Singh v Passenger Transport Standards Committee

[2015] SADC 101

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Appeal Against a Master's Decision)

SINGH v PASSENGER TRANSPORT STANDARDS COMMITTEE

[2015] SADC 101

Judgment of His Honour Judge Tilmouth

25 June 2015

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - POWERS OF COURT

An appeal is competent l from a Master exercising appellate jurisdiction under the Passenger Transport Act and the Dog and Cat Management Act, to a single Judge of the District Court.

Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 SA s 58; Passenger Transport Act (1994) SA s 38; District Court Act 1991 SA s 3(1), 8(5), 42B(1), 20(1). 43(1), (2)(a), 51(1)(b); District Court Civil Rules 1996 SA r6 DCR17. DCR28, 15(6), referred to.
Curnow v Police; Strauss v Police; Errington v Police (2008) 100 SASR 290, [9]; Harrington v Lowe (1996) 190 CLR 311, 324-325, considered.

SINGH v PASSENGER TRANSPORT STANDARDS COMMITTEE
[2015] SADC 101

1. An appeal was before the Court (since abandoned) from a decision of Master Norman, upholding a decision of the Passenger Transport Standards Committee revoking the appellant’s Taxi Driver accreditation and disqualifying him from holding a taxi driver’s licence for five years.

2. In the meantime, at the invitation of the Court, counsel addressed two preliminary issues. The first was the capacity to appeal from a decision of a Master to a single Judge of the District Court, and the second, the origin of the jurisdiction of Masters in appeals of this kind, which run parallel with a Master’s jurisdiction under s 58 of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995 (SA).

3. The proceedings originated in the Passenger Transport Standards Committee established by the Passenger Transport Act 1994 (SA). Section 38 thereof furnishes a right of appeal to the District Court in its Administrative and Disciplinary Division. Statutory jurisdiction is expressly conferred on the District Court by s 42B(1) of the District Court Act 1991 (SA).

4. Section 20(1) of the District Court Act provides that ‘the Court’ may be constituted by a Master ‘if the matter lies within a jurisdiction of the Court conferred by statute or the rules on Masters’.  Section 20(6) provides that a ‘Judge or a Master may sit in any Division of the Court’.   Although the Passenger Transport Act is silent on the constitution of this court exercising appellate jurisdiction thereunder, s 51(1)(b) of the District Court Act provides that rules of court may be made authorising Masters to exercise any part of the jurisdiction of the Court. 

   Rule 6DCR 15(1) of the District Court Civil Rules 1996 (SA) provides: 

   ‘Subject to this rule, a Master may exercise the same jurisdiction as a single Judge of the Court’.

   Rule 15(6) thereof, provides that ‘a Master can hear appeals only under the Passenger Transport Act 1994 and the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995’. The latter Rule was inserted by the District Court Civil Rules (Amendment No 6): see the South Australian Government Gazette 15 January 2009, page 299. 

5. Accordingly, I was satisfied there was a clear conferral of jurisdiction on Masters sitting in the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court, under those two Acts of Parliament.

6. As to the first question, an appeal from a Master to a single judge, that right is in the first place governed by a combination of ss 43(1) and 43(2)(a) of the District Court Act, which provide an appeal by ‘a party to an action’ from a Master to a Judge of the Court. As s 3(1) of the District Court Act defines an action as ‘any civil or criminal proceedings in the Court …’, an appeal would not be an ‘action’ as so defined.  Moreover Rule 6DCR 28 of the District Court Civil Rules defines ‘an action’ as ‘a proceeding in the Court (other than an interlocutory or appellate proceeding)’, rather reinforces that conclusion. 

7. Be that as it may, Rule 6DCR 17 of the District Court Civil Rules provides:

   [DCR 17] Appeal to Judge

   17      An appeal lies, as of right, from a judgment of a Master to the Court constituted of   a Judge.

   Next, s 8(5) of the District Court Act provides: 

   ‘All proceedings before the Court, other than in its Criminal Division, are to be regarded as civil proceedings for the purposes of this Act or any other Act or law’. 

   Accordingly, although there is some tension between the definition of ‘an action’ in the District Court Civil Rules, the problem is resolved by s 8(5) of the District Court Act, fundamentally because the meaning and operation of an Act of Parliament cannot be altered by the rules of court: Curnow v Police; Strauss v Police; Errington v Police.[1] The rules of Court as a form of delegated legislation, cannot limit substantive rights conferred under statute: Harrington v Lowe.[2] It must follow that ss 43(1) and (2)(a) of the District Court Act, in so far as they provide for an appeal by ‘a party to an action’, are to be read in harmony with s 8(5) thereof, and to be regarded as applying to all civil proceedings, of which an appeal launched pursuant to the Passenger Transport Act, is one.

   [1] (2008) 100 SASR 290, [9].

   [2] (1996) 190 CLR 311, 324-25

8. That being so, I was persuaded that the appeal from the decision of Master Norman upholding the Passenger Transport Standards Committee, was validly brought before a single Judge of the District Court sitting in its Administrative and Disciplinary jurisdiction.