Goryl v Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MASON CJ, BRENNAN, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY, GAUDRON AND McHUGH JJ

GORYL v GREYHOUND AUSTRALIA PTY. LIMITED AND ANOTHER

(1994) 179 CLR 463

20 April 1994

Constitutional Law (Cth)

Constitutional Law (Cth) Resident Of one State subject to disability or discrimination in another State on ground of residence—Law limiting damages recoverable by non-resident to those recoverable in that person's place of residence—The Constitution (62 and 63 Vict. c. 12), ss. 117, 118—Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 (Q.), ss. 16, 19, 20.

Orders


Answer the questions in the case stated as follows.
1. (a) Is s.20 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 (Q.) applicable to the (plaintiff's) claim against the first (defendant)?
Answer: In terms, yes. (b) Is s.16(b), operating in conjunction with s.19 of the Motor
Vehicles Insurance Act, applicable to the (plaintiff's) claim against the second (defendant)?
Answer: No.

2. If the answer to either 1(a) or 1(b) is yes, then does s.16(b), operating in conjunction with s.19, and/or s.20 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act, subject the (plaintiff), in Queensland, to a disability or discrimination, which would not be equally applicable to her, if she were a subject of the Queen, resident in Queensland, within the meaning of s.117 of the Constitution? Answer: Section 20 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act subjects the plaintiff, in Queensland, to a disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to her if she were a subject of the Queen, resident in Queensland, within the meaning of s.117 of the Constitution.

3. If the answer to 2 is yes, then does s.117 of the Constitution render s.16(b) and/or s.20 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act inapplicable to the (plaintiff's) claim?
Answer: Section 117 of the Constitution renders s.20 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act inapplicable to the plaintiff's claim.

The defendants to pay the costs of the case stated.

Decisions


MASON CJ In view of the majority decision in Stevens v. Head ((1) (1993) 176 CLR 433.), following upon the majority decision in McKain v. R.W. Miller and Co. (S.A.) Pty. Ltd. ((2) (1991) 174 CLR 1.), I see no point in maintaining the dissenting view which I expressed in those two cases. Accepting the principles established in those cases, I agree with the reasons for judgment prepared by Dawson
and Toohey JJ

2. In the result, I would answer the questions asked as follows:
1. (a) In terms, yes.
(b) No. 2. Section 20 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 (Q.) subjects
the plaintiff, in Queensland, to a disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to her if she were a subject of the Queen, resident in Queensland, within the meaning of s.117 of the Constitution.
3. Section 117 of the Constitution renders s.20 of the Motor
Vehicles Insurance Act inapplicable to the plaintiff's claim.
BRENNAN J The plaintiff was a passenger in a tourist bus registered in Queensland under the Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936-1988 (Q.) ("the Act"). She commenced…
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Details
Case
[1994] HCA 18
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland concerning a claim for damages for personal injury. The appellant, Mr Goryl, had been a passenger on a coach operated by the respondent, Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd, when he sustained injuries. The dispute centred on whether Greyhound Australia owed Mr Goryl a duty of care and, if so, whether that duty had been breached.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether a common carrier, such as a bus company, owes a duty of care to its passengers to take reasonable steps to protect them from foreseeable harm caused by third parties. This involved considering the scope of the duty of care owed by carriers to passengers and the foreseeability of the particular risk of harm that materialised.

The High Court held that a common carrier owes a duty of care to its passengers to take reasonable steps to protect them from foreseeable risks of injury, including those posed by the conduct of other passengers or third parties. The Court reasoned that the relationship between a carrier and its passenger is one of proximity, giving rise to a duty to take reasonable care for the passenger's safety. The foreseeability of the risk of harm is a crucial element in determining whether this duty has been breached. The Court ultimately found that, on the facts, the risk of harm to Mr Goryl was not sufficiently foreseeable to establish a breach of duty by Greyhound Australia.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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