustees and the Commissioner, which asked the Bucharest Tribunal in Romania to recognise that certain transfers of real property located in Romania by Mr Burhala to his children should be declared void, as they were done with the intention of defrauding his creditors (the Avoidance Proceeding); and(c)a proposed action in Romania, to be brought in the names of both the Commissioner and the Trustees, being an application to freeze assets still in the name of Mr Burhala in Romania under Article 1075 of the Romanian Civil Procedure Code (the Proposed Freezing Application).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 39.05 of the Federal Court Rules relevantly provides:39.05 Varying or setting aside judgment or order after it has been enteredThe Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:…(b)it was obtained by fraud; or(c)it is interlocutory; or … The Commissioner has filed an interlocutory application dated 5 June 2020 seeking to have the proceeding summarily dismissed or the whole of the statement of claim struck out. It is this application that is the subject of these reasons. My conclusions are, in summary, as follows:(a)If it be Mr Burhala’s assumption that he needs to set aside the August 2019 Orders to pursue his claims relating to s 58(3)(a), I do not consider that assumption to be correct. The August 2019 Orders and the August 2019 Reasons do not constitute a res judicata or an issue estoppel in relation to Mr Burhala’s claims relating to s 58(3)(a) (or his standing to bring such claims). Further, I do not accept the Commissioner’s submission that it is an abuse of process for Mr Burhala to pursue his s 58(3)(a) claims.(b)Having said this, it is nevertheless necessary to deal with the Commissioner’s contention that Mr Burhala’s claims relating to the August 2019 Orders should be summarily dismissed on the basis that they have no reasonable prospect of success, or should otherwise be struck out. I conclude that Mr Burhala’s claims relating to the August 2019 Orders have no reasonable prospect of success and should be summarily dismissed.(c)In relation to Mr Burhala’s claims relating to s 58(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (as amended by the 2010 Protocol) (the Convention) (paragraphs 3-7 of the amended application and [37]-[47] of the statement of claim), the Commissioner contends that these claims should be summarily dismissed or struck out on two bases: that Mr Burhala lacks standing to bring these claims; and/or that the making of the claims constitutes an abuse of process. I am not persuaded that I should summarily dismiss or strike out the relevant claims on the basis of a lack of standing. Further, I do not accept the Commissioner’s submission that it is an abuse of process for Mr Burhala to bring these claims.The Commissioner’s interlocutory application By his interlocutory application dated 5 June 2020, the Commissioner seeks the following orders (apart from costs):1.An order pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and/or r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 that the proceeding be summarily dismissed on the grounds that:(a)the Applicant has no standing to bring or prosecute the proceeding;(b)the proceeding is an abuse of process; and/or(c)the Applicant otherwise has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.2.In the alternative to order 1, an order pursuant to r 16.21(1) the Federal Court Rules 2011 that the whole of the Statement of Claim filed by the Applicant on 7 May 2020 be struck out.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I discussed some of the principles relating to r 16.21 in Sadie Ville Pty Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm) (2017) 123 ACSR 223 at [15]-[21], with reference to cases including McGuirk v The University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 at [21]-[39], Shelton v National Roads and Motorists’ Association Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 278 at [18] and McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409 at [23]-[26], [29].Consideration It will be convenient to consider, first, the Commissioner’s contentions relating to Mr Burhala’s claims relating to the August 2019 orders, and then the Commissioner’s contentions in relation to Mr Burhala’s claims relating to alleged contravention of s 58(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and the Convention.Mr Burhala’s claims relating to the August 2019 Orders As discussed earlier in these reasons, Mr Burhala seeks to have the August 2019 Orders set aside on two alternative bases: that they were procured by fraud on the part of the Commissioner; alternatively there are exceptional circumstances justifying the setting aside of the orders. The Commissioner contends that these claims should be summarily dismissed; alternatively that the relevant allegations in the statement of claim should be struck out. At the outset, I note that the purpose of seeking to have the August 2019 Orders set aside would seem to be to clear the path to make the claims set out in the last part of the statement of claim, that is, the claims relating to alleged contravention of s 58(3)(a). It seems that Mr Burhala or those advising him have assumed it to be necessary to set aside the August 2019 Orders before he can pursue those claims, perhaps anticipating an argument by the Commissioner that his s 58(3)(a) claims are precluded on the basis of res judicata, issue estoppel or abuse of process. In fact, in his defence, the Commissioner pleads at [48] that the proceeding is an abuse of process. And in his outline of submissions on the present interlocutory application, the Commissioner submits at [27] that Mr Burhala is attempting to re-litigate issues already resolved and this constitutes an abuse of process. However, if it be Mr Burhala’s assumption that he needs to set aside the August 2019 Orders to pursue his claims relating to s 58(3)(a), I do not consider that assumption to be correct. Further, I do not accept the Commissioner’s submission that it is an abuse of process for Mr Burhala to pursue his s 58(3)(a) claims (because they involve the re-litigation of matters already resolved). The August 2019 Orders are merely interlocutory orders. As such, they do not constitute a res judicata, an element of which is that the decision was final: see KR Handley, Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata (5th ed, LexisNexis, 2019) at [1.02], [5.32]. Further, the August 2019 Orders and the August 2019 Reasons do not constitute an issue estoppel in relation to Mr Burhala’s claims relating to s 58(3)(a) (or his standing to bring such claims). It is true that Mr Burhala’s interim application (see [28] above) referred to s 58(3)(a), and that Anderson J decided that Mr Burhala lacked standing to bring his interim application. However, as discussed above, Anderson J focussed on the question of standing in the context of the two substantive elements of the interim application. Thus, his Honour considered, first, Mr Burhala’s standing to set aside the orders made on 20 December 2017 and, secondly, Mr Burhala’s standing to preserve the property of the bankrupt estate. Justice Anderson did not address whether Mr Burhala had standing to claim a contravention of s 58(3)(a), let alone reach a conclusion on this question. Indeed, in the last section of his reasons, Anderson J emphasised that, because of s 58(3)(a), the Commissioner could not enforce any remedy against the person or property of Mr Burhala, and the previous orders granting leave pursuant to s 58(3)(b) should not be understood as permitting this. Thus the orders and judgment do not constitute an issue estoppel on this matter.