R v Brown
[2025] VSC 686
•7 November 2025
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
S ECI 2024 06273
| R (ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY‑GENERAL OF THE STATE OF VICTORIA) | Applicant |
| v | |
| ROHAN BROWN | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | Kaye JA |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATES OF HEARING: | 27, 29 October 2025 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 7 November 2025 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | R v Brown |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2025] VSC 686 |
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CONTEMPT OF COURT – Application by originating motion and summons seeking orders that respondent guilty of 15 charges of contempt – Conduct comprising comments made by respondent in open court and by correspondence – Respondent made abusive and disrespectful comments to County Court judge in court – Respondent sent numerous emails to court containing threatening language and allegations of impropriety and corruption – Correspondence sent to judges’ chambers and court registries – Whether conduct had tendency to interfere with administration of justice or otherwise scandalise the court – Contempt found proven.
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015, r 75.08.1; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, ss 8, 15, 21 and 24; Evidence Act 2008, s 161.
John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 351; R v Dunbabin; ex parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434; Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; LCM Litigation Fund Pty Ltd v Coope [2017] NSWCA 200; R v Slaveski [2011] VSC 643; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Katelaris [2008] NSWSC 389; Re Dyce Sombre (1849) 1 MaC & G 116; 41 ER 1207; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238; Ex parte Attorney-General; Re Goodwin(1969) 70 SR (NSW) 413; Re Wiseman [1969] NZLR 55; R vCollins [1954] VLR 46; McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1058, considered.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Counsel | Victorian Government Solicitors Office |
| For the Respondent | In person via audio-visual link |
HIS HONOUR:
The applicant, by originating motion and summons, has brought an application seeking orders that the respondent be adjudged guilty of contempt. The application is concerned with 14 email communications by the respondent to the County Court and the Supreme Court, or to one of them, between 17 October 2023 and 2 October 2025, and to a comment made by the respondent to the presiding judge in the County Court in the course of a hearing of proceedings involving the respondent on 3 April 2024.
Background circumstances
In 2023, the respondent commenced five proceedings in the County Court of Victoria against the State of Victoria and related entities alleging numerous torts and other claims. By order made by Judge Manova on 21 June 2024, the proceedings were consolidated into one proceeding.
On 17 August 2023, the respondents in the County Court proceedings filed summonses seeking orders that the proceedings be struck out in their entirety. The application was heard before her Honour Judge Tran on 3 October 2023. In the course of submissions, Judge Tran raised concerns with the respondent concerning the manner in which emails, forwarded by him to the Court, had been expressed. Her Honour observed that the emails contained statements about people that could be interpreted as gratuitous/abusive or insulting and which were not relevant to any issue in dispute in the proceedings. The judge indicated her intention to make orders relating to the manner in which the respondent could correspond with the County Court email addresses.
On 4 October 2023, Judge Tran made a number of orders in that respect, including orders identifying the manner in which the respondent was required to communicate by email with the Court. One of the orders made by her Honour was as follows:
(10)Emails sent by Mr Brown to any County Court email address must not contain abusive or threatening material. For the avoidance of doubt, this order does not prevent Mr Brown filing pleadings, affidavits or submissions which include allegations of fact which are relevant to the issues in dispute in the proceeding, or give notice of an application to be made by him in the proceeding.
The alleged contempts
Following the orders so made by Judge Tran, the respondent continued to correspond with the County Court, the Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (‘VGSO’) and others relating to his proceedings.
That correspondence included an email by the respondent to the chambers of Judge Tran at 4:11 pm on 17 October 2023, which stated:
[A]nd I remind Tran that my emails were inspired by the endemic corruption and incompetence of the court.
Meanwhile I don’t pay much attention to orders made by corrupt low lives such as tran.
That email is the first communication by the respondent which in this proceeding is alleged to constitute a contempt of court (‘alleged contempt number 1’).
Subsequently, on 3 April 2024, an interlocutory hearing in the proceedings took place before her Honour Judge Manova of the County Court. In the course of the hearing, the respondent contended that counsel for the defendant in the County Court proceedings had ignored the fact (the respondent asserted) that certain emails contained video footage of a police prosecutor assaulting the respondent in front of the County Court building on 4 October 2017. At that point, Judge Manova sought to raise with the respondent that she had twice viewed the video and had been unable to see any assault take place in it. In the course of that discussion by the judge, the respondent made the remark, which constitutes the second contempt of court alleged in this proceeding.
The relevant passage in the transcript of the hearing on 3 April 2024 is as follows:
RESPONDENT: … the emails contain video footage of police prosecutor, Mark Sontag, assaulting me out the front of the County on 4 October 2017 …
HER HONOUR: Well, just stop, Mr Brown …
RESPONDENT: I haven’t finished. I notice (indistinct words) …
HER HONOUR: No, stop.
RESPONDENT: (Indistinct words) …
HER HONOUR: I want to ask you about this video.
RESPONDENT: You fucking stop, you fuckin’ whore.
HER HONOUR: I want to ask you about this video, Mr Brown. I’ve received it and I’ve watched it twice and I can’t see any assault. At what time does the assault occur?
The remark made by the respondent in the above exchange, in which he called the judge ‘you fuckin’ whore’, constitutes the second contempt of court alleged by the respondent in this proceeding.
On 21 November 2024, the originating motion was issued in this proceeding seeking that the respondent be adjudged guilty of contempt in respect of the first two alleged contempts of court. The originating motion, and the affidavit in support of it, were served personally on the respondent in Hampton Park on 19 December 2024.
As I have noted, on 21 June 2024, Judge Manova ordered that the five County Court proceedings be consolidated into one proceeding.
In the course of her Honour’s ongoing management of the proceeding, the respondent, on 29 May 2025, sent an email to her Honour’s chambers. The email was also addressed to the Attorney‑General, and to Mr Matthew Hocking of the Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office. Copies of the email were addressed to the chambers of the Chief Judge of the County Court, and the chambers of Judge Tran and Judge Clark. The ‘subject’ of the email was: ‘Manova You are a Whore’. The following is the text of the email:
This is your reminder that you are a state funded whore.
You said you could see no assault in this footage. You are a LIAR, a criminal and a state funded whore.
That is immutable fact you state funded whore.
The respondent then attached an image underneath which were the words:
You should be in Dame Phillis Frost prison you whore.
That communication is the third alleged contempt of court in this proceeding.
On 10 July 2025, the applicant in this proceeding filed an amended originating motion which added a claim that the respondent be adjudged guilty of contempt in respect of the third alleged contempt.
On 18 August 2025, Judicial Registrar Burgess held a directions hearing in the matter. The respondent failed to attend, and the judicial registrar made an order that the respondent appear in person at the next directions hearing listed on 8 September.
The directions hearing on 8 September 2025 was listed before her Honour, Tsalamandris J. The respondent failed to appear at the hearing. On the application of the applicant, Tsalamandris J issued a warrant in the proceeding , pursuant to r 75.08.1 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015, for the arrest of the respondent.
In the meantime, the Attorney-General issued a proceeding in this Court seeking relief against the respondent pursuant to the Vexatious Proceeding Act 2014. Judicial Registrar Lorenz has presided over preliminary hearings in relation to that proceeding.
On 16 September, the respondent was arrested by Victoria Police and presented to Court pursuant to the warrant. Following a hearing on the same date, Tsalamandris J made orders, which included that the respondent be released on his own undertaking that he appear in person in this Court on 27 October 2025, and that he not send any emails to the County Court or Supreme Court email addresses which contain ‘abusive or threatening material’. Her Honour also made other orders for the interlocutory processes for the hearing of the substantive application.
Subsequently, between 28 September and 2 October 2025, the respondent forwarded the following twelve emails addressed to Supreme Court and County Court email addresses, which are the subject of further charges of contempt.
On 28 September 2025 at 11:12 am, the respondent sent an email that was addressed to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz of this Court, and which was copied to a number of email addresses that included: the chambers of Justice Beale of this Court; the chambers of the Chief Judge, Judge Manova and Judge Tran of the County Court; the executive associate to the Chief Justice of this Court; the Attorney‑General; Matthew Laxton of Victoria Police; and two email addresses of legal practitioners Russell Kennedy. The email contained the subject heading: ‘IMMUABLE (sic) FACT Christopher Beale is corrupt’. The email then stated:
Dear Katherine,
Just so that we are abundantly clear.
When I was before you I clearly state the immutable fact that Christopher Beale is corrupt.
I referred to when I was on 16th September 2016, in front of the corrupted low life Beale.
The paperwork before Beale on that occasion clearly detailed a false imprisonment which he was active in concealing, because he is corrupt low life.
When I raised the issue of the false imprisonment he directed me not to talk about it.
When I said this Katherine, you warned me that this might be contempt of court also.
Therefore, Katherine you have a few choices here.
1.You charge me with contempt of court, for stating the immutable fact that the low life Christopher Beale is corrupt.
2.You check the transcript and apologise for assuming that I was wrong when I was Beale’s victim.
3.You sweep it under the carpet proving that you are every bit the criminal that Beale is.
The fact is that I called Diana Manova a whore after she said she saw no assault in this video. Manova and Tran are criminal law (sic) lives who conceal crimes committed by cowardly state funded terrorists. Just as Beale did on 16th September 2016, exactly 9 years before as a party of the systemic ongoing criminality by the entirely corrupted state, appeared before you.
Clearly there is an assault in the video, clearly Manova is a low life who is active in concealing and ignoring police criminality.
The email again referred to Beale J as ‘criminal low life’ and to the Court’s ‘corrupt systems’ and then, relevantly, continued as follows:
I won’t be changing my 100% fact-based view of Beale, Tran and Manova just because you pull of (sic) further corruption Katherine. Instead, I will just be adding you to the list and eventually that list will be dealt with accordingly.
I am not afraid of you and the consequences you may apply; police have tried to kill me several times.
I expect this to be clarified immediately,. (sic) As you have had more than adequate time to review the transcript and to confirm that the low life corrupted Beale acted precisely as I have said he had.
If you refuse to do the right thing, then you deserve to be punished, that is how justice works Katherine. Not the way that Beale, Tran and Manova have immutably conducted themselves, supporting and assisting terrorists and acts of terrorism.
(Alleged contempt number 4).
On the following day, 29 September 2025, at 6:31 pm, the respondent sent an email addressed to the ‘Supreme Court – General List’ in the following terms:
Hello General List,
What a peculiar name you have.
Perhaps as a survivor of 13 years of proven endemic corruption, exhibited by the likes of Christopher Beale, Beach Priest, I no longer place any weight on anything you criminals have to say; fancy that.
So, do your worst, I do not care and what I have developed for the world will ultimately expose you all for the low lives you immutably are.
All you have are threats and violence, I have a civilisational solution for all of humanity.
In short General, or Ms List, whatever your name is, if you want to shut me up, you will have to kill me.
Meanwhile as you will note the following explains why — if the foundation is false — the courts “lawful standing” dissolves …
(Alleged contempt number 5).
