Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney (No 3) [2025] FCA 915

File number(s): NSD 1043 of 2024
Judgment of: SHARIFF J
Date of judgment: 8 August 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time and leave to appeal – where application for leave to appeal is more than three years out of time – where no adequate explanation provided for the delay – prejudice to the respondents – proposed appeal has insufficient prospects of success – application dismissed – timetable made for vexatious litigant orders to be considered
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1)(a), 24(1A), 24(1D)(b), 37AO, 37AO(2), 37AO(2)(a), 37AO(2)(b), 37AO(2)(c), 37AO(3), 37AO(4), 37AQ(1)(a), 37AR, 37M

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 486F

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 2.26, 35.13(a), 35.14, 36.03(a), 39.04, 39.32(3), 39.34

Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)

Cases cited:

Abram v Bank of New Zealand [1996] FCA 1650; ATPR 41–507 at 42,347

AIX20 v Director-General of Security [2025] FCAFC 38

AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCAFC 77

Bhagwanani v Martin [1999] SASC 406; 204 LSJS 449

Clark v New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 914

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

EBW21 v Minister For Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 341

Finch v The Heat Group (No 3) [2017] FCA 64

Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138; 280 FCR 479

Fualau v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 11

Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30; 93 ALR 479

Garvey v Australian National University [2024] FCA 632

Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; 104 FCR 564

Katoa v Minister [2022] HCA 22; 276 CLR 579

Khondoker v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 654

Kitoko v Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd [2015] NSWDC 152

Kitoko v Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd [2016] HCASL 305

Kitoko v Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 201

Kitoko v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia [2023] FCA 1056

Kitoko v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia [2024] FCA 1119

Kitoko v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [2024] FCAFC 14

Kitoko v Registrar, Registry of New South Wales, Federal Court of Australia [2025] FCAFC 41

Kitoko v Sydney Local Health District “SLHD” ABN 17 520 269 052 & Ors [2024] HCASL 210

Kitoko v Sydney Local Health District [2017] NSWCATAD 209

Kitoko v Sydney Local Health District [2018] NSWCATAP 38

Kitoko v Sydney Local Health District [2018] NSWSC 1461

Kitoko v Sydney Local Health District [2023]…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 915
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kitoko v University of Technology Sydney (No 3) involved Mr Kitoko seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The primary judge had dismissed Mr Kitoko’s claims as being an abuse of process and precluded by various estoppels, including Anshun estoppel. Mr Kitoko argued that there were reasonable prospects of success for the appeal and that the delay in filing the application for leave to appeal could be excused. The respondents, however, argued that the application was well outside the statutory time limit, there was no adequate explanation for the delay, and the proposed appeal had no prospects of success.

The legal issues the court needed to decide were whether the application for leave to appeal was within the statutory time limit, whether there was an adequate explanation for the delay, and whether the proposed appeal had any prospects of success. The court had to consider the history of the proceedings initiated by Mr Kitoko, which included numerous unmeritorious claims against various respondents, including entities and individuals associated with the Broadway Incident and the discontinuance of his PhD candidature at UTS.

The court dismissed the application for extension of time and leave to appeal. It found that the application was more than three years out of time and that there was no adequate explanation for the delay. The court also held that the proposed appeal had insufficient prospects of success as the claims were precluded by Anshun estoppel and/or abuse of process, and had no reasonable prospects of success on their merits. The court ordered that Mr Kitoko pay the respondents' costs and directed that submissions be filed by a certain date regarding whether any orders should be made under section 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, with the question of making such orders to be listed for a hearing at a later date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for extension of time and leave to appeal filed on 2 August 2024 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs as agreed or taxed.

3. On or by 8 September 2025, the applicant file any affidavits and submissions as to whether any orders should be made under s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act), with any submissions being of no more than 20 pages in length.

