CVG20 v Minister for Home Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 38 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CVG20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 689

Appeal from: [Redacted] – see CVG20 v Minster for Home Affairs (No 2) [2020] FCA 690
File number: QUD 144 of 2020
Judge: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 18 March 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – alleged illogicality or irrationality in fact finding – whether vitiated state of satisfaction required for s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – no illogicality or irrationality
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 452

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 161 ALD 441

Chang v Neill [2019] VSCA 151

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1681

Fastbet Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No 5) [2019] FCA 2073

Han v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 331

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN (2016) 69 AAR 210

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224

MZZUQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 145 ALD 662

NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 7

SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 232 FCR 262

SZUYG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2040

University of Wollongong v Metwally (1985) 60 ALR 68

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

WAHP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 87

Date of hearing: 27 February 2020
Date of last submissions: 27 February 2020
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 77
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Schipp
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sydney West Legal and Migration
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr J Byrnes
Solicitor for the Respondents: MinterEllison

ORDERS

QUD 144 of 2020
BETWEEN:

CVG20

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application to amend the notice of appeal is dismissed.

2.The application to adduce further evidence on the appeal is dismissed.

3.The appeal is dismissed.

4.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read CVG20 v Minister for Home Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] FCA 689
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Tamil male of Hindu faith from the eastern province of Sri Lanka, sought a protection visa after arriving in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival. His application was refused, and the matter was referred to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Authority). The Authority rejected the appellant's claims of being forced to undertake military training with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and of evading the LTTE by hiding, concluding that the appellant's involvement with the LTTE was limited to attending school in 2005. The appellant sought to appeal the Authority's decision to the Federal Court, arguing that the Authority's findings were illogical or irrational and that he should be granted leave to adduce additional evidence and raise new grounds of appeal.

The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Authority's findings were illogical or irrational, which would vitiate the decision under section 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that the Authority's rejection of his claims was illogical because the LTTE knew where he attended school and he continued to attend there until 31 December 2006. The court considered the nature of administrative fact-finding and the applicable legal standards, ultimately concluding that the Authority's findings were not illogical or irrational. The court found that the Authority was entitled to rely on the evidence provided by the appellant, including his Pupil Record Sheet and visa application form, and that different minds might reach different conclusions on the evidence.

The court also dismissed the appellant's application to adduce additional evidence and raise new grounds of appeal. The court found that the proposed new evidence was unlikely to have made a difference to the outcome of the application and that the new grounds of appeal were devoid of merit. The court emphasised the importance of the existence of some merit in the proposed new ground as a necessary and often significant factor in the weighing process for allowing a new ground to be raised on appeal.

The final orders of the court were that the application to amend the notice of appeal and the application to adduce further evidence on the appeal were dismissed, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application to amend the notice of appeal is dismissed.

