Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTJF

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTJF [2015] FCA 1052

Citation: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTJF [2015] FCA 1052
Appeal from: SZTJF v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 1638
Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v SZTJF and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number(s): NSD 979 of 2014
Judge(s): YATES J
Date of judgment: 25 September 2015
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for protection visa – whether error demonstrated in judgment of Federal Circuit Court in quashing decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to adduce evidence on appeal – discussion of relevant principles –   leave refused

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 422B, 424AA, 424A, 425, 429
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Dreamtech International Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation  (2010) 187 FCR 352
Jia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 84 FCR 87
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 192 FCR 173
Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 541
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553
MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483
NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 58 ALD 609
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252
Shannon v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2014) 318 ALR 420
Sobey v Nicol and Davies as Joint and Several Receivers and Managers of the Property of Mercorella and the Scheme and as Joint and Several Liquidators of the Scheme (2007) 245 ALR 389
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 96 ALD 1
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415
SZMDS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 107 ALD 361
SZTJF v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 1638
WAID v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 220
Date of hearing: 4 March 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 95
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Johnson SC with Mr B Kaplan
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sparke Helmore
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Silva of Silva Solicitors
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 979 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant

AND:

SZTJF
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 SEPTEMBER 2015

WHERE…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1052
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTJF, the applicant, a citizen of Fiji, sought a protection visa from the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal denied the application, leading to an appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary judge dismissed the appeal, but the applicant sought leave to appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The central issues in this appeal were whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the applicant's credibility and whether the Full Court should allow the applicant to adduce new evidence that was not presented at the Tribunal hearing.

The court examined the criteria set by previous case law for the admission of new evidence on appeal, particularly the requirement that the evidence could not have been produced at the original hearing with reasonable diligence and that its admission would very probably lead to a different outcome. The applicant argued that the Tribunal drew adverse inferences from her evidence without justification and acted with apprehended bias. However, the court found that the Tribunal's findings were well-supported by the evidence and that the applicant's claims of bias were unfounded. The court held that the Tribunal was entitled to challenge the applicant's credibility and that its conclusions were not illogical or irrational.

Consequently, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and dismissed the applicant's application. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 5 September 2014 be set aside and that, in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:

(1) The application be dismissed.

