Pate v State of Queensland

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pate v State of Queensland [2019] FCA 25

File number: QUD 408 of 2017
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 18 January 2019
Catchwords: NATIVE TITLE – non-claimant application for a negative determination of native title under s 61(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (the NTA) – where the application is unopposed under s 86G of the NTA – the principles relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to make a negative native title determination – the nature of s 24FA protection – the difficulties associated with s 42 of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) – whether negative native title determinations can be granted solely on the basis of satisfying the formal requirements of the NTA – the onus of the non-claimant applicant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that native title does not exist on the relevant area of land – the importance of adducing sufficient evidence to discharge that onus
Legislation:

Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW)

Land Act 1994 (Qld)

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Application for the Determination of Native Title made by the Metropolitan Local Aboriginal Land Council (unreported, Beaumont J, 31 March 1998)

Awabakal Local Aboriginal Land Council v Attorney General of New South Wales [2018] FCA 1249

Bahtabah Local Aboriginal Land Council vNew South Wales Native Title Services Limited [2007] FCA 382

Bahtabah Local Aboriginal Land Council vNew South Wales Native Title Services Limited [2007] FCA 383

CG v Western Australia (2016) 240 FCR 466; [2016] FCAFC 67

Commonwealth v Clifton (2007) 164 FCR 355; [2007] FCAFC 190

Cruse v New South Wales Native Title Services Ltd [2006] FCA 1124

Darkinjung Aboriginal Land Council v Minister for Lands & Ors [2005] FCA 1861

Darkinjung Local Aboriginal Land Council v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council [2001] FCA 1124

Deerubbin Aboriginal Land Council v Attorney-General of New South Wales [2017] FCA 1067

Deniliquin Local Aboriginal Land Council [2001] FCA 609

Eden Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister for Lands [2008] FCA 1934

Eden Local Aboriginal Land Council v NTSCORP Limited [2010] FCA 745

Eden Local Aboriginal Land Council v NTSCORP Limited [2010] FCA 746

Forster Local Aboriginal Land Council v Attorney-General of New South Wales [2017] FCA 997

Forster Local Aboriginal Land Council v New South Wales Native Title Services Limited [2006] FCA 1455

Gandangara Local Aboriginal Land Council v Attorney General of New South Wales [2013] FCA 646

Gandangara Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister for Lands [2009] FCA 1136

Gandangara Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister for Lands for the State of NSW [2011] FCA 383

Hillig as Administrator of Worimi Local Aboriginal Land Council v NSW Native Title Services Ltd [2006] FCA 1184

Jerrinja Local Aboriginal Land Council v Attorney-General of the State of NSW [2013] FCA 562

Kennedy v State of Queensland (2002) 190 ALR 707; [2002] FCA 747

Lightning Ridge Local Aboriginal Land Council v Premier of New South Wales in his…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 25
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Pate v State of Queensland involved a non-claimant application by Ms Pate seeking a negative determination of native title over her pastoral lease in Queensland under section 61(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). The application was opposed by the State of Queensland. The Federal Court had to determine whether the application could be granted on the basis of satisfying the formal requirements of the Native Title Act alone, or whether Ms Pate needed to provide additional evidence to discharge her onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that no native title existed over the land.

The key legal issues were the principles relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to make a negative native title determination, the nature of section 24FA protection, and the difficulties associated with section 42 of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). The Court also considered whether negative native title determinations could be granted solely on the basis of satisfying the formal requirements of the Native Title Act, and the onus of the non-claimant applicant to provide sufficient evidence to discharge their onus.

The Court found that the peculiar circumstance affecting previous non-claimant applications in New South Wales did not apply in this case. Ms Pate was not an Aboriginal Land Council and was not forced to make the application under Queensland State legislation. The Court emphasised the need for a sophisticated approach focusing on the statutory language and the particular facts and circumstances of each case. While Ms Pate had complied with the formal requirements for section 24FA protection, she had not provided sufficient additional evidence to discharge her onus of proving that no native title existed over her land. The Court dismissed the application.