2. The application to adduce further evidence on the appeal is dismissed.

3. The appeal is dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

After instituting the appeal to this Court, the appellant obtained legal representation. He now seeks leave to adduce further evidence on appeal and to add new grounds which were not agitated before the primary judge. Background The appellant is a Tamil male of Hindu faith from the eastern province of Sri Lanka. He was born in the city of Sampur (sometimes spelt “Sampoor”), Trincomalee. He arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 8 November 2012. On 14 March 2016, he lodged an application for a Class XE, Subclass 790 Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). On 2 May 2018, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused the application. The matter was automatically referred to the Authority for consideration pursuant to Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Authority’s decision In broad terms, the appellant claimed to the Authority that he had been forced to undertake military training at the behest of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE), and that as a consequence he feared harm from the Sri Lankan authorities if he were to return to Sampur. The central focus of this appeal was the Authority’s findings at [13] of its reasons: The delegate asked the applicant if he was ever officially recruited to the LTTE to which he replied that he was not, however, when the conflict broke out again in April 2006, he claimed the LTTE requested he fight for them. He told the delegate that he had not complied with this request. The applicant claimed that he avoided any consequences of refusing to fight for the LTTE by hiding. He told the delegate that he would hide inside his house and avoid them and would sleep in the ceiling. He then later claimed in interview that he was captured by the LTTE but was able to escape and pay his way out of the LTTE controlled area. I am not satisfied this is credible. I consider that if the LTTE had of required the applicant to fight for them, they would have been able to easily locate him and forced him to do so, particularly as the LTTE were aware of which school he attended and he provided evidence that indicates he continued to attend classes until 31 December 2006. I am also concerned the applicant did not raise any claims of being captured by the LTTE, escaping and paying bribes to leave the area in his written statement. The evidence he presented at interview in relation to these incidents I find nebulous and vague. The delegate also raised credibility concerns regarding the applicant’s ability to avoid recruitment with the LTTE. Despite this, neither in interview or the post interview submission was further evidence provided to support these claims. The Authority was prepared to accept that the appellant may have undergone some form of compulsory combat training with the LTTE in 2005, but did not accept that he was called up to fight in 2006, or that he was captured by the LTTE and then escaped. It found that his only involvement with the LTTE was while he attended school in the period from October to December 2005.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ultimately, the weighing process in the exercise of the discretionary power to allow a new ground to be raised on appeal will vary from case to case and depend upon the particular circumstances. In any such deliberative process the existence of some merit in the proposed new ground is a necessary and often significant factor. Leave to adduce additional evidence on appeal In support of the application for leave to raise a new ground on appeal, the appellant also sought leave to adduce evidence which was not before the primary judge. In part, that evidence consisted of the full text of an article (written by a Col R Hariharan (retd)) which had been referenced by the appellant in his written submissions to the Authority. The point sought to be made from the article was that from early September 2006 the Sri Lankan army had taken control of the Sampur district in Sri Lanka where the appellant had lived and attended school. The appellant was not represented before the FCC and it seems he is not fluent in English. It was also apparent that he had little understanding of the process before the FCC, the need to adduce evidence at that time or, if he was so aware of it, how that evidence might be adduced. The Minister correctly submitted that in order to adduce new evidence on the appeal two grounds must be shown to exist: s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth); NASB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24 at [42]; namely:(1)the party seeking to adduce the evidence must show that it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been adduced at the trial; and(2)the evidence must be such that very probably the result would have been different. In relation to migration matters it has been recognised that the Court is concerned with whether the fresh evidence will bear upon the jurisdictional error which is alleged: MZZUQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 145 ALD 662 at [24] per Gilmour J. The substance of the Minister’s opposition to the granting of leave to adduce new evidence was, firstly, that it is unlikely that its reception at the hearing before the FCC would have made any difference to the outcome of the application. Second, the Minister submitted that the new grounds of appeal are so devoid of merit that leave should not be granted to allow them to be raised and, it follows, the proposed new evidence should also be rejected.Contextualising the factual issues The appellant’s recourse to assertions of unreasonableness or irrationality in the written submission and in oral address was lacking any contextual framework. It seemed to be submitted that a jurisdictional error arose simply by reason of the making of such errors. Indeed, the appellant sought to rely upon the modern iteration of “Wednesbury unreasonableness” as articulated by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332. However, that case concerned the question of unreasonableness, illogicality or irrationality in the exercise of a power and, in particular, a discretionary power. There is no equivalence in the present matter.

