Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Burns

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Earl Burns & Anor  [2010] NSWCA 265

FILE NUMBER(S):
2009/200033

HEARING DATE(S):
24 August 2010

JUDGMENT DATE:
26 October 2010

PARTIES:
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Appellant)
Earl Burns (First Respondent)
District Court of New South Wales (Second Respondent)

JUDGMENT OF:
Beazley JA Basten JA Campbell JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
2009/200033

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Nicholson DCJ

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
11 February 2010

COUNSEL:
D Arnott SC (Appellant)
J Manuell SC (First Respondent)
Submitting appearance (Second Respondent)

SOLICITORS:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Appellant)
Aboriginal Legal Service (NSW) (First Respondent)
I V Knight, Crown Solicitor (Second Respondent)

CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL – appeal to District Court from decision of a magistrate – Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, s 18 – whether appeal should be conducted by way of review or rehearing
APPEAL – appeal to District Court from decision of a magistrate – Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, s 20 – whether District Court judge exceeded jurisdiction
APPEAL – appeal to District Court from decision of a magistrate – credit findings – whether District Court judge obliged to accept the credit findings of the magistrate
APPEAL – appeal to District Court from decision of a magistrate – setting aside of conviction – whether any additional order ought to be made by the District Court so as to finally dispose of the matter
APPEAL – appeal to District Court from decision of a magistrate – setting aside of conviction – Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, s 73 – production of memorandum to finalise proceedings
APPEAL – appeal to District Court from decision of a magistrate – setting aside of conviction – Criminal Procedure Act 1986, s 206 – certificate certifying the matter has been dismissed
PROCEDURE – trial – conduct of trial judge – reasonable questioning of witness by trial judge – whether trial judge has misused advantage of seeing and hearing witness – bounds of reasonable questioning
BIAS – apprehended bias – test for reasonable apprehension of bias – whether fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that District Court judge might have prejudged the outcome of appeal proceedings
WORDS & PHRASES – “dismiss the charge” – “acquit” – “quash” – “set aside conviction”
WORDS & PHRASES – “autrefois acquit” – “autrefois convict”

LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Supreme Court Act 1970

CATEGORY:
Principal judgment

CASES CITED:
Battenberg v Union Club [2005] NSWSC 242; 53 ACSR 263
Bell v Stewart [1920] HCA 68; (1920) 28 CLR 419
Charara v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 244; 164 A Crim R 39
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; 203 CLR 194
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough [1935] HCA 45; (1935) 53 CLR 220
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Emanuel [2009] NSWCA 42; 193 A Crim R…

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Details
Case
[2010] NSWCA 265
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) sought prerogative relief from the Supreme Court of New South Wales, seeking to quash orders made by a District Court judge and have the matter remitted for determination by a different judge. The DPP’s grounds for relief were that the judge had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by conducting a review rather than a rehearing, that a fair-minded lay observer might apprehend bias due to the judge prejudging the outcome, and that the judge had constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by disregarding the magistrate's credit findings.

The Supreme Court was required to determine whether the District Court judge had erred in law by conducting the appeal as a review rather than a rehearing, whether the judge’s conduct gave rise to an apprehension of bias, and whether the judge had failed to exercise jurisdiction by ignoring the magistrate's findings regarding a witness's credit. The Court also considered the appropriate terminology for setting aside a conviction under the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001.

The Court reasoned that the appeal from a summary conviction to the District Court is by way of rehearing under the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act. While acknowledging that the District Court judge's language in setting aside the conviction was not precisely in line with the statutory wording, the Court found this not to be determinative, noting that the judge had not acted in a manner analogous to exercising a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court found that the DPP's case on apprehended bias had not been made out and that the judge had not constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction.