In conclusion, the Court held that it was not appropriate to exercise its discretion to make the negative native title determination sought by Ms Pate. The Court found that Ms Pate had not provided sufficient evidence beyond compliance with the formal requirements of the Native Title Act to discharge her onus of proving that no native title existed over her land. The amended non-claimant application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended non-claimant application filed 15 September 2017 is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Apart from the effect of the judgment in Worimi FC, there is another matter that stands against the approach in Deerubbin being adopted in this application. It concerns the peculiar circumstance in which that non-claimant application was decided. As has been mentioned a number of times above, the Court in Worimi FC held that the facts and circumstances of each individual case dictate the sufficiency of the evidence required to discharge an applicant’s onus to prove that no native title exists in an area. Griffiths J made the same point twice in Deerubbin. First, at [51], after referring to the judgment in Worimi FC, his Honour said: “Importantly, the Full Court emphasised that each case has to be addressed according to its own particular facts”. Then, immediately after his observations at [53], his Honour said:That is not to say, however, that every case must be approached by reference to such cases. Primacy has to be given to the statutory language. The cases simply provide general guidance on how those powers should be exercised and applied by reference to the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. There is a danger in viewing statements in individual cases too literally and as though they provide the answer in all cases. A more sophisticated approach is required, one which ultimately focuses upon the relevant statutory provision as applied in the particular facts and circumstances of an individual case …(Emphasis added)To similar effect, see his Honour’s observations in Gandangara 2013 at [8]–[9]. The peculiar circumstance that, in my view, affected Deerubbin and, indeed, most of the non-claimant applications decided in New South Wales over the past 18 years listed at [46] and [47] above, is the difficulties associated with the interaction between a particular provision of the apposite State legislation in New South Wales, namely the ALRA, and the related provisions of the NTA. That provision has been the subject of comment by a number of judges over that period. A good example is Lightning Ridge Local Aboriginal Land Council v Premier of New South Wales in his capacity as the State Minister pursuant to the Native Title Act 1993(Cth) [2012] FCA 792 (Lightning Ridge). In that judgment, Perram J identified the source of those difficulties as s 42 of the ALRA. That section prevents a Local Aboriginal Land Council from dealing with the land granted to it under the ALRA unless there has been an “approved determination of native title” under the NTA (see Lightning Ridge at [7]). As Perram J explained in the following passages of Lightning Ridge, that requirement does not take account of the provisions of the NTA providing for s 24FA protection, but instead appears to require a Local Aboriginal Land Council to proceed to obtain a negative determination of native title:20It is perhaps ironic that a local aboriginal land council who has obtained the benefit of a grant of a freehold estate under the ALR Act may then be required to make application to this Court under the NT Act.21The apprehension that irony may be present turns out to be well-founded on closer inspection of the NT Act. The NT Act erects a series of protections known as future act protections following upon the making of an unopposed non-claimant application even without its determination after the expiry of the notification period: s 24FC. Without dwelling on the detail, the effect of s 24FA(1) of the NT Act will be that without the need for the Court to determine the non-claimant application all future acts in relation to the land will be valid even if those acts extinguish native title. The NT Act, therefore, contemplates a procedure where non-claimants may get security as to the validity of their title merely by making a non-claimant application which is properly notified. They do not, therefore, need to undertake the potentially laborious task of proving that there is no native title. Extinguishment of native title by such acts will, however, give the native title holders a right to compensation: s 24FA(1)(b).22The provisions of s 42(1) of the ALR Act may bring about a different result. Depending on its precise meaning it may require a local aboriginal council to ensure that an application under the NT Act is pursued to finality; that is, it is not sufficient merely that an unopposed application is made and notified (as it is with all other non-claimants in that situation) – instead, it may be that the application must be determined which in practice will mean that the council involved will need to prove that there is no native title. This is a burden which does not rest upon any other non-claimant by reason of s 24FC.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The third example cited in Deerubbin at [53], namely Kennedy, was, in my view, an exception to this prevailing view. Like Worimi (No 2), Kennedy began as a contested hearing but, at a late stage of the hearing, the Aboriginal respondents (representatives of the Koa People) sought and obtained leave to withdraw (see Kennedy at [13]). Thereafter, the non-claimant applicant adduced a raft of evidence directed to establishing that native title did not exist in the pastoral lease in question. The nature and extent of that evidence was summarised by Sackville J at [17]–[19] and it led his Honour to conclude as follows (at [34]):Thirdly, the only evidence before the Court strongly suggests that there are indeed no native title interests over Castle Hill. This is not merely a case where possible native title claimants have failed to provide evidence supporting any claim they might have. The evidence adduced indicates that any connection that may have existed between the Aboriginal peoples of the area and Castle Hill, in accordance with traditional laws and customs, has not been maintained. While the content of native title may vary depending on the circumstances (Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, at 169, per Gummow J), it is difficult to see, in the light of the applicant’s evidence, how any incidents of native title over Castle Hill could have survived into the very late twentieth century: cf Native Title Act, s 223; Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, at 59-60, per Brennan J.