SZNJE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZNJE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 803

Appeal from: SZNJE & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3427
File number: NSD 1651 of 2015
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 13 July 2016
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – raising new arguments on appeal – same grounds previously abandoned – leave to raise new grounds refused

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – place at which a hearing is held – appearance by way of video link and telephone

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) ss 2A, 18C, 33A

Administrative Procedure Act 5 USC § 554(b), s 5(a)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 425, 429A, 441

Cases cited:

Ex parte Bourke (1898) 19 LR (NSW) 370

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929, (2001) 64 ALD 9

Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 59 ALJR 481

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTJF [2015] FCA 1052, (2015) 149 ALD 552

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKTI [2009] HCA 30, (2009) 238 CLR 489

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR [2003] FCA 126, (2003) 128 FCR 553

Re Murray and Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2012] AATA 450

Seymour v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] AATA 397

Sobey v Nicol [2007] FCAFC 136, (2007) 245 ALR 389

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35, (2007) 232 CLR 189

SZIAI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1372

SZLWE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1343

SZNJE v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3427

SZQZH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1251

SZUXI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1475

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158

Woodley v Woodley and Meldrum [1928] NZLR 465

Date of hearing: 11 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the First Appellant: The First Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Second Appellant: The Second Appellant was represented by the First Appellant
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms A Lucchese of Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1651 of 2015
BETWEEN:

SZNJE

First Appellant

SZNON

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 JULY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The Appellants are to pay the costs of the First Respondent.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The Appellants are husband and wife.  They are citizens of India.  The husband was born in 1987; the wife was born in 1986.

  2. They…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 803
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the Federal Circuit Court was an appeal brought by the appellants, a married couple, against a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The appellants, both of whom had been granted temporary protection visas, sought a review of the Tribunal's decision to refuse their application for a further extension of their visas. The appellants contended that the Tribunal had erred in refusing their requests for adjournment of the hearing and in holding that their appearance by way of video-link and telephone was not a breach of natural justice. The legal issues before the court included whether the refusal of the adjournment requests was unreasonable and whether the method of appearance by video-link and telephone was in breach of the appellants' right to a fair hearing.

