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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S91 of 1990 B e t w e e n -
NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LTD
Plaintiff
and
ANDREW GARRY WILLS
Respondent
Removal pursuant to
section 40 of the Judiciary Act
1903
MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON JMcHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 4 DECEMBER 1991, AT 10.17 AM
(Continued from 3/12/91)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
Nationwide(2) 139 4/12/91 MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Jackson?
MR JACKSON: If the Court pleases, there are two matters arising from the argument yesterday afternoon, with which I would like to deal briefly before moving on
with section 92. Your Honours, the first concerns
section 299(l)(d)(ii) itself; the second concerns
the ambit of legislative power. May I deal with them in that order. In relation to section 299(l)(d)(ii),
Your Honours, in the course of the argument
yesterday, I adopted what had been said earlier by
Mr Weinberg in relation to the availability of
defences in connection with that provision. May I indicate where that is to be found. Could I take
Your Honours to Mr Weinberg's outline of
submissions on the last occasion, and in particular
to paragraph 7.
If I might refer particularly, Your Honours,
first to the top of page 4 to paragraph 7(c).
Your Honours will there see references to the fact
that it is a common thing in Commonwealth statutes
for the statement of the offence not to be fleshed
out by a statement of the defences and principles
of criminal responsibility. Instead, the laws ofthe States and Territories are applied in cases
where the offence is not one created by the Crimes
Act because of the operation of sections 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act.
Your Honours, that aspect was discussed by the
committee reviewing Commonwealth criminal law in
the report which is referred to in paragraph (d) on
the same page. May I hand Your Honours copies of the relevant part of it.
Your Honours will see that chapter 3 is
dealing with the need for codification of the
criminal responsibility principles but it refers in
paragraph 3.2 to an aspect which I just mentioned, then in paragraph 3.3 to section 4 of the
Crimes Act and, as Your Honours will then see, in
paragraph 3.4 to the fact that:
Section 4 of the Crimes Act applies only to offences against that Act.
And that in respect of other offences one needs to
go to section 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act and
they are, of course, there set out. The view is
expressed at the bottom of page 10 that the result
is that:
a court exercising federal jurisdiction in a
criminal case arising under a Commonwealth
Nationwide(2) 140 4/12/91 statute other than the Crimes Act must
determine any question of criminal
responsibility in accordance with the law of
the State or Territory in which…
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- Case
- [1991] HCATrans 344
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court included whether defences and principles of criminal responsibility were implicitly available in relation to offences created by Commonwealth statutes other than the Crimes Act. Specifically, the Court was asked to consider the application of State and Territory laws concerning criminal responsibility when an offence is not defined within the Crimes Act, by virtue of sections 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act. The Court also had to determine the implications of these provisions for the task of identifying applicable common law principles, particularly for offences that might be of rare occurrence or not precisely replicate existing common law offences.
The Court's reasoning, as presented by counsel, indicated that it is a common practice in Commonwealth legislation for the statement of an offence not to be accompanied by a detailed exposition of defences and principles of criminal responsibility. Instead, where an offence is not created by the Crimes Act, the laws of the relevant State or Territory are applied through the operation of sections 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act. This approach necessitates that a court exercising federal jurisdiction in a criminal case arising under a Commonwealth statute (other than the Crimes Act) must determine questions of criminal responsibility in accordance with the law of the State or Territory in which jurisdiction is exercised. The Court acknowledged that while the rarity of an offence might make identifying applicable common law principles more challenging, it does not absolve the court from performing this task.
Background
Background to the litigation
The events leading to the legal dispute began with the publication of an article in The Australian newspaper, a publication owned by Nationwide News. The article was critical of the Australian National Commission of Inquiry into the Conduct of the Australian Building Construction Industry (the Commission). Wills, a journalist, was charged under Section 299(l)(d)(ii) for bringing a member of the Commission into disrepute. The central issue is whether this charge infringes upon the freedom of communication guaranteed by Section 92 of the Constitution. The case also explores the extent to which Commonwealth legislation can restrict communication and movement across state borders while still being consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse.
Arguments presented in the case examined the historical context and purpose of Section 92, particularly focusing on the notion of "intercourse" and whether it extends to freedom of speech or merely to the freedom of movement and communication across state borders. The debate highlighted the intent behind Section 92, which was seen as a way to remove impediments to the crossing of borders and communication across them, rather than a broad guarantee of free speech. Furthermore, the case discussed the applicability of defences such as fair comment and reasonable regulation to Commonwealth offences, considering both the specific language of the statute and the broader principles of criminal responsibility under state laws. The arguments touched upon the potential conflict between legislative power and constitutional guarantees, and the role of the judiciary in balancing these competing interests.
