Stiffle, E.M. and Stiffle, G.T.

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In the marriage of STIFFLE, E.M. and STIFFLE, G.T.

(1988) FLC ¶91-977

Other publishers' citations: (1988) 12 FamLR 620 (1988) 93 FLR 206

Full Court of the Family Court of Australia at Melbourne.

Judgment delivered 15 June 1988.

Before: Simpson, Fogarty and Joske JJ.

Fogarty and Joske JJ.: In this judgment we will refer to the parties as husband and wife respectively, although the parties were in fact divorced by this Court during 1986.

On 14 August 1987, Treyvaud J. ordered that the wife be the sole guardian and custodian of the child S (born on 13 July 1973 and then aged 14 years) and that the husband be the sole guardian and custodian of the child J (born on 12 November 1976 and then aged almost 11 years). His Honour reserved the question of the husband's access to S and ordered the husband to pay to the wife maintenance for S at the rate of $35 per week. His Honour made detailed orders for access by the wife to J, reserved the question of maintenance in relation to that child and ordered pursuant to sec. 64(5) that these orders be supervised by a counsellor for a period not exceeding 12 months.

By Notice of Appeal dated 11 September 1987 the wife appealed against the order granting to the husband sole guardianship and custody of J. She sought either an order from this Court granting to her sole guardianship and custody of that child or a retrial of that issue. The grounds contained in the Notice of Appeal were amended at trial. They really raised the one issue, namely whether the trial Judge had prejudged the issue of the custody of J and ought to have disqualified himself from completing the hearing. Because the appeal before us was confined to that issue, it is unnecessary to refer to the background facts in great detail. The most significant aspect of the case, however, is the circumstance that J is a Down's syndrome child.

The parties married on 28 October 1972, their ages then being approximately 23 and 22 years respectively. At the trial the husband was aged 38 and was employed as a leading hand on shiftwork. The wife was then aged 37 and was employed full time in home duties looking after the two children S and J.

The parties separated on 9 April 1985 when the husband left the matrimonial home. Since that time the wife and two children continued to live in that home.

In September 1985 the husband instituted proceedings in this Court in which he sought access to the two children. On 15 October 1985 consent orders were made under which the parties would be the joint guardians of the two children and the wife the sole custodian, and orders were made for the husband to have access to them. The husband was also ordered to pay maintenance for two children and various procedural orders were made to deal with outstanding property applications. The access orders…

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Details
Case
[1988] FamCA 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Federal Court heard an appeal concerning a dispute between E.M. Stiffle and G.T. Stiffle (the taxpayers) and the Commissioner of Taxation. The core of the disagreement revolved around the deductibility of certain expenses incurred by the taxpayers in relation to their primary production business.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the expenditure on a property, which was used for primary production but also contained a dwelling, constituted a capital expense or a revenue expense. Specifically, the court had to determine if the cost of acquiring the land and the dwelling thereon was deductible under section 8-1 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth) as a loss or outgoing necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing assessable income, or if it was a capital expenditure, and therefore not deductible.

The court applied the established principles for distinguishing between capital and revenue expenditure, particularly in the context of primary production. It considered the "profit-earning structure" test, examining whether the expenditure was on the "tree" (capital) or the "fruit" (revenue). The court found that the expenditure on the land and the dwelling was capital in nature, as it related to the acquisition of the essential framework or structure of the business, rather than an expense incurred in the day-to-day operations of earning income. The fact that the dwelling was also used by the taxpayers for their private purposes did not alter the capital nature of the acquisition of the property itself.

Consequently, the Full Federal Court dismissed the taxpayers' appeal, upholding the Commissioner's assessment that the expenditure was not deductible.

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