Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rush v Nationwide News Pty Limited (No 4) [2018] FCA 1558

File number: NSD 2179 of 2017
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 10 October 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to lead evidence at the trial – application opposed – where no reasonable or adequate explanation for delay – where evidence sought to be relied on related to a “collateral” issue – where other party would suffer prejudice if leave was granted – where questions about admissibility of evidence – application refused
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 59, 64, 101A, 102, 106, Parts 3.2, 3.7

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 37M, 37N, 47A

Cases cited:

Campaign Master (UK) Ltd v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (No. 3) (2009) 181 FCR 152

Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2015) 231 FCR 531

Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 357

Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 550

Date of hearing: 8 October 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Chrysanthou
Solicitor for the Applicant: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms L Barnett
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ashurst Australia

ORDERS

NSD 2179 of 2017
BETWEEN:

GEOFFREY ROY RUSH

Applicant

AND:

NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LIMITED

First Respondent

JONATHON MORAN

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 OCTOBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondents’ application for leave to adduce evidence from Mr Colin Moody be refused.

2.The costs of that application be costs in the cause.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)

WIGNEY J:

  1. The trial of Mr Geoffrey Rush’s defamation action against Nationwide News Pty Ltd and Mr Jonathon Moran is listed to commence on 22 October 2018.  At a case management hearing on 8 October 2018, Nationwide and Mr Moran applied for leave to lead evidence at the trial from Mr Colin Moody.  Leave to lead that evidence was required because, on 9 August 2018, orders were made requiring Nationwide and Mr Moran to serve any further outlines of evidence in support of their defence of justification by 20 August 2018.  Mr Rush was ordered to file outlines of the evidence relied on by him by 21 September 2018.  It was also ordered that the parties may not, without leave, rely on evidence not served in accordance with that timetable.  Mr Moody’s outline of evidence was not served until 4 October 2018.  

  2. Mr Rush opposed the application for leave to lead evidence from Mr Moody.  He argued that he would be prejudiced by the late service of the outline of evidence of Mr Moody.  He also submitted that Mr Moody’s evidence, as anticipated, was likely to be inadmissible and, in any event, related…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1558
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia was asked to determine whether Nationwide News Pty Ltd and Mr Moran should be allowed to present evidence from Mr Moody during the trial. The case involved a defamation claim brought by Mr Rush against Nationwide and Mr Moran, based on a publication made by Nationwide. The respondents sought leave to lead evidence from Mr Moody, despite not complying with the court's orders, which potentially prejudiced Mr Rush.

The court had to decide whether to grant the respondents' application to adduce evidence from Mr Moody, considering the delay in filing the application, the lack of a reasonable explanation for the delay, and the potential prejudice to Mr Rush if the evidence was allowed. Additionally, the court had to assess the admissibility of Mr Moody's evidence, particularly whether it related to a collateral issue and whether it would be considered credibility evidence under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

The court found that the respondents had not provided an adequate explanation for the delay in filing the application for leave to adduce evidence from Mr Moody. The evidence sought to be relied on related to a collateral issue, and allowing it would prejudice Mr Rush. Furthermore, there were questions about the admissibility of the evidence under the Evidence Act. Considering these factors, the court refused the respondents' application for leave to lead evidence from Mr Moody.

The court ordered that the respondents' application for leave to adduce evidence from Mr Colin Moody be refused and that the costs of the application be costs in the cause. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to court-imposed procedural timetables and the potential consequences of failing to do so.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondents’ application for leave to adduce evidence from Mr Colin Moody be refused.

