McDonald v State of South Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297

Citation: McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297
Parties: FRANCIS MCDONALD v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, KEVIN BOADEN, NANCY SCHUPELIUS, MAUREEN COCHRAM, PETER MITCHELL and SUE HYDE
File number SAD 178 of 2010
Judge: BESANKO J
Date of judgment: 31 March 2011
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Application by respondent to proceeding for order dismissing proceeding as an abuse of process pursuant to O 20 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules — where applicant a former teacher who brought an action against the State of South Australia and individual employees in the Department of Education and Children’s Services — where applicant self-represented — where applicant had previously brought an unsuccessful action against the State in relation to substantially the same subject matter in the Supreme Court of South Australia — where statement of claim disclosed a number of causes of action against the respondents some of which had been brought in the previous proceeding — whether doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel applied to the various causes of action and to all respondents — whether if those doctrines did not apply the action was an abuse of process by relitigation — identity of the applicant’s employer

HELD: The proceeding was dismissed. Each of the causes of action against all of the respondents could not be maintained either by reason of res judicata, issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel, or should be dismissed as an abuse of process by way of relitigation.  

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 22
Education Act 1972 (SA)

Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA)
Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 31A
Federal Court Rules O 9 r 7, O 20 r 5

Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA)
Public Sector Management Act 1995 (SA) s 74

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 54
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)

Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (2007) 232 CLR 1, cited
Arthur JS Hall & Co v Simons [2000] 3 WLR 543, cited
Bradken Consolidated Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 107, cited Cox v Journeaux [No 2] (1935) 52 CLR 713, cited
Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 510, cited
Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313, cited
Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1, cited
Leggott v Great Northern Railway Co (1876) 1 QBD 599, cited
McDonald v State of South Australia (2008) 172 IR 256, cited
McDonald v State of South Australia [2010] HCATrans 25, cited
McDonald v State of South Australia (Judge Lunn, unreported, 25 July 2007
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589, cited
R v Lessur-Millar (1990) 47 A Crim R 111, cited
Ramsay v…
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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 297
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of McDonald v State of South Australia involves a former teacher who brought an action against the State of South Australia and individual employees in the Department of Education and Children’s Services. The applicant, who was self-represented, had previously brought an unsuccessful action against the State in relation to substantially the same subject matter in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The statement of claim in the current proceeding disclosed a number of causes of action against the respondents, some of which had been brought in the previous proceeding. The court was required to determine whether the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel, and Anshun estoppel applied to the various causes of action and to all respondents, and if those doctrines did not apply, whether the action was an abuse of process by relitigation.

The court held that the proceeding was dismissed. Each of the causes of action against all of the respondents could not be maintained either by reason of res judicata, issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel, or should be dismissed as an abuse of process by way of relitigation. The applicant had previously litigated the same or substantially similar issues in a previous proceeding against the State of South Australia, and the current proceeding was found to be an abuse of process. The court found that the doctrines of res judipata and issue estoppel applied to some of the causes of action, and that Anshun estoppel applied to others. The court also found that the applicant’s employer had changed since the previous proceeding, which further supported the dismissal of the proceeding.

The final orders of the court were that the applicant’s proceeding be dismissed. This outcome was based on the finding that the proceeding was an abuse of process by relitigation, and that the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel, and Anshun estoppel applied to the various causes of action and to all respondents. The court’s decision was based on a careful analysis of the relevant legal principles and the facts of the case, and represented a significant victory for the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

