FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Qajar v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 1339
File number(s): QUD 70 of 2022 Judgment of: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 11 November 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal on the basis of apprehended bias – whereas the applicant contends apprehended bias on the basis of previous proceedings concerning the validity of documents on which he relies in these subsequent proceedings – whether a fair-minded lay observer would apprehend failure to bring an impartial mind to the determination of the applicant’s application – bias not substantiated – application dismissed
APPEAL – application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of a Judge of this Court refusing leave to issue subpoenas and setting aside notices to produce – whereas applicant contends leave is not required as his liberty is affected – whether decision of the primary Judge is attended by sufficient doubt as to necessitate its reconsideration – applicant’s liberty is not affected so as to dispense with the requirement of leave – primary Judge’s decision not attended by sufficient doubt – application dismissed
Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)
Federal Court Act 1975 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Australian Gas Light Company v ACCC [2003] FCA 1101
Cavar v Greengate Management Services Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 961
Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337
Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1224
Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 155
Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCASL 30
Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92
McIlwaine v Ramsey Food Packaging Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 785
Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Limited [2022] FCA 227
Qajar v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 189
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No.11) [2006] FCA 174
Talacko v Talacko
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 55 Date of hearing: 7 September 2022 Counsel for the Applicant The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First and Third Respondents Mr J Kay Hoyle Solicitors for the First and Third Respondents Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
QUD70 of 2022 BETWEEN: THE SOVEREIGN SOLTAN QUEMARS SHAH QAJAR
Applicant
AND: AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
First Respondent
MINISTER FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Third Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 NOVEMBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for recusal filed on 25 August 2022 (recusal application) be dismissed.
2.The application for leave to appeal filed on 15 March 2022 (leave to appeal application) be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the costs of the second and…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1339
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the primary Judge was subject to apprehended bias, and whether the primary Judge's interlocutory decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The court had to determine whether a fair-minded lay observer would apprehend a failure to bring an impartial mind to the determination of the applicant's application, and whether the decision of the primary Judge was subject to sufficient doubt to necessitate its reconsideration.
The court found that the apprehended bias was not substantiated, as there was no evidence to suggest that a fair-minded lay observer would apprehend a failure to bring an impartial mind to the determination of the applicant’s application. The court also found that the decision of the primary Judge was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The court held that the applicant's liberty was not affected by the interlocutory decision, and thus the requirement for leave to appeal was not dispensed with. The applicant's proposed grounds of appeal were deemed vague, unparticularised, and merely caviling with the decision of the primary Judge without identifying particular errors.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the applicant's applications for recusal and leave to appeal. The court ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the second and third respondents of and incidental to the recusal application and the leave to appeal application, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for recusal filed on 25 August 2022 (recusal application) be dismissed.
2. The application for leave to appeal filed on 15 March 2022 (leave to appeal application) be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the costs of the second and third respondents of and incidental to the recusal application and the leave to appeal application, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Fourth, the Orders sought by the applicant in the substantive proceedings, namely the issue to him of a visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)(Migration Act) and related travel documents, seek entirely administrative acts by the Executive. This Court has no jurisdiction to issue visas or compel the issue of visas under the Migration Act. Even if the applicant were granted the orders he sought from the primary Judge, the material he sought would not assist him in respect of the substantive orders he seeks. Fifth, the proposed grounds of appeal are vague, unparticularised, and merely cavil with the decision of the primary Judge without identifying particular errors. I am not persuaded that the decision of the primary Judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered on appeal. I am also not persuaded that any injustice, much less substantial injustice, would result to the applicant if leave to appeal were refused, supposing the decision of the primary Judge to be wrong.CONCLUSION For the reasons I have outlined I dismiss the applicant’s applications for recusal and leave to appeal. It is appropriate that the applicant pay the costs of the respondents of and incidental to these applications, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.