The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in refusing the adjournment requests. The appellants had failed to demonstrate that the wife's pregnancy constituted an exceptional circumstance that would warrant a further adjournment. The court held that the Tribunal had acted reasonably in considering the medical evidence before it and in concluding that the wife's condition did not prevent her from attending the hearing. The court also found that the appellants' appearance by way of video-link and telephone was valid under the relevant provisions of the Migration Act. The court held that the use of these methods of appearance did not breach the appellants' right to a fair hearing, as they were authorised by statute and allowed the appellants to give evidence and present their arguments.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the first respondent. The court held that the appellants had failed to establish that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, and that the appeal was therefore without merit. The court further held that the costs order was appropriate given the nature and outcome of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellants are to pay the costs of the First Respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Second, the husband appearing by way of video-link and the wife by way of telephone were valid means of appearance authorised by s 429A of the Migration Act. Section 429A of the Act as it was then in force conferred a discretionary power to permit “the appearance by the applicant[s]” by one or other of the means there specified. Section 429A provided as follows:Oral evidence by telephone etc. For the purposes of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may allow the appearance by the applicant before the Tribunal, or the giving of evidence by the applicant or any other person, to be by: (a) telephone; or (b) closed-circuit television; or (c) any other means of communication.Section 441 at the time provided as follows: Sittings of the Refugee Review Tribunal(1)Sittings of the Tribunal are to be held from time to time as required, in such places in Australia as are convenient.(2)The Tribunal constituted by a member may sit and exercise the powers of the Tribunal even though the Tribunal constituted by another member is at the same time sitting and exercising those powers.Section 441(1) presumably was a direction that the convenience of the applicant (and his advisers) as well as that of the Tribunal and the Commonwealth Respondents were to be taken into account. Section 5(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act in the United States (5 USC § 554(b)) is, by way of contrast, more certain in its terms when it expressly provides in part as follows:In fixing the time and place for hearings, due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives.Since the incorporation of the Refugee Review Tribunal within the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in July 2015, it may be noted that ss 18C and 33A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) (the “Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act”) confer comparable powers to ss 441 and 429A respectively. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is also required to make itself “accessible” to its users: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, s 2A. It has been noted that although the Tribunal maintains registries in each State capital city and in Canberra, it will on occasion travel to regional centres to make itself accessible to applicants who have difficulty travelling. The Tribunal also retains a power to take evidence from an applicant “inside or outside Australia”, but the convenience of the applicant overseas must be balanced against any potential to “disrupt” the conduct of the hearing itself: Re Murray and Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2012] AATA 450 at [14]. To avoid the disruption of the Tribunal sitting overseas, there have been instances of the Tribunal exercising the power to take evidence from outside Australia by way of video-link, where it is in the interests of the administration of justice to do so: Seymour v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] AATA 397 at [79] to [80]. A person may nevertheless be denied a reasonable opportunity to be heard – and denied an opportunity to “appear” – where a hearing is held at a place that a party cannot attend: e.g., Ex parte Bourke (1898) 19 LR (NSW) 370; Woodley v Woodley and Meldrum [1928] NZLR 465.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Before the Tribunal, the Appellant husband appeared by way of video-link; the wife appeared by way of telephone. In recounting its reasons for refusing the second adjournment, the Tribunal concluded in relevant part as follows:20. The Tribunal initially invited both applicants to appear on 22 December 2014 to give evidence and present arguments. By way of a Response to the Hearing Invitation signed and dated 5 December 2014, both applicants had confirmed they would attend the hearing. Thereafter, two requests for postponement were received. The Tribunal granted the first request, and postponed the hearing to 7 January 2015. A further request for postponement was received on 2 January 2015, which was refused by the Tribunal. On both occasions, the ground relied upon for the request was that the wife was pregnant and due to give birth in late January 2015. Although the Tribunal agreed to grant the first postponement, it noted that the medical evidence indicated that the wife was subject to regular medical check-ups, and did not suggest that she could not attend a hearing. Therefore, the Tribunal refused to grant the request for a three month adjournment of the hearing (for both applicants), and scheduled the hearing for 7 January 2015. A further request for adjournment was made on 2 January 2015, however the medical evidence again did not suggest that she could not attend a hearing on 7 January 2015, and the Tribunal refused to again postpone the hearing, providing the same reasons. On 6 January 2015 the Tribunal was informed that the applicant would attend the hearing (which was scheduled by video link to the closest location to the applicants, Hay Hospital), but that the wife would not attend because she is pregnant and due to give birth at the end of January 2015. A Tribunal case officer telephoned the agent’s office and repeated that the hearing would not be postponed, but that the wife could give evidence by telephone if she wished.In rejecting the argument founded upon a wrongful refusal of an adjournment, the Federal Circuit Court Judge relevantly concluded:[9] … there is nothing before the Court to show that the condition of the wife applicant prevented her from having a real and meaningful opportunity to give evidence and present arguments. In my view, the assertions in the letter, coming from a person not medically qualified and without support from any qualified medical practitioner, must be given little weight. However, in my view, even if accepted, the assertions in the letter do not support the claim that the wife applicant was not in a position to have a real and meaningful opportunity to give evidence.Conclusion[10] For that reason, there was no breach by the Tribunal of its obligation to invite the applicants to attend a hearing to give evidence and to present arguments. Further, on the state of the material before the Tribunal, it was not unreasonable for it to refuse to grant an adjournment as requested by the applicants. The reason given by the Tribunal for its refusal was that the medical evidence before it did not establish that the wife applicant was unable to attend the hearing.[11] In my view, that was a reasonable basis for the refusal to adjourn the hearing and for that reason, the Tribunal did not fall into the error of unreasonably failing to exercise one of the powers given to it for the purposes of review. The power in this Court to review decisions of the Tribunal under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is such that the applicant must establish that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The applicants have failed to do that in this case and so the application must be dismissed.The grounds of appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established