Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 80 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 2) 
[2018] FCA 550

SUMMARY

In accordance with the practice of the Federal Court in cases of public interest, the following summary has been prepared to accompany the orders made today.  This summary is intended to assist in understanding the outcome of this proceeding and is not a complete statement of the conclusions reached by the Court.  The only authoritative statement of the Court’s reasons is that contained in the published reasons for judgment which will be available on the internet at the Court’s website.  This summary is also available there.

Mr Geoffrey Rush has commenced defamation proceedings against Nationwide News Pty Ltd and Mr Jonathon Moran.  Like many applicants in defamation proceedings, he is anxious to have his claim dealt with quickly so that, if successful, he may be publicly vindicated while the offending publications are still fresh in the mind of the public. He has made that clear from the outset. Perhaps more significantly, like any litigant in this Court, be they an asylum seeker, a Minister of the Crown, a regulatory body, a large media corporation or any ordinary Australian citizen, he is entitled to expect that his claim will be resolved as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Regrettably, the approach that Nationwide and Mr Moran have taken to their defence of Mr Rush’s claim threatens to stymie or frustrate the achievement of that overarching objective of the Court’s civil practice and procedure. 

It would not be unfair to say, in all the circumstances, that while Nationwide and Mr Moran were quick to publish, they have been slow to defend.

There are before the Court two interlocutory applications. Both of them were filed by Nationwide and Mr Moran.  Both were opposed by Mr Rush.

In the first application, Nationwide and Mr Moran sought leave to file a further amended defence.  The proposed further amended defence was effectively Nationwide and Mr Moran’s fourth attempt at filing the defence that they wish to take to trial.  In the second interlocutory application, Nationwide and Mr Moran sought leave to file a notice of cross-claim outside the time period prescribed in the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The cross-respondent named in the draft notice of cross-claim is the Sydney Theatre Company Limited.

I have decided that both of the interlocutory applications must be dismissed.

The proposed amended defence

The proposed further amended defence made two substantive and substantial additions to Nationwide and Mr Moran’s existing defence. 

The first addition was to effectively reintroduce paragraphs of the qualified privilege defence that I struck out in my earlier judgment (Rush v Nationwide News [2018] FCA 357), but this time as particulars of facts and matters that were said to be relevant to the mitigation of damages, rather than as particulars of the defence of qualified privilege. This addition to the defence was said to be justified by a decision of the Court of Appeal of England & Wales in

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 550
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2), the applicants sought leave to further amend their defence and to file a cross-claim against the STC, a third party. The applicants argued that the particulars previously struck out of their qualified privilege defence could be reintroduced as particulars relevant to the mitigation of damages, and that their proposed cross-claim had sufficient merit. The court was required to decide whether the applicants' explanations for the delay in filing the further amended defence and the cross-claim were satisfactory, and whether granting leave would cause further delay in the proceedings.

The court found that the applicants' explanations for the delay were unsatisfactory. They had already been granted leave to amend their defence three times, and the proposed further amended defence was their fourth attempt at settling a viable and satisfactory defence. The court also found that the proposed cross-claim was weak and the prospects of success were poor. The court considered that the delay was significant and likely to be productive of considerable prejudice to the applicant. The court concluded that granting leave would not be in the interests of justice, and dismissed the applicants' applications for leave.

The court ordered that the applicants' amended interlocutory applications seeking leave to file a further amended defence and a cross-claim be dismissed. The court also ordered that the applicants pay the applicant's costs of and associated with the amended interlocutory applications. If the applicants filed a further amended defence in accordance with the leave granted in order 2, they were to pay the applicant's costs thrown away as a result of the filing of the further amended defence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended interlocutory application filed by the First and Second Respondents seeking leave to file a further amended defence in the form annexed to that application is dismissed.

2. The First and Second Respondents be granted leave to file a further amended defence strictly in the form annexed to the interlocutory application as originally filed on 3 April 2018.

3. The amended interlocutory application filed by the First and Second Respondents seeking leave to file a cross-claim in the form annexed to that application pursuant to r 15.05(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) is dismissed.

4. The First and Second Respondents pay the Applicant’s costs of and associated with the amended interlocutory applications.

