Bej15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 52 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BEJ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1033

Appeal from: BEJ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 25
File number: QUD 82 of 2016
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 26 August 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a Refugee Review Tribunal decision – whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to find the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error – whether the Federal Circuit Court took into account an incorrect and misleading representation or submission made by counsel for the Minister – whether the Federal Circuit Court failed to take into account a relevant consideration

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application to adduce evidence on appeal – whether the appellant could show, with reasonable diligence, that the evidence could not be adduced at trial – whether the evidence was such that very probably the result would have been different

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510; [1999] HCA 14

ACC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 97

BEJ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 25

BEV15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 507

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTQS [2015] FCA 1069

NASB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 24

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63

SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 404; [2015] FCAFC 175

Date of hearing: 4 May 2016 and 29 June 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 47
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Beehre
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B McGlade
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

QUD 82 of 2016
BETWEEN:

BEJ15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application filed on 14 June 2016 is dismissed.

2.The appeal is dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

REEVES J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant has appealed from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court:  see BEJ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 25 (BEJ15).  These reasons address an application filed by the appellant to adduce evidence on this appeal and the substantive appeal.

  2. The appellant’s notice of appeal has been amended on several occasions.  In its final amended form, it set out two grounds as follows:

    1.The Federal Circuit Court erred in failing…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Bej15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1033
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Bej15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant challenged the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss his application for judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The core of the dispute revolved around the application of the complementary protection provisions under section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act, specifically concerning whether the appellant would face significant harm if returned to Sri Lanka, including the time he would spend in jail awaiting bail.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Circuit Court erred by not identifying a jurisdictional error made by the Tribunal, and if the Court had improperly considered misleading submissions from the Minister's counsel. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the Federal Circuit Court overlooked a relevant consideration in its decision-making process. The central issue was whether the Tribunal properly identified and addressed the necessity of a surety for the appellant's bail, which was crucial in assessing the risk of significant harm upon his return to Sri Lanka.

The court's reasoning highlighted that the Tribunal failed to discuss with the appellant the necessity of providing a surety for bail, which was an important issue for determining the likelihood of the appellant receiving bail. This oversight meant that the Tribunal did not allow the appellant to present evidence or make submissions on this critical issue. The Federal Circuit Court acknowledged this oversight but concluded that it did not amount to a jurisdictional error. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that it had been misled by the Minister's counsel. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed on 14 June 2016 is dismissed.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which dismissed an application for judicial review of a Refugee Review Tribunal decision. The central issue in the case is the application of the complementary protection provisions of s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act to the appellant, Bej15. The provisions are relevant to whether there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the appellant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm. The significance of the time the returnee would remain in jail awaiting bail was a critical factor in determining if it amounted to significant harm. The Federal Circuit Court found that the Tribunal had not adequately discussed with the appellant and his representative the issue of the availability of a surety, which was necessary for the appellant's release on bail. This was despite the Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant would not face an extended period of imprisonment due to the short term nature of the imprisonment on remand.

