OF VICTORIA. Contempt of Court-Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration- ords
calculated to bring Court into disrepute-Wilfulness-Commonwealth Concilia- tion and Arbitration Act 1904-1918 (No. 13 of 1904 No. 39 of 1918), sec. 83. Practice-High Court-Appeal from inferior Court of State exercising Federal juris
diction-Limitation on power of High Court-Court of Petty Sessions of Victoria -Order to review-The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), sec. 73-Rules of the High Court 1911, Part II., Sec. IV., r. 1-Justices Act 1915 (Vict.) (No. 2675),
During the hearing in the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitra- tion, before the President, of a plaint wherein one of the claims was for a reduc- tion of the hours of work the question was being debated as to whether em- ployees were "slowing down." Before the hearing was completed an article was published in a newspaper in which the following words occurred - Mr. Justice Higgins is not satisfied that slowing down' is practised in industry. The lack of judicial knowledge of facts well known to the parties is not unknown in cases outside industrial matters. and, although the Court can take no cogni- zance of notorious facts, there is nothing in law to forbid the public from feeling amused at this display of innocence from the Bench.
The detachment of the Arbitration Court from the facts of industrial life explains, in some measure, why industrial life is rapidly detaching itself from the Court." The printer and publisher of the newspaper was prosecuted under sec. 83 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act on two charges in respect of the publication of those words, one of wilfully by writing using words calculated to bring the
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration into disrepute, and the other of a wilful contempt of that Court; and he was convicted on both charges.
Held, by Knox C.J., Isaacs, Gavan Duffy, Rich and Starke JJ., that the conviction on the first-mentioned charge should be set aside because the words were not capable of a meaning which was calculated to bring the Court into disrepute.
Held, also, that the conviction on the second charge should be set aside: by Knox C.J., Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ., on the ground that the adminis- tration of the law by the President of the Court could not be obstructed or interfered with by the words published; by Isaacs and Rich JJ., on the ground that although the words were a technical contempt as having a tendency to influence the result of the proceedings then before the Court, the contempt
The right of appeal given by sec. 73 of the Constitution is not limited by Part II. of the Rules of the High Court, which merely regulates the procedure by which appeals are brought; and, therefore, on an appeal from a Court of Petty Sessions of Victoria brought by way of order to review pursuant to rule 1 of Sec. IV.…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Bell v Stewart [1920] HCA 68
Case
[1920] HCA 68
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Bell v Stewart* concerned appeals to the High Court of Australia from convictions in the Court of Petty Sessions of Victoria. The appellant, George Bell, was the printer and publisher of the *Argus* newspaper, which published an article during ongoing proceedings in the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. The article contained commentary on the issue of "slowing down" by employees, suggesting a lack of judicial knowledge and a detachment of the Arbitration Court from industrial realities. Bell was charged and convicted on two counts under section 83 of the *Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1918*: one for wilfully using words calculated to bring the Court into disrepute, and another for wilful contempt of the Court.
The High Court was required to determine whether the published words were capable of bringing the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration into disrepute, and whether they constituted a wilful contempt of that Court. A preliminary issue also arose regarding the extent of the High Court's power on an appeal by way of order to review from a State Court exercising federal jurisdiction, specifically whether the Court was bound by the limitations of the State appeal process or could exercise its own judgment.
A majority of the Court, comprising Knox C.J., Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ., held that the conviction for using words calculated to bring the Court into disrepute should be set aside, finding that the words were not capable of such a meaning. They also held that the conviction for wilful contempt should be set aside on the basis that the administration of the law by the President of the Court could not be obstructed or interfered with by the published words. Isaacs and Rich JJ. agreed that both convictions should be set aside. They found the conviction for bringing the Court into disrepute unsustainable for similar reasons regarding the capacity of the words. However, they differed on the contempt charge, concluding that while the words constituted a technical contempt due to their tendency to influence pending proceedings, the requirement of "wilfulness" under the Act meant that the prosecution had failed to prove the necessary intent to obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice. The Court unanimously affirmed that its appellate power under section 73 of the Constitution was not limited by the High Court Rules and that it was obliged to give its own judgment on the merits of the appeal.
The High Court made the orders absolute, setting aside both convictions and ordering the informant to pay the costs of the proceedings in both the High Court and the Court below.