BRL17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 47 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BRL17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1083   

Appeal from: BRL17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 1086
File number(s): VID 627 of 2023
Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J
Date of judgment: 5 September 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from dismissal of an application for judicial review of a decision not to grant a protection visa – where applications made for leave to adduce additional evidence and advance new grounds of appeal – where Tribunal failed to consider a post-interview submission which was not provided to the Tribunal due to administrative error – where Tribunal had regard to country information which post-dated information relied on in the post-interview submission – whether Tribunal breached s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by not giving the appellant an opportunity to address specific concerns regarding his credibility – whether it was open to the Tribunal to make adverse credibility findings in circumstances of delay between hearing and decision – whether Tribunal’s findings legally unreasonable – whether Tribunal made jurisdictional error – Held: leave to raise new grounds allowed in part; appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 65, 425

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.05

Cases cited:

AZAAD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 156; 189 FCR 494

BRH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 74

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146

DBWG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 3; 301 FCR 344

DGS18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 982

EIJ20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1429

Huynh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 153; 283 FCR 451

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Applicant A125 of 2003 [2007] FCAFC162; 163 FCR 285

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

MZYNN [2012] FCA 1177; BDW15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 2742

NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470

NASB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152

SZJUB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1486

Tohi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 125; 285 FCR 187

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 92
Date of last submission/s: 20 March 2025
Date of hearing: 19 March 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Krohn
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BRL17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] FCA 1083
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in BRL17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship was brought by an applicant for a protection visa against the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. The dispute centered around the applicant's contention that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) had failed to consider relevant information, specifically a post-interview submission that was not provided to the Tribunal due to an administrative error. The Federal Court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's failure to consider the post-interview submission amounted to a jurisdictional error and if the Tribunal's findings were legally unreasonable. Additionally, the court needed to decide if the Tribunal had breached the applicant's right to procedural fairness under section 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court examined the procedural history and the Tribunal's reasoning in affirming the delegate's decision to refuse the application for a protection visa. It was found that the Tribunal did not have the post-interview submission at the time of the hearing, which contained crucial information regarding the applicant's claims of persecution. The primary judge had concluded that the Tribunal's error in not considering the post-interview submission was not material because the issues it raised were covered in the Tribunal's reasons. The court further noted that the Tribunal had relied on country information that post-dated the information in the post-interview submission, thus mitigating the impact of the error. The court also addressed the issue of adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal, considering the delay between the hearing and the decision. Ultimately, the court found that the Tribunal's findings were not legally unreasonable and no jurisdictional error was made.

The court allowed the application for leave to adduce additional evidence and to rely on a proposed amended notice of appeal in relation to the proposed Ground 1, but denied leave for other new grounds. The appeal was dismissed with costs to be assessed if not agreed. The court also made an order to amend the name of the first respondent to "Minister for Immigration and Citizenship" and extended the time to file a notice of appeal to 26 July 2023.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2. To the extent necessary, the time to file a notice of appeal be extended to 26 July 2023.

3. The application for leave to adduce additional evidence on the appeal be allowed.

4. Leave be granted to rely on a proposed amended notice of appeal in relation to proposed Ground 1, but otherwise be refused.

