Huynh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Huynh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2020] FCAFC 153

Appeal from: Huynh and Anor v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 3693
File number(s): VID 15 of 2020
Judgment of: REEVES, BROMWICH AND ANDERSON  JJ
Date of judgment: 18 September 2020
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – whether there was a denial of procedural fairness in one Federal Circuit Court Judge relying on draft reasons of another Federal Circuit Judge – whether Tribunal misconstrued or misapplied s 5F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether there was a denial of procedural fairness in failing to disclose to the appellant certain material available to the Tribunal which might have disclosed maker of certain allegations

MIGRATION – no denial of procedural fairness which was sufficiently material to constitute jurisdictional error – when Tribunal’s reasons are fairly read, Tribunal conducted an evaluative assessment which did not represent a misinterpretation or misapplication of s 5F – no appellable error demonstrated – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5F, 357A, 362A, 375A

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 1.15A

Cases cited:

Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd [2018] FCAFC 93

Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38

Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow (2019) 372 ALR 555

Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees Pty Ltd (No. 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833

Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

He v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 206

Kazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian; In the Matter of Frontier Architects Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2011] FCAFC 136

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534

Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Angkawijaya [2016] FCAFC 5

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164

Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72

Parvin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another [2019] FCAFC 86

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1

Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679

Snedden v Minister for Justice for the Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCAFC 156

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 103
Date of hearing: 8 July 2020
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr Angel Aleksov
Solicitor for the Appellants: WLW Migration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Nick Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice
Table of Corrections
20 July 2021 In [28], deleted “[11]” and replaced with “[9]”; in [80], deleted “breech” and replaced with “breach” in square bracketed…
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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Huynh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, Ms Huynh, sought to challenge a decision made by the Tribunal in relation to her application for a visa. The primary issues before the court involved allegations of procedural unfairness and misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. Specifically, the appellant contended that the Tribunal had misapplied section 5F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and failed to disclose certain material which might have revealed the maker of certain allegations against her.

The court began by examining whether there was a denial of procedural fairness when the Federal Circuit Court Judge relied on the draft reasons of another judge. The court found that the reliance on draft reasons did not constitute a denial of procedural fairness as the primary judge had clearly stated that any errors or infelicities were his alone. This was confirmed by the court's review of the primary judge’s reasons, which demonstrated that the judgment was an independent exercise of judicial function.

Further, the court assessed whether the Tribunal had misconstrued or misapplied section 5F of the Migration Act. The court held that the Tribunal's reasons, when fairly read, indicated that it conducted an evaluative assessment that did not represent a misinterpretation or misapplication of the statutory provisions. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was based on a proper understanding of the statutory criteria and did not contain any error that warranted an appeal.

Finally, the court considered whether the Tribunal's failure to disclose certain material constituted a denial of procedural fairness. The appellant argued that had she known about the "dob in" information, she could have taken steps to discredit it. However, the court found that even if there was a procedural error, it did not result in a material prejudice that would have altered the outcome of the decision. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the amended notice of appeal filed by leave was otherwise dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the Minister’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to rely upon ground of appeal 2(b) is refused.

2. The amended notice of appeal filed by leave on 8 July 2020 is otherwise dismissed.

3. The appellant will pay the Minister’s costs of and incidental to the appeal to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In short, the appellant put her case on ground 2(a) on the basis that “[t]he Tribunal … should be understood as saying … one criterion, and one criterion only, was [not satisfied], s 5F(2)(b)”. For the reasons set out above, that submission fails. Was there error in the primary judgment? The exercise of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is governed by Division 2 of Part III of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). It involves an appeal by way of rehearing: Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees Pty Ltd (No. 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833; 117 FCR 424 (Branir) at [20] per Allsop J (as his Honour then was), with Drummond and Mansfield JJ agreeing; see also Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd [2018] FCAFC 93; 261 FCR 301 (Aldi) at [1] to [10] per Allsop CJ and at [45] per Perram J. The task of the appellate court is to conduct a “real review” of the trial and the primary judge’s reasons: Lee v Lee [2019] HCA 28; 266 CLR 129 at [55] per Bell, Gageler, Nettle and Edelman JJ (citing Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118 at 126-127 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ and Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; 90 ALJR 679 at 686). The “task of a court on an appeal by way of rehearing is the correction of error”: Branir at [22]. If the appellate court is to vary or reverse the decision of the primary judge, it is necessary for the appellate court to demonstrate error in the primary judge’s findings or conclusion: Branir at [21]. Given the matters set out above, there is no error disclosed by a review of the primary judge’s reasons at [30] (extracted at [17] above), which considered whether the Tribunal misconstrued or misapplied s 5F(2)(b) of the Migration Act. It follows that there is no appellable error and ground 2(a) must be rejected.Disposition of Ground 2(a) For these reasons, ground 2(a) is dismissedGROUND 2(B): WAS THERE A DIFFERENT DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS?The appellant’s submissions The appellant by ground 2(b) complains that the Tribunal failed to comply with the requirements of procedural fairness in that the Tribunal did not notify the appellant of the certification by the Minister that s 375A of the Migration Act applied to certain documents that were before the Tribunal. The appellant further submits that the certificate was not valid because it did not state on its face any reasons which would support a claim for confidentiality on public interest grounds. The appellant submits that the certificate information contained highly prejudicial allegations sourced from an anonymous “dob in” informant. Those allegations were said to be to the effect that the appellant was actually married to a different person and that the Sponsor was actually married to another woman who was the mother of his children. The appellant submits that the “dob in” information (being a “Job Details Report” dated 1 August 2013) contained highly prejudicial allegations and, had the appellant known of the “dob in” information, the appellant could have taken steps to discredit the reliability of the source of that information. The appellant submits that the Tribunal’s error was material in that, had the existence of the certificate and the “dob in” information been known to the appellant, it might realistically have been used by the appellant to persuade the Tribunal to make a different decision.Minister’s submissions