On 1 October 2025, following receipt of the above emails, Tsalamandris J made an order in chambers directing that this proceeding be listed for mention at 2:15 pm on the following day, 2 October 2025, in court number 1.
On 2 October 2025, following a hearing at which the respondent did not appear, her Honour adjourned the mention hearing to Monday 6 October 2025.
On 1 October 2025, the respondent sent three emails, each of which are alleged to contain communications in contempt of court.
On 1 October 2025, at 1:07 pm, the respondent sent an email to the Supreme Court – General List email address which included the following:
Do you recall my undertaking that you are not an actual court, nor are you a system of justice?
Rather that you are engaged in necromancy?
Your silence on the immutable fact, displayed in the transcript of 16th September 2016, that the criminal lowlife, and sexually ambiguous ponce Christopher Beale concealed the fact that on that day the paperwork, (applications and unchallenged affidavits) clearly present as a false imprisonment.
The fact is the Christopher Beale is a criminal who should be in Ararat prison.
Should the purported “Judicial Registrar” Lorenz remain silent, given her false claim that my saying that may be contempt of court, would show that she should be in the Dame Phyllis Frost correction centre.
…
Meanwhile, I do not bow to criminals, I expose them; your silence and this email with unfounded allegations, proves that you are criminals.
I sincerely hope that you burn in hell.
(Alleged contempt number 6).
On 1 October 2025, at 1:39 pm, the respondent sent a further email to the Supreme Court – General List in the following terms:
It should not be too hard for you to show where Beale addressed the fact that my application and affidavit stated that I had been charges (sic) 12 days after being remanded, a fact that was likewise made out in the police affidavit in opposition to Bail.
Your non response of course is your acquiescence to this immutable fact.
So yes, tell me again how suggested that Christopher Beale ius (sic) a corrupt criminal low life is contempt of court and not the truth backed by immutable evidence, which you have and may verify easily and quickly.
See, your entire rotten profession, top to bottom is corrupt, it is immutable fact.
(Alleged contempt number 7).
On 1 October 2025, at 11:03 pm, the respondent forwarded a further email to the Supreme Court – General List, and to an email address of the Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office, which stated that the Court had been sent a ‘lawful basis for non‑attendance’. The respondent referred to the matter handled by Beale J and to grievances which he had with two police members. He then stated:
…
Perhaps prior to addressing how I speak to people who are immutably a part of a proven corrupted system, these immutable criminal acts are dealt with accordingly.
…
I am only responding under threat of violence and of being deprived of my liberty, as I have been numerous times since at least 27th of July 2012 …
I do not hold that you are a lawful court of law, rather a criminal enterprise acting under the colour of law. The fact of this system being more concerned with rude however truth based emails than it is about wilful misconduct in the form of serious crimes and systemic concealment, is all the evidence I need to confirm the submissions in the attached documents, that you are not a lawful court with any foundation in law.
(Alleged contempt number 8).
On the following day, 2 October 2025, the respondent forwarded seven emails, each of which are alleged to constitute a contempt of court.
On 2 October 2025, at 11:12 am, the respondent sent an email to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, which was copied to a number of email addresses, including: the chambers of Beale J; the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz; the chambers of Judge Tran; and the email addresses of the Attorney-General, of Mr R Kennedy (of legal practitioners Russell Kennedy) and Mr Mark Sontag (of Victoria Police). The email referred to an appearance by the respondent before Beale J of this Court on 16 September 2016, and posed the question why on that date his Honour did not question the date of the arrest charges and the dates on the charges and police submissions in respect of the matter before him. Having posed that question, the email then stated as follows:
Answer: Why, because like Mark Sontag Christopher Beale is a corrupt low life who should be in prison.
The transcript speaks for itself: Christopher Beale is corrupt and is involved in systemic corruption resulting in false imprisonment.
The Attorney-Generals since that time all know, the VGSO knows, My Anh Tran knows.
Tran relied on dubious documents not before Beale for her part in this coverup.
(Alleged contempt number 9).
On 2 October 2025 at 11:18 am, the respondent sent an email addressed (among others) to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Beale J, the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, the chambers of Judge Tran, and the email addresses of the Attorney-General, Mr Kennedy and Mr Sontag. The email commenced with offensive allegations about police lawyer, Mark Sontag. Having done so, the email then proceeded:
Why is Mark a practising lawyer and police officer, after being proven to be a deliberate wilful and reckless perverter of the law?
Because you are all criminal low lives and perverters of the law.
The email then made further offensive allegations about two other persons and concluded:
Since when does hypervigilance excuse systemic corruption as the little fake jew worm says in this attached footage.
(Alleged contempt number 10).
On 2 October 2025, at 11:43 am, the respondent forwarded the following email to the email address of the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and which was copied to the chambers of Beale J, the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, the chambers of Judge Tran, and to the email addresses of the Attorney-General, Mr R Kennedy and Mr Sontag:
Funny how you low lives get all bent out of shape over the content of emails that you refuse to respond to or read in any case.
You are all 100% full of shit and should be euthanised, the lot of you.
(Alleged contempt number 11).
On 2 October 2025, at 11:45 am, the respondent sent an email addressed (inter alia) to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and copied to the chambers of Beale J, the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, the chambers of Judge Tran and to the email addresses of the Attorney-General, Mr R Kennedy and Mr Sontag, which stated:
Just ignore the words that upset your weak minds and cowardly hearts, just like you ignore the endemic corruption, you low lives.
(Alleged contempt number 12).
On 2 October 2025, at 11:56 am, the respondent sent an email to (inter alia) the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and which was copied to the chambers of Beale J, the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, the chambers of Judge Tran and to the email addresses of the Attorney-General, Mr Kennedy, and Mr Sontag. The email contained the following:
Magistrate Rohan Lawrence provides a masterclass on how to change the subject to protect a corrupt little perverting grub lawyer.
M11690601 TUICA v Brown: Scumbag police officer (terrorist) who is a solicitor (sworn liar) proven perjury which is systematically concealed by the court, Bar, Attorney General and VGSO.
(Alleged contempt number 13).
On 2 October 2025, at 12:06 pm, the respondent sent an email to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, which was copied to the chambers of Beale J, the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, the chambers of Judge Tran and to the email addresses of the Attorney-General, Mr Kennedy, and Mr Sontag. The email commenced:
Nothing you do changes the facts, it only goes to prove how entirely corrupted this state is from top to bottom.
The email then listed the names of seven County Court judges, three Supreme Court judges, five magistrates, and four politicians and then stated under that list:
Etc, etc, etc, etc, etc, all part of systemic coverup, all corrupt, all should be in prison.
Lock me up, fine me, assault ,(sic) bash, falsely imprison me, it will only go to further solidify my lawful position and your criminality.
I won’t stop until I pass, and I am not suicidal.
(Alleged contempt number 14).
On 2 October 2025, at 2:03 pm, the respondent sent an email to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, copied to the chambers of Beale J, the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, the chambers of Judge Tran, and the email addresses of the Attorney‑General, Mr Kennedy, and Mr Sontag. The email stated:
Just get Christopher Beale, the Application for bail, affidavit in support of application for bail, the affidavit in opposition to bail filed by police and the transcript.
Then have the low life criminal, Christopher Beale explain using that paperwork how it was a lawful imprisonment.
Not like Tran did relying upon documents that were not in court and did not exist until they were created later to conceal this easily confirmed crime.
Of course, you will all ignore this, because you are trying to incriminate me for rude words while you conspire to defeat the administrative course of public justice protecting proven liars and perverters of the law in your profession.
Now, you have a choice.
(1) Choose justice and separate yourselves from these criminals.
(2)Join the list of these criminals that will one day be dealt with accordingly.
Only (1) will cause me to change my trajectory, likewise yours.
(Alleged contempt number 15).
Following receipt of those emails, Tsalamandris J, on 6 October, made orders revoking order number 1 of the orders that her Honour had made on 16 September 2025. Her Honour further ordered, pursuant to r 75.8.1 of the Supreme Court Rules, that the Court issue a warrant for the arrest of the respondent, and listed the matter for mention in this Court on 8 October.
On 8 October, I made an order that the applicant be granted leave to file and serve a summons alleging further contempt of court by the respondent, in respect of the alleged contempts of court numbered 4 to 15 inclusive.
On 15 October 2025, the applicant filed and served a summons seeking orders that the respondent be adjudged guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court in respect of each of the alleged contempts of court numbered 4 to 15.
On 20 October, at a mention hearing attended by the respondent who appeared via audiovisual link, I made an order that, pending the hearing and determination of the originating motion and applications for contempt, the respondent not send any emails to the County Court or the Supreme Court email addresses which contained abusive or threatening material.
The basis of the claimed contempts
In the originating motion, and in the summons by the applicant seeking orders for contempt in respect of alleged contempts number 4 to 15, the applicant specified the basis upon which it contends that each of the 15 publications by the respondent constitute a contempt of court.
In the amended originating motion it is contended that the first and third alleged contempts, consisting of the email by the respondent to the chambers of Judge Tran on 17 October 2023, and the email by the respondent to the chambers of Judge Manova on 29 May 2025, were each intended, and/or had a tendency, to interfere with the due administration of justice, in that the emails: were abusive of the judges and offensive to them in their role as judicial officers; were abusive of the County Court and disrespectful of the authority of the County Court; and, in respect of the email to Judge Tran’s chambers, were knowingly in breach of the 4 October order made by Judge Tran.
In the amended originating motion, the applicant contends that, by calling Judge Manova in Court a ‘fuckin whore’ in the course of the hearing before her Honour (alleged contempt number 2), the respondent’s conduct was intended, and/or had a tendency, to interfere with the due administration of justice, in that the conduct: was abusive of, and offensive to, the judge in her role as a judicial officer; was disrespectful of the authority of the County Court; and was disruptive and disturbed the proceeding.
In the amended summons seeking relief in respect of alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15, the applicant contends that the respondent’s conduct in sending each of the emails was intended to and/or had a tendency to interfere with the due administration of justice in that each email: was intended to influence, place improper pressure on and/or threaten or intimidate a judicial officer in the performance of his or her duties; and was abusive of, and disrespectful of the authority of, the County Court and/or the Supreme Court. It is contended that each email had a tendency to: interfere with, and intimidate, a judicial officer in the performance of their duties; dissuade a judicial officer from continuing to perform their duties in connection with proceedings involving the respondent; and undermine the authority of the Supreme Court and/or the County Court. It is further alleged that each of the emails were sent by the respondent in breach of the undertaking given by the respondent to the Court on 16 September 2025.
In the course of oral submissions, counsel for the applicant made it clear that the applicant did not rely on the proposition, that alleged contempts numbered 1, and 3 to 15 (inclusive) constituted a breach by the respondent of the order of the County Court of 4 October 2023, and further alternatively, the undertaking contained in the order of Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025, as the sole or determinative basis upon which it was alleged that those communications constituted contempt of court. In particular, counsel submitted that, in determining whether the communications were each a contempt of court, the order by Judge Tran, and the undertaking contained in the order of Tsalamandris J, are relevant in demonstrating an intention by the respondent to interfere with the due administration of justice.