(Emphasis added)It can therefore be seen that Sackville J expressly did not proceed only on the basis of compliance with the formal requirements of the NTA. Instead, his Honour’s approach was entirely consistent with the judgment in Worimi FC, albeit that his judgment was delivered some eight years beforehand. Apart from the effect of the judgment in Worimi FC, there is another matter that stands against the approach in Deerubbin being adopted in this application. It concerns the peculiar circumstance in which that non-claimant application was decided. As has been mentioned a number of times above, the Court in Worimi FC held that the facts and circumstances of each individual case dictate the sufficiency of the evidence required to discharge an applicant’s onus to prove that no native title exists in an area. Griffiths J made the same point twice in Deerubbin. First, at [51], after referring to the judgment in Worimi FC, his Honour said: “Importantly, the Full Court emphasised that each case has to be addressed according to its own particular facts”. Then, immediately after his observations at [53], his Honour said:That is not to say, however, that every case must be approached by reference to such cases. Primacy has to be given to the statutory language. The cases simply provide general guidance on how those powers should be exercised and applied by reference to the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. There is a danger in viewing statements in individual cases too literally and as though they provide the answer in all cases. A more sophisticated approach is required, one which ultimately focuses upon the relevant statutory provision as applied in the particular facts and circumstances of an individual case …(Emphasis added)To similar effect, see his Honour’s observations in Gandangara 2013 at [8]–[9].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Whether or not that is so, that peculiar circumstance is certainly not present in this matter. Ms Pate is not an Aboriginal Land Council. Nor, so far as I am aware, is she an Aboriginal person. More importantly, there is no Queensland State legislation forcing her to make this application for a negative determination. To the contrary, the offer the State made to her advanced an alternative course, namely a registered ILUA under Subdivision D of Division 3 of Part 2 of the NTA (see at [2] above). To achieve such an ILUA, Ms Pate would need to secure the agreement of the Native Title Representative Body for the area covering her land to the freehold grant that she has requested the State to make (see ss 24DE(2)(b) and 24DF(2) respectively). It is also worth adding that this option would most likely avoid the outcome I have identified above (at [41]).THE CONCLUSION – THE APPLICATION MUST BE REFUSED Having regard to the matters set out above, I do not consider it is appropriate to exercise the discretion under s 86G to make the negative determination that Ms Pate has sought. In reaching this conclusion, I have had particular regard to the following matters. First, there is the caution that always needs to be taken when a court is asked to make a determination of the present kind. Emmett J described that caution in Munn in the following terms (at [22]):… The Court must, of course, exercise caution where any declaratory order involving property rights is sought. Orders that have particular public interest elements require closer examination by the Court than orders that operate solely inter partes. A determination under the Act that native title exists, and perhaps even a determination that it does not exist, is a real action, in the sense that an order generally operates against the entire world. It does not only resolve an issue inter partes.(Emphasis in original)To similar effect, see CG at [44] and Dale v Western Australia (2011) 191 FCR 521; [2011] FCAFC 46 at [92]. These factors are all present in this matter. The determination, if made, will concern real property, it will constitute a judgment in rem binding the whole world and, once made, it will have that binding effect for all time subject only to the very limited exceptions contained in s 13 (see at [32] and [35] above). Moreover, in CG at [66], the Full Court urged this type of caution when a court was being asked to make a negative determination of native title following a fully contested hearing. That being so, I consider much greater caution is required in an unopposed and uncontested application for a negative determination under s 86G of the NTA. Secondly, for the reasons discussed at length above and subject to the reservations expressed at [41], I do not consider it is open to make this negative determination of native title in the circumstances of this matter because to do so would be inconsistent with one of the main objects and purposes of the NTA. Thirdly, but alternatively, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of this case, I do not consider Ms Pate has adduced sufficient evidence to discharge her onus to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that no native title exists in the land comprising her lease. In this respect, it is to be noted that the only evidence Ms Pate has adduced in support of her application is her compliance with the formal requirements for s 24FA protection as set out in s 24FC. Conversely, apart from the evidence of the three native title determination applications which covered the land comprising her lease (see at [5] above), she has not adduced any evidence about the history of that land, the presence or absence of any native title in the vicinity of it, or the presence or absence of any Aboriginal connection with it. She has also not adduced any evidence from the Native Title Representative Body for the area concerned expressing its views