Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 42

File number: SAD 40 of 2019
Judges: BESANKO, FLICK AND ABRAHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 17 March 2020
Catchwords: COSTS – whether lump sum costs order should be made – lump sum costs order to be assessed by the Registrar   
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 35A, 43

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 3.01, 40.02, Item 221 to Schedule 2

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Daniels Corporation Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 936

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

In Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72

Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 146; (2017) 253 FCR 403

Ruddock v Vadarlis(No 2) [2001] FCA 1865; (2001) 115 FCR 229

Thomas v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 144

Tristar Steering and Suspension Australia Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 95; (2007) 159 FCR 274

Victoria v Sportsbet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 174

Date of hearing: Decided on the papers
Date of last submissions: 19 February 2020
Registry: South Australia
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 22
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant filed written submissions
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms B Ng filed written submissions
Solicitor for the Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons

ORDERS

SAD 40 of 2019
BETWEEN:

THOMAS PATRICK MARTIN

Appellant

AND:

NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA

Respondent

JUDGES:

BESANKO, FLICK AND ABRAHAM  JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The order for costs in favour of the respondent made in these proceedings on 18 December 2019, be awarded in a lump sum pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2.The Registrar is directed to determine the quantum of the respondent’s costs in such a manner as the Registrar deems fit including, if thought appropriate, on the papers.

3.At the conclusion of this process the Registrar is to make orders about the payment of the respondent’s costs in the sum or sums determined, to be payable within 28 days of such orders.

4.The respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for a lump sum cost order are to be paid by the applicant as part of the costs of the proceedings.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. On 18 December 2019, the Court published reasons for judgment in relation to this matter: Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia [2019] FCAFC 234 (Martin v Norton Rose).

  2. The Court ordered as follows:

    1.The application for an…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 2), the court was required to determine whether a lump sum costs order should be made in favour of the respondent, and if so, to determine the quantum of such an order. The case arose from a dispute between the parties, with the court previously awarding costs in favour of the respondent on 18 December 2019. The applicant objected to the order for costs and sought an oral hearing to challenge the quantum of a lump sum order. The court considered the principles regarding the award of costs and concluded that the matter should be determined on the papers. The court held that the principles regarding the award of costs are well established, and a successful party is entitled to an award of costs in its favour in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order.

The court further held that the issue of costs is to be determined on the papers, and the applicant’s submission in relation to the order for costs was insufficient to alter the application of ordinary principles. The court noted that the applicant’s primary concern appeared to be with the loss of ability to challenge the respondent’s evidence, but the applicant was not prejudiced in this case. The court concluded that there was no basis to vary the order that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent and that the order for costs in favour of the respondent made in these proceedings on 18 December 2019 was to be awarded in a lump sum, in an amount to be assessed by a Registrar of the Court. The court directed the Registrar to determine the quantum of the respondent’s costs in such a manner as the Registrar deems fit, including, if thought appropriate, on the papers. The court further ordered that the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for a lump sum cost order were to be paid by the applicant as part of the costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The order for costs in favour of the respondent made in these proceedings on 18 December 2019, be awarded in a lump sum pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2. The Registrar is directed to determine the quantum of the respondent’s costs in such a manner as the Registrar deems fit including, if thought appropriate, on the papers.

3. At the conclusion of this process the Registrar is to make orders about the payment of the respondent’s costs in the sum or sums determined, to be payable within 28 days of such orders.

