FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Morros v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2025] FCA 800
File number: SAD 108 of 2025 Judgment of: CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 15 July 2025 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – cross applications for summary judgment – applicant seeking relief relating to possession of mortgaged land – controversy concerning the respondent’s entitlement to possess the land already tried and determined in the Supreme Court of South Australia – proceeding in this Court constituting an abuse of process on several bases Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B, 78B
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 19, 22, 23, 31A, 32
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01
Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA) s 11
Real Property Act 1886 (SA)
Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 292
Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd (ACN 114 658 070) v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (ACN 070 396 020) [2006] FCA 1352; 236 ALR 720
Cameron v Cole (1944) 68 CLR 571
Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (In liq) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (2018) 264 CLR 165
Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713
Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529
McDonald v Colbran [2019] FCA 1937
McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297
Morros v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2025] SASC 40
Rana v Department of Defence [2018] FCA 1642
Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19
Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (ACN 007 656 555) (No 5) [2004] FCA 1262
Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 6) [2004] FCA 1699
State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Stenhouse Ltd (1997) Aust Tort Rep 81 – 423
Division: General Division Registry: South Australia National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction Number of paragraphs: 35 Date of hearing: 11 July 2025 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Roder Solicitor for the Respondent: Gadens Lawyers ORDERS
SAD 108 of 2025 BETWEEN: MATTHEW MORROS
Applicant
AND: COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA (ACN 123 123 124)
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for summary judgment against the respondent is dismissed.
2.Pursuant to r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the originating application is summarily dismissed.
3.The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the originating application in a fixed amount to be determined by a Registrar.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J
The parties in this matter each seek an order for summary judgment…
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- AGLC
- Morros v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2025] FCA 800
- Case
- [2025] FCA 800
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to grant summary judgment and whether the applicant's proceeding constituted an abuse of process. The court considered whether the applicant's claims were properly within its jurisdiction and if there were grounds to prevent the relitigation of the controversy concerning CBA’s entitlement to possess the land, which had already been determined by the Supreme Court. The court referred to the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel, and Anshun estoppel, as well as the broader jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process.
The court found that while the applicant's claims under the ACL could be heard in the Federal Court, the relitigation of the controversy concerning CBA’s entitlement to possess the land would be an abuse of process. The finality principle, supported by the doctrines of res judipata and Anshun estoppel, meant that the court could not adjudicate on the same subject matter already decided by the Supreme Court. The court also noted that the finality principle is not limited to cases where the technical requirements for estoppel are met. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicant’s application for summary judgment and the originating application, ordering the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.
The court made an order dismissing the applicant’s application for summary judgment, summarily dismissing the originating application, and directing the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs in a fixed amount to be determined by a Registrar.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for summary judgment against the respondent is dismissed.
2. Pursuant to r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the originating application is summarily dismissed.
3. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the originating application in a fixed amount to be determined by a Registrar.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant appeared self-represented in the proceeding. He did not deny the existence of the Possession Order, but he did make submissions to the effect that he did not recognise its legitimacy. His submissions explaining the factual and legal foundation of his case are as summarised at [8] above. Among other things, he submitted that CBA’s lawyers and the Supreme Court had wrongly characterised his arguments as “pseudo law” and that this Court may award summary judgment in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred under the ACL. He submitted that he had commenced a proceeding in this Court because he had not received a just hearing in the Supreme Court and because he had more recently obtained information about the “securitisation” of the Loan Agreement and Mortgage and CBA’s dealings with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.CONSIDERATION Both summary judgment applications may be considered together. This Court has such jurisdiction as is vested in it by laws made by the Parliament: FCA Act, s 19(1). The ACL is such a law, as is the Judiciary Act. In addition, to the extent that the Constitution permits, the Court has jurisdiction in respect of matters not otherwise within its jurisdiction that are associated with matters in which its jurisdiction has been invoked: FCA Act, s 32. In matters falling within its jurisdiction, the Court has power to make orders of such kinds and to direct the issue of writs of such kinds as it thinks appropriate: FCA Act, s 23. Section 22 of the FCA Act provides:The Court shall, in every matter before the Court, grant, either absolutely or on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks just, all remedies to which any of the parties appears to be entitled in respect of a legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by him or her in the matter, so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of proceedings concerning any of those matters avoided. The applicant is correct in his submission that an action seeking relief under the ACL for unconscionable conduct and misleading and deceptive conduct may be commenced in this Court and that, in such a proceeding, the Court would have jurisdiction to hear claims founded in equity in the resolution of the whole of the controversy. However, in the present case, a controversy concerning CBA’s entitlement to possession of the Land has been tried in the Supreme Court and the Possession Order remains in force. The order is founded upon a finding that the Loan Agreement and Mortgage are binding and enforceable instruments. It would offend the finality principle for this Court to adjudicate a controversy going to the same subject matter, irrespective of whether the technical requirements for issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel or res judicata are fulfilled. As Besanko J explained in McDonald v SA (at [41]):The doctrines set out above have a number of technical requirements. The Court’s jurisdiction to protect a party from an abuse of process constituted by an attempt to relitigate a case already disposed of is not limited to cases where those technical requirements can be made out: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ (‘Walton’); Rana v University of South Australia [2008] FCA 1903 at [43]. The operation of the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel is subsumed into the Federal Court’s implied incidental power to prevent abuse of its processes: Spalla at [59]. Justice French said in Spalla (at [66]) that:the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel, and Anshun do not exhaust the circumstances in which a proceeding may be regarded as amounting to an abuse of process by way of attempted relitigation of a dispute already judicially determined.In Walton Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ said (at 393) that:… proceedings before a court should be stayed as an abuse of process if, notwithstanding that the circumstances do not give rise to an estoppel, their continuance would be unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive for the reason that it is sought to litigate anew a case which has already been disposed of by earlier proceedings.