4. The question as to whether the Court should make any orders under s 37AO of the FCA Act be listed for hearing at a time convenient to the Court and the applicant after 8 September 2025.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondents disputed Mr Kitoko’s contentions. They said that there had been a substantial delay for which there was no adequate explanation and this was reason enough to dismiss Mr Kitoko’s application. They further relied upon the history of the very many unmeritorious proceedings that Mr Kitoko has instituted over time in order to support their position that the primary judge’s determination that Mr Kitoko’s claims should be summarily dismissed was not attended by sufficient doubt such that he has no arguable case for leave to appeal. 4. BACKGROUND TO THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT In order to make sense of the primary judgment, it is necessary to outline the primary judge’s careful consideration of the very many proceedings that Mr Kitoko has commenced over time in various courts and tribunals.4.1 The history of past proceedings involving the respondents Mr Kitoko’s various claims have as their impetus the Broadway Incident and the discontinuance of his PhD candidature at UTS. In 2013, Mr Kitoko commenced proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales against Mirvac (now the third respondent) and Access Group (now the fifth respondent) seeking damages for personal injury allegedly suffered by reason of the Broadway Incident (District Court Proceedings). In those proceedings, Mr Cooper (now the fourth respondent) was a lawyer for Mirvac, and DLA Piper (now the sixth respondent) were the solicitors for Access Group. An employee of UNSW (now the ninth respondent), Associate Professor Mark Pickering, was a witness in those proceedings. A neurologist employed at Concord Public Hospital (CPH) by SLHD (now the seventh respondent), Dr Lord, who had treated Mr Kitoko, prepared medical reports which were before the District Court. Separately to the District Court Proceedings, Mr Kitoko had lodged an internal appeal relating to the discontinuance of his PhD candidature. 4.1.1The District Court Proceedings The District Court Proceedings were dismissed with costs on 7 August 2015: Kitoko v Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd [2015] NSWDC 152 (Elkaim SC DCJ) (Proceedings 1). The primary judge observed that, during the trial in the District Court, CCTV footage demonstrated that Mr Kitoko had “simply walked into the pane of glass”, rather than having slipped on a viscous substance on the floor due to negligence of the defendants, as was alleged by him: PJ [14]. The District Court also rejected claims made by Mr Kitoko that the CCTV footage had been falsified: PJ [14]. Mr Kitoko appealed from the decision of the District Court, but the Court of Appeal of New South Wales dismissed his application with costs: Kitoko v Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 201 at [59] (Macfarlan JA, Sackville AJA and Garling J) (Proceedings 2). On 16 November 2016, Mr Kitoko’s application for special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused: Kitoko v Mirvac Real Estate Pty Ltd [2016] HCASL 305 (Gageler J, as his Honour then was) (Proceedings 3). Although the District Court Proceedings related to a different subject matter altogether to Mr Kitoko’s complaints against UTS, the primary judge relevantly observed that in his application for special leave, Mr Kitoko asserted that since commencing the proceedings in the District Court, “Broadway Mirvac shopping centre lawyers have worked in collaboration with … my PH.D main supervisor (Professor Hung Nguyen) at UTS for my punishment”: PJ [16].4.1.2NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal proceedings

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge’s critical reasoning at PJ [107]–[140] was as follows: (a)the breach of contract, collusion and conspiracy claims as against UTS and its officers were precluded by reason of issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel and/or abuse of process in so far as they sought to re-litigate issues of fact already finally determined in the FCCA Proceedings and in the proceedings before the NSW Supreme Court, and otherwise had no reasonable prospects of success; (b)specifically, the breach of contract claims relied upon factual matters that had been determined adversely to Mr Kitoko in the FCCA Proceedings;(c)as against the other respondents, the breach of contract claims constituted an abuse of process, applying the High Court’s decision in Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; 256 CLR 507 at [21]–[22] (French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ). The primary judge reasoned that, even though the third to tenth respondents were not parties to the FCCA Proceedings and the proceedings before the NSW Supreme Court, an abuse of process may still arise where re-litigation of an issue would be “unjustifiably oppressive” or “manifestly unfair” to a party or “would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” including because Mr Kitoko’s allegations were based on a conspiracy or collusion with UTS and its officers which substantially relied upon the same factual matrix advanced in those other proceedings;(d)Mr Kitoko had not satisfied the primary judge as to any good reason why the allegations could not have been raised in the previous proceedings;(e)the primary judge rejected Mr Kitoko’s submission that the doctrine of abuse of process does not apply to the FCCA Proceedings because the issues determined were not identical to the claims before the primary judge. The primary judge reasoned that even though the causes of action in the FCCA Proceedings were different to those being advanced before his Honour, the factual matrix underlying the respective proceedings were substantially the same and had been finally determined against Mr Kitoko; (f)in any event, the primary judge reasoned that, to the extent that any factual allegations in relation to the breach of contract claim had not been finally determined by the FCCA Proceedings, the proceedings before the NSW Supreme Court or the NCAT Proceedings, they had no reasonable prospects of success including as they were “fanciful” and were founded on broad and sweeping allegations which lacked both specificity and any inherent credibility; (g)as to Mr Kitoko’s claims as to misleading and deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct, the primary judge concluded that these claims could not be maintained for the same reasons and the doctrines of Anshun estoppel and/or abuse of process applied. His Honour reasoned that the material facts had already been finally determined in the FCCA Proceedings and in other respects, insofar as they are intelligible, the claims had no reasonable prospects of success as Mr Kitoko has not pleaded with sufficient clarity the “circumstances which gave the representation its deceptive and misleading character”; (h)the tort of conspiracy claims were an abuse of process and also attracted the doctrine of Anshun estoppel;(i)the negligence claim was an abuse of process and also attracted the doctrine of Anshun estoppel; and(j)the breach of fiduciary duty claim was also an abuse of process and attracted the doctrine of Anshun estoppel.6. CONSIDERATION 6.1 Delay and the explanations for it