FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Garvey v Australian National University (No 2) [2024] FCA 632
File number(s): QUD 129 of 2023 Judgment of: MEAGHER J Date of judgment: 14 June 2024 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for an extension of time to bring a judicial review application – Where delay is lengthy – Where no sufficient explanation for delay – Where substantive case lacks arguable merit – Application dismissed Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1976 (Cth) ss 5, 11(3), 11(1)(c)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 31.02
Research Awards Rule 2017 rr 48, 53
Cases cited: Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1997) 73 FCR 75
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Doyle v Chief of General Staff ((1982) 71 FLR 56
Duff v Freijah (1982) 62 FLR 280
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Brown [1999] FCA 1198
Hickey v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 47 ALR 517
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344
Intervest Corporation Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 3 FCR 591
Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411
Maric v Comcare (1993) 40 FCR 244
Pattanasri v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1993) 34 ALD 169
Trevor, in the matter of Bell Group NV (in liq) [2016] FCA 851
Wyong-Gosford Progressive Community Radio Inc v Australian Communications Media Authority (2006) 93 ALD 784
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 46 Date of hearing: 27 March 2024 Solicitor for the Applicant: The Applicant was self-represented Counsel for the Respondent: Ms KE Slack Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers ORDERS
QUD 129 of 2023 BETWEEN: BENJAMIN PATRICK GARVEY
Applicant
AND: AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MEAGHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 JUNE 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MEAGHER J
INTRODUCTION
By an application filed on 3 April 2023, the applicant seeks an extension of time pursuant to r 31.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to lodge a judicial review application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The impugned decision was made by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the respondent, the Australian National University (ANU), to decline to uphold the appeal of a decision to terminate the applicant’s candidature in his PhD program.
In his draft amended originating application, which was lodged on 15 March 2024, the applicant seeks the following orders:
1. The impugned decision of Professor Keith Nugent be quashed, that it be declared void ab initio and that it be remitted back to the new deputy-vice-chancellor (research and innovation), Professor Lachlan Blackhall, to be remade according to law.
2. A prohibitive…
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 632
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the applicant's delay was significant and there was no sufficient explanation for the delay. Additionally, the substantive application was without merit as there was no evidence to support the applicant's claims. The Court also considered the public interest in finality of decisions, which weighed against granting an extension of time. The Court held that the public interest would be served by the dismissal of the application for an extension of time, as allowing the application would undermine the importance of adhering to time limits for judicial review applications.
The Court dismissed the application for an extension of time. The Court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed. The Court emphasised that the decision was based on the significant delay, lack of merit in the substantive application, and the public interest in finality of decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MEAGHER J
The respondent submitted that the allegations by the applicant were assertions unsupported by evidence and that by the relief sought by the applicant, the applicant is asking the Court to engage in merits review. I agree with the respondent’s submissions in that regard. There is no evidence before the Court to support the applicant’s claims in respect of the substantive application. As correctly contended by the respondent, there is also no evidence to link Professor Schmidt, who is the subject of many of the allegations, to the Impugned Decisions. I am satisfied that the substantive application is, on its face, without merit. Public interest considerations The Court ought to consider the prejudice to the public interest in the administration of the law when determining whether to exercise the discretion to grant an extension of time. This consideration is relevant both in relation to the importance of finality of decisions and in respect of reviewing the correctness of the decision: Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1997) 73 FCR 75; 143 ALR 381 at 85. This balancing exercise has been helpfully summarised by Smithers J in Intervest Corporation Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 3 FCR 591; (1984) 58 ALR 317 at 599 as follows: …It is in the public interest that the administration of the law should not be inappropriately hampered by the extension of indulgences to undeserving persons, but it is in accordance with justice and the public interest that a citizen should not lose an entitlement by delay which is neither reprehensible or excessive. … The applicant submitted that there is a significant public interest in the application for judicial review, in “getting a criminal out of the position of [V]ice [C]hancellor” and in “publicly detailing the mostly covered-up or glossed-over criminal, human-rights-violating practices…of US proxies in overseas jurisdictions.” He contended that the Court should accordingly issue a public interest order wherein each party bears their costs irrespective of the outcome. Conversely, the respondent submitted that finality of decisions is in the public interest and referred to Taylor at 552 wherein McHugh J stated: …people should be able to arrange their affairs and utilize their resources on the basis that claims can no longer be made against them…public institutions…have a significant interest in knowing that they have no liabilities beyond a definite period… the public interest requires that disputes be settled as quickly as possible. (Footnotes omitted) The respondent also advanced the argument that, in promoting fairness between the applicant and people in a similar position to that of the applicant, being students who comply with the prescribed time limit, the public interest would not support the granting of an extension of time in these circumstances. In this case, I am satisfied that the public interest is served by the dismissal of the application for an extension of time. As correctly submitted by the respondent, there is a public interest in ensuring that time limits are not waived in circumstances where it is not in the interests of justice that an extension of time be granted, particularly where the delay is significant. As to the applicant’s contentions, I do not consider that such matters would be addressed by a judicial review application. CONCLUSION