In that respect, counsel noted that the undertaking before Tsalamandris J was recorded in the orders made by her Honour on 16 September. In the course of the hearing before her Honour on 16 September 2025, the judge informed the respondent that such an undertaking would be a condition of his release from custody, so as to protect the recipients of the emails so far forwarded by the respondent from any future conduct to that effect.
Submissions by respondent
Before the commencement of oral submissions, the respondent filed written submissions setting out the basis upon which he resisted the application in the present case. After the applicant presented its case on the hearing of the application, the respondent advanced further submissions at the hearing of the application.
Subsequently, and after I had adjourned the matter in order to consider my decision, the respondent emailed to the Court, and copied to the email address of the applicant, a ’letter of apology’ in which he stated that he accepted responsibility for his conduct and was prepared to face whatever consequences the Court considered appropriate. Notwithstanding that communication, in the circumstances of the case, and particularly in view of the submissions which the respondent previously relied on, both in writing and at the hearing of the application, it is appropriate that I treat the application as being defended, and that I consider, in respect of each alleged contempts of court, whether the applicant has established its case.
The central submission made by the respondent in his written submissions was that the communications, that are the subject of each of the 15 alleged contempts, fall within the scope of lawful political expression and are to be assessed in light of the protections provided by the Commonwealth Constitution and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (‘the Charter’). The respondent submitted that each communication engaged fundamental questions of equality, proportionality and fair process. It was further contended that the communications did not contain any threats of violence or unlawful conduct, but, rather, they reflected strong criticism and frustration by the respondent at perceived administrative misconduct.
In support of that submission, the respondent referred to and relied on a number of provisions of the Charter, and other legislation. He also referred to the implied freedom of political communication that was explained by the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation[1] and Coleman v Power.[2] In addition, the respondent relied on the decision of the High Court in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)[3] in support of the proposition that state courts may not be used as instruments of executive policy, and on the decision of the High Court in Mabo v Queensland (No 2)[4] in support of the principle that the rule of law requires that legal standards apply equally to all citizens and officials.
[1](1997) 189 CLR 520 (‘Lange’).
[2](2004) 220 CLR 1 (‘Coleman’).
[3](1996) 189 CLR 51 (‘Kable’).
[4](1992) 175 CLR 1 (‘Mabo’).
Based on those principles, the respondent submitted that the communications, relied on by the applicant in this case, concerned governmental and judicial integrity, they are political in character, and they fall within the scope of the principle of implied freedom of expression. I shall discuss the principles, so relied on by the respondent, later in these reasons, after I have first outlined the relevant principles of law concerning contempt of court.
The respondent further submitted that relevant material has not been provided to him, including CCTV recordings and related documents. I interpolate that those recordings and documents do not relate to the present application, but, rather, appear to have some connection with previous proceedings in which the respondent was involved.
The respondent further submitted that there have been examples of official or comparable conduct by public officials which have not been the subject of any appropriate sanction. I note that the examples provided by the respondent do not relate to any conduct in Court, or any conduct by persons concerning processes in Court, which could, as such, constitute a contempt of court.
The respondent next submitted that there has been ‘extended delay’ in the present case which has infringed ‘statutory and constitutional safeguards’. He submitted that there was a period of some 12 days between his detention and being charged, and that he spent a total period of 110 days in custody. I interpolate that it is not apparent how that period is calculated.
The next submission made by the respondent was to the effect that the conduct of the applicant in this case constituted an abuse of process, and that the current proceeding should be stayed unless and until the prosecution has made ‘full disclosure’ to the respondent of information sought by him. In that respect, the respondent, again, relied on his contention that there had been non-disclosure of ‘CCTV and related documents’, and he also relied on the ‘extended detention and charge delay’, on the ‘comparable’ examples of official misconduct he had referred to, and the proposition advanced by him that the prosecution in the present case is directed to penalise expressions by him critical of government.
The documents referred to by the respondent apparently relate to previous incidents, and proceedings, involving the respondent. The respondent has failed to demonstrate how those matters have any relevance to the issues in the current proceeding.
The respondent submitted that the communications by him do not constitute contempt of court. He submitted that they were written protests and complaints by him concerning matters of public administration, they contained no threats of violence or incitement, and that the tone of the communications — though ‘passionate’ — mirrored accepted Australian idiom and fall within the constitutional and Charter protection. Accordingly, it was submitted that the communications could not objectively be classified as ‘abusive’ or ‘threatening’.
In further written submissions, the respondent submitted that as the alleged conduct involved communications to the County Court judicial officers and registries, this Court lacks jurisdiction to punish for contempt of that Court.
That submission is misconceived. As the superior court in the jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has power not only to punish contempt committed against itself, but in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, it also has power to deal with contempts committed against courts of inferior jurisdiction, including the County Court.[5]
[5]John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 351, 365 (Dixon CJ, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ); Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1, 17 (Dawson J).
The respondent further submitted that the County Court proceeding presided over by Judge Tran, in fact, concluded on 28 July 2023, so that there was no live proceeding, or judicial function, capable of being ‘impeded’ and thus the subject of a contempt of court.
That submission may also be readily addressed. As noted, the respondent issued a number of proceedings in the County Court. In one of those proceedings (No 22‑04616), Judge Tran granted an application by the defendant (the State of Victoria) for summary judgment.[6] However, that order did not affect the other proceedings issued by the applicant in the County Court. The proceeding, in which Judge Tran made the order dated 4 October 2023, restraining the respondent from forwarding emails to the County Court email address that contained abusive or threatening material, was made in a separate proceeding (Cl-23-02495).
[6]Brown v State of Victoria [2023] VCC 1282.
That proceeding has remained on foot in the County Court. On 1 September 2025, Judge Pillay of that Court made orders that the proceeding be temporarily stayed until the final determination of the proceeding in this Court brought by the Attorney-General to have the respondent declared a vexatious litigant.[7] The temporary stay of the County Court proceeding does not mean that it has been brought to an end. It is extant, albeit that it is temporarily stayed.
[7]Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Brown (SECI 2024 No 06736).
The respondent advanced further arguments in oral submissions at the hearing of the proceeding. In that respect, it is relevant to note that after the completion of the presentation by the applicant of its submissions on the first day of the hearing, I adjourned the case for two days, to enable the respondent to prepare any submissions which he wished to advance in response.
The respondent commenced his oral submissions by contending that the transcript of the proceeding on the first day of the hearing before me was inaccurate. He submitted that, as a consequence, the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the contempt proceeding against him was suspended, and that it should not proceed until the transcript had been properly corrected.
I do not accept that submission. The transcript of the hearing on the first day did not record any evidence. It provided useful assistance by recording the arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant. Any error in it does not, and could not, affect the validity of this proceeding, or the right of the respondent to have a fair hearing.
The second proposition advanced by the respondent is that this proceeding should not be considered in isolation, but in the context of previous proceedings involving the respondent, which commenced with charges against him in 2013, which were dismissed by the Magistrates’ Court. The respondent submitted he was arrested and detained in June 2016 without lawful warrant, and ultimately was brought before Beale J, who granted him bail. In addition, he submitted that in May 2017, he was assaulted by a police prosecutor outside the Magistrates’ Court, and that subsequently that prosecutor filed a false statement depicting himself as the victim. The respondent also stated that in August 2021, he was subject of a search warrant on him that was executed at gunpoint in a public reserve.
I am not persuaded that the matters, to which the respondent referred, are relevant to the current proceeding. While those matters might have engendered in the respondent a feeling of grievance against the justice system, they are not relevant to the issues in the present case, namely, whether the respondent performed the conduct that is the subject of each of the 15 alleged contempts of court, and, if so, whether that conduct itself constituted a contempt of court.
The respondent also relied on the doctrine of necessity as a defence to the communications which he made to the Court, and which are the subject of each of the 15 alleged contempts of court. However, there was no basis, either in the evidence adduced on this application, or otherwise, which would support such a defence to any of the communications which are the subject of the 15 alleged contempts of court.
The respondent submitted that each of the 15 communications constituted the product of, or were expressions of, psychological harm that he had suffered as a result of the conduct by various organs of the State towards him. He submitted that if the Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office and the Attorney-General had acted as model litigants in previous litigation, he would not have been involved in proceedings that were before the County Court.
That proposition does not constitute a valid defence in the present case. First, the respondent did not provide any evidence at all which would sustain the proposition that he has suffered psychiatric harm, as he contended. Secondly, he has not demonstrated how, if he has suffered psychological harm, it in some way might provide a defence in respect of the communications that he engaged in and which constitute the 15 alleged contempts of court.
Contempt of court — legal principles
In general, a contempt of court consists of conduct that interferes with, or which has a real and definite tendency as a matter of practical reality to interfere with, the course of justice. The basic purpose of the principles of contempt law is to protect and uphold the integrity and independence of the court and to maintain and vindicate public confidence in the judicial process.[8]
[8]Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238, 245 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ); Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525, 533–4 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) (‘Holloway’).
In R v Dunbabin; ex parte Williams,[9] Rich J explained the purpose of the principles of contempt in the following terms:
Any matter is a contempt which has a tendency to deflect the Court from a strict and unhesitating application of the letter of the law or, in questions of fact, from determining them exclusively by reference to the evidence. But such interferences may also arise from publications which tend to detract from the authority and influence of judicial determinations, publications calculated to impair the confidence of the people in the Court's judgments because the matter published aims at lowering the authority of the Court as a whole or that of its Judges and excites misgivings as to the integrity, propriety and impartiality brought to the exercise of the judicial office. The jurisdiction is not given for the purpose of protecting the Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals. It is not given for the purpose of restricting honest criticism based on rational grounds of the manner in which the Court performs its functions. The law permits in respect of Courts, as of other institutions, the fullest discussions of their doings so long as that discussion is fairly conducted and is honestly directed to some definite public purpose. The jurisdiction exists in order that the authority of the law as administered in the Courts may be established and maintained.[10]
[9](1935) 53 CLR 434 (‘Dunbabin’).
[10]Ibid 442–3; see also 445–6 (Starke J), 447 (Dixon J).
Although the contempt proceeding is brought under Order 75 of the Supreme Court Rules, it is, in reality, criminal in nature. Accordingly, each charge of contempt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[11]
[11]Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525, 534 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
In order to establish a contempt of court involving a breach of an order of the Court, the applicant must establish, first, that the terms of the order were clear and unambiguous, secondly, that the order was served on the alleged contemnor or otherwise appropriately brought to the contemnor’s notice, thirdly, that the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the terms of the order, and, fourthly, that the alleged contemnor breached the terms of the order.[12]
[12]Advan Investments Pty Ltd v Dean Gleeson Motor Sales Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 201 [31] (Gillard J); Scott v Evia Pty Ltd [2007] VSC 15 [36] (Dodds-Streeton J).