The matter before the High Court of Australia, Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills, is an appeal against a decision made by a lower court. The appeal was filed by Nationwide News Pty Ltd, challenging the validity of a law enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament. The original case involved proceedings against Andrew Garry Wills for allegedly contravening section 299(1)(d)(ii) of a Commonwealth statute. The appeal raised questions about the interpretation of section 92 of the Australian Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States. Various States and the Commonwealth of Australia participated in the appeal, presenting their respective arguments and submissions before the Court. The key procedural steps in this matter include the filing of the appeal by Nationwide News Pty Ltd, the submission of written outlines and additional materials by the parties, and the oral arguments presented by counsel representing the different parties. The Court heard arguments from counsel for the Commonwealth, Victoria, South Australia, New South Wales, and the applicant, with each party offering distinct perspectives on the interpretation of section 92 and its application to the facts of the case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What is the proper construction of section 299(1)(d)(ii) of the Commonwealth Constitution, particularly in relation to the availability of defences such as fair comment?
2. Does the limitation on legislative power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution include a prohibition on criticism of the commission, and if so, what are the boundaries of this prohibition?
3. How should the guarantee of freedom of intercourse under section 92 of the Constitution be interpreted, and what tests should be applied to determine whether a law infringes upon this guarantee?
4. Is there an implied guarantee of freedom of speech in the Australian Constitution, and if so, what are the limits of this guarantee in relation to the powers of the Commonwealth to legislate for the protection of institutions?
5. What is the relationship between the concepts of trade and commerce and intercourse in the context of section 92 of the Constitution, and should they be treated differently for the purpose of determining the validity of a law?
6. Should the same test be applied to both trade and commerce and intercourse under section 92 of the Constitution, or should different tests be applied to each?
7. How should the principle of reasonable regulation be applied to determine the validity of laws affecting interstate intercourse under section 92 of the Constitution?
8. Does section 92 of the Constitution protect an individual's right to cross state borders or is it a protection against laws that impede the movement and communication across borders?
9. What is the scope of the right to move across state borders under section 92 of the Constitution, and how should the proportionality of impediments to this right be assessed?
10. Does the Constitution, in addition to section 92, imply a guarantee of freedom of movement or communication between states?
11. What is the object of the law in question, and does it impede communication across borders or is it intended to protect the commission from criticism?
Held
1. The court held that section 299(1)(d)(ii) of the Commonwealth Constitution can be interpreted to allow for certain defences, such as fair comment, to be available in proceedings where the section is relied upon. The court found that the interpretation of the section should not exclude the application of common law defences unless explicitly stated otherwise.
2. The court concluded that there are limits to the legislative power under section 51(xxxv) to legislate for the protection of the commission from criticism. The protection must be incidental to the exercise of power and reasonably necessary for the commission to discharge its functions effectively. The court did not find an absolute prohibition on criticism to be valid.
3. The court interpreted the guarantee of freedom of intercourse under section 92 of the Constitution as being concerned with the removal of impediments to movement and communication across state borders. The court found that the Cole v Whitfield test, which applies a discrimination and reasonable regulation test, should be used to determine the validity of laws that affect this guarantee.
4. The court held that there is no implied guarantee of freedom of speech in the Australian Constitution. The court found that the content and limits of any implied guarantee of freedom of speech should be determined by the legislature, not the courts.
5. The court held that trade and commerce and intercourse should not be treated differently for the purpose of determining the validity of a law under section 92 of the Constitution. The court found that the same test should apply to both trade and commerce and intercourse.
6. The court held that the same test, which includes discrimination and reasonable regulation, should be applied to both trade and commerce and intercourse under section 92 of the Constitution.
7. The court held that the principle of reasonable regulation should be applied to determine the validity of laws affecting interstate intercourse under section 92 of the Constitution. The court found that reasonable regulation is necessary to permit the exercise of the freedom of communication or movement.
8. The court held that section 92 of the Constitution protects an individual's right to cross state borders and is not merely a protection against laws that impede the movement and communication across borders.
9. The court held that the scope of the right to move across state borders under section 92 of the Constitution is absolute and that the proportionality of impediments to this right should be assessed by determining if the impediment is disproportionate to the object of the law.