as to whether native title rights and interests are likely to exist on that land. This is an important deficiency in the evidence because one of the functions of a Native Title Representative Body under the NTA is to “as far as is reasonably practicable, identify persons who may hold native title in the area for which the [B]ody is the representative body” (see s 203BJ(b)). Moreover, and relatedly, while there is evidence that there has, in the past, been a registered claimant application extant with respect to the land comprising Ms Pate’s lease, which application was subsequently dismissed, Ms Pate has not adduced any evidence to explain how that application managed to pass the registration test in Part 7 of the NTA. Given the function of a Native Title Representative Body mentioned above, it is likely, in my view, that the Body with responsibility for the area covering Ms Pate’s lease will be able to shed some light on that issue. Finally on this aspect, I should record that the existence of that registered claim, albeit that it has since been dismissed, combined with the absence of any evidence to explain how it came to be registered, stands against my drawing the inference that Ms Pate has proffered, that no native title rights and interests exist in the area of her lease. It is because of all these deficiencies in Ms Pate’s supporting evidence that I do not consider she has discharged the onus she bears in this non-claimant application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Because a determination that no native title exists in an area is a determination “whether or not native title exists”, on its face, s 94A requires such a determination to set out the matters mentioned in ss 225(a) to (e) above. However, because those matters only relate to a determination if native title exists in the area concerned, self-evidently, those matters are otiose where a negative determination is involved. Accordingly, I am satisfied that Ms Pate has met the jurisdictional pre-conditions mentioned above.THE DISCRETION AND THE CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING IT There then remains the question posed by the phrase in s 86G(1) above, “the Court may, if it appears appropriate to do so” make the order sought. Plainly, that phrase gives the Court a discretion whether to make the order sought. The nature of that discretion and some of the considerations affecting its exercise were also addressed by Emmett J in Munn. Because the apposite phrase in s 86G is identical to that in s 87 of the NTA, I consider the following observations of Emmett J in Munn provide some guidance on the exercise of the discretion under the former section. First, Emmett J underscored the unfettered nature of the discretion while emphasising the usual constraint that it “must be exercised judicially in accordance with ordinary principles” (Munn at [26]). Next, his Honour set out a non-exhaustive list of considerations to be taken into account when exercising the discretion. Prominent in that list was, unsurprisingly, the objects and purposes of the NTA (Munn at [28]). The main objects of the NTA are set out in s 3 as follows:(a)to provide for the recognition and protection of native title; and(b)to establish ways in which future dealings affecting native title may proceed and to set standards for those dealings; and(c)to establish a mechanism for determining claims to native title; and(d)to provide for, or permit, the validation of past acts, and intermediate period acts, invalidated because of the existence of native title. Broadly speaking, ss 13, 61, 66, 81 and 86G itself, all serve, in differing ways, to advance the objects or purposes stated in (a) and (c) above. As well, the future act provisions of Part 2 of Division 3 of the NTA, including the sections comprising Subdivision F of Division 3, play a similar role with respect to the objects or purposes in (a) and (b) above. The impact these provisions and the objects or purposes above have on the exercise of the discretion under s 86G is a matter to which I will return later in these reasons.THE THREE AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON In deciding whether to exercise the discretion under s 86G in this matter, a convenient starting point is the three authorities upon which both Ms Pate and the State relied in their contentions set out above. The first authority in time was Worimi (No 2). It involved a non-claimant application which resulted in a contested hearing between a Local Aboriginal Land Council under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) (the ALRA) and an Aboriginal person called Worimi. Prior to the trial, Worimi’s two claimant applications over the land in question had been dismissed by the primary judge. He was then joined as a respondent party to the Land Council’s non-claimant application (see Worimi (No 2)) at [9]). In that peculiar litigious context, one of the issues in contention at the trial was Worimi’s evidentiary onus as an Aboriginal respondent party contesting the negative determination that the Land Council was seeking (see the discussion in Worimi (No 2) at [45]–[62]). From this brief description of its procedural background, it can be seen that Worimi (No 2) was not an unopposed non-claimant application under s 86G. Furthermore, in seeking a negative determination in that matter, the Land Council did not rely only on its compliance with the formal requirements of the NTA. Instead, a significant amount of other evidence was adduced at the trial, the nature and extent of which was summarised in the subsequent Full Court judgment (Worimi FC) as follows at ([76]):In this matter, the primary judge had the benefit of the absence of a claimant application after the extensive notification required by the NT Act of the Land Council’s application. That may indicate that no native title claim group or groups assert native title rights and interests over the Land: Clifton 164 FCR 355 at [59]. There was evidence of 11 persons, three of whom were cross-examined, including eight who identified as Worimi people. They were Aboriginal people with some knowledge and experience of the Area, including the Land. Their evidence was that the Land is not considered to be subject to native title rights and interests …(Emphasis added)