Decision

Reasons for decision

He arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 8 November 2012. On 14 March 2016, he lodged an application for a Class XE, Subclass 790 Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). On 2 May 2018, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused the application. The matter was automatically referred to the Authority for consideration pursuant to Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Authority’s decision In broad terms, the appellant claimed to the Authority that he had been forced to undertake military training at the behest of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE), and that as a consequence he feared harm from the Sri Lankan authorities if he were to return to Sampur. The central focus of this appeal was the Authority’s findings at [13] of its reasons: The delegate asked the applicant if he was ever officially recruited to the LTTE to which he replied that he was not, however, when the conflict broke out again in April 2006, he claimed the LTTE requested he fight for them. He told the delegate that he had not complied with this request. The applicant claimed that he avoided any consequences of refusing to fight for the LTTE by hiding. He told the delegate that he would hide inside his house and avoid them and would sleep in the ceiling. He then later claimed in interview that he was captured by the LTTE but was able to escape and pay his way out of the LTTE controlled area. I am not satisfied this is credible. I consider that if the LTTE had of required the applicant to fight for them, they would have been able to easily locate him and forced him to do so, particularly as the LTTE were aware of which school he attended and he provided evidence that indicates he continued to attend classes until 31 December 2006. I am also concerned the applicant did not raise any claims of being captured by the LTTE, escaping and paying bribes to leave the area in his written statement. The evidence he presented at interview in relation to these incidents I find nebulous and vague. The delegate also raised credibility concerns regarding the applicant’s ability to avoid recruitment with the LTTE. Despite this, neither in interview or the post interview submission was further evidence provided to support these claims. The Authority was prepared to accept that the appellant may have undergone some form of compulsory combat training with the LTTE in 2005, but did not accept that he was called up to fight in 2006, or that he was captured by the LTTE and then escaped. It found that his only involvement with the LTTE was while he attended school in the period from October to December 2005. The Authority accepted that he had travelled from Sri Lanka to Qatar in 2007 for work purposes and that he remained there working as a labourer and a painter for just under two years. He had travelled to Qatar on his own passport and re-entered Sri Lanka via the international airport in Colombo. On neither occasion did he encounter any difficulties with the authorities. That suggested he was neither known by the authorities nor had a profile that warranted adverse attention by the security forces.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The question is then: was the Authority illogical or irrational in rejecting the appellant’s claim that he was pursued by and evaded the LTTE on the basis that the LTTE members knew where he attended school and he continued to attend there until 31 December 2006?Was the Authority’s finding illogical or irrational? It must be kept steadily in mind that the process of administrative fact finding differs substantially to that engaged in by courts. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 656 [143], Gummow J identified the different approaches to fact finding in curial and administrative settings and, in doing so, referred to the observations of the joint judgment in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 282:Where facts are in dispute in civil litigation conducted under common law procedures, the court has to decide where, on the balance of probabilities, the truth lies as between the evidence the parties to the litigation have thought it in their respective interests to adduce at the trial. Administrative decision-making is of a different nature (Mahon v Air New Zealand Ltd [1984] AC 808 at 814). A whole range of possible approaches to decision-making in the particular circumstances of the case may be correct in the sense that their adoption by a delegate would not be an error of law. The administrative decision-maker is entitled to make a finding of fact based on the existence of some evidence, even if there exists other substantial evidence to the contrary. This has correlations in the area of jurisdictional error which might arise where, in the course of exercising power, the repository of that power has made a finding of fact based upon “no evidence”: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 359–360 per Mason J. Here, there existed evidence on which the Authority could rely for the purposes of concluding that the appellant had remained at school and attended classes until 31 December 2006. It was provided by the appellant in the Pupil Record Sheet and in his answers in the visa application form. That was more than sufficient for the Authority to make the finding it did. Even if the appellant’s oral evidence to the delegate was to the effect submitted by Mr Schipp, the Authority was not required to accept it. It was entitled to prefer the information in the documents provided to it. The nature of the illogicality or irrationality which might occur in a fact finding process and which might vitiate a subjective jurisdictional fact was considered in EHF17 at [76]–[85] and there is no need to repeat that discussion here. It sufficies to say that the words “irrational” or “illogical” have their ordinary meaning “of devoid of, or contrary to, logic; or ignorant or negligent of, and not in conformity with, the laws of correct reasoning (see: The Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed 1989, The Macquarie Dictionary 2nd ed. 1991), and are analogues of arbitrary or perverse”: WAHP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 87 at [7] per Lee J. The manner of assessing whether a conclusion or finding of fact is illogical or irrational was identified by Crennan and Bell JJ in SZMDS at 648 [131] where their Honours observed:What was involved here was an issue of jurisdictional fact upon which different minds might reach different conclusions. The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.