Qajar v Australian Human Rights Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Qajar v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 1339    

File number(s): QUD 70 of 2022
Judgment of: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 11 November 2022
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal on the basis of apprehended bias – whereas the applicant contends apprehended bias on the basis of previous proceedings concerning the validity of documents on which he relies in these subsequent proceedings – whether a fair-minded lay observer would apprehend failure to bring an impartial mind to the determination of the applicant’s application – bias not substantiated – application dismissed

APPEAL – application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of a Judge of this Court refusing leave to issue subpoenas and setting aside notices to produce – whereas applicant contends leave is not required as his liberty is affected – whether decision of the primary Judge is attended by sufficient doubt as to necessitate its reconsideration – applicant’s liberty is not affected so as to dispense with the requirement of leave – primary Judge’s decision not attended by sufficient doubt – application dismissed    

Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

Federal Court Act 1975 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Australian Gas Light Company v ACCC [2003] FCA 1101

Cavar v Greengate Management Services Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 961

Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1224

Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 155

Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCASL 30

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92

McIlwaine v Ramsey Food Packaging Pty Ltd (2005) 221 ALR 785

Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Limited [2022] FCA 227

Qajar v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 189

Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No.11) [2006] FCA 174

Talacko v Talacko

Tohi v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 125

Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 5) [2017] FCA 690

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 55
Date of hearing: 7 September 2022
Counsel for the Applicant The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First and Third Respondents Mr J Kay Hoyle
Solicitors for the First and Third Respondents Australian Government Solicitor       

ORDERS

QUD70 of 2022
BETWEEN:

THE SOVEREIGN SOLTAN QUEMARS SHAH QAJAR

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

First Respondent

MINISTER FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

Second Respondent

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for recusal filed on 25 August 2022 (recusal application) be dismissed.

2.The application for leave to appeal filed on 15 March 2022 (leave to appeal application) be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the costs of the second and…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1339
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Qajar v Australian Human Rights Commission, the applicant sought recusal of the primary Judge and leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision concerning the issuance of subpoenas and the production of documents. The dispute centred on the applicant's contention that the primary Judge should be recused due to apprehended bias arising from previous proceedings, and that leave to appeal was necessary to address the alleged injustice in the interlocutory decision. The primary Judge had previously refused the issuance of subpoenas and dismissed interlocutory applications related to the production of documents, finding that the evidence sought was not relevant to the substantive proceedings.

The legal issues before the court included whether the primary Judge was subject to apprehended bias, and whether the primary Judge's interlocutory decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The court had to determine whether a fair-minded lay observer would apprehend a failure to bring an impartial mind to the determination of the applicant's application, and whether the decision of the primary Judge was subject to sufficient doubt to necessitate its reconsideration.

The court found that the apprehended bias was not substantiated, as there was no evidence to suggest that a fair-minded lay observer would apprehend a failure to bring an impartial mind to the determination of the applicant’s application. The court also found that the decision of the primary Judge was not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The court held that the applicant's liberty was not affected by the interlocutory decision, and thus the requirement for leave to appeal was not dispensed with. The applicant's proposed grounds of appeal were deemed vague, unparticularised, and merely caviling with the decision of the primary Judge without identifying particular errors.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the applicant's applications for recusal and leave to appeal. The court ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the second and third respondents of and incidental to the recusal application and the leave to appeal application, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for recusal filed on 25 August 2022 (recusal application) be dismissed.

2. The application for leave to appeal filed on 15 March 2022 (leave to appeal application) be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the costs of the second and third respondents of and incidental to the recusal application and the leave to appeal application, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

After hearing argument, I refused Ms Fard the issue of the subpoena to Mr Sohail Laghaifar (or Mr Qeumars) and dismissed her interlocutory applications: Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1224. Relevantly I observed:39.Further, as the respondent correctly submits, under r 36.57 of the Rules the appellant must describe the ground(s) of appeal to which the application for fresh evidence relates. In this case the appellant seeks to rely on only one ground of appeal, namely that the decision of the primary Judge was unjust and unfair. It may be that the evidence upon which the appellant now seeks to rely is relevant. Indeed, this evidence may be such that the Tribunal could have formed a different view had the Tribunal had the advantage of receiving it at the relevant time. This, however, is simply speculation. Indeed, I note that:•It is simply not reasonable to suggest that the existence of evidence which was not before the primary Judge could in any way have resulted in that decision being “unjust and unfair”. I make this observation in light of the apparent circumstance that the appellant chose not to press this evidence for consideration by the primary Judge.•It is not the role of either the primary Judge or this Court to conduct a merits review of the decision of the Tribunal. The tenor of the appellant’s case in respect of this evidence is that she is inviting the Court to undertake such an impermissible review.•As the respondent correctly submitted, Sami [2013] FCAFC 128 is authority for the proposition that the Court must have regard to the limits of its jurisdiction in reviewing decisions of the Tribunal in assessing the potential relevance and weight of the fresh evidence sought to be adduced.(emphasis added) It follows that, in that interlocutory decision, it was unnecessary for me to “[make] determinations concerning the authenticity of Document for Travel to Australia 032105, “the visa”. The authenticity of any visa was not the subject of the proceedings before me. The subsequent decision of the Full Court in Fard v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 155 was unanimous. The Full Court dismissed the appeal by Ms Fard. Relevantly the Court observed at [21]:We have summarised, in some detail, the reasons of the primary Judge. We are unable to identify any basis on which his Honour’s reasons could be described as “unjust and unfair”, as claimed by the appellant in her notice of appeal. On the contrary, the reasons demonstrate that his Honour gave thorough and thoughtful attention to the application before him, and that his decision to dismiss the appeal was correct for the reasons he gave. The Court continued:23.First, and notwithstanding the generality of the terms in which the ground of appeal before us is framed, it is clear from both written and oral submissions of the appellant that her fundamental complaint is that the Department did not provide her with information concerning “visa codes K4551 and K4552 as they applied from 1984 to 1990 inclusive”. The appellant submitted that these “visa codes” related to the gender of visa recipients, and that the “female” visa code was K4551. The appellant submitted that the use of the “female” visa code in respect of the visa issued on 11 December 1989 to the man the Department alleged was her son indicated that the Department had erred in identifying him. The appellant claimed that this indicated a fundamental error in the records of the Department, supporting her application for correction of the Department’s records.24.During the course of the hearing of the appeal however it became apparent that the so-called “visa codes K4551 and K4552” were, in fact, not referable to gender, but were classes of visas prescribed by regulations made under the Migration Act and this information was publicly available…

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Fourth, the Orders sought by the applicant in the substantive proceedings, namely the issue to him of a visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)(Migration Act) and related travel documents, seek entirely administrative acts by the Executive. This Court has no jurisdiction to issue visas or compel the issue of visas under the Migration Act. Even if the applicant were granted the orders he sought from the primary Judge, the material he sought would not assist him in respect of the substantive orders he seeks. Fifth, the proposed grounds of appeal are vague, unparticularised, and merely cavil with the decision of the primary Judge without identifying particular errors. I am not persuaded that the decision of the primary Judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its being reconsidered on appeal. I am also not persuaded that any injustice, much less substantial injustice, would result to the applicant if leave to appeal were refused, supposing the decision of the primary Judge to be wrong.CONCLUSION For the reasons I have outlined I dismiss the applicant’s applications for recusal and leave to appeal. It is appropriate that the applicant pay the costs of the respondents of and incidental to these applications, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.