The case originated as an application to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal. In the original application, the appellant raised seven grounds of review, but at the hearing, he abandoned all but the first two grounds. The first ground was that the tribunal committed jurisdictional error by not complying with s 425(1) of the Act, particularly in relation to the assumption that someone would be able and willing to provide the surety required for the appellant’s bail. The second ground was that the tribunal failed to address whether the detention of the appellant on remand in Sri Lanka would amount to degrading treatment or punishment and cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for judicial review, leading to the appellant's appeal to the higher court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Thirdly, it is important to note that, for present purposes, the central issue was the application of the complementary protection provisions of s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act to the appellant. Those provisions are directed to whether there are substantial grounds for believing that “as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the [appellant] being removed from Australia to [Sri Lanka], there is a real risk that [he] will suffer significant harm”. Thus, because of the distinction adverted to above, it was not the prosecution that was relevant, but rather whether the time that the returnee would remain in jail awaiting bail amounted to significant harm.THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT In the appellant’s original application to the Federal Circuit Court, he raised seven grounds of review. However, at the hearing of his application, he abandoned all but the first two of those grounds. The remaining two grounds were as follows:1. The tribunal committed jurisdictional error in that it failed to comply with s 425(1) of the Act. Particulars The Tribunal found that the applicant “may be placed in the remand section of Negombo prison” and would remain there “until a bail hearing is available”The Tribunal said that bail “is routinely given”, but qualified that statement by finding that “a family member is also required to provide surety”The Tribunal concluded that it is not satisfied that “due to the short term nature of the imprisonment on remand that the applicant will face a real chance of serious harm while held on remand”The tribunal also concluded “the evidence before the tribunal too does not suggest the he is without any relative able to provide surety” and “as such there is no real chance that the applicant will face an extended period of imprisonment”: thereby implicitly concluding or assuming that someone would be able and willing to provide the surety required for the applicant’s bail. It was only on that basis that the Tribunal could have concluded that the applicant would be released after a few days on bail. The “issues arising in relation to the decision under review” therefore included whether the applicant or his family or someone else would be able and willing to provide the surety required for the applicant’s bail so as to cause him to be released from the overcrowded prison2. The tribunal failed to address an issue which arose on the material before it being whether the detention of the applicant on remand in Sri Lanka in the prison conditions prevalent there would be degrading treatment or punishment and cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment. As to ground one, the Federal Circuit Court Judge noted that “[b]efore the delegate, it was assumed that the applicant would simply be given bail. There is no reference to the need for a surety from another person to secure a grant of bail”. This led his Honour to the following conclusions about the surety issue:32. In my view, however, the first respondent’s submissions frame the relevant issue too broadly. The existence of a person willing and able to provide the necessary surety was an issue arising on the review that did not exist before the first respondent’s delegate. It was an important issue because, without a finding that there was some person willing to provide the necessary surety, the tribunal could not have found that the applicant was likely to get bail following his arrest and detention upon re-entry to Sri Lanka. The finding about the availability of such a person was, I am satisfied, a link in the chain of reasoning that led the tribunal to determine that the applicant would not suffer significant harm if he was detained upon return to Sri Lanka. Moreover, it was not a conclusion that would obviously be open on the known material before the tribunal. 33. It was, in those circumstances, incumbent upon the tribunal to bring that issue to the attention of the applicant so as to permit him to give evidence and make submissions about that issue. Thus, the critical question for the purposes of this application is whether the tribunal did that.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On the second ground of appeal, the Minister submitted there was no basis, on the face of the Federal Circuit Court Judge’s reasons, to conclude that his Honour was in any way misled by the submissions made by his counsel.CONSIDERATIONThe application to adduce evidence on the appeal and the first ground of appeal To meet the second condition for the admission of the Tribunal hearing transcript as evidence on this appeal, the appellant needs to show that “very probably the result would have been different” before the Federal Circuit Court if that transcript had been available. A higher level of probability is usually required to meet this condition (see at [5] above). It is appropriate to begin with the reasons in BEJ15. It is apparent from those reasons that, in the absence of the transcript, the Federal Circuit Court Judge inferred from the Tribunal’s reasons that the Tribunal had discussed with the appellant and his representative “the country information that it had as to the likely prosecution, likelihood of bail, time spent on remand and likely fine” (see at [28(37)] above). Conversely, his Honour was not able to infer from its reasons that the Tribunal “did not raise the issue of the availability of a surety with the [appellant]” (see at [28(37)] above). This became an issue before the Federal Circuit Court Judge because, as his Honour correctly observed (see at [26(32)]), the Delegate did not mention that there was a need for someone to provide a surety before a person would be released on bail. This is apparent from the Delegate’s decision where he said: “even if the [appellant] was held for a short time in a Sri Lankan prison while arranging to be released on bail,” (see at [12] above). Because of this failure to specifically mention the surety issue, it was, as the Federal Circuit Court Judge also correctly observed, “incumbent upon the tribunal to bring that issue to the attention of the [appellant] so as to permit him to give evidence and make submissions about that issue” (see at [27(33)] above). In making this observation, his Honour was reflecting the obligations imposed on the Tribunal by s 425 of the Act. More specifically, his Honour was reflecting the content of those obligations as described by the High Court in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63 (SZBEL) as follows (at [35]):The Tribunal is not confined to whatever may have been the issues that the delegate considered. The issues that arise in relation to the decision are to be identified by the Tribunal. But if the Tribunal takes no step to identify some issue other than those that the delegate considered dispositive, and does not tell the applicant what that other issue is, the applicant is entitled to assume that the issues the delegate considered dispositive are “the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. That is why the point at which to begin the identification of issues arising in relation to the decision under review will usually be the reasons given for that decision. And unless some other additional issues are identified by the Tribunal (as they may be), it would ordinarily follow that, on review by the Tribunal, the issues arising in relation to the decision under review would be those which the original decision-maker identified as determinative against the applicant.