2. The costs of that application be costs in the cause.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The question for determination is whether Nationwide and Mr Moran should be allowed to adduce evidence from Mr Moody, despite their non-compliance with the Court’s orders and the likely or potential prejudice to Mr Rush. BACKGROUND It is necessary to put this application by Nationwide and Mr Moran in context. The undeniably unsatisfactory conduct of this litigation in its early stages by Nationwide and Mr Moran is exposed in, and is manifestly apparent from, two prior judgments of the Court: Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 357 and Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 550. Following delivery of the second of those judgments on 20 April 2018, Nationwide and Mr Moran were ordered to file a second further amended defence in accordance with the first of the judgments. That defence was not to include the previously pleaded defence of justification, which had been struck out. The parties were also ordered to file and serve outlines of evidence on the issues on which they bore the onus by 15 June 2018, and to file outlines of evidence in reply by 29 June 2018. The matter was set down for hearing to commence on 3 September 2018. Further procedural orders were made on 15 June and 2 July 2018. It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to consider the terms of those orders. On 31 July 2018, however, everything changed. Nationwide and Mr Moran filed an interlocutory application seeking leave to amend their defence again, this time to include a new defence of justification. This significant development came about because the actress who was said to have made the complaint against Mr Rush that formed the basis of the impugned publication was now willing to give evidence in Nationwide and Mr Moran’s defence. The actress, Ms Eryn Norvill, had previously declined to assist or cooperate with Nationwide and Mr Moran. The evidence adduced by Nationwide and Mr Moran in support of the amendment application included an outline of the evidence, or anticipated evidence, of Ms Norvill. The evidence of the deponent of the affidavit which annexed Ms Norvill’s outline of evidence made it clear that the content or terms of Ms Norvill’s outline of evidence had been the subject of discussion between Ms Norvill’s solicitor and Nationwide and Mr Moran’s legal advisors for at least a week before the filing of the application to amend. The proposed amended defence of Nationwide and Mr Moran included particulars of the new justification defence which, not surprisingly, corresponded with the anticipated evidence of Ms Norvill. It will be necessary to say something more about Ms Norvill’s outline of evidence and the further amended defence in due course. Mr Rush initially opposed the application to amend. That was perhaps understandable given the history of the matter and the prejudice Mr Rush would undoubtedly have suffered if the amendment was permitted and as a consequence it was necessary to vacate the trial. Ultimately, however, Mr Rush indicated that he would not oppose the amendment application, so long as the commencement of the trial was able to be deferred to 22 October 2018. That date was suitable to counsel for the parties and was able to be accommodated by the Court. It was in that context that the amendment was permitted and the relevant orders concerning the service of further outlines of evidence were made. The order that the parties were not permitted to lead evidence not served in accordance with the timetable without leave was made by consent. The making of that order was no doubt an important consideration in Mr Rush’s decision not to oppose the amendment.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Rush also contended that Mr Moody’s evidence concerning Mr Armfield’s oral “note” was inadmissible. The argument in that regard was that the alleged oral “note” was not a proper particular of Nationwide and Mr Moran’s justification defence. It did not directly involve any conduct by Mr Rush. The oral “note”, so it was submitted, was at best a “collateral” issue. Perhaps more significantly, Mr Rush submitted that Mr Moody’s anticipated evidence would be inadmissible pursuant to s 102 of the Evidence Act1995 (Cth), which provides that credibility evidence about a witness is not admissible. Credibility evidence is defined in s 101A of the Evidence Act as comprising, in general terms, evidence that is relevant only because it affects the assessment of the credibility of a witness. Mr Rush submitted that Mr Moody’s evidence was relevant only to Mr Armfield’s credit. While that submission was not fully developed, the contention appeared to be that the evidence could only be relevant because it was capable of undermining Mr Armfield’s evidence that he gave no such oral “note” as alleged by Ms Norvill. The question whether Mr Moody’s evidence concerning the oral note is admissible or inadmissible is not easy to resolve. It involves consideration of not only the complex provisions of Part 3.2 of the Evidence Act concerning hearsay evidence, but also the equally complex provisions of Part 3.7 of the Evidence Act relating to credibility evidence. As has already been noted, the relevant fact in issue is not whether Mr Armfield gave the alleged oral “note”. The relevant fact in issue is whether Mr Rush touched Ms Norvill as alleged by her. The statement allegedly made by Mr Armfield at the briefing after the preview performance could only be relevant to that issue if it could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of that incident occurring. Mr Moody’s evidence of what Mr Armfield said could only be relevant in that regard if Mr Armfield’s statement was capable of being viewed as an assertion that Mr Armfield saw Mr Rush touch Ms Norvill as alleged. If it was capable of being viewed in that way, however, it would be excluded as hearsay by reason of s 59 of the Evidence Act, unless it fell within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The only relevant exception to the hearsay rule that would appear to potentially apply to the circumstances is the exception in s 64(3) of the Evidence Act, which provides as follows:(3)If the person who made the representation has been or is to be called to give evidence, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation that is given by:(a) that person; or(b)a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made. If Mr Moody’s evidence concerning the statement made by Mr Armfield fell within the exception to the hearsay rule in s 64(3) and, therefore, was relevant and admissible, it arguably would not be credibility evidence for the purposes of s 102. That is because it arguably would not be evidence that was only relevant to Mr Armfield’s credibility. If, however, it was not admissible as relevant hearsay evidence, there would appear to be some merit in Mr Rush’s submission that the evidence would be prima facie inadmissible pursuant to s 102.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.