5. If the First and Second Respondents file a further amended defence in accordance with the leave granted in order 2, the First and Second Respondents pay the Applicant’s costs thrown away as a result of the filing of the further amended defence.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Much the same can be said about the proposed Speight v Gosnay claim. The difficulties that have been addressed in detail in the context of the publication to Mr Moran claim and the Webb v Bloch claim all apply equally to the Speight v Gosnay claim. It is unnecessary to repeat what has already been said. Suffice it to say that the fundamental problem is that, like the other claims, the Speight v Gosnay claim requires Nationwide and Mr Moran to prove that the statements made by the STC conveyed all the same imputations that Mr Rush alleges were conveyed by the three matters complained of (the poster and the two Daily Telegraph articles). For the reasons already given, that contention is, to say the very least, extremely difficult to accept. Indeed it is difficult to accept that the STC statements conveyed any of the imputations alleged by Mr Rush against Nationwide and Mr Moran. The overall content, headlines, photographs, layout and other features of the three matters complained of conveyed something entirely different to the statements made by the STC. As has also already been explained in detail, the contention that Ms Stevenson, on behalf of the STC, approved or assented to the second matter complained of (let alone the first and third matters complained of), or somehow had the opportunity, ability or power to stop or even alter that publication is also extremely weak.Conclusion in relation to the merits of the cross-claim It follows from this discussion of the proposed cross-claim that each of the four ways that Nationwide and Mr Moran put their case against the STC faces significant factual and legal hurdles. The proposed cross-claim as presently pleaded is weak and the prospects of success are poor. It should be emphasised and reiterated that this is not a concluded finding that any claim that Nationwide and Mr Moran may have against the STC is not reasonably arguable. Equally, nothing that has been said should be taken to be directed to the merits of Nationwide and Mr Moran’s defence to Mr Rush’s claim. That was not the subject of argument. This analysis has been directed solely to the merits of the proposed cross-claim against the STC. Delay and prejudice The Rules provide that Nationwide and Mr Moran were required to file the cross-claim on 30 January 2018. They did not seek leave to file the cross-claim until 3 April 2018, though the amended interlocutory application annexing the final version of the proposed cross-claim was later still. The delay is accordingly just over two months. In some litigation, such a delay would not be particularly significant. In this particular litigation, however, the delay is significant and is likely to be productive of considerable prejudice to Mr Rush. Mr Rush commenced these proceedings promptly. He has, at each opportunity, sought to pursue his claim without delay. He seeks public vindication at a time when the alleged defamatory publications are still fresh in the mind of the public. As the chronology of the proceedings described earlier clearly shows, however, Mr Rush’s attempts to have his matter heard at the earliest opportunity have been frustrated by Nationwide and Mr Moran’s conduct of their defence. They filed a defence towards the very end of the period prescribed by the Rules. The defence as originally filed contained insufficient and deficient particulars of Nationwide and Mr Moran’s pleaded defences. They effectively admitted as much when they sought leave to file an amended defence. They were given leave to file, and in due course filed, an amended defence. That amended defence was found, in Rush v Nationwide No. 1, to have contained insufficient particulars of the defence of justification, and to have included irrelevant and ambiguous particulars of their defence of qualified privilege. Nationwide and Mr Moran are pursuing an application for leave to appeal against the judgment striking out parts of their defence of qualified privilege, but at the same time have sought to amend the defence and file a cross-claim.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The inclusion of those paragraphs in the defence will, of course, need to be reconsidered if Nationwide and Mr Moran are successful in their appeal. In the meantime, however, Nationwide and Mr Moran should not be permitted to amend the defence to reinsert the struck out paragraphs. Discretionary considerations The delays that have been encountered thus far in this proceeding have already been considered. The version of the further amended defence that was the subject of Nationwide and Mr Moran’s amended interlocutory application was, in effect, their fourth attempt at settling a viable and satisfactory defence. That tortuous process alone has been productive of delay. The only explanation given for the failure to include the supposed Burstein particulars in the earlier iterations of the defence was the explanation by Mr Perkins that the inclusion of those particulars had not been suggested prior to new counsel being briefed. That is hardly an acceptable explanation for the delay. If those particulars had been even remotely important to Nationwide and Mr Moran’s defence, it is difficult to see how existing counsel, who was and is highly regarded and experienced in defamation law, could have missed it. It should also be noted that, as the Full Court pointed out in Tamaya Resources Ltd v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu [2016] FCAFC 2; (2016) 332 ALR 199 (at [155]), the explanation required is that of the party who applied for the amendment, not merely their solicitor or counsel. The client may know of matters relevant to the explanation for delay which are not known by the lawyers. Despite, or perhaps irrespective, of what Mr Perkins said in his evidence, there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the real reason that Nationwide and Mr Moran have pressed for the inclusion of the previously struck out paragraphs of the defence, either in relation to the mitigation of damages or qualified privilege, is that if those paragraphs are included, they may then seek to re-agitate the subpoena to the STC in the hope that documents produced by the STC might allow it to re-plead a defence of justification. That inference flows from the conduct of the proceeding to date and, in particular, the zeal, if not desperation, which has been displayed by Nationwide and Mr Moran in pursuing what have been found to be impermissible inclusions in their defence. It is also supported by their late attempt to file a cross-claim against the STC, about which more will be said shortly. There could be little doubt that, if they were granted leave to file the further amended defence, in its final iteration, the next thing Nationwide and Mr Moran would have done would be to seek to have the STC subpoena reissued. That is not to say that Mr Perkins had that purpose. He was not cross-examined on his evidence. Nor could it be (or was it) suggested that counsel for Nationwide and Mr Moran had that purpose. The question, however, is what the clients’ purpose was. Neither Mr Moran, or any relevant decision-maker from Nationwide, gave evidence in support of the amendment application. That is despite the fact that Mr Rush, through his counsel, had submitted, in forceful and at times colourful terms, that Nationwide and Mr Moran’s sole purpose in pursuing the amendments was to attempt to justify a subpoena to the STC.