4. The respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for a lump sum cost order are to be paid by the applicant as part of the costs of the proceedings.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Given these conclusions, the foreshadowed application for disqualification if there is to be an oral hearing does not arise. In any event, the Court notes that the only proposed basis for that application is the applicant’s dissatisfaction with the Court’s conduct of the matter and the rejection of his submissions, as reflected in the reasons for judgment. Nonetheless, considering the relevant principles as set out in Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 (Johnson v Johnson) and affirmed in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, there would have been no proper basis to the application. The test for determining whether a judge should be disqualified by reason of apprehended bias is “whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”: Johnson v Johnson at [11]. That observer is amongst other things: (1) taken to be reasonable; (2) does not make snap judgments; (3) knows commonplace things and is neither complacent or unduly sensitive or suspicious; (4) has knowledge of all the circumstances of the case; and (5) is an informed one who will have regard to the fact that a judicial officer’s training, tradition and oath or affirmation, equip the officer with the ability to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial. That a judge has made a previous decision on issues in a matter does not “mean either that [the judge] will approach the [other] issues in that case otherwise than with an impartial and unprejudiced mind in the sense in which that expression is used in the authorities or that [the judge’s] previous decisions provide an acceptable basis for inferring that there is a reasonable apprehension that [the judge] will approach the issues in this way”: In Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 352. An application based on the applicant’s disagreement with the Court’s decision or conduct on the substantive hearing of the matter, if it were to be made, is not a proper basis in this case to disqualify the Court from determining the issue of costs arising from the decision. Conclusion There is no basis to vary the order that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent. The order for costs in favour of the respondent made in these proceedings on 18 December 2019 is to be awarded in a lump sum, in an amount to be assessed by a Registrar of this Court. The making of such an order simply resolves the question left open by Order 4 of the orders made on 18 December 2019, and provides the mechanism whereby the quantum of the lump sum is to be resolved.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant only briefly addressed the issue of whether a costs order should be made. The applicant contended that the question of costs should be reserved for determination of the substantive proceedings “on the basis that if the allegations are found proven, then the conduct of the Respondents in defending these proceedings ought be considered a deliberate obstruction of the victim of their fraud from obtaining relief, and furthermore, a fraud on justice on the Court, such that my conduct of the proceedings was wholly justified in the attainment of justice” (without alteration).Consideration A preliminary issue is whether, in light of the applicant’s notice of objection, this matter should be listed for oral argument. As noted above, the notice of objection only provides as a reason for oral argument the denial of the ability to challenge the quantum of a lump sum order, if that order were made. For the reasons below, this Court will not decide the issue of quantum. The Court is satisfied that the determination of this matter would not be aided by an oral hearing. The parties have provided detailed written submissions. As will be apparent from the reasons below, the applicant’s submission in relation to the order for costs plainly is insufficient in this case to alter the application of ordinary principles. Moreover, the principle concern appears to be with the applicant’s loss of ability to challenge the respondent’s evidence, but, for the reasons below, the applicant is not prejudiced in this case. The Court notes that this approach also has the benefit of saving further costs being incurred. The issue of costs is to be determined on the papers: s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court of Australia Act). The principles regarding the award of costs are well established. Ordinarily, a successful party is entitled to an award of costs in its favour in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order: see Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) [2001] FCA 1865; (2001) 115 FCR 229 at [11] per Black CJ and French J; Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 at [67] per McHugh J, [134] per Kirby J; Victoria v Sportsbet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 174 at [6]–[7] per Emmett, Kenny and Middleton JJ. It is important to recall that normally this Court should be in a position to deal with the question of costs in its judgment, unless there is a particular reason to reserve that question for later and separate consideration: Tristar Steering and Suspension Australia Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 95; (2007) 159 FCR 274 at [26] per Buchanan J (Kiefel and Gyles JJ agreeing); Thomas v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 144 at [5] per Dowsett, Perram and Pagone JJ. In this context, as observed by Wilcox J (Moore and Lindgren JJ agreeing) in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Daniels Corporation Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 936 at [9]:… Normally, the matter of costs will be dealt with, one way or the other, at the time when judgment is delivered. This statement applies to both trials and appeals. The exception is where some specific arrangement or request is made in regard to costs. To demonstrate this is the position, it is sufficient for me to refer to what was said by a Full Court in Preston Erection Pty Limited v Speedy Gantry Hire Pty Limited [1999] FCA 122. In that case, which happened to be a patent case, a request was made to the Court, after delivery of judgment, to re-open the matter for the purpose of dealing with costs. That request was refused. In delivering reasons for refusal, the Court said (at paras 4-5):“It was open to the respondent on the hearing of the appeal to advance argument that, in the event of the appeal succeeding, the appellants should not receive all their costs of the trial. Or the respondent could have requested that, in the event of the appeal succeeding, it be given leave to put further submissions as to costs. Neither course was adopted. As we have said, a respondent is at risk of having to meet the appellant's costs of the appeal and the trial, should the appeal succeed. We do not accept that patent cases are in a special category in this respect. In the present case the appellants explicitly sought an order for the costs of the appeal and the trial. Accordingly, we do not consider it appropriate to take the exceptional course of an appeal court setting aside an order to enable a party to advance an argument which was open to it, but not advanced on the hearing of the appeal itself.”