NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NASB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCAFC 24

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal – application by appellant to adduce further evidence on appeal – Refugee Review Tribunal affirms decision of delegate of respondent Minister not to grant protection visa – application to Court for prerogative relief in respect of Tribunal’s decision is dismissed – appeal to Full court from that dismissal – Tribunal not satisfied that authorities in country of nationality had continuing interest in appellant – appellant seeks leave to lead on hearing of appeal evidence recently received by him of summons and notice issued in his country of nationality requiring his attendance at Court – hearing date in summons preceded delegate’s decision – notice issued after hearing before Tribunal, requiring attendance after Tribunal’s decision – documents received by appellant from a friend in his country of nationality only within the month preceding hearing of appeal – whether breach of rules of natural justice.

EVIDENCE – appeal – application by appellant to adduce further evidence on appeal – Refugee Review Tribunal affirms decision of delegate of respondent Minister not to grant protection visa – application to Court for prerogative relief in respect of Tribunal’s decision is dismissed – appeal to Full court from that dismissal – Tribunal not satisfied that authorities in country of nationality had continuing interest in appellant – appellant seeks leave to lead on hearing of appeal evidence recently received by him of summons and notice issued in his country of nationality requiring his attendance at Court – hearing date in summons preceded delegate’s decision – notice issued after hearing before Tribunal, requiring attendance after Tribunal’s decision – documents received by appellant from a friend in his country of nationality only within the month preceding hearing of appeal – whether breach of rules of natural justice.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632 cited
R v Copestake;  Ex parte Wilkinson [1927] 1 KB 468 cited
Florance v Andrew (1985) 58 ALR 377 cited
Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 cited
R v West Sussex Quarter Sessions, Ex parte Albert and Maud Johnson Trust Ltd [1974] QB 24 discussed
Al-Mehdawi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1990] 1 AC 876 discussed
Pullicino v Harness Racing Victoria [2002] VSC 346 referred to
R v Bolton; Ex parte Scally [1991] 2 WLR 239 cited

NASB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL
& INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 1550 of 2003

BEAUMONT, LINDGREN & TAMBERLIN JJ
25 FEBRUARY 2004
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1550  OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

NASB
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BEAUMONT, LINDGREN AND TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

25 FEBRUARY 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant’s motion brought by notice of motion filed on…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs involved an appellant seeking orders in the nature of mandamus and certiorari against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The appellant, who had applied for a protection visa, challenged the Refugee Review Tribunal's (RRT) decision which dismissed his application. The primary judge dismissed the appellant's application, and the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The central legal issue was whether the discovery of fresh evidence, which could not have been found with due diligence before the trial, was a ground for granting certiorari. The appellant argued that the fresh evidence could have influenced the outcome of the RRT's decision. The court had to determine if the RRT's decision was vitiated by a mistake, as suggested by the appellant, or if it fell within the established limits of certiorari, which do not extend beyond defects or irregularities at the trial.

