McDonald v State of South Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 1251

Citation: McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 1251
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297
Parties: FRANCIS THOMAS MCDONALD v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, KEVIN BOADEN, NANCY SCHUPELIUS, MAUREEN COCHRAM, PETER MITCHELL and SUE HYDE
File number: SAD 76 of 2011
Judge: LANDER J
Date of judgment: 7 November 2011
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal against order dismissing proceeding – judge dismissed proceeding on the basis of res judicata, issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel, and abuse of process by relitigation – whether decision attended by sufficient doubt to justify grant of leave – no error demonstrated – claims substantially the same as claims dismissed by Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court – application for leave to appeal dismissed
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 1976 O 52 r 10
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 30, s 54(1)
Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc. (1991) 33 FCR 397 cited
Date of hearing: 25 July 2011, 18 August 2011, 10 October 2011
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Golding
Solicitor for the Respondents: Crown Solicitor (SA)

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 76 of 2011

BETWEEN:

FRANCIS THOMAS MCDONALD
Applicant

AND:

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

KEVIN BOADEN
Second Respondent

NANCY SCHUPELIUS
Third Respondent

MAUREEN COCHRAM
Fourth Respondent

PETER MITCHELL
Fifth Respondent

SUE HYDE
Sixth Respondent

JUDGE:

LANDER J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 NOVEMBER 2011

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 76 of 2011

BETWEEN:

FRANCIS THOMAS MCDONALD
Applicant

AND:

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

KEVIN BOADEN
Second Respondent

NANCY SCHUPELIUS
Third Respondent

MAUREEN COCHRAM
Fourth Respondent

PETER MITCHELL
Fifth Respondent

SUE HYDE
Sixth Respondent

JUDGE:

LANDER J

DATE:

7 NOVEMBER 2011

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from an order of a judge of this Court made on 31 March 2011.  The application for leave to appeal was made on 20 April 2011.  This was outside the time prescribed by O 52 r 10 of the Federal Court Rules 1976, which required that an application be made within seven days after the date on which the interlocutory judgment was pronounced.

  2. The respondent accepted that if I were of the opinion that leave should be granted then I should at the same time extend the time within which the applicant had to apply for leave to appeal from the interlocutory judgment to 20 April…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1251
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of McDonald v State of South Australia involved an application by the applicant for leave to appeal against an order dismissing his proceeding against the State of South Australia. The primary judge dismissed the proceeding on the basis of res judicata, issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel, and abuse of process by relitigation. The applicant had previously brought an action in the Supreme Court of South Australia in relation to the same subject matter. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the decision to dismiss the proceeding was attended by sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave to appeal.

The legal issues that the court needed to decide included whether the application for leave to appeal demonstrated sufficient doubt to warrant a review of the primary judge's decision. Additionally, the court had to assess if there was any error in the primary judge's application of the principles of res judicata, issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel, and abuse of process. The court also had to examine whether the claims brought in the Federal Court were substantially the same as those dismissed by the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court.

The court found that there was no demonstrated error in the primary judge's decision to dismiss the proceeding. The claims brought in the Federal Court were substantially the same as those dismissed by the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs. This decision was based on the well-established principles of res judicata, issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel, and the prohibition against abuse of process by relitigation. The court concluded that the primary judge's decision was correct and should not be appealed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

However, for the reasons that follow, I am of the opinion that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed.Background Facts Prior to commencing the proceeding in this Court, which was dismissed by the primary judge on 31 March 2011, the applicant had brought an action in the Supreme Court of South Australia in relation to the subject matter of the proceeding brought in this Court. I turn now to consider the facts underlying the proceedings in this Court and the Supreme Court. In 1990 the applicant was employed as a teacher with the South Australian Department of Education and Children’s Services (DECS). In 1996 he was appointed to Mount Barker High School, where in addition to his teaching load he was asked to manage that school’s computing systems. The applicant experienced difficulties in carrying out his normal and extra duties, and he complained to the Director of Personnel of DECS about those difficulties. In 1997 the applicant was transferred to Brighton High School to teach mathematics in Year 11, computing in Year 12, and to become the Coordinator of Information Technology. His duties at Brighton High School were similar to those he had carried out at Mount Barker, and included the extra duties to which I have referred. In April 1997 he was appointed Acting Coordinator of Information Technology across the curriculum and was confirmed in that position in January 1998 for a period of five years. That appointment resulted in a reduction of his teaching hours. However, the applicant continued to find the management of his workload difficult. His workload was further reduced, and an assistant was appointed to assist him in 1998 and 1999. During that period the applicant’s son also assisted him on a part-time basis. In 2000 a new network was installed at Brighton High School, and a number of secondhand computers were purchased. These computers required considerable work to adapt them for the school’s use. The applicant undertook that task but found it time consuming. In late 2000 a further person was employed to assist the applicant with the task. The Principal at Brighton High School offered to reduce his teaching hours further, but the applicant refused that offer. In January 2001 the applicant, because he feared he would not be reappointed as Coordinator in January 2003, wrote to the Principal at Brighton High School resigning from his employment on the basis of his “impossible work situation”. That letter was not acted upon by DECS. Instead a meeting was held on 29 January 2001 between the applicant, the Principal at Brighton High School, and the District Superintendent where the persons present discussed the applicant’s grievances with the Principal, including his workload, his difficulties with another staff member, and the situation relating to information technology. A further meeting was held on 7 February 2001. At that meeting it was agreed that the applicant would no longer provide technical support for a computing network at Brighton High School. Instead he would concentrate on his role as Coordinator.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established