In order to establish the fourth element, that the contemnor has breached the terms of the order, it is not necessary to establish that the alleged contemnor had intention to disobey or breach the order. It is sufficient to establish that the act or omission by the contemnor, that is alleged to constitute the breach, was wilful.[13]
[13]Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union & Ors v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98, 112 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ); Attorney-General for New South Wales v Dean (1990) 20 NSWLR 650, 656 (Gleeson CJ, Kirby P and Priestly JA); Chan v Chen (No 2) [2007] VSC 24 [22] (Kaye J); Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v Grocon Constructors (Victoria) Pty Ltd (2014) 47 VR 527, 563-564 [138]–[141] (Ashley, Redlich and Weinberg JJA).
In Witham v Holloway,[14] McHugh J stated the applicable principles in the following terms:
Although criminal contempts take many forms, their characteristic attribute is an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or as part of a continuing process. Defiance of the court or its procedures, publication of matters scandalising the court, actions calculated to prejudice the fair trial of a pending case, threats to parties or witnesses and misconduct within the court are examples of criminal contempts. Civil contempts, on the other hand, are concerned with failures to comply with judgments or orders of the courts. But civil and criminal contempt overlap. Thus, disobedience to the order of a court constitutes criminal contempt when the disobedience is contumacious. Defiance of the court’s order renders criminal what would otherwise be civil contempt. Where non-compliance with a judgment or order goes beyond mere breach and involves misconduct, civil contempt also has ‘a penal or disciplinary jurisdiction [that is] exercised by the court in the public interest’.[15]
[14](1995) 183 CLR 525.
[15]Ibid 538–9 (citations omitted).
The same principles apply, with appropriate modification, to a case of contempt involving a breach by the alleged contemnor of an undertaking made to the Court. In LCM Litigation Fund Pty Ltd v Coope,[16] Emmett AJA (with whom Macfarlan and Simpson JJA agreed) stated the relevant principles as follows:
The primary judge set out the legal principles by which the claim was to be determined in a manner that was and is uncontroversial. It was common ground that it was necessary for LCM to prove the elements of the contempt alleged beyond reasonable doubt. The primary judge made reference to principles concerning contempt by breach of an order of a court, which, with appropriate adaptations, are equally applicable to contempt by breach of undertakings made to a court. With those adaptations, the relevant principles are:
1. the undertakings must have been given to a court;
2.the terms of the undertakings must be clear, unambiguous and capable of compliance;
3.the alleged contemnor must have breached the terms of the undertaking.[17]
[16][2017] NSWCA 200 (‘LCM’).
[17]Ibid [23].
The second alleged contempt in this case concerns an offensive remark made by the respondent to Judge Manova in the course of a directions hearing in the County Court proceedings. The principles relating to contempt of the kind alleged, in the face of the Court, are not designed to serve to assuage the injured feelings of the judicial officer in question, but to protect the administration of justice and to ensure that the authority of the Court is appropriately vindicated and respected.[18]
[18]R v Davison (1821) 4 Barn & Ald 329, 333; (1821) 106 ER 958, 959 (Abbott CJ); Magistrates’ Court at Prahran v Murphy [1997] 2 VR 186, 216 (Callaway JA).
In R v Slaveski,[19] a case of contempt involving a number of intemperate outbursts by a litigant in the course of court proceedings, Whelan J stated:
The reason why insulting and offensive behaviour before the presiding judge constitutes contempt of court has nothing to do with the personal dignity of the judge, or his or her personal feelings. Such conduct is contempt because it challenges the authority of the Court, interrupts the Court’s proceedings, and detracts from the capacity of the Court to conduct proceedings which are dispassionate and rational both in fact and in appearance.[20]
[19][2011] VSC 643.
[20]Ibid [23].
In Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Katelaris,[21] that principle was applied to an outburst by an accused person, directed at a jury, after the jury had announced its verdict. In holding that the respondent in that case was guilty of contempt, Hoeben J stated:
The cases recognise that it is a contempt of court to threaten or take reprisals against judges, witnesses and legal practitioners involved in the judicial process in relation to particular legal proceedings. As the extract from Re Johnson makes clear, that principle applies equally to jurors. Action taken by way of reprisal may constitute a contempt whether or not proceedings remain pending because such conduct may interfere with the administration of justice as a continuing process by discouraging or influencing participation of such persons in future legal proceedings.[22]
[21][2008] NSWSC 389.
[22]Ibid [33].
Apart from the second alleged contempt, each of the other publications involved communications by the respondent to the courts, to particular judges, and to others, relating to or commenting on proceedings that were or had been before the courts. A consideration of those communications involves the application of principles relating to two species of contempt, namely, first, to communications which are directed to influencing or affecting the decisions of the courts, and, secondly, to communications which may, by scandalising the Court, be calculated to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the courts.
In respect of the first category of communications, in some of the emails the respondent did communicate with members of the County Court while he was involved in proceedings before that Court, and, in the case of the communications with the Supreme Court, after the commencement of the current proceedings in this Court on 21 November 2024.
In respect of that category of communication, it is well-established that it is a contempt of court to make contact with a court, by communicating with it extra-curially, for the purpose of influencing or affecting the decision of the Court in respect of a case before it.[23]
[23]Rajski v Bainton (1990) 22 NSWLR 125, 131–2 (Samuels AP, Handley JA); R v Vasiliou [2012] VSC 216 [36]–[37] (Beach J); R v Bonacci [2015] VSC 121 [80]–[88] (Kaye JA).
In Re Dyce Sombre,[24] Cottenham LC stated:
Every private communication to a judge, for the purpose of influencing his decision upon a matter publicly before him, always is, and ought to be, reprobated; it is a course calculated, if tolerated, to divert the course of justice, and is considered, and ought more frequently than it is, to be treated as, what it really is, a high contempt of court.[25]
[24](1849) 1 MaC & G 116; 41 ER 1207 (‘Re Dyce Sombre’).
[25]Re Dyce Sombre (1849) 1 MaC & G 116, 122; 41 ER 1207, 1209; Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 66 ALR 239, 244 (Mason J).
The second kind of potential contempt, arising from the communications in this case, involves the species of communications that scandalise the Court, by having a tendency to undermine public confidence in, and the authority of, the Court.
In Dunbabin, the High Court was concerned with a newspaper article which, in intemperate terms, impugned the reputation of the High Court and its members, referring to the Court as ‘… this pestilent Court’. The Court concluded that the respondents in the case were guilty of contempt. In his concurring judgment, Dixon J stated:
It is necessary for the purpose of maintaining public confidence in the administration of law that there shall be some certain and immediate method of repressing imputations upon Courts of justice which, if continued, are likely to impair their authority. But it must be done by judicial remedies, and judicial remedies are necessarily by the Courts themselves. The Court, must, therefore, undertake the task notwithstanding the embarrassment of considering what it should do in relation to an attack upon itself. There is no practicable alternative. It can but do its best to disregard all considerations except those which strictly relate to the question whether the publication amounts in law to a contempt. That question is whether, if permitted and repeated, it will have a tendency to lower the authority of the Court and weaken the spirit of obedience to the law … .[26]
[26](1935) 53 CLR 434, 447.
In Gallagher v Durack,[27] the Court was concerned with public remarks made by the federal secretary of the Builders Labourers Federation concerning a case in which he was a party then before the Federal Court. In refusing special leave to appeal a decision by the Federal Court holding the applicant guilty of contempt, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ stated the relevant principles in the following terms:
The principles which govern that class of contempt of court which is constituted by imputations on courts or judges which are calculated to bring the court into contempt or lower its authority had been discussed by this Court in Bell v Stewart (1920) 28 CLR 419 and R v Fletcher; Ex parte Kisch (1935) 52 CLR 248 before R v Dunbabin; Ex parte Williams was decided, and the judgment of Rich J in the last mentioned case is consistent with what had been said in the earlier decisions. The law endeavours to reconcile two principles, each of which is of cardinal importance, but which, in some circumstances, appear to come in conflict. One principle is that speech should be free, so that everyone has the right to comment in good faith on matters of public importance, including the administration of justice, even if the comment is outspoken, mistaken or wrong-headed. The other principle is that "it is necessary for the purpose of maintaining public confidence in the administration of law that there shall be some certain and immediate method of repressing imputations upon Courts of justice which, if continued, are likely to impair their authority": per Dixon J in R v Dunbabin; Ex parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR at p 447. The authority of the law rests on public confidence, and it is important to the stability of society that the confidence of the public should not be shaken by baseless attacks on the integrity or impartiality of courts or judges. However, in many cases, the good sense of the community will be a sufficient safeguard against the scandalous disparagement of a court or judge, and the summary remedy of fine or imprisonment "is applied only where the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the ordered and fearless administration of justice and where the attacks are unwarrantable …[28]
[27](1983) 152 CLR 238.
[28]Ibid 243.
The foregoing principles have on occasion been applied in cases in which the communication in question was made in either a limited form or to a limited audience.
In Ex parte Attorney-General; Re Goodwin,[29] a District Court judge, sitting without a jury, found a verdict for the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution in which the respondent was the defendant. Subsequently, the respondent sent letters to 13 registrars of District Courts of New South Wales accusing the judge of having made a malicious and unwarranted attack on the respondent’s character and in doing so having been activated by an ulterior motive. The Court of Appeal in New South Wales held that the communication to the registrars was a contempt of court. In their joint judgment, Wallace P, Jacobs and Holmes JPA stated:
… it seems to us beyond debate that the letter of 4 August and its enclosure goes much further than mere strong criticism, because it is calculated to bring the judge into contempt and so falls within the first class referred to by Lord Russell of Killowen in R v Grey, that is to say, scandalising the Court.
…
Then the claim that the area of publication was insufficient to support the Attorney-General’s application is unacceptable. In Re Wiseman,[30] and in R v Collins,[31] the material constituting the contempt appeared only in affidavits and a notice of motion filed in Court, and in the one case, the New Zealand Court of Appeal and in the other Sholl J found the publisher guilty of contempt and in each case a sentence of imprisonment was imposed. In the present case, the publication was made to a substantial number of District Court registrars and such an area of publication is clearly sufficient to support contempt proceedings.[32]
[29](1969) 70 SR (NSW) 413 (‘Re Goodwin’).
[30][1969] NZLR 55.
[31][1954] VLR 46.
[32]Re Goodwin (1969) 70 SR (NSW) 413, 417.
In Re Wiseman,[33] to which the Court referred in Goodwin, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand was concerned with affidavits that were filed by the respondent, in contempt proceedings, after the conclusion of the proceeding. The Court adjudged the respondent guilty of contempt in making and publishing the affidavits. North P (with whom Turner and McGregor JJ agreed) stated:
… in our opinion, the affidavits, in particular, which make violent accusations against the judges who heard the cases in which the respondent was a party, clearly impute the most improper motives to [the judges]. It is quite impossible to regard these statements as being within the widest limits of legitimate criticism and, in our opinion, clearly have the tendency to lower the authority of the courts and to reflect on the integrity, propriety and impartiality of the judges. We have no doubt whatever that this respondent must be convicted of contempt of court in respect of the statements made and published by him.[34]
[33][1969] NZLR 55.