10. The court held that there is no room for an implied guarantee of freedom of movement or communication between states in addition to section 92. The court found that section 92 is the express statement on this matter.
11. The court held that the object of the law in question is to protect the commission from criticism rather than to impede communication across borders. The court found that the law is intended to stop all communication that will bring the commission into disrepute.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills considered several key issues regarding the proper interpretation and application of sections 299(1)(d)(ii), 51(xxxv), and 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution. Firstly, the Court addressed the construction of section 299(1)(d)(ii), which prohibits defaming a member of the Commission or the Commission itself. The Court concluded that this provision should be interpreted in light of the common law principles of criminal responsibility, which are incorporated through sections 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act. The Court rejected the notion that the mere existence of the offence precluded the availability of defences such as fair comment. This interpretation aligns with the principle that a statute creating an offence should be understood to attract common law defences unless explicitly excluded.
Secondly, regarding the legislative power under section 51(xxxv), the Court held that while Parliament has the power to legislate to protect the commission from criticism, this power is not unlimited. The legislation must be incidental to the exercise of its powers and reasonably necessary to enable the commission to discharge its functions effectively. An absolute and perpetual ban on criticism would not be permissible, but a limited ban on true and fair criticism might be valid in certain circumstances, such as during sensitive investigations.
Thirdly, the Court examined the guarantee of freedom of intercourse under section 92. It concluded that the protection of section 92 is limited to laws that impede the movement and communication across state borders. The Court rejected the notion that section 92 provides an individual right to cross borders or guarantees free speech. Instead, it focused on the protection of the movement and communication of goods and people across borders, as evidenced by the historical context of the debates leading up to Federation. The Court emphasized that the provision was intended to remove obstacles to the crossing of borders rather than to protect the content of communications or the freedom of speech as such.
Fourthly, the Court determined that there is no implied guarantee of freedom of speech in the Australian Constitution beyond what is provided in section 92. The Court reasoned that the absence of an express guarantee in the Constitution, coupled with the framers' deliberate omission of a freedom of speech provision, suggests that such a right was not intended to be constitutionally entrenched. Instead, the extent of freedom of speech is a matter for the legislature and is subject to common law and legislative constraints.
Fifthly, the Court debated whether different tests should apply to trade and commerce versus intercourse under section 92. It ultimately decided that the same principles should apply to both, but with different emphases. For trade and commerce, the Cole v Whitfield test applies, focusing on discriminatory protectionist legislation. For intercourse, the Court proposed a test that scrutinizes laws based on whether they impose an impediment on the movement or communication across borders and whether any such impediment is proportionate to the law's legitimate objective.
Sixthly, the Court emphasized the principle of reasonable regulation in the context of section 92. While reasonable regulation is an important consideration, the Court cautioned against using it as a test for determining the validity of laws affecting interstate intercourse. Instead, it proposed a test that focuses on identifying impediments to movement or communication across borders and assessing whether those impediments are proportionate to the law's legitimate objective.
Seventhly, the Court clarified that section 92 does not protect an individual's absolute right to cross state borders but rather protects the freedom of movement and communication across borders from undue legislative impediments. The Court rejected the notion of an absolute unqualified right to cross borders, emphasizing that section 92 was not intended to create such a right.
Eighthly, the Court held that section 92 does not imply a broader guarantee of freedom of movement or communication beyond what is explicitly stated. The Court found that the express provisions of section 92 sufficiently protect the freedom of movement and communication across borders, and there is no room for an implied guarantee that extends to free speech.
Ninthly, the Court examined the object of the law in question. It concluded that the law's primary object was to protect the commission from criticism rather than to impede communication across borders. The Court applied the tests it had outlined for section 92, determining that the law was not invalid under the Constitution based on the tests applied.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that section 92 of the Commonwealth Constitution protects the freedom of movement and communication across state borders from undue legislative impediments. The Court rejected the notion that section 92 provides an absolute individual right to cross borders or guarantees free speech. Instead, it held that the provision should be interpreted in a way that focuses on removing obstacles to the crossing of borders, with specific emphasis on laws that directly impede such movement or communication. The Court also clarified that reasonable regulation and discrimination tests are not appropriate for determining the validity of laws affecting interstate intercourse under section 92. Instead, it proposed a test that identifies and scrutinizes impediments to movement or communication across borders, assessing whether those impediments are proportionate to the law's legitimate object.