5. The appeal be dismissed with costs, such costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I will address the procedural history and then the respective decisions of the Tribunal and the Primary Court culminating in this appeal, before addressing the grounds raised by the Amended Notice of Appeal. For convenience, I will refer to the applicant and would be appellant as the appellant throughout, notwithstanding that in the earlier proceedings he was the applicant.PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The delegate’s decision On 26 November 2013, the appellant attended an interview with a delegate. On 9 December 2013, the appellant’s migration agent sent a post-interview submission to the delegate. Broadly, the following four topics were addressed in the post-interview submission:(1)the appellant believed he was targeted because he was suspected of being linked to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by members of the Karuna group, a paramilitary group described as being allied to Sri Lanka’s security forces, that is, the army and the police; (2)the appellant was at risk of persecution on return because he was suspected of having links to the LTTE; (3)the appellant was at risk of persecution on return because he was a failed asylum seeker; and (4)there was nowhere within Sri Lanka to which the appellant could safely relocate if he was returned. The information included in the post-interview submission was in the main based on country information that ranged in date from October 2010 to May 2013. On 17 November 2014, the appellant’s application for a protection visa was refused by the delegate. The proceeding in the Tribunal On 5 December 2014, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. On 31 March 2016, the appellant was invited to, and attended, a hearing before the Tribunal. The appellant was represented by his registered migration agent at that hearing. The appellant was also assisted by an interpreter. As a result of an administrative oversight, the Tribunal was not supplied with a copy of the post-interview submission that the appellant had provided to the delegate. The post-interview submission informs Ground 1 of the Amended Notice of Appeal. For the purpose of his interlocutory applications, the appellant relies on a transcription of an audio recording of the hearing before the Tribunal on 31 March 2016 which has been prepared by the appellant’s solicitors. The transcript is annexed to the affidavit of Lisa Marie Quinn, solicitor, affirmed on 14 March 2025. I note that a partial transcript was annexed to an earlier affidavit of Ms Quinn affirmed on 26 February 2025. The later transcript relevantly contains the introductory remarks made by the Tribunal whereas the earlier transcript did not. In referring to the transcript in these reasons, I am referring to the later, more fulsome transcription of the audio recording of the hearing before the Tribunal. In doing so, I note that in this later and more fulsome transcription, there are sections which have been described as “inaudible” which have not been transcribed. The Minister does not object to the affidavits annexing the transcripts.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 27 March 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate (Tribunal decision or T). Judicial review proceeding in the Primary Court On 20 April 2017, the appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The appellant relied on two unparticularised grounds of review: first, that the decision of the Tribunal was affected by an error of law; and secondly, that he had been denied procedural fairness. The primary judge noted that the grounds of review had no particularity and described them as “somewhat meaningless as they stand”: PJ[55]. The primary judge noted that at the hearing, the primary judge had asked the appellant (who was not legally represented) to elaborate on the grounds of review and his application generally. The primary judge summarised the appellant’s response as follows:[55] … He said to me that he is not sure about what error of law there was, but that the decision was contrary to what he did say, though he does not know why. [56]I asked the applicant to expand on this, and he said that he had told the AAT that, after 2007, he could not stay in one place, but they said that he was in the area. He said that the AAT said that he was contacted by phone, but he had told them that he was contacted by other means as well, and he told them that he was attacked at the bus stop, and this did not seem to be accepted.[57]He said that the AAT had repeatedly talked about there being no evidence, but he said that he was not ever asked to give evidence, and that if he was asked he would have gotten evidence, but he was not asked. [58]He said that, because the AAT missed these issues, the overall tale that was told became diminished and the seriousness of his situation was not fully understood. He said that he just knows that something is wrong; he cannot pinpoint what it is because he does not know if it is an interpreter issue, but he just knows that it is wrong. The primary judge concluded that the appellant’s claims “really have very little merit”: PJ[59]. The primary judge found that the Tribunal had correctly summarised the appellant’s claims as to what had occurred, but that the Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s claims: PJ[59]. In short, the primary judge noted that the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant’s account was truthful: PJ[61]. In the hearing before the primary judge, the appellant submitted that he was not asked by the Tribunal to give evidence and that he would have put on evidence had he been asked to do so: PJ[57]. The primary judge noted that, at each step of the process, the appellant had been asked for evidence and the appellant had plenty of time within which to provide evidence, especially given the long delays between each of the procedural steps in the process: PJ[62]-[63]. The primary judge concluded that the appellant had not established either of the grounds of review: PJ[64]. The primary judge then referred to the post-interview submission at PJ[65]-[66], noting that it had been omitted from the materials provided to the Tribunal:[65] The Minister, in his role as the model litigant, has pointed out to the Court that the post-interview submission was not given by the Secretary to the AAT when the AAT was looking at this matter. That submission is found at CB 106 to 109, and it covers a number of submissions and country information. It seems to me that all of the matters that were raised in that submission were covered, and covered extensively, by the AAT in its reasons.[66] Therefore, there is no materiality to the error of the AAT of failing to consider this particular submission.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For completeness, as I have said, I will admit the joint note provided by the parties on 20 March 2025 which clarified a transcription issue raised during the course of the hearing on the interlocutory application but not on the appeal proper (see paragraph [15] above).CONSIDERATIONGround 1: Post-interview submission which was not provided to the Tribunal As mentioned, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision (T[31]), but in doing so, did not have a copy of the post-interview submission that had been before the delegate. Ground 1 reflects the issue raised before the primary judge in relation to the post-interview submission which the primary judge addressed at PJ[65]-[66], extracted above. I have addressed the issue of leave to raise this ground above. Ground 1 alleges error on the part of the primary judge in concluding that the Tribunal’s error in failing to consider the post-interview submission, which it did not have, and which was relevant, was not a material error, and that therefore the Tribunal’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. The primary judge’s conclusion that the error was not material was informed by his Honour’s assessment of the Tribunal’s reasons which led his Honour to conclude that the topics raised in the post-interview submission were in fact covered by the Tribunal in its reasons in any event, even though the post-interview submission was not provided to the Tribunal: PJ[65]-[66]. It is not in dispute that the post-interview submission was not provided to the Tribunal even though it should have been as a document relevant to the review of the delegate’s decision in accordance with s 418(3) of the Act (which has since been repealed). As mentioned, it appears that the post-interview submission was not provided as the result of an administrative error. As noted by the primary judge, the Minister, consistently with the role of a model litigant, drew to the primary judge’s attention the fact that the post-interview submission had not been provided to the Tribunal: PJ[65]. By this ground, the appellant raises an issue which was raised before the primary judge, albeit by the Minister. The primary judge accepted the Minister’s submission on this point, namely that the issues addressed in the appellant’s post-interview submission were covered by the Tribunal in its reasons. In the result, the primary judge was satisfied that the Tribunal’s failure to have regard to the post-interview submission, although an error, was not material: PJ[65]-[66]. The relevant principles in relation to a third party breach of the obligation in s 418(3) of the Act were summarised as follows by Burley J in EIJ20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1429 at [33]-[34]:[33]There is consistent authority for the proposition that there are limited circumstances in which a third party breach, not known to the Tribunal, may result in jurisdictional error. In SZOIN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 38; 191 FCR 123 at [59]–[66] the Full Court (Bennett and McKerracher JJ, Rares J agreeing at [90]) found that in the absence of a contention that a part of the process has been tainted by fraud or that the action of the Secretary was other than inadvertent, a breach of s 418(3) will not amount to a jurisdictional error. That decision was recently followed in Ashraf v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 50; 261 FCR 97 where the Full Court (Tracey, Mortimer and Moshinsky JJ) found that it was not plainly wrong, and should be followed (at [63], [64]).[34] In BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 61; 248 FCR 159 at [92]–[107], the Full Court (Griffiths, Kerr and Farrell JJ) considered a similar contention. After reviewing the authorities, including SZOIN, the Court concluded:(a)that a breach of s 418(3) will not of itself found jurisdictional error in the Tribunal, absent the taint to which the court in SZOIN referred (at [93]).(b) however, it is a failure to comply with s 425 of the Act if the failure to provide information causes the Tribunal, even innocently, to mislead an applicant to mistakenly believe that a state of affairs exists and that in turn affects the manner in which the case is conducted to the applicant’s detriment (at [106]).