(2) The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Once again, this ground of contention is reflected in one of the grounds of review in the Federal Circuit Court, which the primary judge rejected. Having considered the way in which the contention has been advanced in this appeal, I, too, am satisfied that it should be rejected.LEAVE TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE As I have noted, the first respondent sought leave to adduce evidence in the appeal. The first respondent submitted that the purpose of this evidence was to establish, first, that she could not provide an adequate response to the relevant information within the time given by the Tribunal and, secondly, that “she had apprehension about the conduct of the Tribunal.” Section 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Federal Court Act) relevantly provides: 27 Evidence on appealIn an appeal, the Court shall have regard to the evidence given in the proceedings out of which the appeal arose, and has power to draw inferences of fact and, in its discretion, to receive further evidence … In NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24 (NASB), the Full Court stated (at [42]): [42]In order for this Court to receive further evidence, generally speaking (cf: Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCAFC 53; [2002] FCA 232 at [18]-[21], citing CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at 184-186 per Gaudron J, 199-201 per McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ and 230-238 per Kirby J) it will be found that two conditions must be satisfied: first, the party seeking to adduce the evidence must show that it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been adduced at the trial; and, secondly, the evidence must be such that very probably the result would have been different: see, for example, Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632 at 635-636 per Latham CJ. The second condition has been variously expressed in the cases, but the point made in all of them is that it is not enough that the new evidence was relevant and otherwise admissible, and may have affected the result. Language referring to, at the lowest, ‘probability’, and at the highest, ‘certainty’, of a different result, has been used: cf R v Copestake; Ex parte Wilkinson [1927] 1 KB 468 at 477 (‘of such importance as very probably to influence the decision’ and ‘of such weight as, if believed, would probably have an important influence on the result’); Orr v Holmes at 636 (‘high degree of probability that the admission of the new evidence would result in a different verdict’); Florance v Andrew (1985) 58 ALR 377 at 381 (‘such a different complexion on the case that a reversal of the former result ought certainly to ensue’); Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 367-368 ((as agreed by the parties) ‘almost certain that, … , an opposite result would have been reached by the primary judge’). In Sobey v Nicol and Davies as Joint and Several Receivers and Managers of the Property of Mercorella and the Scheme and as Joint and Several Liquidators of the Scheme (2007) 245 ALR 389 (Sobey), the Full Court stated (at [71]-[72]): [71] The discretion to receive further evidence must be exercised judicially, consistently with proper judicial process and in the interests of justice. It is highly unlikely that the legislature intended that s 27 should be construed in such a way as to obliterate the distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction.[72]The proper role of an appellate court under s 25 of the Federal Court Act has been considered on a number of occasions in recent years including in Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424; [2001] FCA 1833 and Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v Silver Fox Co Pty Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 211; [2005] FCAFC 131 at [45]; it is ordinarily to correct error. Nothing in CDJ was, in our view, intended to minimise the force of the observation of Gibbs CJ and Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ in Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7; 65 ALR 656 at 660 that:It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The parties did not challenge the accuracy of this summary or its sufficiency for the purpose of determining this appeal. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The primary judge summarised (at [5]-[9]) the Tribunal’s principal findings in respect of the first respondent’s claims, as follows: [5]The Tribunal found that aspects of the applicant’s claimed circumstances were consistent and supported by reliable sources. For example, it accepted that she was married, had seven children, separated in 2009 and that her husband was the former Mayor of Savusavu and maintained a public profile. However, the Tribunal also found that the evidence did not reveal that her husband had any adverse profile or that the applicant would be at any risk of harm because of her connection to him, particularly as they had separated.[6]After exploring the applicant’s claims at a lengthy hearing, the Tribunal found that significant aspects of her claims and evidence were “problematic and lacking in credibility”. The Tribunal found that significant aspects of her evidence were “vague, changing, rehearsed, unconvincing and untrue”. For example, the Tribunal maintained its concern about the applicant’s evidence regarding her living arrangements in Australia and her departure from Fiji, which the Tribunal identified was different to other evidence that was before it.[7]The Tribunal’s credibility concerns were compounded by the applicant having identified no difficulty in leaving Fiji, and having delayed departure for two months after her tourist visa was granted. The Tribunal did not accept that her explanations for the delay were plausible.[8]The Tribunal placed reliance on the very limited adverse approaches that the applicant claimed she experienced from any person or agent of the Fijian regime. In addition, the Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence that her daughter-in-law was approached and threatened was not credible and that her evidence about her role with the HPMWG was “uncertain and unconvincing” and in other respects “vague”. It also found that the applicant sought to interchangeably portray herself as vulnerable and elderly; but also claimed that she had spoken “critically and sarcastically to police” in October 2011.[9]Given its credibility concerns, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claims about being President of the HPMWG or that she had had the claimed adverse encounter with the police in October 2011. Nor did it accept on the basis of its credibility concerns that she had any adverse profile with the police in November 2011 or confronted them in February 2012. Similarly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had any intention or desire or would speak out about human rights. For these reasons, the Tribunal was not satisfied that she met the refugee or complementary protection criteria for a protection visa.(Footnotes omitted.) Once again, the parties did not challenge the accuracy of this summary for the purpose of determining this appeal. There are, however, other findings by the Tribunal which are at the centre of the appeal, to which I now turn.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal was not satisfied that, in relation to this incident, the first respondent spoke directly to the police as she had claimed or that she had made herself known to the police or military in any way that singled her out for future harm. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the police or military went to her home or took her away for questioning or mistreatment in February 2012, or at any other time.Consideration In respect of both incidents, the notice of contention particularises the first respondent’s contention as follows:The Tribunal drew adverse inferences on credibility while none existed or based on pure speculation. It appeared that the Tribunal was intent on drawing negative inferences whatever response the first respondent gave bordering on demonstrating apprehended bias. This ground of contention is reflected in one of the grounds of review in the Federal Circuit Court, which the primary judge rejected. In my respectful view, the primary judge was correct to do so. In the course of submissions, I was referred to passages from the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal where the first respondent was questioned on the claimed incidents. Having considered the relevant passages of the transcript, in conjunction with the Tribunal’s reasons dealing with these claimed incidents, I am satisfied that it was open to the Tribunal to make the findings it did. Nothing in those passages sustains the contention that the Tribunal was intent on drawing negative inferences from whatever response the first respondent gave. The Tribunal was entitled to probe and challenge the first respondent’s evidence. It did not do so unfairly or in a way to suggest that it had a closed mind on those matters. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to these claimed incidents were based essentially on its assessment of the first respondent’s credibility after testing the evidence she gave and also after taking into account its general concerns about the first respondent’s credibility, which I have discussed above. The primary judge correctly remarked that the Tribunal’s conclusion that the first respondent was not credible is a finding of fact par excellence: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 58 ALD 609 at [67]. In its decision record, the Tribunal expressed its reasons for rejecting the first respondent’s evidence in relation to the incidents. No useful purpose would be served by me setting out those reasons here or by seeking to summarise them. As I have said, I am satisfied that it was open to the Tribunal to make the findings it did. The Tribunal’s findings in this regard are not illogical or irrational and the first respondent’s strong disagreement with the findings does not make them so. Moreover, in coming to its findings, it could not be said that the Tribunal was acting arbitrarily or capriciously. I reject the first respondent’s contention that the Tribunal’s adverse findings were based on inferences that could not be drawn or were based on pure speculation.