[34]Ibid 58.
In R vCollins, the respondent, who was involved in litigation before Hudson AJ of the Supreme Court, provided to an officer of the Court two affidavits which were held to constitute a contempt of court. In proceedings for contempt before Sholl J, the affidavits were described as containing matter likely and calculated to lower the authority of the Court and the judges of it, to detract from the authority and influence the decisions of the Court and the judges of it, to reflect on the integrity, propriety and impartiality of the judges of the Court, and to reflect improperly and in contentious language on the integrity and propriety of conduct of counsel and solicitors engaged against the respondent in the Court. Sholl J considered that the affidavits contained ‘allegations of the grossest kind against judges of this Court’.[35] His Honour accordingly considered that the communications constituted contempt, which had a tendency to deflect the Court from a consideration of the case, and which thus came within the first class of cases of contemptuous material described by Rich J in Dunbabin. Sholl J also considered that the affidavits filed by the respondent were capable of amounting to contempt on a further basis. His Honour stated:
But even if I am wrong in the view which I have just expressed, the matter may be looked at in another way. So looking at it, I am of opinion that, for two further reasons, the matter complained of in these affidavits is capable of amounting to contempt of the kind known as scandalizing the Court, as being calculated to lower the authority of the Court and to lessen the confidence of the public in its judgments. In the first place — leaving out of account for the moment publication to the general public by reason merely of the documents being placed on the Court file — it cannot be supposed that, if a litigant were permitted once to make with impunity such an attack upon the Judge hearing his cause, and other Judges of the Court, by handing in an affidavit (but not reading it aloud), that litigant, or others who might thereafter hear about it from him or by other means, would not be tempted thereafter to repeat such conduct. In the long run such a practice would, of course, tend to destroy the status and dignity of the Courts and be greatly to the disadvantage of the public in consequence.[36]
[35][1954] VLR 46, 49.
[36]Ibid, 50.
In determining whether a particular communication to a limited class of persons constitutes a contempt of court, it is important to take into account the particular circumstances of the communication. In McGuirk v University of New South Wales,[37] the Court was concerned (inter alia) with a claim by the applicant that the respondent had committed a contempt of court by communications which, it was alleged, scandalised the Court. The communications comprised faxes sent to the presiding judge’s own associates, the Independent Commission against Corruption, the ombudsman, the solicitor for the opposing party in the proceedings and two members of parliament. In the circumstances, James J was not satisfied that the relevant communications constituted contempt of court. In reaching that conclusion his Honour stated:
In the present case, the faxes were sent only to the judge’s own associate, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Ombudsman, the solicitor for the opposing party in the proceedings and to two members of parliament.
The Independent Commission Against Corruption is a body and the Ombudsman is a person one of whose principal functions is to receive allegations of corrupt or improper conduct. In my opinion, the court should be slow to find that a complaint that a judge has been corrupt sent to either the Independent Commission Against Corruption or the Ombudsman is a contempt of court, however groundless the complaint is.
All of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Ombudsman and Ms Bennett had had long experience of Mr McGuirk and of receiving allegations of misconduct from him and I consider that this can be taken into account in determining whether there was a real risk that the communications sent to them would have had a tendency to lower the authority of Simpson J.
The conclusion I have reached is that I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the faxes relied on in the statement of charge, although scandalising and untrue, would carry a real risk as a matter of practical reality of having a tendency to lower the authority of Simpson J or impair public confidence in the court. Consequently, I dismiss the charge of contempt by scandalising the court.[38]
[37][2009] NSWSC 1058.
[38]Ibid [341]–[344].
Breach of undertaking — principles
One of the bases, on which the applicant relies in its summons, is that each of the emails constituting alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15, were transmitted by the respondent in breach of an undertaking referred to in the order of Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025. In a preliminary mention hearing in this matter, I raised with the parties the question whether, in fact, the respondent had given to the Court, on that date, a binding undertaking which could form the basis of a finding of contempt of court.
As a consequence, on the hearing of the substantive application, counsel for the applicant did not seek to rely on a breach of the undertaking as the sole or determinative basis for a finding of contempt of court in respect of each of the alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15. Rather, counsel submitted that the undertaking, recorded in the Court order, and the circumstances in which that order was made, were relevant as they made clear to the respondent that the kind of communications with the Court, that he had engaged in, were impermissible and were in contempt of the Court.
That position, taken by counsel for the applicant, was correct. For the following reasons, I am not persuaded that in the hearing before Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025, the applicant did give an undertaking to the Court, which, of itself, would be sufficient to constitute the basis of a finding of contempt of court.
As earlier mentioned, the respondent was arrested on 16 September 2025 pursuant to the warrant issued by Tsalamandris J on 8 September 2025. Following his arrest, the respondent came before Tsalamandris J on the same day. Her Honour made an order containing a number of directions concerning the future conduct of the contempt proceedings. In the formal orders, in the preamble, it was noted that the respondent had been arrested by Victoria Police and presented to Court pursuant to the warrant, and that the respondent was ‘… released on the undertakings contained in orders 1(a) and 1(b) below’.
Her Honour then made the following orders (inter alia):
1 The respondent be released on his own undertaking that:
(a)He appear in person at the Supreme Court of Victoria at Melbourne on 27 October 2025 at 10:00am, and if required on the days thereafter, for the hearing and determination of the contempt charges contained in the amended originating motion dated 10 July 2025.
(b)He not send any emails to County Court or Supreme Court email addresses which contain abusive or threatening material.
The transcript of the hearing before her Honour is in evidence in the current proceeding. In the course of the hearing, after other matters had been dealt with, the judge stated that in circumstances, in which she was provided with an undertaking (by the respondent) that he would return to Court on the day of the hearing and that he would not send any abusive or intimidating email correspondence to either the County Court or Supreme Court email addresses, she would make the orders discussed in the hearing. Her Honour then raised with counsel and the respondent whether any other orders were sought or required. Having done so, the following exchange occurred between the judge and the respondent:
HER HONOUR: Mr Brown, I’ll hear the contempt charges on the date that I’ve listed it for, and I will release you now on the undertaking that you have provided — let’s make this clear — that you’ll be here on 27 October in person …
RESPONDENT: Yeah. I’ll come on 27 October.
HER HONOUR: … and every day thereafter that it proceeds and that you will not — you undertake not to send any intimidating or abusive emails to people at either the Supreme Court or County Court?
RESPONDENT: Yes, I won’t. I’ll leave your little corrupt butterflies alone, and they are corrupt …
The respondent then proceeded to allege that a particular judge of the Supreme Court was corrupt. Tsalamandris J interrupted and told the respondent that he could have ‘whatever private thoughts’ he wished to, but that referring to that judge as being corrupt may itself constitute a contempt of court. Following that exchange, the judge stated that she would adjourn the Court on the undertakings given by the respondent, to which the respondent answered: ‘Yep’.
The question is whether, in those circumstances, the respondent gave a formal binding undertaking to the Court, which was such as might constitute the basis of a finding of contempt of court in the case of a relevant breach of it.
As I have noted, and as discussed by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales in LCM[39] the principles, that apply concerning contempt of court by breach of an order of a court, are relevantly the same (with appropriate modification) to an allegation of a breach of an undertaking made by a party to a court.
[39][2017] NSWCA 200 [23] (Simpson JA).
As stated by Donaldson MR in Hussain v Hussain,[40] an undertaking to the Court ‘… is as solemn, binding and effective as an order of the Court in the like terms’. In a case such as the present, in which the respondent was not represented, a question arises whether, objectively, it might be properly concluded that the respondent did give such an undertaking to the Court. That is, the question is whether the respondent made an undertaking to the Court in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have understood to be providing a commitment that was as binding and effective as an order of the Court itself.
[40][1986] Fam 134, 139.
The importance of that question is illustrated, in a different context, by the decision of Barker J of the Federal Court in Oswal v Burrup Holdings Limited (No 2).[41] In that case, the applicant applied to the Federal Court for orders granting him access to the books and records of the respondent. The Federal Court made orders granting the applicant access to those documents. The order provided that the inspection by any person of the documents would be subject to the previous receipt by the solicitors for the respondent of a signed confidentiality undertaking by the person. The applicant provided a signed confidentiality undertaking which was expressed to be given ‘to the Court’. The undertaking was never filed in the Federal Court. The respondent alleged that the applicant breached the undertaking by disclosing the content and substance of certain documents to a national newspaper.
[41](2012) 297 ALR 599.
In upholding the applicant’s no case submission, Barker J noted that, in order that the conduct of the applicant constitute a contempt of court, it must be demonstrated not only that the applicant gave the undertaking, but that it was received and accepted by the Court.[42] His Honour concluded that in the circumstances, and based on a proper construction of the terms of Court order, it could not be concluded that the confidentiality undertaking signed by the applicant had been given in terms that it was an undertaking given to the Court.[43]
[42]Ibid, 612 [78].
[43]Ibid, 614 [85].
In the present case, in the course of the exchange between Tsalamandris J and the respondent, the judge did tell the respondent that he would be released from custody ‘on the undertaking’ that he provided, which included not to send any intimidating or abusive emails to people at the County Court or Supreme Court. However, there is nothing in the exchange between the judge and the respondent which would permit a conclusion that, in agreeing to such a course, it might be reasonably concluded that the respondent understood, or ought to have understood, that he was thereby making to the Court a binding promise which would have the force of an order of the Court. The noun ‘undertaking’ is commonly used in ordinary parlance, in a sense which is qualitatively different than that in which the term is used in a court proceeding. On balance, it could not be concluded that, in the relevant exchange with the judge, the respondent ought reasonably to have understood that he was thereby making to the Court a binding promise, breach of which might constitute a contempt of court.
On the other hand, for the reasons submitted by the applicant, the order made by Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025, and the circumstances in which that order was made, are relevant, particularly to a consideration of the intention with which the respondent, following that date, made the communications that are the subject of alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15.
As I have noted, before Tsalamandris J made that order, her Honour stated that she considered it appropriate to ensure that the respondent refrain from sending any abusive or intimidating emails to the County Court or to the Supreme Court, in order that the courts were protected from any future conduct that may constitute a contempt of court. Tsalamandris J explained to the respondent that the undertaking by him, not to send any abusive or intimidating emails to the County Court and Supreme Court, was a condition of his release. It is in those circumstances, and in the context of the exchange between the judge and the respondent to which I have earlier referred,[44] that the intention of the respondent, in sending the emails that were the subject of alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15, should be assessed.
[44]Above [102], [109].
The respondent’s defences – legal principles
The fundamental submission made by the respondent, in written submissions in response to each of the charges of contempt, is that the communications in question each constituted lawful political expression by the respondent, and are to be assessed in light of both the constitutional and Charter protections.
In support of that proposition, the respondent referred to and relied on the High Court decisions in Lange[45] and Coleman.[46]
[45](1997) 189 CLR 520.
[46](2004) 220 CLR 1.
