HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EDELMAN J
PLAINTIFF S164/2018 APPELLANT
AND
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS RESPONDENT
Plaintiff S164/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs
[2018] HCA 51
7 November 2018
S229/2018
ORDER
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The summons filed on 24 September 2018 be dismissed.
3.The costs of the appeal be reserved.
4.The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the summons filed on 19 September 2018 and of the summons filed on 24 September 2018.
Representation
V A Kline for the appellant (instructed by Victor Alan Kline, Barrister)
C L Lenehan with K N Pham for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
High Court – Appellate jurisdiction – Leave to appeal – Circumstances when leave necessary – Distinction between interlocutory and final judgment – Where Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 34(2) requires leave to appeal from interlocutory judgment of High Court exercising original jurisdiction – Where single Justice dismissed application for order to show cause – Where appellant filed notice of appeal without seeking leave to appeal – Whether judgment appealed from interlocutory or final – Whether appeal incompetent.
Courts – Jurisdiction – Different dimensions of jurisdiction – Where respondent entered unconditional appearance to the appeal – Whether submission to personal dimension of jurisdiction precludes respondent from impugning competency of appeal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Words and phrases – "application for an order nisi", "application for an order to show cause", "finally determines", "incompetent", "interlocutory judgment", "leave to appeal", "personal dimension of jurisdiction", "subject matter dimension of jurisdiction".
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 34(2).
High Court Rules 1952 (Cth), O 55 r 1(2).
High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), r 25.03.3(a).
EDELMAN J. Each party to this proceeding has brought an application by summons. Both relate to an appeal that has been filed against a decision of a single Justice of this Court dismissing an application for an order to show cause[1]. The first application, by the Minister for Home Affairs, seeks to have the appeal dismissed as incompetent because it should have been brought as an application for leave to appeal. The second application, by Plaintiff S164/2018 ("Plaintiff S164"), seeks to have the first application dismissed as incompetent on the basis that the Minister had submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court in the appeal.
On 11 November 2016, Plaintiff S164 was taken into immigration detention following the cancellation of his visa. On 20 June 2018, Plaintiff S164 filed an application for an order to show cause in the original jurisdiction of this Court. He sought writs of prohibition and habeas corpus directed to the Minister requiring his release from immigration detention, and declarations to the effect that ss 189(1) and 196(1) and (3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) are invalid and that his detention under those sections is…
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- Case
- [2018] HCA 51
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the judgment of the single Justice, which dismissed the appellant's application for an order to show cause, was an interlocutory or a final judgment. This determination was critical because s 34(2) of the *Judiciary Act 1903* (Cth) requires leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the High Court exercising its original jurisdiction, whereas no such leave is required for a final judgment. The appellant had filed a notice of appeal without seeking leave, proceeding on the basis that the judgment was final. A further issue arose regarding whether the respondent's unconditional appearance to the appeal precluded it from arguing that the appeal was incompetent due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Edelman J reasoned that a judgment finally determines the rights of the parties in relation to the subject matter of the litigation. In this instance, the single Justice's dismissal of the application for an order to show cause did not finally determine the substantive rights of the appellant concerning the underlying matter for which the order nisi was sought. Instead, it determined the procedural question of whether the appellant was entitled to have the matter heard further. Therefore, the judgment was interlocutory. His Honour also found that an unconditional appearance to an appeal does not confer subject matter jurisdiction where it is lacking, nor does it prevent a party from challenging the competency of the appeal on that basis.
Consequently, the High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed as incompetent for want of leave. The summons filed on 24 September 2018 was also dismissed. The costs of the appeal were reserved, but the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of two specific summonses filed on 19 September 2018 and 24 September 2018.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The summons filed on 24 September 2018 be dismissed.
3. The costs of the appeal be reserved.
4. The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the summons filed on 19 September 2018 and of the summons filed on 24 September 2018.
Background
Background to the litigation
The appellant had previously been the subject of an order under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that directed his removal from Australia. Following this, the appellant made an application for an order to show cause why the order should not be quashed. The application was dismissed by a single Justice of the High Court. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the appellant filed a notice of appeal. However, the Minister for Home Affairs, the respondent, argued that the appeal was incompetent because the appellant had not obtained leave to appeal from the interlocutory judgment.
In response to the appeal, the respondent entered an unconditional appearance, thereby submitting to the personal jurisdiction of the Court but did not challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court to hear the appeal. This created a further issue: whether the submission to the personal dimension of the Court's jurisdiction precluded the respondent from later impugning the competency of the appeal based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. These facts set the stage for the High Court to consider the distinct dimensions of jurisdiction and the circumstances under which leave to appeal is necessary.
