FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CVG20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 689
ORDERS
QUD 144 of 2020 BETWEEN: CVG20
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
DERRINGTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 MARCH 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application to amend the notice of appeal is dismissed.
2.The application to adduce further evidence on the appeal is dismissed.
3.The appeal is dismissed.
4.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 689
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Authority's findings were illogical or irrational, which would vitiate the decision under section 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that the Authority's rejection of his claims was illogical because the LTTE knew where he attended school and he continued to attend there until 31 December 2006. The court considered the nature of administrative fact-finding and the applicable legal standards, ultimately concluding that the Authority's findings were not illogical or irrational. The court found that the Authority was entitled to rely on the evidence provided by the appellant, including his Pupil Record Sheet and visa application form, and that different minds might reach different conclusions on the evidence.
The court also dismissed the appellant's application to adduce additional evidence and raise new grounds of appeal. The court found that the proposed new evidence was unlikely to have made a difference to the outcome of the application and that the new grounds of appeal were devoid of merit. The court emphasised the importance of the existence of some merit in the proposed new ground as a necessary and often significant factor in the weighing process for allowing a new ground to be raised on appeal.
The final orders of the court were that the application to amend the notice of appeal and the application to adduce further evidence on the appeal were dismissed, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application to amend the notice of appeal is dismissed.
2. The application to adduce further evidence on the appeal is dismissed.
3. The appeal is dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The question is then: was the Authority illogical or irrational in rejecting the appellant’s claim that he was pursued by and evaded the LTTE on the basis that the LTTE members knew where he attended school and he continued to attend there until 31 December 2006?Was the Authority’s finding illogical or irrational? It must be kept steadily in mind that the process of administrative fact finding differs substantially to that engaged in by courts. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 656 [143], Gummow J identified the different approaches to fact finding in curial and administrative settings and, in doing so, referred to the observations of the joint judgment in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 282:Where facts are in dispute in civil litigation conducted under common law procedures, the court has to decide where, on the balance of probabilities, the truth lies as between the evidence the parties to the litigation have thought it in their respective interests to adduce at the trial. Administrative decision-making is of a different nature (Mahon v Air New Zealand Ltd [1984] AC 808 at 814). A whole range of possible approaches to decision-making in the particular circumstances of the case may be correct in the sense that their adoption by a delegate would not be an error of law. The administrative decision-maker is entitled to make a finding of fact based on the existence of some evidence, even if there exists other substantial evidence to the contrary. This has correlations in the area of jurisdictional error which might arise where, in the course of exercising power, the repository of that power has made a finding of fact based upon “no evidence”: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 359–360 per Mason J. Here, there existed evidence on which the Authority could rely for the purposes of concluding that the appellant had remained at school and attended classes until 31 December 2006. It was provided by the appellant in the Pupil Record Sheet and in his answers in the visa application form. That was more than sufficient for the Authority to make the finding it did. Even if the appellant’s oral evidence to the delegate was to the effect submitted by Mr Schipp, the Authority was not required to accept it. It was entitled to prefer the information in the documents provided to it. The nature of the illogicality or irrationality which might occur in a fact finding process and which might vitiate a subjective jurisdictional fact was considered in EHF17 at [76]–[85] and there is no need to repeat that discussion here. It sufficies to say that the words “irrational” or “illogical” have their ordinary meaning “of devoid of, or contrary to, logic; or ignorant or negligent of, and not in conformity with, the laws of correct reasoning (see: The Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed 1989, The Macquarie Dictionary 2nd ed. 1991), and are analogues of arbitrary or perverse”: WAHP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 87 at [7] per Lee J. The manner of assessing whether a conclusion or finding of fact is illogical or irrational was identified by Crennan and Bell JJ in SZMDS at 648 [131] where their Honours observed:What was involved here was an issue of jurisdictional fact upon which different minds might reach different conclusions. The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.