In Lange, the Court was concerned with proceedings for defamation by the plaintiff, who was formerly the Prime Minister of New Zealand. In response to the claim, the defendant pleaded that its publication was subject to qualified privilege. In considering that defence, the High Court held that the Commonwealth Constitution protects freedom of communication between people concerning political or government matters which enables people to exercise a free and informed choice as electors.[47] The Court explained that the freedom of communication, which the Constitution protects, is not absolute, but is limited to what is necessary for the effective operation of the system of representative and responsible government provided for by the Constitution. Thus, a law, which might restrict freedom of communication, is legitimate if the object of the law is compatible with the maintenance of representative and responsible government, and if the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving that legitimate object.[48]
[47](1997) 189 CLR 520, 559-60 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ).
[48]Ibid, 561-2.
Based on those propositions, the Court concluded:
When a law of a State or federal Parliament or a Territory legislature is alleged to infringe the requirement of freedom of communication imposed by ss 7, 24, 64 or 128 of the Constitution, two questions must be answered before the validity of the law can be determined. First, does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political matters either in its terms, operation or effect? Second, if the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government and the procedure prescribed by s 128 for submitting a proposed amendment of the Constitution to the informed decision of the people (hereafter collectively "the system of government prescribed by the Constitution"). If the first question is answered "yes" and the second is answered "no", the law is invalid.[49]
[49]Ibid, 567-8.
In Coleman,[50] the Court was concerned with an appeal by a man who was convicted of an offence under s 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences 1931 (Qld), which provided that any person who in a public place or near a public place used any ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words’ to any person would be liable to a fine or imprisonment. The High Court by a majority (Gleeson CJ, Callinan and Heydon JJ dissenting) held that the conviction of the appellant for using insulting words in a public place should be set aside.
[50](2004) 220 CLR 1.
In reaching that conclusion, McHugh J held that the provision in question was invalid because the word ‘insulting’ was so wide as to be capable of burdening communication about government or political matters and was not reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving a legitimate end consistent with the system of representative government enshrined by the Commonwealth Constitution. Gummow and Hayne JJ in their joint judgment (with whom Kirby, in effect, agreed), having referred to the test expounded in Lange, construed s 7(1)(d) in a narrow manner, so as not to apply to the words published by the appellant. Based on that narrow construction of s 7(1)(d), their Honours concluded that the provision was not invalid.[51]
[51]Ibid, 77–9 (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
The present case is concerned with statements by the respondent (in emails and in Court) which are alleged to constitute a contempt of court. As I have discussed, the Courts have emphasised that the purpose of the principles of contempt law is not to protect individual judges or judicial officers personally from criticisms and imputations against them. Rather, the fundamental purpose of the principles of contempt law is to protect and uphold the integrity and independence of the Courts, and to maintain public confidence in the judicial process and the system of justice.
Applying the principles stated in Lange, it is clear that the principles of contempt law, which I have outlined, are reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end, namely, the protection of the integrity of the system of justice, the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the system of representative and responsible government prescribed by the Commonwealth Constitution.
The respondent has also relied on the decision of the High Court in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)[52] in support of the proposition that State Courts cannot be used as instruments of executive policy, so that the Court must remain independent when evaluating communications that are critical of government. The decision in Kable was concerned with the validity of a New South Wales Act of Parliament which empowered the Supreme Court of that state to make an order for the detention of a specified person in prison after the expiration of a sentence of imprisonment imposed on that person. The majority of the Court held that the legislation was invalid because it reposed in the Court a power that was, in essence, the antithesis of the judicial process and which, in effect, rendered the Court an instrument of executive government policy.[53] That principle does not have any application in a case such as the present. In exercising its jurisdiction to hear and determine proceedings based on a contempt, the Court is not in any way acting or being used as an instrument of administrative or executive policy. Rather, as a matter of first principle, the Court is performing a judicial function to protect the integrity of the justice system and to vindicate public confidence in the courts.
[52](1996) 189 CLR 51.
[53]Ibid, 107-8 (Gaudron J), 122–4 (McHugh J), 134, 143 (Gummow J).
Further, contrary to the submission by the respondent, the principles of contempt law do not involve the application of legal standards which do not apply equally to citizens and officials. The fundamental principles of contempt law apply to all persons, whatever their status. In that context, I should note that the four ‘comparative instances of official conduct’, referred to by the respondent in his submissions, appear to describe conduct by persons which had nothing to do with the justice system.
The respondent has also relied on a number of provisions contained in the Charter and more specifically, ss 8(3), 15, 21 and 24.
Section 8(3) of the Charter provides that every person is equal before the law. As discussed, that provision does not, relevantly, preclude or affect the current proceedings against the respondent for contempt of court.
Section 15(1) of the Charter provides that every person has the right to hold an opinion without interference, and sub-s (2) provides that every person has a right of freedom of expression. However, s 15(3) provides that those rights may be subject to lawful restrictions that are reasonably necessary to respect the rights of others, and to protect (inter alia) public order. Plainly, s 15 does not, and may not, qualify or exclude the fundamental principles of contempt law, which, as I have discussed, serve the purpose of protecting and preserving the integrity of the judicial system.
Section 21 of the Charter provides that every person has a right to liberty and security. However, of course, that right is not unqualified or absolute. Thus, s 21(3) provides that a person must not be deprived of his or her liberty except in accordance with procedures established by law.
Section 24 of the Charter provides that a person charged with a criminal offence, or a party in a civil proceeding, has a right to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing. In the present case, the proceedings for contempt have been commenced by originating motion and summons. The applicant has set out, in some detail, the basis upon which the proceedings are brought. The Court is competent, independent and impartial in determining the proceeding brought by the applicant.
Finally, the respondent has submitted that in each case communications by him did not contain threats of violence or unlawful conduct, and while they used and were expressed in terms of strong criticism, the comments by the applicant were directed at ‘perceived administrative misconduct’. I shall address that submission in considering whether the applicant has made out its case on each of the individual alleged contempts in this case.
The principal issues
The two principal issues in the present proceeding are:
(1)whether the respondent engaged in the conduct that is the subject of each of the alleged contempts;
(2)whether, by doing so, the respondent was in contempt of court.
Whether respondent engaged in the alleged conduct
In the present proceeding, it was not in issue that the respondent engaged in the conduct that is the subject of each of the 15 alleged contempts of court.
The emails, that constitute alleged contempt numbers 1 and 3, were each transmitted from the email address ‘[email protected]’. The affidavit of service of the applicant’s solicitor in this proceeding dated 18 June 2025 notes that in the consolidated proceeding in the County Court, the respondent had filed a number of court documents with his email address listed as ‘[email protected]’ and that he had also contacted various parties using that email address in the proceeding. In addition, the VGSO had received a number of emails from that address, electronically signed by ‘Rohan Michael Brown’.
The emails, that are the basis of alleged contempts numbered 4 to 15 inclusive, were each transmitted from the email address ‘[email protected]’. In the hearing before Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025, the respondent himself provided that email address as the ‘best email address’ by which he was to be contacted. I note that by an email sent on 9 October 2025, and which is evidence in this proceeding, the respondent used the email address ‘[email protected]’ and stated:
Please note I have regained access to my former email address.
Section 161 of the Evidence Act 2008 provides that if a document purports to contain a record of an electronic communication, it is presumed that that communication was sent by or on behalf of the person by or on whose behalf it appears that the document was sent or made, and that it was sent or made on the day which appears on the document.
In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the respondent did transmit each of the emails that are the subject of alleged contempts numbered 1, 3, and 4 to 15 (inclusive).
It was not in issue in this application that the respondent, in the course of the hearing before Judge Manova on 3 April 2024, spoke the words that are the subject of the second alleged contempt. The recording of that proceeding was tendered in evidence in this application. Having listened to it, there is no doubt that the transcript (which was also tendered in evidence) accurately recorded the exchange that I have set out earlier,[54] and which contained the remark made by the respondent to the judge, calling her Honour ‘you fuckin’ whore’.
[54]Above [9].
It is not suggested by the respondent that in some way the expression by him was a slip of the tongue or some unintended remark. In his email to the chambers of Judge Manova (and others) dated 29 May 2025 (alleged contempt number 3), the respondent, in three separate passages, accused her Honour of being a ‘state funded whore’ and in the concluding sentence of the email he called her a ‘whore’. In his email to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz dated 28 September 2025 (alleged contempt number 4), which was copied to others, including the chambers of Judge Manova, the respondent admitted that he had called Judge Manova a ‘whore,’ because she said that she did not see any assault in the video that she viewed in Court. More recently, in an email to the Attorney-General and others dated 9 October 2025, the respondent made the same accusation about Judge Manova, describing her as a ‘woman without virtue who performs immoral acts for payment’.
In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the respondent not only spoke the words that are the subject of alleged contempt number 2, but that he did so consciously and deliberately.
Whether the publications constitute contempt of court
Before making individual submissions concerning each of the alleged contempts, counsel for the applicant commenced by submitting that the real gravamen of the alleged contempt in respect of each of the publications was that they were intended to place improper pressure or threaten to take reprisal on the Court, the judicial officers and the officers of the Court, and that they thus had a tendency to interfere with the course of justice by threatening the Court’s judicial officers and other officers of the Court in connection with their roles in administering justice.
In considering that proposition, it is to be noted that the emails that constituted contempts numbered 4 to 15, were transmitted by the respondent over a period of four days. As submitted on behalf of the applicant, in evaluating the import of each successive email, it is appropriate to take into account, as relevant context, the emails which preceded it.[55]
[55]Compare R v Duffy; Ex parte Nash [1960] 2 QB 188, 197–8 (Lord Parker CJ); Attorney-General v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1986) 43 SASR 374, 393 (Matheson J), 407 (Olsson J); R v Bonacci [2015] VSC 121 [101] (Kaye JA).
I now turn to consider each of the 15 alleged contempts of court.
The first alleged contempt (email dated 17 October 2023)
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the email dated 17 October 2023 was a knowing, deliberate and intentional breach by the respondent of the order of Judge Tran dated 4 October 2023. Counsel submitted that the email constituted a deliberate attempt by the respondent to intimidate, defy and influence the decision‑making of the judge and was calculated to divert the course of justice. Accordingly, it was submitted that the email had a tendency to interfere with the course of justice and was intended to do so.
As I have noted, Judge Tran made the orders of 4 October 2023 following a directions hearing by her Honour on the preceding date, in which her Honour specifically raised her concern that any email sent by the respondent to the County Court email address must not contain abusive or threatening material. Judge Tran noted that the respondent had sent communications to the Court that could be interpreted as gratuitously abusive or insulting, and her Honour stated that she intended to specify clearly the Court’s expectations concerning the use of various email addresses and the contents of the emails sent to the Court. Accordingly, her Honour made the orders dated 4 October 2023 in which she specified the precise email addresses to which correspondence should be forwarded, and her Honour (order number 10) directed that any emails sent by the respondent to any County Court email address ‘must not contain abusive or threatening material’.
