FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTJF [2015] FCA 1052
Citation: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTJF [2015] FCA 1052 Appeal from: SZTJF v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 1638 Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v SZTJF and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number(s): NSD 979 of 2014 Judge(s): YATES J Date of judgment: 25 September 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for protection visa – whether error demonstrated in judgment of Federal Circuit Court in quashing decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to adduce evidence on appeal – discussion of relevant principles – leave refused
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 422B, 424AA, 424A, 425, 429
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Dreamtech International Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 187 FCR 352
Jia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 84 FCR 87
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 192 FCR 173
Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 541
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553
MZXBQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 166 FCR 483
NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 58 ALD 609
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252
Shannon v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2014) 318 ALR 420
Sobey v Nicol and Davies as Joint and Several Receivers and Managers of the Property of Mercorella and the Scheme and as Joint and Several Liquidators of the Scheme (2007) 245 ALR 389
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 96 ALD 1
SZMCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 174 FCR 415
SZMDS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 107 ALD 361
SZTJF v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 1638
WAID v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 220Date of hearing: 4 March 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 95 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Johnson SC with Mr B Kaplan Solicitor for the Appellant: Sparke Helmore Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Silva of Silva Solicitors Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 979 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
AppellantAND: SZTJF
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 SEPTEMBER 2015
WHERE…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1052
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the criteria set by previous case law for the admission of new evidence on appeal, particularly the requirement that the evidence could not have been produced at the original hearing with reasonable diligence and that its admission would very probably lead to a different outcome. The applicant argued that the Tribunal drew adverse inferences from her evidence without justification and acted with apprehended bias. However, the court found that the Tribunal's findings were well-supported by the evidence and that the applicant's claims of bias were unfounded. The court held that the Tribunal was entitled to challenge the applicant's credibility and that its conclusions were not illogical or irrational.
Consequently, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and dismissed the applicant's application. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 5 September 2014 be set aside and that, in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:
(1) The application be dismissed.
(2) The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal was not satisfied that, in relation to this incident, the first respondent spoke directly to the police as she had claimed or that she had made herself known to the police or military in any way that singled her out for future harm. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the police or military went to her home or took her away for questioning or mistreatment in February 2012, or at any other time.Consideration In respect of both incidents, the notice of contention particularises the first respondent’s contention as follows:The Tribunal drew adverse inferences on credibility while none existed or based on pure speculation. It appeared that the Tribunal was intent on drawing negative inferences whatever response the first respondent gave bordering on demonstrating apprehended bias. This ground of contention is reflected in one of the grounds of review in the Federal Circuit Court, which the primary judge rejected. In my respectful view, the primary judge was correct to do so. In the course of submissions, I was referred to passages from the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal where the first respondent was questioned on the claimed incidents. Having considered the relevant passages of the transcript, in conjunction with the Tribunal’s reasons dealing with these claimed incidents, I am satisfied that it was open to the Tribunal to make the findings it did. Nothing in those passages sustains the contention that the Tribunal was intent on drawing negative inferences from whatever response the first respondent gave. The Tribunal was entitled to probe and challenge the first respondent’s evidence. It did not do so unfairly or in a way to suggest that it had a closed mind on those matters. The Tribunal’s findings in relation to these claimed incidents were based essentially on its assessment of the first respondent’s credibility after testing the evidence she gave and also after taking into account its general concerns about the first respondent’s credibility, which I have discussed above. The primary judge correctly remarked that the Tribunal’s conclusion that the first respondent was not credible is a finding of fact par excellence: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 58 ALD 609 at [67]. In its decision record, the Tribunal expressed its reasons for rejecting the first respondent’s evidence in relation to the incidents. No useful purpose would be served by me setting out those reasons here or by seeking to summarise them. As I have said, I am satisfied that it was open to the Tribunal to make the findings it did. The Tribunal’s findings in this regard are not illogical or irrational and the first respondent’s strong disagreement with the findings does not make them so. Moreover, in coming to its findings, it could not be said that the Tribunal was acting arbitrarily or capriciously. I reject the first respondent’s contention that the Tribunal’s adverse findings were based on inferences that could not be drawn or were based on pure speculation.