The Court of Appeal, while acknowledging the appellant's claims of fresh evidence, held that the scope of certiorari does not encompass the discovery of new evidence that could have influenced the outcome of the decision. The majority opinion, supported by Orr and Lawton LJJ, emphasised that certiorari is not concerned with the miscarriage of justice arising from the evidence but rather with the jurisdiction and regularity of the proceedings. The court concluded that the RRT's decision, being a privative clause decision, was not subject to the appellant's ability to present fresh evidence unless the Minister exercised specific powers under the Migration Act.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the motion, affirming the primary judge's decision. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and the costs of the motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant’s motion brought by notice of motion filed on 13 February 2004 be dismissed.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal including the respondent’s costs of the appellant’s motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 17 June 2003 the appellant applied to this Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for orders in the nature of mandamus and certiorari in respect of the RRT’s decision. At the hearing before his Honour, the appellant was not represented, but he was aided from time to time by a barrister who was present in court. On 2 October 2003, the primary Judge dismissed the appellant’s application with costs.BACKGROUND FACTS The live issue on the appeal is a narrow one. For this reason, we will outline the background and summarise the reasoning of the RRT and of his Honour, the primary judge, more briefly than might otherwise have been appropriate. The appellant claimed that he had 13 years of education; had undertaken compulsory military service between 1992/93 and 1994/95; was self-employed as a car mechanic and trader between 1993/94 and 1998/99; and traded in mobile phones in a bazaar in Tehran between 1998/99 and late 2002. He said he lived at the same address in Tehran from 1992/93 to late 2002, when he left Iran. In his application for a protection visa, the appellant made the following claims:· his mother worked as a civilian employee within the Army during the Shah’s régime (she died from illness when the appellant was young);· his father was a commanding officer within the military, an important position in the Shah’s government, and knew the Shah because of that position; · his family was in danger after the Shah was overthrown, and his father was executed in 1981, the family house was confiscated, and the insurance pay-out, which should have been received on his father’s death, was stopped;· he was subjected to discrimination and physical harm during his school days because of his father’s position;· during his military service he was arrested by the military police and was taken to the security section where he was interrogated about his contacts and routines for about two hours;· during his military service he was detained about three times and on the last occasion he was physically assaulted (attempts were made to ascertain his political views and he was accused of being a royalist);· the Basiji (apparently paramilitary volunteers with an Islamic policing or monitoring function) have taken him in on numerous occasions, sometimes twice a year, and more often when there was political unrest, generally to the security section of the police called the Ettelaat. On some of these occasions, he was physically abused. He was held for periods of between a few hours and a few days, longer in times of political unrest;· he was refused entrance to university, was refused an end of military service card for five years, and was refused a passport;· he did not have the right to own property and was not permitted to work in government jobs. People in the community avoided him because of his past. Many of his belongings, especially print materials and videos, were repeatedly taken by the authorities, so that the authorities might ascertain his political activities, contacts or views. He was also discriminated against in sporting activities;· His sister is still in Iran, and his contacts have told him she was detained after his departure from Iran, and has been released on strict conditions;· because he was denied a passport, he had to leave Iran on a false passport.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In obiter dicta, however, all three members of the Court of Appeal expressed opinions as to whether the discovery of fresh evidence was, in itself, a ground on which certiorari could be granted. The majority, Orr and Lawton LJJ, thought it was not, while Lord Denning MR thought it was. Orr LJ said (at 39):‘The limits of certiorari are, in my judgment, well established and do not extend beyond defects or irregularities at the trial. I need not enumerate all the headings under which the relief has hitherto been granted, but they all fall within those limits, and they include fraud because fraud is recognised as vitiating proceedings. In my judgment, however, it cannot be said that for this purpose there is a defect or irregularity in proceedings because the tribunal, if other evidence had been adduced, might have come to a different conclusion. To extend the ambit of certiorari to such cases would, it seems to me, be a radical transformation of its character.’ (our emphasis)After reviewing the authorities, Lawton LJ stated (at 42):‘How should this general law be applied to the facts of this case? Quarter sessions were acting within their jurisdiction: there was nothing irregular about either the conduct of the magistrates or of the parties; there were no irregularities in procedure. In my judgment this case falls outside the limits set for certiorari by the judgment in Reg v Bolton [(1841) 1 QB 66]. Certiorari is not concerned with miscarriage of justice arising on the evidence but with jurisdiction and the regularity of the proceedings: see Colonial Bank of Australasia v Willan (1874) LR 5 PC 417, 444. The essence of the landowners’ case is that there may have been a miscarriage of justice upon the evidence because not enough was put before quarter sessions. If the new evidence had been available, it would have merely produced a conflict of evidence with which the court on certiorari is not concerned.’ (our emphasis)Disagreeing with their Lordships, Lord Denning MR said (at 36), in a passage relied on by the appellant:‘Hitherto the cases have only gone to the extent of allowing certiorari where the decision of the inferior court is vitiated by fraud or perjury. But I see no reason why the remedy should be confined to those two grounds. A decision of a question of fact may be vitiated by mistake just as much as by fraud. A witness may say something which is entirely wrong – fraudulently knowing it is false – or incorrectly believing it to be true. If the court believes him and bases its decision on it, then on discovering the untruth, the decision should be set aside – without embarking on an inquiry whether he was fraudulent or not. In such cases the fresh evidence is admitted by affidavit to prove the fraud or mistake. It is proved by something that has happened since the trial. Those cases are in my opinion only instances of the wide principle on which fresh evidence is admitted: and that is when it is necessary to do justice between the parties. It is the same principle as has been applied for centuries in regard to decisions of the High Court. There is no reason why it should not be applied to decisions of the kind here in question – decisions which will be conclusive for ever in determining the existence of a public right. I would, therefore, extend the remedy of certiorari to cases where fresh evidence is discovered which could not have been found with due diligence before the trial, where it is apparently credible and would have an important influence on the result.’ (our emphasis)

Decision

Reasons for decision

But the Act creates a special régime in relation to decisions of the RRT. The RRT’s decision here was a privative clause decision: see s 474 of the Act. While in the migration zone, the present appellant may not make a further application for a protection visa in which the significance of the additional evidence can be assessed by the RRT, unless the Minister personally determines otherwise on public interest grounds – and the Minister does not have a duty to consider whether so to determine: see s 48A and s 48B(1), (2) and (6) of the Act. Alternatively, under s 417 of the Act, the Minister may, on public interest grounds, substitute for the RRT’s decision another decision more favourable to the appellant. Again, however, the power may be exercised only by the Minister personally, and the Minister does not have a duty to consider whether to exercise it: s 417(3) and (7).CONCLUSION The motion brought by notice of motion filed on 13 February 2004 and the substantive appeal should both be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established