Relevantly, on 17 October 2023, the respondent sent to the chambers of Judge Tran, and copied to others, an email which accused the Court of being either incompetent or deliberately corrupted. The email made a number of accusations, including concealment of a fraud, concealing serious offences, and supporting and assisting terrorism. Following receipt of the email, the chambers of Judge Tran sent an email to the respondent reminding the respondent of the orders her Honour had made on 4 October 2023, and stating that emails sent by the respondent would not be placed on the Court file or replied to unless they complied with those orders.
It was in that context that the respondent then sent the email that is alleged contempt number 1, and which expressly and directly accused Judge Tran as being a ‘corrupt low [life]’.
Applying the principles which I have discussed, it is clear that the email constituted a contempt of court on a number of bases. First and foremost, it was an intentional and direct contravention by the respondent of the order made by Judge Tran, just 13 days earlier, that an email sent by him to any County Court email address must not contain abusive or threatening material. Secondly, the email was directed to a judge who was presiding over hearings in a case in which he was a party. It constituted an extra-curial attempt by the respondent for the purpose of influencing or affecting the deliberations and considerations by the judge. Thirdly, the email was intended to, and had the tendency to, undermine and detract from the authority of the judge as a member of the Court and, as such, to compromise the system of justice.
For those reasons, it must be concluded that the email dated 17 October 2023 (the first alleged contempt) constituted a contempt of court by the respondent.
Second alleged contempt (hearing before Judge Manova — 3 April 2024)
In respect of the second alleged contempt, counsel for the applicant submitted that the respondent spoke the particular words in an extremely expressive and threatening tone to the judge. He submitted that the insult by the respondent was part of a campaign by him to undermine judicial officers with whom the respondent took issue, and that objectively, it was calculated to interfere with the judge’s ability to administer justice.
Having had the opportunity to listen to the relevant part of the recording of the hearing before Judge Manova, I accept that the words, which are the subject of alleged contempt number 2, were spoken by the respondent in a tone, and in a manner, which evidenced an intention by him to deliberately insult the judge. The words, so spoken by the respondent, constituted abuse by him in court of a judge who was presiding on the hearing in which he was involved. As such, they clearly constituted contempt of court. As explained by Whelan J in Slaveski,[56] that conduct was contempt because it challenged the authority of the Court, it interrupted the Court’s proceedings, and it detracted from the capacity of the Court to conduct proceedings in a dispassionate, rational and objective manner.
[56][2011] VSC 643 [23].
The insult directed by the respondent to the judge was plainly entirely unjustified. The respondent spoke the words in response to a request by the judge to identify to her the part of the video footage in which he alleged that he had been assaulted by the police prosecutor. In that way, the judge was endeavouring to assist the respondent in the presentation of his case. The insult directed by the respondent to the judge was entirely gratuitous.
As I have noted, it is quite clear that the words spoken by the respondent were deliberately chosen by him, and were not a mere slip of the tongue, or the product of a momentary loss of rationality. The subsequent conduct by the respondent clearly demonstrates that he selected the insult, and intended that it offend the Court. As such, it not only undermined the authority of the Court, but it was intended and calculated to endeavour to intimidate the judge in the conduct by her of the judicial proceeding that was before her Honour.
For those reasons, I am satisfied that the words, that constitute allege contempt number 2, did, in fact, constitute a contempt of court.
Third alleged contempt (email to Judge Manova dated 29 May 2025)
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the third alleged contempt was transmitted by the respondent after the commencement of the contempt proceeding by originating motion, and in circumstances in which he was aware that he was already being prosecuted for contempt of court by calling Judge Manova a ‘whore’. It was an email sent to the chambers of a judge who had supervised the proceeding, that was still on foot, in which he was a party. Counsel submitted that the email constituted a direct breach by the respondent of the order of Judge Tran made 4 October 2023. It was an insult specifically selected by the respondent, and was calculated to interfere with the course of justice, by retaliating against decisions and views made or expressed by the judge in the course of the hearing in which she presided.
The email forwarded by the respondent to Judge Manova, that is the subject of alleged contempt number 3, clearly constituted an intentional breach by him of the order of Judge Tran dated 4 October 2023, namely, that he must not send emails to the Court which contained abusive or threatening material. The respondent was aware of the terms and content of the order. By transmitting the email, he intentionally and knowingly contravened the order which, he ought to have understood, was made for the purpose of ensuring that appropriate communications be made to the Court to enable the Court to objectively and appropriately undertake its work in the system of justice.
Further, the email constituted an extra-curial communication, by the respondent, with a judge who had managed proceedings in which he was then a party before the Court. As such, the email was calculated by the respondent to influence or affect the management by the judge, and by the Court, of the proceeding in which he was a party.
In addition, the email was forwarded, not only to Judge Manova’s chambers, but to others, including the chambers of two County Court judges, the Chief Judge of the County Court, the Attorney-General, and the Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office. In the circumstances, I am persuaded that the level of distribution of the email was such as to constitute it a contempt also on the basis that it was a scandalous disparagement of the judge in the Court, and, as such, it had a tendency to interfere with the course of justice.
For those reasons, the third alleged contempt did constitute a contempt of court by the respondent.
Alleged contempt number 4 (email to Judicial Registrar Lorenz dated 28 September 2025)
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the email, that is the subject of alleged contempt number 4, is a serious contempt, constituting a direct threat to Judicial Registrar Lorenz, who was then conducting proceedings in the Supreme Court involving the respondent. Counsel also noted that the email denigrated judicial officers who had previously conducted, or were conducting, proceedings involving him, including two judges of the County Court.
Applying the principles which I have discussed, it is clear that the email, that is the subject of alleged contempt number 4, was a contempt of court. First, it was directed to a judicial officer, namely Judicial Registrar Lorenz, who was then responsible for the conduct of Supreme Court proceedings in which the respondent was a party. It was a communication quite plainly directed, and intended, to intimidate the judicial registrar and her management of the proceeding. Most seriously, it contained a direct threat to the judicial registrar concerning and in respect of the pending proceeding involving the respondent. As such, it was, as the applicant has submitted, a direct deliberate attempt by the respondent to divert the course of justice.
In addition, I note that the respondent copied the email (inter alia) to the Chief Judge of the County Court, and to the chambers of Judge Tran and Judge Manova. As such, the email was a direct contravention by the respondent of the order made by Judge Tran on 4 October 2023, in circumstances in which the respondent well knew and understood that he was prohibited from forwarding to members of the County Court abusive and threatening emails. In the email the respondent directly referred to Judge Manova and Judge Tran in grossly disparaging terms. As I have noted, the County Court proceedings involving the respondent were, at that time, still extant, although they were temporarily stayed. The email, as such, constituted a contempt of court by being intended to intimidate the judges of the County Court in their proceedings in which he was a litigant.
Further, in addition to being copied to the Chief Judge of the County Court, and to the chambers of Judges Tran and Manova, the email was also copied to the Attorney‑General, to two solicitors acting for the plaintiff in the vexatious litigant proceedings, and to one Matthew Laxton of Victoria Police. The email again referred to Judges Manova and Tran, and Beale J in terms which constituted a scandalous disparagement of each of those judges of those Courts and, as such, had a tendency to undermine the administration of justice in the State.
For those reasons, alleged contempt number 4 constituted a clear and serious contempt of court by the respondent.
Alleged contempt number 5 (email dated 29 September 2025)
In respect of the fifth alleged contempt, counsel for the applicant noted that before the email was sent by the respondent, the Supreme Court – General List had forwarded an email to the respondent reminding him of the undertaking given by him on 16 September 2025, enclosing a copy of the orders made on that date, and noting that the respondent had corresponded with the Court by email on 28 September 2025 in breach of the undertaking so given by the respondent to the Court on 16 September.
Counsel submitted that although the email, that constitutes alleged contempt number 5, was not sent directly to the chambers of a judge, nevertheless, it was forwarded directly to the Court, and to an employee of the Court who was engaged in official duties, with the intention of intimidating the Court and undermining the Court’s authority. Counsel noted that the email was forwarded by the respondent in defiance of the reminder given to him that he was not to forward such emails to the Court.
In considering the fifth alleged contempt, a number of considerations are relevant. First, at the time, the respondent was a party to litigation in the Supreme Court. Secondly, the email in question, under the heading ‘Subject’, specified that proceeding. Thirdly, the email plainly contravened the ‘undertaking’ given by the respondent to the Court on 16 September, of which the respondent had been reminded on the previous date. The email commenced by disparaging three members of the Court, alleging that they were exemplars of the ‘proven endemic corruption’ of the Court.
Taking those matters into account, I am persuaded that the communication by the respondent constituted a contempt of court, by comprising an extra-curial communication by him for the purpose of influencing or affecting the conduct of the litigation in the Court in which he was a party.
It follows that the communication constituted a contempt of court.
Alleged contempts numbered 6 and 7 (emails dated 1 October 2025 at 1.07pm and 1.39pm)
Alleged contempts numbered 6 and 7 comprised emails sent by the respondent to the Supreme Court General List email address on 1 October 2025 at 1:07 pm and 1:39 pm, respectively. Earlier on the same day, at 10:51 am, the Court General List had sent an email to the respondent attaching the authenticated order of Tsalamandris J dated 1 October, and advising the respondent that the matter had been listed for mention at 2:15 pm on 2 October in court number 1. The email attached the order. In ‘other matters’ the Court noted that on 28, 29 and 30 September, the respondent had sent email correspondence to the Court which needed to be addressed.
Counsel for the applicant submitted that, in that context, each email constituted a contempt of court, because it had the tendency to interfere with the course of justice. Counsel submitted that although alleged contempt number 6 was not sent directly to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz or Tsalamandris J, it was clearly directed to those two judicial officers. Further, counsel submitted that the email constituted a contempt of court by being sent to an employee of the Court, and was expressed in such terms as it had a tendency to discourage the recipient from undertaking their duties in relation to the proceeding that was before the Court. Counsel submitted that it should be inferred that each email was forwarded to the Court with that intention, namely, to place pressure on those connected with the respondent’s cases from performing their duties in respect of them.
As in the case of alleged contempt number 5, the ‘subject’ of each of alleged contempts numbered 6 and 7 was the present proceeding. The only reasonable inference, both from the context, and from the content, of each of the two emails, is that they were intentionally directed to Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz, and that it was the intention of the respondent that they be brought to the attention of each of those two judicial officers.
As I have noted, the two emails followed the email by the Court to the respondent notifying him of the order of Tsalamandris J that the matter was listed for mention at 2:15 pm on the following day, 2 October. The sixth alleged contempt commenced with a reference by the respondent to the ‘undertaking’ that he gave to the Court on 16 September. The email expressly referred to Judicial Registrar Lorenz. The email that constituted alleged contempt number 7 followed that email (alleged contempt number 6), and was, in a sense, an addendum to it. In that context, it must be concluded that it was the intention of the respondent that each of those emails be brought to the attention of the two judicial officers who were managing his cases, namely, Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz.
