Garvey v Australian National University (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Garvey v Australian National University (No 2) [2024] FCA 632  

File number(s): QUD 129 of 2023
Judgment of: MEAGHER J
Date of judgment: 14 June 2024
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for an extension of time to bring a judicial review application – Where delay is lengthy – Where no sufficient explanation for delay – Where substantive case lacks arguable merit – Application dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1976 (Cth) ss 5, 11(3), 11(1)(c)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 31.02

Research Awards Rule 2017 rr 48, 53

Cases cited:

Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1997) 73 FCR 75

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541

Doyle v Chief of General Staff ((1982) 71 FLR 56

Duff v Freijah (1982) 62 FLR 280

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Brown [1999] FCA 1198

Hickey v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 47 ALR 517

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344

Intervest Corporation Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 3 FCR 591

Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411

Maric v Comcare (1993) 40 FCR 244

Pattanasri v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1993) 34 ALD 169

Trevor, in the matter of Bell Group NV (in liq) [2016] FCA 851

Wyong-Gosford Progressive Community Radio Inc v Australian Communications Media Authority (2006) 93 ALD 784

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 46
Date of hearing: 27 March 2024
Solicitor for the Applicant: The Applicant was self-represented
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms KE Slack
Solicitor for the Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

QUD 129 of 2023
BETWEEN:

BENJAMIN PATRICK GARVEY

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MEAGHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 JUNE 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MEAGHER J
INTRODUCTION

  1. By an application filed on 3 April 2023, the applicant seeks an extension of time pursuant to r 31.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to lodge a judicial review application under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The impugned decision was made by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the respondent, the Australian National University (ANU), to decline to uphold the appeal of a decision to terminate the applicant’s candidature in his PhD program.

  2. In his draft amended originating application, which was lodged on 15 March 2024, the applicant seeks the following orders:

    1. The impugned decision of Professor Keith Nugent be quashed, that it be declared void ab initio and that it be remitted back to the new deputy-vice-chancellor (research and innovation), Professor Lachlan Blackhall, to be remade according to law.

    2. A prohibitive…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 632
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a former PhD candidate at the Australian National University, sought an extension of time to bring a judicial review application against the decision to terminate his candidature. The applicant alleged that his candidature was terminated due to his complaints about mistreatment and a lack of proper supervision. The Federal Court was required to decide whether to grant an extension of time to the applicant to bring his judicial review application, considering the significant delay and lack of merit in the substantive application. The Court assessed the application against the relevant considerations, including the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, the merits of the substantive application, and the public interest in finality of decisions.

The Court found that the applicant's delay was significant and there was no sufficient explanation for the delay. Additionally, the substantive application was without merit as there was no evidence to support the applicant's claims. The Court also considered the public interest in finality of decisions, which weighed against granting an extension of time. The Court held that the public interest would be served by the dismissal of the application for an extension of time, as allowing the application would undermine the importance of adhering to time limits for judicial review applications.