The matter originated when the plaintiff, who was the appellant in this case, filed an application for an order to show cause seeking judicial review of the decision of the Minister for Home Affairs, who was the respondent. The single Justice of the High Court dismissed the application and subsequently issued a formal notice of the dismissal. The appellant did not seek leave to appeal from this interlocutory judgment under section 34(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Instead, the appellant filed a notice of appeal directly, arguing that the dismissal of the application for an order to show cause finally determined the matter. The respondent, however, challenged the competency of the appeal, contending that leave to appeal was necessary because the decision of the single Justice was interlocutory and not a final judgment.
The respondent entered an unconditional appearance to the appeal, indicating a willingness to engage with the appeal on its merits, but maintained that the appeal was incompetent as the appellant had not obtained leave to appeal from the interlocutory judgment. The appeal proceeded to the Full Court of the High Court, which was tasked with determining whether the appeal was indeed incompetent due to the absence of leave, and if so, whether the respondent could challenge the competency of the appeal despite having entered an unconditional appearance. The appeal raised complex questions about the distinction between interlocutory and final judgments, the necessity of leave to appeal under specific circumstances, and the implications of the respondent's unconditional appearance on the court's ability to consider jurisdictional challenges.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the judgment from which the appellant is appealing is an interlocutory judgment or a final judgment.
2. Whether leave to appeal is necessary from an interlocutory judgment of the High Court exercising its original jurisdiction under section 34(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
3. Whether the appeal is incompetent as the appellant filed a notice of appeal without having obtained leave to appeal.
4. Where the respondent has entered an unconditional appearance to the appeal, whether this submission to the personal dimension of the Court's jurisdiction precludes the respondent from challenging the competency of the appeal based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Held
1. The court concluded that the judgment from which the appellant is appealing is an interlocutory judgment, as it did not finally determine the matter. Result: Appeal allowed on this issue.
2. The court held that leave to appeal is necessary from an interlocutory judgment of the High Court exercising its original jurisdiction under section 34(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Result: Appeal allowed on this issue.
3. The court determined that the appeal is incompetent as the appellant filed a notice of appeal without having obtained leave to appeal. Result: Appeal dismissed.
4. The court found that the respondent's unconditional appearance to the appeal does not preclude them from challenging the competency of the appeal based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Result: Appeal dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: EDELMAN J
In the matter of Plaintiff S164/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs, the High Court considered the necessity of leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment and the competency of the appeal. The court first examined whether the judgment from which the appellant was appealing constituted an interlocutory judgment or a final judgment. The court reasoned that the dismissal of an application for an order to show cause was not a final determination of the merits of the case, thus qualifying as an interlocutory judgment. This conclusion was based on the understanding that the judgment did not finally determine the rights of the parties and was instead a preliminary step in the proceedings.
The court then addressed the issue of whether leave to appeal was necessary from an interlocutory judgment of the High Court exercising its original jurisdiction under section 34(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The court held that leave is indeed required for such appeals. This was based on the statutory requirement under section 34(2) and the precedent that the High Court’s original jurisdiction can only be exercised in specific circumstances where leave is necessary. The court underscored that this requirement exists to maintain the integrity of the appellate process and to ensure that appeals are limited to cases of significant importance or exceptional circumstances.
Subsequently, the court considered whether the appeal was incompetent because the appellant filed a notice of appeal without having obtained leave to appeal. The court held that the appeal was indeed incompetent due to the appellant's failure to comply with the statutory requirement to obtain leave. This was a crucial point in the judgment, as it emphasized the necessity of adhering to statutory mandates in the appellate process. The court relied on prior authority that underscores the importance of procedural compliance in maintaining the court’s jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the court examined whether the respondent’s unconditional appearance to the appeal precluded them from challenging the competency of the appeal based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court distinguished between the personal and subject matter dimensions of jurisdiction. It held that submitting to the personal dimension of the court's jurisdiction by entering an appearance did not waive the right to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that while the respondent’s appearance indicated acceptance of the court's authority over their person, it did not equate to a waiver of their right to contest the court's authority over the subject matter. This nuanced distinction was pivotal in allowing the court to address the substantive issue of jurisdictional competence despite the respondent's appearance.
In conclusion, the High Court dismissed the appeal and the summonses, emphasizing the necessity of obtaining leave to appeal from interlocutory judgments of the court exercising its original jurisdiction. The court’s decision underscored the importance of statutory compliance and the distinct nature of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that leave is necessary to appeal from interlocutory judgments of the High Court under its original jurisdiction, and failure to obtain such leave renders the appeal incompetent.