In the circumstances, the only reasonable inference, from the content of each of the two emails, is that they were intended by the respondent to influence or affect the discharge by each of those judicial officers of their roles in the cases involving the respondent. As such, they were intended to, and had the tendency, to interfere with and undermine the proper administration of the course of justice. The alleged contempt number 6 concluded with a clear threat to the intended recipients, which reinforces the conclusion that the emails were intended to undermine the due course of justice in respect of the cases in which the respondent was involved in this Court.
For those reasons, the emails constituting alleged contempts numbered 6 and 7 were each contempts of court.
Alleged contempt number 8 (email dated 1 October 2025 at 11:03pm)
In respect of alleged contempt number 8, counsel for the applicant noted that the email commenced by being addressed ‘Dear Associate’. Counsel noted that the email continued and made further allegations of corruption against the Court, and was a demand that the Court attend to his grievances, before he would cooperate by appearing in the proceeding on the next day. Counsel submitted that, as such, the email constituted an extra-curial correspondence directed to the associate that was intended to influence the Court in its handling of the matter.
There is some substance in the submissions made on behalf of the applicant in respect of alleged contempt number 8. Nevertheless, reading the email as a whole, I could not be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that it constituted an intended attempt by the respondent to influence or affect the Court’s determination of the proceedings in which he was involved. Nor am I persuaded, beyond reasonable doubt, that the email could be fairly described as having such a tendency. In particular, it is not possible to exclude, as a reasonable hypothesis, that the email constituted an ill‑expressed explanation by the respondent for his failure to attend the mention hearing of the present proceeding that was listed before Tsalamandris J on the following day, 2 October 2025.
For those reasons, I am not persuaded that the eighth alleged contempt did constitute a contempt of court by the respondent.
Alleged contempt number 9 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:12am)
In respect of the ninth alleged contempt, counsel for the applicant noted that the email was addressed and copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judge Tran, and, as such, constituted a breach of her Honour’s order made on 4 October 2023.
Counsel further submitted that the email contravened the undertaking contained in the order of Tsalamandris J on 16 September 2025, and was part of an ongoing campaign by the respondent to attempt to put improper influence on the Court in respect of the proceedings in which he was a litigant. Accordingly, it was submitted that the email, being directed to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and copied to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, was transmitted by the respondent with an intention to divert the course of justice, by attacking and seeking to intimidate judicial officers who were responsible for the conduct of proceedings in which he was a party.
For the reasons relied on by counsel for the applicant, I am persuaded that alleged contempt number 9 does constitute a contempt of court by the respondent.
First, the email was copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judge Tran of the County Court. The email twice referred to Judge Tran, and alleged that her Honour was part of an alleged coverup of corruption in the justice system. As such, the email contravened the order by Judge Tran of 3 October 2024, in that it contained abusive and threatening material.
Further, the email was directed to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and copied to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, each of whom were then presiding over cases in the Supreme Court in which the respondent was a party. On its face, it was plainly an extra-curial communication to two presiding judicial officers. It followed, inter alia, alleged contempts numbered 6 and 7, which had been sent on the previous day, and which I have concluded were intended by the respondent to influence or affect the discharge by those judicial officers of their roles in the cases involving the respondent. In that context, and taking into account the text of the alleged contempt number 9, the circumstance that the email was forwarded and copied to two judicial officers who were then presiding on cases in which he was a party, and that it was copied to other persons involved in the justice system, the only reasonable inference is that the respondent sent it to those judicial officers with an intention to divert the course of justice, by seeking to intimidate Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz who were responsible for the conduct of proceedings in which he was a party.
It follows, that it must be concluded that the ninth alleged contempt did constitute a contempt of court by the respondent.
Alleged contempt number 10 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:18am)
Counsel for the applicant submitted that alleged contempt number 10 constituted a broadside attack by the respondent on anyone who has been involved in the respondent’s court proceedings, including judicial officers to whom the email was sent and copied. Counsel noted that the email accused everyone of being ‘criminal low lives and perverters of the law’. It was submitted that the email was an attack on any person who would attempt to undertake their duties in connection with the respondent’s proceedings and, as such, constituted a contempt of court.
The email was directly copied to the email address of Judge Tran. It addressed each of the recipients — including Judge Tran — of being ‘criminal low lives and perverters of the law’. As such, it was plainly in contravention of the order of her Honour made 4 October 2023 and, accordingly, constituted a contempt of court.
Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, as submitted by the applicant, the remarks made by the respondent in the email were directed to each of the recipients of it, including Tsalamandris J to whom the email was directed, and Judicial Registrar Lorenz, to whom it was copied. As submitted on behalf of the applicant, the email abused, in quite flagrant terms, each of the recipients, including those judicial officers who were then involved in the conduct and litigation in which the respondent was a party. It was a blatant attack on any person who had been involved in legal proceedings in connection with the respondent. The only reasonable inference is that, by sending the email, the respondent intended to intimidate each person who was involved in his proceedings, including the judicial officers responsible for the management of the two proceedings in the Supreme Court.
That conclusion is reinforced by the circumstance that the email was sent by the respondent just six minutes after he had remitted the email which constitutes alleged contempt number 9 and which, as I have concluded, was transmitted by the respondent with the same intent to the recipients, including Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz.
It follows that it must be concluded that alleged contempt number 10 constituted a contempt of court.
Alleged contempt number 11 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:43am)
Counsel for the applicant made the same submissions, in respect of the 11th alleged contempt of court, as he advanced in respect of the tenth alleged contempt of court.
I am satisfied that the 11th alleged contempt of court did constitute a contempt of court for two reasons.
First, by being addressed to Judge Tran’s chambers, it constituted a breach of the order made by her Honour on 4 October 2023, by constituting an email that contained abusive and threatening material.
Secondly, the email, by suggesting that the recipients should each be ‘euthanised’, constituted a blatant threat by the respondent to the recipients, including to the two judicial officers, Tsalamandris J and Judicial Registrar Lorenz, who were then involved in the management of cases in which he was a party. The abuse contained in the email, and that threat, could only have been sent by the respondent with the intention of intimidating those judicial officers — and others — involved in connection with those cases. As such, it constituted a clear and blatant contempt of court.
Alleged contempt number 12 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:45am)
The email, that constitutes alleged contempt number 12, was transmitted by the respondent exactly two minutes after he transmitted the email that was the subject of alleged contempt number 11. As such, it must be construed and considered as a continuation of, or addendum to, that email.
In that context, I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the intention of the respondent in forwarding the email to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and copying it (inter alia) to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, was to attack and intimidate those judicial officers in the performance of their duties in connection with the proceedings involving the respondent. As such, it constituted a contempt of court.
Further, by being copied to the chambers of Judge Tran, it again breached the order made by her Honour on 4 October 2023, and as such, also constituted a contempt of court in that way.
For those reasons, alleged contempt of court number 12 constituted a contempt of court.
Alleged contempt number 13 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 11:56am)
Counsel for the applicant submitted that although the email, that constitutes alleged contempt number 13, was not directly insulting to Tsalamandris J or the other judicial officers to whom it was copied, nevertheless, it was part of an overall campaign by the respondent to place pressure on, and intimidate, those who are undertaking their duties in the justice system, including the judge who was about to hear a mention in the present case.
If the email were considered in isolation, it would be questionable whether, standing alone, it did constitute a contempt of court. However, the email followed four previous emails transmitted by the respondent to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, and copied to others including Judicial Registrar Lorenz, over a period of 44 minutes. As such, it was part of the same chain of emails.
The email was addressed to the chambers of Tsalamandris J and copied (inter alia) to Judicial Registrar Lorenz. It directly impugned a magistrate who had presided over a case in which the respondent was a party, and directly accused that magistrate of acting in a corrupt manner to protect a corrupt lawyer. The balance of the email, which I have not quoted, was expressed in vituperative and quite offensive language. Taken in context, I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that alleged contempt number 13 was, as the applicant has contended, part of an overall campaign by the respondent to place pressure on and intimidate those who were undertaking their duties in cases in which he was a party, including Tsalamandris J, who was about to hear a mention in the present case, and also Judicial Registrar Lorenz, who was managing the other proceedings in this Court involving the respondent.
For those reasons, alleged contempt number 13 did constitute a contempt of court.
Alleged contempt number 14 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 12:06pm)
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the 14th alleged contempt is a contempt of court because it constituted an intentional defiance by the respondent for the authority of the Court in connection with the hearing before Tsalamandris J that was to take place, in the present case, later on the same day.
On analysis, that submission is correct. The email was directed to the chambers of Tsalamandris J, who was to preside in the directions hearing in this matter that was to take place at 2:15pm on 2 October. The second-last sentence in the email was, as the applicant has submitted, a deliberate defiance of the authority of the Court. The email was sent in the context of the communications that preceded it on the same day. In that context, the only reasonable conclusion is that the respondent transmitted the email with the intention of defying and intimidating the Court, and thus undermining the authority of the Court. In that connection, it is also relevant that the email was copied (inter alia) to the chambers of Judicial Registrar Lorenz, who, as I have discussed, is responsible for the management of the other Supreme Court proceedings in which the respondent is a party.
In addition, the email was copied to the chambers of Judge Tran, and it contained explicit abuse directed to her Honour and to other members of the County Court. In that way, the email was also a contempt of court on the basis that it contravened the order of Judge Tran dated 4 October 2023.
For those reasons, it is concluded that alleged contempt number 14 was a contempt of court.
Alleged contempt number 15 (email dated 2 October 2025 at 2:03pm)
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the 15th alleged contempt constituted a contempt of court because it contained a threat, addressed to Tsalamandris J, that was in the last three lines of the email.
I uphold that submission. The last section of the email informed the recipient, Tsalamandris J, that she had a ‘choice’. It then set out the ‘choice’, the first of which would be favourable to the respondent. The clear threat to the judge was that if her Honour did not make that ‘choice’, she would be ‘one day dealt with accordingly’. That threat was reinforced by the last line, which was to the effect that if the judge did not adopt the course favourable to the respondent, he would not change his ‘trajectory’, which plainly would be unfavourable to the judge.
The email, that constitutes the alleged contempt number 15, was the sixth email directed to Tsalamandris J in the preceding period of two hours. It was transmitted by the respondent just 12 minutes before her Honour was due to preside over a hearing of the present case in which the respondent is, of course, a party. In that context, and by its terms, the email was clearly a direct threat to the judge, intended to intimidate her. As such, it was a serious contempt of court by the respondent.
Summary of conclusions
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the emails, and comments made by the respondent in open court on 3 April 2024, that comprise alleged contempts number 1 to 7 (inclusive), and alleged contempts number 9 to 15 (inclusive), were each contempts of court.
Accordingly, the respondent is convicted of the 14 counts of contempt of court constituted by that conduct. Subject to hearing from the parties, I shall make declarations that the respondent be adjudged guilty of contempt of court in respect of each of those communications and comments. I shall, in due course, hear submissions from the parties on the issue of the appropriate sentence in respect of those contempts.
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