The applicant’s proceeding be dismissed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Condoluci’s affidavit of 14 December 2010 annexes, among other documents, the judgment at first instance of the Supreme Court in the applicant’s action (McDonald v State of South Australia (2008) 172 IR 256) and the judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court on the appeal (State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344). BACKGROUND I now set out a general summary of the factual matters which arose in the Supreme Court. The summary is based on the findings made by the trial judge as varied or modified by the Full Court on the appeal (see in particular the reasons of the Full Court at [27]-[103] and [140]-[178], [295]-[379]). The applicant was first employed as a teacher with the South Australian Department of Education and Children’s Services (‘DECS’) in 1990. On the hearing of this application the applicant made a number of submissions regarding the precise identity of his employer and I will come back to that topic. The applicant had previously worked as a teacher in Scotland, with qualifications in teaching business education and economics. He had experience with word processing but not with computing generally. In 1996 the applicant was appointed to Mount Barker High School, where he was asked to take on the role of network manager of the school’s computing systems, in addition to his teaching load. The role involved repairing and maintaining computers and other equipment. This was not work for which the applicant was qualified and he found it stressful. His workload affected the applicant’s health adversely. Over the course of several conversations, the applicant informed Mr Boaden, the second respondent, who was then the Assistant Director of Personnel with DECS, about the difficulties he was experiencing. Mr Boaden was aware that Brighton Secondary School needed to fill the position of Co‑ordinator of Information Technology and a Year 12 Computing teacher. The applicant was appointed to teach computing to Year 12 and mathematics to Year 11 at Brighton High School for the following year. At Brighton Secondary School, the applicant took on similar duties to those he had performed at Mount Barker, including managing the computer network. This was in addition to his teaching load. Ms Schupelius, the third respondent, was then the principal of Brighton. In April 1997 the applicant was appointed Acting Coordinator of Information Technology Across the Curriculum (‘Co-ordinator’), and was confirmed in this position for a five-year term from January 1998 to January 2003. There was a reduction in his teaching hours, but the applicant continued to find it difficult to manage his workload. Ms Schupelius was aware of this and engaged Mr Crompton to help the applicant on a part-time basis. The applicant’s teaching load was further reduced. The applicant continued to be assisted with his workload by Mr Crompton, and later by his son, Damien McDonald, on a part time basis. The trial judge found that things proceeded ‘reasonably well’ for the remainder of 1998 to the end of 1999. A new computer network was installed at Brighton at the beginning of 2000 and a number of second-hand computers, requiring considerable work in order to make them suitable for the school’s use, were purchased throughout that year. The applicant undertook that work and found it time-consuming. In late 2000 a part-time School Services Officer was employed to assist the applicant with the task. The trial judge found that Ms Schupelius was aware that the applicant continued to work long hours, and was not qualified for the work that he had undertaken. She offered to further reduce Mr McDonald’s teaching hours but the offer was refused.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The trial judge found that the State was in breach of the first and second alleged implied terms, and that the applicant had been constructively dismissed. He rejected the claim for damages for deceit, finding that the elements of the tort had not been established because there had been no false representation. The trial judge did not deal with the issue of estoppel, but the Full Court noted (at 368-369 [114]) that there was no doubt that damages were not claimable by reference to estoppel. The trial judge also rejected a claim for aggravated and exemplary damages. He awarded damages in the amount of $392,850.00 for loss of earning capacity, superannuation entitlements and long service leave entitlements. The judgment of the Full Court The State appealed against the trial judge’s decision. The applicant cross-appealed on various grounds. The State raised for the first time on appeal a submission that the applicant’s claim for breach of contract was barred by section 54(1) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. The Full Court rejected the submission, finding that even if the applicant had suffered a compensable disability, the relationship between the compensable disability and the alleged repudiatory breach of contract lay only in the fact that the conduct amounting to the repudiatory breach had also caused the compensable disability. The liability in contract did not depend on the existence of the compensable disability and accordingly the applicant was not precluded from bringing the contractual claim, notwithstanding that he remained entitled to bring a claim under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, as he has since done. The Full Court nevertheless allowed the appeal, finding that there was no implied term requiring the State not to damage seriously or destroy his relationship of mutual trust and confidence with the applicant. This was because the extensive statutory regulation of the applicant’s employment contract, which provided a process for addressing his grievances, rendered the implication of such a term unnecessary. The Court also found that even if such a term was implied into the applicant’s employment contract, it had not been breached in a repudiatory way because of the availability to the applicant of grievance resolution processes within the confines of the employment relationship. In relation to the implied contractual duty of care, the Court held that any breach was not repudiatory, because the issues of the definition of the applicant’s role at the school, his workload, and harassment by other staff had been resolved well before the applicant terminated his employment; and because it had upheld certain challenges to factual findings made by the trial judge which supported the finding that there had been a repudiatory breach. It further considered that the conclusion that the applicant had been bullied and victimised by Mr Mitchell and excluded from committee participation was not supported by the evidence and could not amount to a breach of the duty. Nor did any breaches cumulatively amount to a repudiatory breach of the employment contract.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established