Consequently, the application for prerogative relief was dismissed with costs. The Court noted that the parties might need to apply to the District Court judge to correct the order to accurately reflect that the conviction was set aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application is dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) seeks prerogative relief in this Court pursuant to the Supreme Court Act 1970, s 69, seeking that the orders made by Nicholson DCJ be quashed and that the matter be remitted to the District Court to be determined by a different judge, according to law, on the following bases: 1.That his Honour acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction by reviewing the decision of the Magistrate in the court below rather than conducting a hearing and basing his determination on the evidence.2.That a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that his Honour prejudged the outcome of the appeal proceedings, thereby denying procedural fairness to the DPP.3.That his Honour constructively failed to exercise his jurisdiction in the appeal proceedings by ignoring findings of credit made by the Magistrate about a witness in the court below.Background facts On 6 September 2009, the respondent attended the Dubbo police station to report to the police in accordance with bail conditions to which he was then subject. The Constable on duty observed that the respondent appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, which was in breach of his bail conditions. He was arrested and searched. At the time, the respondent was wearing a bumbag around his waist which contained a green handled Phillips head screwdriver, a small red torch, a pocket knife with a foldaway blade and a small lip balm. When questioned about the contents of the bumbag, the respondent explained that the screwdriver was in his bag because he had to fix his sister’s door and that the pocket knife was his fishing knife. The respondent was not questioned about the lip balm. However, the police officer made an observation, which he recorded in the statement he made in respect of the search, that the lip balm had a groove down the side which appeared as if the screwdriver had been rubbed along it. The respondent was then charged with an offence under s 114(1)(b). A charge under s 114(1)(b) may be defended by the accused person establishing that he or she had the implements in his possession for a lawful purpose: the Crimes Act, s 417A. Proof of lawful purpose need only be established on the balance of probabilities. At the hearing before the Magistrate, the respondent’s case was that he had inadvertently taken the items, other than the knife, which was his, from his sister’s house that day and that it was his intention to return them. The respondent’s sister, Ms Burns, gave evidence in the respondent’s defence that earlier that day the respondent had commenced to fix a door at her house with his pocket knife and that she had told him she had tools that he could use which were in an esky. She said he then went and got the screwdriver from the esky. In her evidence, Ms Burns identified a photograph of the screwdriver as being one of the screwdrivers from her toolbox. Ms Burns also identified the torch as belonging to her daughter which, she said, was usually kept in the esky with the tools. She said that the respondent had needed to use the torch because there was no light in the area near the door to be fixed and it was after dark.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my opinion, notwithstanding the remarks of Nicholson DCJ, the DPP’s case on bias has not been made out. Conclusion It follows from the above that I consider that the application should be dismissed with costs. I would only observe that it may be necessary for the parties to make an application to Nicholson DCJ to correct the error in his order, so that it correctly records that the conviction is set aside. BASTEN JA: I agree with Beazley JA that the application before this Court should be dismissed and that the Director should be ordered to pay the respondent’s costs. The application invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). That jurisdiction is limited to grounds demonstrating jurisdictional error, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in the District Court being subject to a privative clause: District Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 176; Spanos v Lazaris [2008] NSWCA 74 at [15]; Director of Public Prosecutions v Emanuel [2009] NSWCA 42; 193 A Crim R 552 at [18] (Spigelman CJ) and [45]. The nature of the appeal from the Local Court to the District Court, in respect of a summary conviction, is an appeal by way of rehearing in accordance with the provisions of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) (“the Appeal and Review Act”), ss 18-20. The nature of the jurisdiction has been discussed in a number of cases, including Gianoutsos v Glykis [2006] NSWCCA 137; 65 NSWLR 539; Charara v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 244; 164 A Crim R 39 and Emanuel (above). Emanuel was superficially similar to the present case. The District Court purported to “quash” a conviction on the basis that the magistrate had acted without jurisdiction, so that the convictions recorded against Mr Emanuel were invalid: at [22]. As the Chief Justice noted, the District Court judge appeared to be exercising the supervisory jurisdiction vested in this Court, and not available in the District Court: at [23]-[24]. Critical to that conclusion was the fact that the primary judge had relied entirely on the failure of the magistrate to grant an adjournment, in the face of a mandatory statutory requirement, and that there had been no discussion of the evidence in the District Court judgment. Neither of those factors exists in the present case. One common element between the two cases is that in each the District Court judge purported to “quash” the conviction, whereas the statutory language is “set aside” the conviction: Appeal and Review Act, s 20. I expressed the view in Emanuel that such language should not be treated as determinative as it might merely reflect an ingrained habit arising from the use of both “quash” and “set aside” in the earlier provisions of the Justices Act 1902 (NSW), s 125. As appears from the joint judgment in Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Cavanough [1935] HCA 45; 53 CLR 220 at 225 (Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) in relation to s 125:“… the power given to the Quarter Sessions includes authority to quash and set aside convictions. These are familiar expressions and describe a jurisdiction exercisable at common law by Courts of error. The effect of the reversal of a conviction by proceedings in error has long been settled, and the same effect is produced by quashing it, or setting it aside upon a statutory appeal. The conviction is avoided ab initio.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established