FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCA 555
Appeal from: AZO24 v Commonwealth [2024] FCA 218; AZO24 v Commonwealth (No 2) [2024] FCA 426 File number(s): NSD 325 of 2024 Judgment of: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 28 May 2024 Catchwords: HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – application for leave to appeal decision for disqualification of judge on basis of apprehended bias – application refused
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal order that no document be accepted for filing in proceeding without leave granted by a Judge – application refused
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal refusal to file interlocutory injunction application – application refused
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23, 24, 37M
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 2.27
Cases cited: AZC20 v Secretary, Department of Home Affairs [2023] FCA 1252
AZO24 v Commonwealth [2024] FCA 218
AZO24 v Commonwealth (No 2) [2024] FCA 426
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397
Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19
Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 56; (2007) 234 CLR 52
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564
Kamruzzaman v Minister For Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 523
Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534
Northern Territory of Australia v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; (2019) 265 CLR 164
Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72
QYFMv Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs & Anor [2023] HCA 15; (2023) 409 ALR 65
Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139; (2010) 81 ATR 36
Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342
Sali v SPC Ltd [1993] HCA 47; (1993) 116 ALR 625
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Federal Crime and Related Proceedings Number of Paragraphs: 45 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers. Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant is self-represented. Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J E McKenzie Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr N Bentley Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Crown Solicitor for New South Wales ORDERS
NSD 325 of 2024 BETWEEN: AZO24
Applicant
AND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 MAY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to appeal the order made on 7 March 2024 is refused.
2.Leave to appeal the order made on 20 March 2024, that no document be accepted for filing in NSD1036/2023 without leave granted by a Judge, is refused.
3.Leave to appeal…
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 555
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the applicant had demonstrated that the decisions were sufficiently doubtful to warrant reconsideration and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The applicant argued that she genuinely believed she was being persecuted, but the court found that her belief was not based on rational or logical evidence. The court also considered whether the applicant's proposed appeal had a chance of success. The court concluded that the applicant had not met the required criteria and that the appeal was unlikely to succeed.
The court refused the application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the respondents' costs. The applicant argued that the order would be punitive and that the respondents' actions caused her to bring the proceedings. The court rejected these arguments, noting that the applicant had not established any basis for her claims and that costs are compensatory, not punitive. The court also found that the applicant's financial situation was irrelevant to the award of costs.
The court's decision was based on the principle that leave to appeal is granted at the court's discretion, and the applicant must demonstrate that the decision is doubtful and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The court found that the applicant had not met these requirements and that the appeal had no prospect of success. The court also noted that the orders in question did not affect the applicant's liberty and that interlocutory orders require leave to appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal the order made on 7 March 2024 is refused.
2. Leave to appeal the order made on 20 March 2024, that no document be accepted for filing in NSD1036/2023 without leave granted by a Judge, is refused.
3. Leave to appeal the order made on 20 March 2024, that the applicant be refused leave to file the interlocutory application and accompanying affidavit she sought to file on 18 March 2024, is refused.
4. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondents to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the reasons below, leave to appeal is refused. Consideration It is necessary to first consider the applications for leave to appeal. The relevant principles are well established. The discretion to grant leave to appeal is an unfettered one, with each case being determined on its merits. Nonetheless the discretion is informed by well-established principles including that generally an applicant must establish: (1) that, in all the circumstances of the case, the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered; and (2) that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397 (Décor Corporation) at 398-400; Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564 at [44]; Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238 at [26]-[30]. These considerations are “cumulative” and are not satisfied unless each limb is made out: Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 139; (2010) 81 ATR 36 at [5]. In determining whether to grant leave, the Court must have regard to the statutory command that the power must be exercised in a way that best promotes the overarching purpose in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act), being to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: Bellamy’s Australia Ltd v Basil (2019) 372 ALR 638; [2019] FCAFC 147 at [6]. If an appeal has no prospect of success, leave to appeal should be refused: Kamruzzaman v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 523 at [17]. Insofar as the applicant relied on s 24(1C) of the Federal Court Act to contended that she does not require leave to appeal as the matters she alleges relate to her liberty, I do not accept the submission. These interlocutory orders, given their terms and the context in which they were made, cannot properly be said to affect the liberty of an individual. As the orders which the applicant seeks to appeal are interlocutory in nature, leave to appeal is required. Disqualification application The disqualification application was heard on an ex parte basis as the applicant was yet to serve her proceedings on the respondents. The primary judge applied the correct legal principles, as articulated in QYFMv Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs & Anor [2023] HCA 15; (2023) 409 ALR 65 at [38] (summarised in AZC20 v Secretary, Department of Home Affairs [2023] FCA 1252 at [10]-[11], recited at [8] of the primary judgment). As the primary judge correctly details, the application was advanced on the basis his Honour was appointed to the Court by the Governor-General acting on the advice of the current federal government, on the advice of the current Attorney-General. This, the applicant said, gave rise to an apprehension of bias. The primary judge described the basis of that apprehension at [7]: The apprehension of bias is said to arise, not because the Commonwealth is a party to the proceeding, but because the applicant makes allegations that each of the Prime Ministers and Attorneys-General who have held office since 2017 has been personally involved in decisions to take unlawful actions against her and has done so for improper purposes. Again, it is not necessary to go into the details. To understand the applicant’s point, it is sufficient to note that the judge who hears the case (if it goes to a final hearing) may have to decide whether to make findings of serious misconduct against persons who hold and have held office as Prime Minister and as Attorney-General. Her argument is that it is unsatisfactory for those matters to be decided by a judge who was appointed on the advice of any of those persons.