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Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd

Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd

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Case Copied 3 September 1971 81 min read

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Menzies, Windeyer, Owen, Walsh and Gibbs JJ.

STRICKLAND v. ROCLA CONCRETE PIPES LTD

(1971) 124 CLR 468

3 September 1971

Constitutional Law (Cth)

Constitutional Law (Cth)—Powers of the Commonwealth Parliament—Law requiring certain agreements between trade competitors to be registered—Validity—Whether with respect to foreign corporations or trading or financial corporations formed within the Commonwealth—General provisions—Whether to be construed distributively in relation to constitutional heads of power—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 51 (xx.)—Trade Practices Act 1965-1969 (Cth), ss. 7, 35, 3 6, 41, 42, 43—Acts Interpretation Act 1901-1964 (Cth), s. 15A.

Decisions

September 3.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. The Parliament passed the Trade Practices Act 1965-1969 (Cth) ("the Act") as an Act, as its long title proclaims, "to preserve competition in Australian trade and commerce to the extent required by the public interest". The full scope of the Act is not limited by its express terms as to the persons upon whom it operates or as to the nature of the trade with respect to which their agreements or practices relate. Having regard to the terms of the Act it is plain enough that the Parliament entertained some hope that, in so far as its own legislative power did not extend, (and it was apparently conscious that it did not extend for the full scope of the Act) the States, or at least some of them, would complement the provisions of the Act by passing laws in substantially similar terms. Consequently the Act provides for the contingency that one or more of them might do. See s. 8. In the event of complementary State legislation operating with the Act, the draftsman has sought to avoid some of the problems of possible inconsistency and of possible liability under both statutory provisions. Clearly the Act cannot validly operate to the full extent of its terms. This would be still true even if the States or some of them had passed laws in terms identical with the substantive provisions of the Act. The form of the Act however in attempting to cover the event of complementary legislation has given rise to difficult questions as to its constitutional validity which have not proved easy of resolution. (at p480)

2. The respondents in these appeals, trading corporations formed in Australia were parties to certain agreements said to be examinable under the Act. The agreements related exclusively to trade within one State, namely the State of Queensland. The respondents were charged before the Commonwealth Industrial Court with having failed to furnish particulars of such agreements as required by s. 43 of the Act. As the agreements related entirely to aspects of intra-State trade legislative control of the respondents in relation to them was not within Commonwealth legislative power unless within the power granted by s. 51 (xx.). That Court dismissed the charge holding itself, properly as I think, bound by this Court's decision in Huddart, Parker &Co. Pty. Ltd. v.…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1971] HCA 40
Decision Date: 3 September 1971

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the case of *Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd*. The dispute concerned the validity of a price-fixing agreement entered into by Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd and other manufacturers of concrete pipes. The agreement, which was registered under the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (NSW), aimed to control the prices at which concrete pipes were sold in New South Wales. The Commissioner of Trade Practices sought declarations that the agreement was void and that Rocla had engaged in conduct that was an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the price-fixing agreement constituted a contract, arrangement, or understanding in restraint of trade, and whether it was rendered valid by its registration under the NSW *Industrial Arbitration Act*. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the agreement was a "trading agreement" for the purposes of the *Trade Practices Act 1965* (Cth) and, if so, whether the State legislation could validly exempt it from the operation of the Commonwealth Act.

The High Court held that the agreement was a contract, arrangement, or understanding in restraint of trade and therefore a "trading agreement" within the meaning of the *Trade Practices Act*. The Court reasoned that the *Trade Practices Act* was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's legislative power under the corporations power and the external affairs power. It further held that the registration of the agreement under the NSW *Industrial Arbitration Act* did not render it valid or exempt it from the operation of the Commonwealth legislation, as the Commonwealth Act evinced a clear intention to cover the field of restrictive trade practices. The Court found that the State legislation could not operate so as to prevent the Commonwealth Act from having full effect.

The High Court declared that the agreement was void and of no effect pursuant to section 34 of the *Trade Practices Act*. It also declared that Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd had engaged in conduct that was an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade.

Orders