The Court dismissed the application for an extension of time. The Court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed. The Court emphasised that the decision was based on the significant delay, lack of merit in the substantive application, and the public interest in finality of decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the application for an extension of time is dismissed. BACKGROUND The applicant was a PhD candidate at the ANU from February 2016 until 2019 in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian Centre for China in the World. His research related to changes in Hong Kong’s political situation. On 15 November 2016, the applicant met with the supervisory panel to discuss his Thesis Proposal Review (TPR) which was scheduled for 2 December 2016. As a result, it was determined that the applicant’s thesis proposal was lacking a substantial thesis question. The first TPR was deemed unsatisfactory, and it was recommended that the applicant undertake a further review of his Thesis Proposal. From the end of 2016, the applicant conducted field work related to his proposed thesis in Hong Kong. In November 2017, when he was towards the end of the field work, he alleges that he was subject to ritual abuse, torture, human experimentation, bastardisation, attempted brutalisation and involuntary initiation ritual. On 9 April 2018, a second TPR took place wherein it was determined that the applicant’s thesis remained unsatisfactory and “showed that the period of fieldwork in Hong Kong had not clarified [the applicant’s] ideas on a research question”. It was recommended that the applicant show cause as to why his candidature should not be terminated. On 18 May 2018, the Panel Chair, Dr Benjamin Penny met with the applicant to advise him of the panel’s “continuing lack of satisfaction and of the decision to allow him a last chance to demonstrate his capabilities”. Ultimately, while it was acknowledged that the applicant’s work showed some progress, it was determined to be unsatisfactory for the standard required for a PhD. On 20 August 2018, Dr Penny again met with the applicant and informed him that the Panel had unanimously recommended that the applicant’s candidature be terminated. He was repeatedly advised to consider withdrawal from the program so that his ability to pursue a PhD in a different institution would not be adversely impacted. He was given two weeks to assess his options. On 2 September 2018, the applicant advised Dr Simon Avenell, Associate Dean, that he believes he has been treated unfairly, there had been an infringement on his academic freedom and that Dr Mark Harrison did not supervise him in good faith. On 6 September 2018, Dr Avenell advised the applicant that ANU was considering terminating his candidature on the basis of the two failed TPRs and invited the applicant to make any written representation to him. On 31 October 2018, the applicant was advised by letter that his candidate was being terminated pursuant to s 48 of the Research Awards Rule 2017 (which was then in force). The grounds provided were as follows: a.You have failed two attempts at the Thesis Proposal Review (TPR), the first on 2 December 2016 and the second on 9 April 2018; b.Your supervisory panel has attempted to assist you and provide direction after both TPRs; however, they have reached the unanimous decision that your work and progress have been unsatisfactory; and c.Your supervisory panel are no longer supportive of your continued candidacy.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MEAGHER J
On 5 April 2019, Professor Keith Nugent, Deputy Vice-Chancellor, advised the applicant that the appeal was not upheld on the basis that the university had followed its procedures (Impugned Decision). This decision is the one which is the subject of the judicial review application which the applicant seeks to bring. At the hearing, the applicant was self-represented and relied upon his affidavits affirmed on 3 April 2023 and 11 September 2023 (September Affidavit). The respondent read the affidavit of Alexandra Gorman affirmed on 16 October 2023 and a written outline of submissions. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK Section 5(1) of the Act relevantly provides: (1)A person who is aggrieved by a decision to which this Act applies that is made after the commencement of this Act may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) for an order of review in respect of the decision on any one or more of the following grounds:(a)that a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the decision;…(e)that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made;…(g)that the decision was induced or affected by fraud;(h)that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision;…(j) that the decision was otherwise contrary to law. Pursuant to s 11(3) of the Act, an application for judicial review must be made within 28 days after the decision is furnished to the applicant. However, s 11(1)(c) of the Act empowers the Court to extend the time by which the applicant can make an application for judicial review, whether before or after the expiration of the prescribed period. The considerations relevant to this exercise of discretion were set out in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344; [1984] FCA 186 at 348 – 349. They include the length of, and explanation for the delay, action taken by the applicant, prejudice to the respondent, public interest considerations and the merits of the substantive application.CONSIDERATION At the outset of the hearing, the applicant advanced the argument that this Court is a court of equity and accordingly should invoke its equitable jurisdiction to prevent an unjust application of the prescribed time limit for bringing a judicial review application. However, as correctly submitted by the respondent, the application is brought under the Act and invokes the Court’s statutory jurisdiction. Further, as to the applicant’s submission that the Court should not allow for a strict application of the provision and should consider the relevant circumstances, that is indeed what the Court is doing when considering the various factors in Hunter Valley. It is appropriate to consider each of the relevant factors in turn. Length of, and explanation for, the delay A paramount consideration for the Court in exercising its discretion to grant an extension of time is whether the applicant can show an explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to grant the extension.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MEAGHER J

The respondent submitted that the allegations by the applicant were assertions unsupported by evidence and that by the relief sought by the applicant, the applicant is asking the Court to engage in merits review. I agree with the respondent’s submissions in that regard. There is no evidence before the Court to support the applicant’s claims in respect of the substantive application. As correctly contended by the respondent, there is also no evidence to link Professor Schmidt, who is the subject of many of the allegations, to the Impugned Decisions. I am satisfied that the substantive application is, on its face, without merit. Public interest considerations The Court ought to consider the prejudice to the public interest in the administration of the law when determining whether to exercise the discretion to grant an extension of time. This consideration is relevant both in relation to the importance of finality of decisions and in respect of reviewing the correctness of the decision: Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1997) 73 FCR 75; 143 ALR 381 at 85. This balancing exercise has been helpfully summarised by Smithers J in Intervest Corporation Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 3 FCR 591; (1984) 58 ALR 317 at 599 as follows: …It is in the public interest that the administration of the law should not be inappropriately hampered by the extension of indulgences to undeserving persons, but it is in accordance with justice and the public interest that a citizen should not lose an entitlement by delay which is neither reprehensible or excessive. … The applicant submitted that there is a significant public interest in the application for judicial review, in “getting a criminal out of the position of [V]ice [C]hancellor” and in “publicly detailing the mostly covered-up or glossed-over criminal, human-rights-violating practices…of US proxies in overseas jurisdictions.” He contended that the Court should accordingly issue a public interest order wherein each party bears their costs irrespective of the outcome. Conversely, the respondent submitted that finality of decisions is in the public interest and referred to Taylor at 552 wherein McHugh J stated: …people should be able to arrange their affairs and utilize their resources on the basis that claims can no longer be made against them…public institutions…have a significant interest in knowing that they have no liabilities beyond a definite period… the public interest requires that disputes be settled as quickly as possible. (Footnotes omitted) The respondent also advanced the argument that, in promoting fairness between the applicant and people in a similar position to that of the applicant, being students who comply with the prescribed time limit, the public interest would not support the granting of an extension of time in these circumstances. In this case, I am satisfied that the public interest is served by the dismissal of the application for an extension of time. As correctly submitted by the respondent, there is a public interest in ensuring that time limits are not waived in circumstances where it is not in the interests of justice that an extension of time be granted, particularly where the delay is significant. As to the applicant’s contentions, I do not consider that such matters would be addressed by a judicial review application. CONCLUSION