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submits that it is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether the judgment below is affected by procedural unfairness. That is because, even if it was, that would not cause this Court to grant the appellant the relief sought as a consequence. It was said that any unfairness that was occasioned to the appellant by Judge Burchardt relying on Judge Wilson’s draft reasons in preparing his own judgment, will be cured by this Court determining the success or failure of the other grounds of appeal.Consideration of ground 1 There is nothing in the reasons or conduct of the primary judge which would support this ground of appeal. This is so for the following reasons. The appellant’s written submissions did not cite any authority which would support the appellant’s contention under ground 1. The appellant’s submissions did not argue that the relevant circumstances evinced any relevant bias on the part of the primary judge. The appellant’s submissions were directed to whether the impugned circumstances entailed a breach of what is commonly referred to as “the hearing rule”. Broadly speaking, the rules of procedural fairness do not have an immutably fixed content (see Snedden v Minister for Justice for the Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCAFC 156 [175]-[178]; 230 FCR 82 (per Middleton and Wigney JJ) (Snedden) citing Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38; 295 ALR 638 at [156]). What will be both sufficient and necessary to ensure a fair hearing in any given case will depend on, and vary with, the context in which a decision maker acts, including any statutory or regulatory requirements or considerations (see Snedden at [177] and the various High Court authorities cited there). The content of procedural fairness is flexible and adaptable to the circumstances of the particular case and must be approached on the basis of what is reasonable (Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 (Kioa) at 627) and necessary to avoid “practical injustice” (see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1 at [37]-[38]). What is required by procedural fairness is a fair hearing, not a fair outcome (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152 at [25] (per Gleeson CJ and Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ)). The primary judge recorded in his reasons for judgment (Reasons), as a preliminary matter, the following (at [1]):I should make an acknowledgement at the outset. In preparing these reasons for judgment in respect of grounds 1-8, I have had the considerable benefit of draft reasons for judgment prepared by Justice Wilson prior to his appointment to the Family Court. With his Honour’s permission I have relied extensively on those draft reasons in preparing this judgment. Self-evidently, it is my judgment and all errors and infelicities are mine alone. (Emphasis added.) As the primary judge observed in the last sentence of [1] (emphasised by way of italicised text above), the judgment “and all errors and infelicities” are the primary judge’s alone. That is demonstrated by a consideration of the balance of the reasons where the primary judge identified the matter which was the subject of judicial review, narrated the factual background, recorded the relevant findings in the Tribunal’s reasons and then, dealing with ground 1 of the judicial review grounds (grounds 2 to 8 having been abandoned on appeal and grounds 9 and 10 having not been before Judge Wilson on judicial review), concluded the following in relation to that ground (at [30]):It seems to me that in relation to this ground the Tribunal made no error. It was required to examine a domestic relationship between the applicant and the sponsor against considerations set out in section 5F of the [Migration Act] and ref 1.15A of the Regulations. The concept of exclusivity was one consideration. I reject the contention urged by the applicant that in undertaking that task the Tribunal somehow adopted “the fairy-tale or Hollywood notice of a happy marriage” as appeared in the wording of this ground. In my view the Tribunal was entitled to reach the conclusion that it reached in relation to the concept of “exclusive”. The evidence revealed that the [S]ponsor fathered two children with [another person, Ms Le] at a time he was married to the [first appellant]. It was true that the sponsor was not married to Ms Le at that time and so the [S]ponsor was not concurrently married to two persons. However, in fathering two children to Ms Le, it could scarcely be said that the sponsor was simultaneously committed exclusively to his union with the applicant. In my view the applicant’s creative and unrealistic characterisation of the facts of this case was misdirected. In my view the Tribunal made no error in the manner suggested under ground one. This ground is devoid of merit. (Bold, italicised text added for emphasis.)